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For the scholars of religion, discussions concerning the nature of the academic 
perspective on religion have been ever-present practically since the very beginning 
of the discipline. The acceptability and reliability of method(ologie)s, research 
practices and theories has depended on their ability to acquire knowledge in ways 
which appear academically justifiable. So it is that we can find statements about 
this even in the most regular conference reports, such as the one detailing the 
discussions of the IAHR regional conference in Harare, Zimbabwe over 25 years 
ago (Geertz 1992). Following a short overview of the noteworthy debates, he 
notes in the most casual manner: “All were in agreement though that the study of 
religion must be neutral, unbiased, non-confessional, and peaceful, but it should 
not, however, remain a purely descriptive endeavor, rather it should address the 
significant philosophical problems of modern times” (Geertz 1992: 226). The 
question not addressed, of course, is obvious – how should one actually do this? 
How should one pursue academic study of religion in such a way that maintains 
the unbiased neutrality of the scholar and the discipline, but at the same time also 
avoids pure descriptiveness and does address major philosophical-theoretical 
problems?  
This work here offers one look into this complex problem. However, the full 
treatment of such a fundamental, far-reaching issue would obviously extend far 
beyond the limitations of just one volume. Therefore, even though many different 
proposals have been made with regard to the position of the scholars and its 
conceptualization in the context of the study of religion in the past century or so, 
I will here focus on the one most fervently debated in the past few decades as far 
as the position of the scholar is concerned. Predictably, I have in mind methodo-
logical naturalism and the issue of its justifiability in the evolutionary study of 
religion as well as for the study of religion in general. The narrower focus thus 
will be on analysing methodological naturalism and arguments presented to justify 
it as the preferable position for all scholars of religion. At the same time, focusing 
solely on the epistemological justifiability of one specific conceptualization would 
not really tell a whole lot in itself. Because of that, it is vital to also take into 
account the larger context in which the debate over methodological naturalism 
takes place. Inevitably, this raises the issue of possible alternatives. After all, 
unless one is out to discredit a discipline or a research approach in general, it is 
vital to pay attention to the alternatives and their justifiability when criticising any 
of the possibilities. In this thesis I will try to balance both sides of this issue as it 
relates to the justifiability of methodological naturalism and to the relationship of 
evolutionary research and methodological naturalism. On the one side, this means 
taking a look at the larger picture and situating the debate over methodological 
naturalism within that context. As I will show, this complex matter is at the same 
time methodological and epistemological. On the other side, evaluation of metho-
dological naturalism necessitates a closer analysis of all its justifications as well 
as some likely theoretical counter-arguments to the arguments presented. All in 
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all, I will explain in detail why justifications of methodological naturalism are not 
nearly as strong as they are made to appear in the context of the study of religion 
and how methodologically, theoretically as well as evolutionarily consistent alter-
natives are entirely possible. 
However, as one has likely already noticed from the list of contents, an ana-
lysis of such a complex topic necessitates a very interdisciplinary approach. Thus 
I have pursued issues primarily dealt with in epistemology, evolutionary biology, 
evolutionary epistemology as well as in the philosophy of science, when neces-
sary for discussing one or another question in more detail. Throughout these 
discussions focus will be also on the more general issues, as relevant for the study 
of religion. In each case, I have tried to give as much background information as 
necessary for the reader to be able to follow the discussion without major obstacles, 
as one cannot expect most readers to be familiar with the specifics of the cognitive 
science of religion, evolutionary epistemology or the underdetermination thesis 
at the same time. Thus, many chapters also incorporate compact descriptions and 
analyses of the specific field or topic of research currently under focus. In this 
sense, one can also say that on the one hand a lot of research has been done on all 
the topics that I am bringing together here. However, on the other hand I could 
also say that as far as I know no one has previously worked to bring these research 
perspectives together and show their intertwined relationship in the context of the 
study of religion. That said, I will be discussing previous research on specific 
topics throughout the chapters, thus I will not present an overview of earlier 
research in this introduction, as this would merely duplicate discussions inevitably 
necessary later on anyway. 
Bringing these distinct fields of research together has necessitated a particular 
kind of a general structure for this work. Metaphorically speaking I would describe 
this as a kind of a loop, which repeatedly returns to the same place, having in the 
meantime taken a further look in some specific direction. Above all this discussion 
will be continuously returning to issues of epistemology, methodology and scienti-
ficity as these intertwine in matters related to the positioning options available for 
scholars – in particular in relation to methodological naturalism. Furthermore, I 
have tried to include as many cross-references to other chapters and sections as 
possible to point out relevant connections in between chapters.  
Such considerations have also led to the structure of the thesis as presented 
here. All in all the chapters have been grouped into three larger parts, each 
including two or three chapters. In two chapters of the first part I will lay out an 
analysing description of the current situation. Thus in the first chapter I will begin 
with a short overview of the current state of research in the behavioural and 
cognitive sciences of religion, followed by a comparative take on the concept of 
scientificity as it is understood in these research programmes as well as elsewhere 
in the study of religion. The second chapter is wholly devoted to the issue of 
method and methodology as one can find it in the study of religion. As I will 
show, this is particularly important, since issues of (epistemological) self-posi-
tioning have been understood as matters of methodology in the study of religion. 
All in all the first two chapters should function as the basis for the subsequent 
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discussions, since everything discussed in the following five chapters relate to the 
first two or evaluates matters initially described in the first two. The subsequent 
three chapters of the second part are wholly devoted to the detailed analysis of 
the philosophical (that is, mostly epistemological) arguments presented in defence 
of methodological naturalism. While the first two chapters set the stage by 
looking at most general issues and the treatment of these, following three chapters 
go deeper and deeper into very specific aspects of a number of arguments. And 
since methodological naturalism is primarily justified in relation to the 
behavioural and cognitive sciences of religion and with particular emphasis on its 
relation to the natural sciences, this is where theoretical biology, evolutionary 
epistemology and philosophy of science become immediately relevant.  
In the third part of the thesis, where I will return to the larger questions at 
stake. I will first critically evaluate concepts of scientificity and the unity of 
sciences as described in the first chapter. This is necessary for the concluding 
discussion in the seventh chapter where I will bring together issues dealt with in 
the first two and the sixth chapter with the detailed problems of epistemological 
justifiability as discussed in the middle three chapters. Such a structure is 
necessary, since human limitations necessitate a linear structure, even if it would 
be perhaps easier to present the complexity of the situation as three or four parallel 
texts, all read simultaneously. Yet, as humans are not capable of that, I have had to 
make difficult choices concerning the linear order of presentation of this complex 
matter. These parallel lines of argumentation are all necessary for the comparative 
evaluation of the scholarly self-positioning options, which will be the primary 
focus of the discussion in the seventh chapter. I intend to show how methodo-
logical naturalism is far from being as strong of an option as its advocates have 
claimed. Its competitors can claim to be at least as credible as methodological 
naturalism. Yet, I will also show why all the possible positioning choices also fall 
short in being able to claim universal applicability. All in all my goal is on the 
one hand on the evaluation of methodological naturalism. But on the other hand 
I also want to highlight the overall complexity of the situation, as there do not 
appear to be any easy solutions or any positions or arguments far stronger than 
all others.  
At this point one might ask about the method of this thesis itself. Predictably, 
the answer to this issue is a complex one. What is the method of a metatheoretical, 
a philosophical or a meta-methodological study after all? Throughout this thesis 
I will be describing my approach to the matter as one of description, discussion, 
analysis, evaluation and criticism. Yet, if method(ology) itself is the focus of the 
study – as it above all clearly is, in particular in the second and seventh chapter – 
then a description of the methodological-procedural practice as detailed as it is, 
for example, possible in experimental sciences, is likely just not possible at all. 
That said, I would say that aside analysis and discussion as common in all meta-
theoretical discussions, my aim throughout this thesis is to systematically present 
the intersection and interrelatedness of a number of issues which otherwise are 
typically dealt with separately from each other. One could thus say my approach 
is also described by deliberate intertwining of seemingly independent research 
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perspectives for the purposes of offering a more in-depth analysis of the situation 
at hand. Of course, this as well remains a relatively theoretical description when 
compared to the procedural methodologies relied on in many research approaches, 
but it would seem that offering more detailed descriptions of the method is just 
not possible in metatheoretical studies.  
Finally, I would like to also say a few words about a couple of concepts I will 
be using throughout this thesis. Although I will be using a number of other 
concepts quite a lot as well, those will be defined and explained during the dis-
cussion as they become relevant, thus here and now I want to limit myself to just 
three: study of religion, religion and cognition/cognitive. Starting with ‘study of 
religion’ as the name of the academic practice which this thesis relates to I want 
to emphasize that I will be using it as a tentative marker of the discipline or the 
field of study as such. There is clearly a difference between calling it a discipline 
or a field of study. This difference is something I will be implicitly touching on 
during my analysis as well. But since ideals of scientificity, possibilities of unity 
or fragmentation and other issues also definitely do affect ways one can think of 
the study of religion as one thing or another, all usages of the concept itself in the 
subsequent chapters function merely as provisional markings or indeed as the 
object of the discussion itself. But it is not necessary for the purposes of this thesis 
to offer a pre-set definition of the study of religion or reach some kind of a final 
conclusion about the nature of the discipline / field of study.  
Secondly, I would like to turn to the issue of ‘cognition’. While this concept 
as well has meant many different things in different research perspectives over 
the years, from strictly psychological denotations to meaning conscious, rational 
thought in some philosophical discussions of the 20th century, in the context of 
this thesis I will be relying on ‘cognition’ as it is used in the cognitive science of 
religion. As I will show in the next chapter, ‘cognition’ there basically means the 
set of (unconscious) mental processes the human mind relies on its everyday 
functionality. ‘Cognition’ thus is a general designation, which can include most 
of the psychological processes we can observe and measure as visible through 
human actions and deliberate psychological experimentation. And ‘cognitive’ 
will therefore merely function as an adjective referring to the processes and 
functionalities seen as part of the human cognition. 
Lastly, there is the matter of ‘religion’, the central concept for all study of 
religion. Here the matter is somewhat more complex. Not only is the concept used 
in noticeably different ways in different research approaches, but various critics 
have also extensively disputed its usefulness in general. However, in the context 
of this study, most of the time I will be staying outside such disputes, even though 
debates over the concept and its applicability as such would clearly have con-
sequences for the issues I focus on here as well. Still, since it is far from obvious 
what the result of these conceptual debates will or can be, I will be here prioritising 
the kind of conceptual usage which on the one hand tries to avoid the most glaring 
problems as highlighted by the constructionist critics, while still aiming to maintain 
consistency with term as it is used in the behavioural and cognitive science of 
religion. After all, basic agreement concerning conceptual tools is vital for 
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dialogue and discussion to take place at all. Without that one would have to be 
disputing the research approach in general. However, as that is not my goal here 
and since I will be primarily discussing matters related to the evolutionary study 
of religion, I will have to rely on conceptualizations at least principally compatible 
with theirs for my conclusions to be relevant and important. Furthermore, since I 
am concentrating on one aspect of the wide-reaching phenomenon typically 
designated by ‘religion’, I inevitably have to conceptualize it more precisely in 
some of its aspects than others.  
Thus, I can say that in the context of this study, Kevin Schilbrack’s proposal to 
understand religions as “composed of those social practices authorized by refe-
rence to a superempirical reality, that is, a reference to the character of the Gods, 
the will of the Supreme Being, the metaphysical nature of things, or the like” 
(Schilbrack 2013: 313) most useful. Or as he puts it even more succinctly: “In 
short, I define religion as forms of life predicated upon the reality of the 
superempirical” (Schilbrack 2013: 313). This is practically very useful, since it 
emphasizes much of what is typically thought of as part of religion, while at the 
same time also highlighting ‘superempirical’ aspects of religion, which in a way 
acquire centre stage as soon as we come to the issue of epistemological justifi-
ability. After all, without that much emphasis on the superempirical, many of the 
epistemological issues would not arise in the context of the positioning debate at 
all. Still, one should not take this as my conclusive take on how to define religion. 
Similarly, Schilbrack suggest that this definition is simply a heuristic tool that he 
hopes scholars find practically useful (Schilbrack 2013: 293). My usage of reli-
gion is analogous – since most of the methodological-epistemological debate is 
focused on those aspects of religiosity that deal with things we cannot assess 
empirically, I will be inevitably focusing on this more than other aspects of 
religiosity. But this does not mean that other aspects are not important if we 
looked at religion in general or at some other aspect in more detail. Nonetheless, 
there will also be a section in this thesis where debates over the conceptualization 
of ‘religion’ are used to exemplify larger issues and highlight one or another 
aspect pertinent for the central focus of the thesis. In those cases ‘religion’ clearly 
becomes the object of discussion in itself. All other central concepts and termino-










PART I –  






1. Scientific explanation of religiosity as  
a research paradigm and as a goal in  
the cognitive-evolutionary study of religion 
To keep this interdisciplinary thesis clearly defined and its focus steady, it is first 
of all important to clarify the actual research programmes1 I am primarily inter-
ested in throughout this thesis. Of course, I could say that the subsequent analyses 
will mainly focus on the cognitive science of religion or on the evolutionary study 
of religion in general, but terminological designations in these matters have not 
always been consistent, thus actual specification is necessary. After saying a few 
words about that and related matters concerning the focus, I will highlight the 
main characteristics and the most noteworthy shared features of the relevant 
research programmes. I will not be presenting a thorough analysis of all their 
research and relevant literature, but merely an overview of the most noteworthy 
and influential research programmes. This is necessary to be clear about the kind 
of research I have in mind in my later analyses. Also, given the focus of this 
thesis, it is especially important to see how the proponents and practitioners of 
this field of research understand the “scientificity” of their approach or “scienti-
ficity” as the idealized goal of the study of religion as such. This is particularly 
important for the subsequent analyses and discussions of epistemology and self-
positioning, since the way one understands the scientificity of one’s research or 
true scientificity as the ideal form of research has a major impact on the epistemo-
logical and positional dimensions of research. As the last topic of this chapter, I 
will draw attention to a couple of ways matters of scientificity and positioning 
interrelate to each other. 
 
 
1.1. Cognitive, behavioural and other evolutionary  
approaches to religion 
A couple of choices I have made need an explanation before I turn to the specifics 
of this field of research. First of all, there is the issue of the name of this field of 
research. After all, why use that stretched out designation visible in the title of 
this section? Could I not just call it the cognitive science of religion as many 
practitioners in the field do? This is indeed a relatively common way to deal with 
                                                                          
1  When it comes to the question of defining a ’research programme’ I largely agree with Gavin 
Flood’s definition: “A research programme I take to be a coherent theoretical and methodo-
logical orientation which has a clear formulation of its aims, theoretical underpinnings, inter-
subjective criteria of adequacy, and method; all of which occur within a wider environment 
which sanctions the process” (Flood 1999: 65). I do suspect that perhaps demanding a ‘clear 
formulation’ of its aims, theoretical underpinnings and criteria of adequacy is probably an 
overstatement in some cases – in regular daily research practice these often remain uncon-
scious and are not clearly formulated – but if taken not that strictly, Flood’s definition is 
definitely a good one. 
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this situation. Robert N. McCauley and Emma Cohen (2010), Ilkka Pyysiäinen 
(2012) and Dimitris Xygalatas (2014) among others include everything from the 
cognitive by-product theories of belief to the cognitive study of religious trans-
mission to the behavioural perspectives under this generalized heading.2 Unfor-
tunately, things are not as simple and this kind of a generalization is somewhat 
problematic. For one, some of the research programmes here certainly are not doing 
cognitive science and secondly, they specifically do not understand themselves 
as part of the cognitive science of religion. The most notable example is the 
behavioural ecology of religion (see Sosis and Bulbulia 2011), but among cogni-
tivists Justin L. Barrett (2011b) has also found it necessary to distinguish the likes 
of Richard Sosis, David Sloan Wilson, Paul Bloom and others from the cognitive 
science of religion, portraying them as “evolutionary studies of religion” (Barrett: 
2011b: 233). At the same time, phrases like “evolutionary perspectives” or about 
“evolutionary theories” have been used to designate the whole wider field in 
general, including all the subfields of the cognitive science of religion and other 
related research perspectives in addition to the behavioural models (for example 
see Boyer, Bergstrom 2008; Schloss 2009). Similarly, Sosis and Kiper (2014) 
talk about “evolutionary theories” and distinguish between two main areas of 
research under that general heading: cognitive and behavioural. It is this last 
approach that I find most useful. Although it is definitely true that all of the 
approaches included under these different headings are based on the theory of 
evolution, calling them all evolutionary is – while correct – a bit too vague and 
uninformative. Instead, I find it more useful to talk about the cognitive per-
spective and the behavioural perspective. Furthermore, there are now a couple of 
distinctively different evolutionary perspectives that try to incorporate all the 
existing sub-fields into unified perspectives. 
Therefore, as a preliminary specification we can say that the kind of research 
I have in mind here is focused on studying religion or religiosity (or aspects of 
either one) in an evolutionary framework by applying the approaches and pro-
cedural methods of evolutionary psychology, behavioural ecology or other related 
fields on available empirical data. From such a perspective religion is one of the 
more salient traits of humans as a biological species and thus the existence of 
such a trait can be and should be explained by evolutionary research. One way or 
another all these research approaches try to come up with evolutionary explana-
tions for the existence and persistence of religiosity (or, of specific aspects of it). 
The theory of evolution, therefore, serves as the basis of all research. Whether 
one studies religion by adopting a cognitive perspective, a behavioural perspective, 
a combination of both or instead relies on a more generalized evolutionist scheme 
(such as the group selection perspective for example), does not result in that big 
                                                                          
2  Or as a few critics have noted: “The “cognitive science of religion” is a ragbag term that 
covers the diverse activity of scholars from a wide range of disciplines – including anthropo-
logy, psychology, history, philosophy, and biblical studies – united, such as it is, by an 
enthusiasm for the methods and theories of cognitive and evolutionary psychology” (Jong, 
Kavanagh, Visala 2015: 246–247). 
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of a difference if one keeps in mind the big picture background they all share. I 
will return to the issue of the noteworthy and important similarities in section 
1.1.5. What I have outlined here is meant merely as a starting point – as the most 
obvious shared characteristic.  
It should be noted that although most of the research programmes and per-
spectives I will be dealing with are relatively recent – going back to the 1990s at 
the earliest – this kind of research does have predecessors from earlier eras as 
well. Cognitivists themselves actually often understand the book, “Rethinking 
religion: connecting cognition and culture” by E. Thomas Lawson and Robert N. 
McCauley (1990) as the beginning of the discipline – this becomes very apparent 
in the recent collection of articles: “Religion Explained? The Cognitive Science 
of Religion after Twenty-five Years” (Martin, Wiebe 2017). The evolutionist 
paradigm of the late 19th and early 20th century is perhaps what most might first 
recall at this point, but similarities and connections between that perspective and 
the contemporary cognitive-behavioural perspectives are very superficial and 
mostly limited to the fact that both wish to apply the theory of evolution to studying 
religion. Predecessors more significant and in many respects more similar to the 
goals of contemporary research and practices begin to appear after the Second 
World War. For example, Marvin Harris and Roy Rappaport (1968, 1979) are very 
noteworthy and influential predecessors of the behavioural ecology of religion.3 
Also, Walter Burkert had been developing his own ideas about a potential natura-
listic theory of religion for some time by the 1990s (Burkert 1972, 1998).4 At the 
same time, on the cognitivist side the idea of ‘a cognitive theory of religion’ goes 
back at least to Guthrie who published an article with that exact title in 1980 (see 
Guthrie 1980).5 Still, cognitive and ecological research programmes, as they are 
understood and practised today began in the 1990s with the works of Lawson and 
McCauley (1990), Pascal Boyer (1994) and William Irons (1996), although the 
influence of the earlier approaches is undoubtedly present in them. 
Secondly, before turning to the specifics of these research programmes, there 
is another issue that needs to be addressed. Namely – aside the evolutionary study 
of religion there is an even more extensive field of research that we could loosely 
describe as the evolutionary-cognitive study of culture. Going from Robert Boyd 
and Peter J. Richerson (1988) to Merlin Donald (1991) to Tooby and Cosmides 
(1992) to Michael Tomasello (1999a, 1999b) to Mesoudi, Whiten and Laland 
                                                                          
3  Richard Sosis in his articles also refers to Rappaport quite often. For a good overview of 
the earlier researchers in the ‘ethology of religion’ (as it is called in that article), see Wunn, 
Urban and Klein (2014). 
4  For an overview of Burkert’s ideas and criticism of it see Schüler (2014b: 16–19). 
5  But it should be noted that the possibility of even earlier cannot be ruled out. As far as I 
know, no proper history of all the attempts to apply the cognitive science to the study of religion 
has been written yet. All the ‘historical overviews’ we have thus far are written by practising 
cognitive scholars who are using the historical perspective to highlight the kinds of scholarship 
they find especially noteworthy. Thus such overviews functions at least as much as ways how 
to construct the identity of the contemporary cognitive perspective as they function as histories 
of the perspective (about this matter also see Gilhus 2014 and Peedu 2018).  
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(2006) and to Joseph Henrich (2016), this wider field of research is certainly rather 
closely related to the study of religion. Many scholars of religion have clearly relied 
on such research in their own conclusions about religion. However, quite obviously 
including all of these research programmes here is simply not realistic. The extent 
and scope of this thesis would become almost gigantic. Because of that I am going 
to concentrate solely on theories that explicitly deal with religion and attempt to 
present generalized theoretical conclusions about religion. In addition, I think 
there are reasons to believe that much of the methodological and epistemological 
problems that I am dealing with here are specific to the evolutionary theories of 
religion and do not have as much relevance for the more general field of the evo-
lutionary study of human culture as such. The reasons for this should become 
apparent in the subsequent chapters where I highlight the particular epistemo-
logical questions that dominate the evolutionary research on religion.  
In addition, I am also leaving out all neurological studies of religiosity.6 Partly 
the reason for this is also the need to limit the scope of this thesis and give it a 
better focus, but to a significant extent this also has to do with the way these 
research approaches are practised. Even though the research programmes I will 
be discussing clearly have much in common with the neurological perspectives, 
in actual research practice right now these research programmes largely function 
and have functioned independently from each other. This is somewhat unfor-
tunate and more cooperation would certainly benefit both sides, but as it is right 
now, this is not the case. Additionally, because of this it is possible to leave those 
research programmes aside here as my main interest is in the evolutionarily 
cognitive and behavioural treatments of religiosity. Therefore, the subsequent 
overview of the field is only meant as a compact introduction to the particular 
types of research I have in mind, what they have focused on and what kind of 
research questions scholars have asked. I have analysed the current state of 
research in the cognitive and ecological research perspectives more extensively 
elsewhere (Peedu 2015b).  
 
 
1.1.1. The cognitive science of religion 
The main goal of the cognitive science of religion can be described as an attempt 
to determine how the evolutionarily developed cognitive basis of our minds 
determines or guides the ways humans can think, behave and function religiously 
(Sørensen 2005: 467–475). Religiosity of course is also manifested through 
elaborate rituals, behavioural norms and many other aspects of human life, but in 
the end it is always the human being who does these things or thinks about these 
things and clearly this is determined by the cognitive processes of the human 
mind. This does not mean that neurological studies are considered irrelevant and 
such “even more fundamental” levels of human cognition are being ignored, but 
rather that the proponents of the cognitive science of religion do not consider it 
                                                                          
6  For an overview of earlier research in the neuroscience of religion see Schjoedt (2009). 
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possible to study cultural aspects and forms of human life without taking into 
account their cognitive underpinnings. Also, it is important to note that in this 
research programme religion is understood as too complex a research object to 
offer a unified, general explanation of it. Instead, it is often emphasized that we 
should study religion in a ‘piecemeal fashion’ and therefore focus on smaller units 
and aspects of the complex general phenomenon of religion (for example see 
Sørensen 2005: 467–470; Barrett 2007a: 768–769). However, despite this most 
of the research in the cognitive science of religion has still focused on belief, its 
underlying cognitive mechanisms and forms. This is very well exemplified by the 
work of Pascal Boyer who sets out to present a general explanatory framework 
of religion (Boyer 2001) and yet the primary question he asks is “what is the 
origin of religious ideas?” (Boyer 2001: 4). 
To answer that question research in the cognitive science of religion has 
worked towards identifying all the different mechanisms and structural elements 
of human cognition that shape and sculpture what we would call cultural forms 
and aspects of our lives. The first of these noteworthy elements of our minds is 
the ‘theory of mind’ (TOM). ‘Theory of mind’ is understood as a set of cognitive 
mechanisms that guide us to rely on the presumption that on a more general level 
all humans think, feel and comprehend the world the same way we do. With the 
help of the theory of mind we can deduce the inner cognitive states of other people 
based on visibly available information (gestures, facial expressions, talk, etc.) 
(Boyer 2002: 68–92; Bering 2002: 3–24; Bulbulia, Slingerland 2012: 575–577). 
Aside the theory of mind, hyperactive agency detection device (HADD) has also 
been emphasized a lot in the cognitive science of religion. HADD is understood 
as the innate tendency of all humans to assume the actions of agency behind things 
we witness and experience in the world – things do not just happen, behind events 
there are agents whose actions led to the outcomes we have witnessed (Barrett 
2000: 31–32; Barrett 2007a: 773; Barrett, Lanman 2008: 115–116). This agency 
detection device is called hyperactive, since it does not just help humans under-
stand how other living beings have caused one or another thing to happen, but 
because it has a tendency to cause many false positives as well. It is therefore some-
what too willing to suggest that the deliberate acts of an agent are behind some-
thing. Evolutionarily it is argued that this has been beneficial to us in a kind of a 
“better safe than sorry” form, since only those who assumed agency behind signs 
of threat and fled survived. The third central concept for the cognitive perspective 
is the idea of counterintuitiveness (Boyer, Ramble 2001; Pyysiäinen, Lindeman, 
Honkela 2003). Basically, this relies on the idea that all human beings have a 
shared set of innate and intuitive beliefs about the world – other people think like 
us, living beings are different from inanimate objects, different kinds of objects 
behave differently and so on. This means that if a phenomenon is considered as 
an example of some general type (person, artefact, animal, inanimate object, etc.), 
then it is assumed to have a certain set of characteristics. However, religious ideas 
break these intuitive rules and combine attributes which should not be simultaneous 
characteristics of the same phenomenon. For example ‘ghosts’ are supposedly 
persons with minds, yet they have no visible, biological body. Because of this 
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religious ideas are ‘minimally counterintuitive’. They do not break every intuitive 
assumption we have about the world, but they do go in conflict with a few of them. 
Religion persists because experimental research has shown that people remember 
counterintuitive ideas better than regular, intuitive ideas.  
In the cognitive science of religion the existence of this kind of universal 
cognitive mechanisms is central for showing how humans have a strong pre-
disposed tendency to think about religious matters in rather specific ways. This 
is also why widespread folk beliefs and the theological doctrines of the community 
typically differ so significantly: theological concepts are too complex and diffi-
cult to learn and understand and then use, whenever relevant. Instead, humans 
prefer to save their ‘cognitive energy’ and apply simpler concepts when it becomes 
necessary (Barrett 1998, 1999). If so, then this also makes it possible to explain 
why people do not cognitively rely on ‘theologically authoritative’ beliefs and it 
also helps us explain why concepts of supernatural beings are so remarkably 
similar all over the world (Barrett 2002: 95–96).  
What I have described here thus far is commonly called the standard model of 
the cognitive science of religion (Powell, Clarke 2012; Jensen 2009). Due to the 
aspects described here, researchers in the cognitive perspective have generally 
concluded that religiosity is not a direct result of evolutionary selection, but 
merely the by-product of a number of cognitive adaptations. Religiosity therefore 
has persisted not because it is beneficial for humans, but because it relies on a 
number of beneficial cognitive functions (Boyer 2003). However, the cognitive 
science of religion is not limited to the standard model. In addition there are also 
a couple of alternative research programmes that are also clearly cognitive in their 
aims, research questions and methods.  
The earliest among them is the only significant attempt to focus on ritual from 
a cognitive perspective (Lawson, McCauley 1990, 2002). Lawson and McCauley 
understand religious ritual as a formal system for information communication. 
The difference between religious rituals and all other rituals has to do with super-
natural agents – they play a very important role in the religious rituals, but do not 
have any relevance in other rituals. For Lawson and McCauley linguistics is the 
ideal science in humanities as there scholars have managed to find the “funda-
mental building blocks” of language. Lawson and McCauley want to do the same 
for religion. However, subsequent empirical research in this research programme 
has been rather scarce, and has mostly been limited to subsequent treatments of 
by Lawson and McCauley themselves (for example, see McCauley, Lawson 2002). 
The second distinct sub-perspective in the cognitive science of religion is the 
theory of supernatural punishment (Johnson, Bering 2009; Bering, Johnson 2005). 
Here the main focus has been on how connecting some event or a thing with 
supernatural agents affects the thinking and behaviour of people. The theory is 
understood as an answer to the evolutionary problem of cooperation – according to 
this theory belief in supernatural beings spread because fear of supernatural 
punishment motivated people to adhere to the shared rules of the community. 
Different experimental researches have shown that people behave more generously 
when they believe that they are being watched as well as in situations that people 
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understand to be specifically religious (Bateson, Nettle, Roberts 2006; Shariff, 
Norenzayan 2007). 
The last one to bring up right now, but perhaps also the most significant out 
of these three sub-perspectives in the cognitive science of religion is the theory 
proposed by Harvey Whitehouse. He has argued that we can cognitively distinguish 
between different modes of religiosity (Whitehouse 2002, 2004a, 2004b). 
Whitehouse notes that only such religious beliefs and rituals can form that people 
can memorize and remember. Secondly, people must be motivated to pass down 
these rituals and beliefs. In other words, similarly to Boyer, Barrett and others, 
Whitehouse is also interested in how human religiosity is shaped by our pre-
existing cognitive structures. Beliefs and practices must be congruous with our 
mental setup to persist and spread. Whitehouse considers it possible to distinguish 
between two main modes of religiosity – the doctrinal mode and the imagistic 
mode. In the doctrinal mode (Whitehouse 2002: 296–303) gurus, prophets and 
other leading figures play an important role and doctrinal concepts are frequently 
and regularly emphasized and repeated. Also, this mode has a tendency towards 
a higher level of institutionalization. Since ideas are memorized independently 
from when and where they were acquired, semantic memory is very important. 
In the imagistic mode (Whitehouse 2002: 303–308), on the other hand, religious 
practises are irregular, but highly stimulating and memorable. Episodic memory 
is very important and spontaneous exegetical discourse common – this also gives 
room for a plurality of views and beliefs. At the same time, institutionalization is 
not as important or extensive and communities rather rely on episodic memory – 
it is not possible to be a member of a community if others do not recognize you 
as such. Because of these aspects such movements do not spread over large popu-
lations. 
While the cognitive science of religion is certainly not limited to the research 
programmes that I have briefly described here, the ones I have brought up can be 
safely called the most influential and widespread. But aside the cognitive perspec-
tive there are also other notable research perspectives, perhaps the most signi-
ficant among them is the behavioural ecology of religion. 
 
 
1.1.2. The behavioural ecology of religion 
The ecological research programmes definitely are closely related to the cognitive 
perspective and in many ways these two are competing research paradigms that 
attempt to present explanations of the same phenomenon.7 The ecological perspec-
tive is quite noticeably different from the cognitive one, asking different kinds of 
questions and emphasizing different causal aspects in their explanatory schemes. 
                                                                          
7  This is perhaps especially apparent in how they depict, analyse and criticize each other’s 
research programmes. See for example Pyysiäinen and Hauser (2010) and Boyer and 
Bergstrom (2008: 116–117) from the cognitive side and Sosis (2009) and Purzycki, Haque 
and Sosis (2014) from the side of behavioural ecology. 
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While the cognitive approach is above all interested in mental processes, the eco-
logical perspective considers human behaviour the decisive aspect, because in the 
end our behavioural choices determine our ability to survive, multiply and per-
severe (Sosis, Bulbulia 2011). 
The best-known and most thoroughly developed research programme in the 
ecological perspective is definitely that of the costly signalling theory of religion. 
This theory is based on the idea of costly signals as proposed in the 1970s (Zahavi 
1975; Zahavi, Zahavi 1997). Basically, it suggests that evolutionary selection can 
occasionally favour traits that do not give the organism a direct benefit (and 
instead are rather costly). However, at the same time these traits make it possible 
to communicate trustworthy information about some inner quality of the organism 
that is otherwise unobservable. This kind of traits can be corporeal (such as the 
peacock’s tail) as well as behavioural. Various human activities and characteristics 
have been discussed and analysed as potential examples of this evolutionary 
mechanism (Hawkes, Bliege Bird 2002; Bliege Bird, Smith 2005; Smith, Bliege 
Bird, Bird 2003). 
The costly signalling theory of religion builds on this, point out the apparent 
uselessness of religion from a strictly evolutionary perspective – time and energy 
spent on performing elaborate religious rituals could be used far more productively. 
Yet, given the universality of religiosity, evolutionary selection has clearly 
favoured the perseverance of religiosity (Sosis 2006; Bulbulia 2004a). For the 
proponents of this theory the solution to this contradiction comes from the problem 
of cooperation – religiosity is here understood as the solution to the problem of 
trustworthiness in large groups.8 Religious behaviours, norms and signs indicate 
devotion and commitment (Sosis 2003, 2005, 2006; Sosis, Kress, Boster 2007). 
Religious behaviours involve complicated and time-consuming rituals and 
activities, observing the rules and norms of the community, a willingness to adhere 
to the same limitations as others in the community and the usage of the correct 
signs and badges to indicate devotion to one specific community and no other. At 
the same time, faking all of this for the benefits one gains from community 
membership, while actually not sincerely valuing all of these becomes very 
complicated and tiring, if one wants to avoid “being caught” by other members 
of the community. Thus, religiosity can appear costly, but it turns out to be the 
most reliable way of acquiring trustworthy information about the commitments 
of fellow community members.  
Lots of empirical research has been done to test and analyse the costly signalling 
hypothesis concerning religion, from the inner dynamics of Israeli kibbutzes 
(Ruffle, Sosis 2007) to Candomblé in Brazil (Soler 2012) to ovaa practices in 
                                                                          
8  It should be noted that the proponents of the cognitive science of religion are not entirely 
denying the central relevance of this problem. For example Boyer repeatedly argues in his 
famous book that the two things people need most are (1) information about the surrounding 
social environment, and (2) the cooperation of other people (Boyer 2001: 120, 150–155). 
However, contrarily to the behavioural ecology for Boyer this does not mean that we ought to 




Tyva (Purzycki 2010; Purzycki, Arakchaa 2013). While research in the cognitive 
science of religion focuses on psychological experiments, research here is rather 
a combination of anthropological fieldwork, behavioural experiments and inter-
viewing (based on a detailed set of questions), but there have been a few historical 
analyses as well (such as Sosis 2000 for example). In newer research behavioural 
ecologists have also turned their attention to the question, how to integrate the 
cognitive science of religion with the ecological perspective? How to make them 
more compatible? They have proposed that religiosity ought to be understood as 
an extended phenotype that has adaptively coupled ritual and belief (Purzycki, 
Sosis 2013). 
In addition to the costly signalling theory, David Sloan Wilson’s proposal that 
religion can be understood as a group-level adaptation9 is also best regarded as 
part of the behavioural ecology approach.10 In a way quite similar to Sosis, Wilson 
looks for the ecological reasons behind human behaviour. His theory is based on 
the idea that evolutionary selection can take place on multiple different “levels” 
simultaneously – gene, individual as well as group can be the unit of selection 
depending on the situation (Sober, Wilson 2000; Wilson 2002: 5–35). As Wilson 
notes, the human body can be treated at the same time as one unit or as a community 
of cooperating cells (Wilson 2002: 17–20; 33–34). Another similarity between 
Sosis and Wilson is the shared interest in asking for the explanation why religiosity 
has persisted despite its sub-optimality from an evolutionary perspective. Wilson 
argues that religiosity is a group level adaptation for humans, making it possible 
for cooperative societies to function and endure (Wilson 2002: 163–168; Wilson 
2005: 391–396). In this he is obviously very similar to Sosis, but also visibly 
relies a lot on the ideas of Durkheim (see especially Wilson 2002: 52–56, 156 etc.). 
It should be noted that he presents this as a case of cultural evolution – he does 
not claim selection for this kind of cooperation has established itself on the 
genetic level. To presents his ideas in more detail, he analyses two particular cases 
based on available historical and anthropological data: early Calvinism (Wilson 
2002: 86–124) and the water temple system in Bali (Wilson 2002: 126–133). 
Lastly, it has be emphasized that Wilson’s theory has not been tested through 
actual empirical research as much as the costly signalling theory or as the different 
research perspectives of the cognitive science of religion. While Wilson himself 
has of course relied on existing empirical material in his analyses, these have not 
been gathered specifically to test his hypotheses. 
                                                                          
9  The issue of group-level selection certainly has been rather controversial among evolutionary 
theorists and many do not find it acceptable in evolutionary studies at all (see Shanahan 2004: 
37–62). However, David Sloan Wilson and Elliott Sober have been among those leading 
evolutionary theorists who have argued that group selection does have a justifiable place in 
evolutionary theory (for example, see Wilson, Sober 1994), inspiring subsequent studies (for 
example, see Price 2008). Because of this, the topic of group selection has become part of the 
evolutionary study of religion as well (for example see Davis 2015). 
10  It should be noted, though, that as far as I know, Wilson himself has never explicitly said so. 
Also, the following general description is based on the analysis of Wilson’s theory that I 
presented in my Master’s thesis (Peedu 2011: 18–24). 
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1.1.3. The biocultural perspective 
In recent years the so-called biocultural perspective (Geertz 2010a), sometimes 
also called ‘the Aarhus school’ has firmly established itself as the third note-
worthy research perspective besides the cognitive and the ecological. Contrarily 
to the previous two research perspectives scholars here have not concentrated as 
much on presenting a complete causal theory of religion as they have focused on 
working out a wider research perspective that would enable one to study the bio-
logical and cultural evolution of humans in a combined way, without resorting to 
dualist presumptions. This attempt to overcome the dualism of culture and cog-
nition is the most important difference between the biocultural perspective and 
the cognitivist mainstream. Whereas from the cognitive science perspective 
cultural forms are understood as growing out of the cognitive formations that 
have already fully developed by time cultural forms appear, the biocultural per-
spective emphasizes studying the ways how culture and cognition are thoroughly 
intertwined and thus how culture can bring about changes in cognition as well. 
Evolutionarily they have pointed out that since the required skills, mechanisms 
and capacities for religiosity were present already in homo erectus 400 000 to 
600 000 years ago it makes little sense to differentiate between the biological and 
cultural level as strictly as scholars in the cognitive science have done thus far 
(Geertz 2014a).  
Therefore, whereas the cognitivist model can be described as an “inside-out” 
perspective, attempting to explain religion on the basis of innate cognitive capa-
cities and mechanisms, the biocultural model is rather an “outside-in” perspective, 
drawing attention to the way how culture has modelled us into cognitively 
functioning humans (Jensen 2011a: 37–39; Donald 2000; Wilson 2010). As Jeppe 
Sinding Jensen notes, “”Culture” is a convenient designation for all that which is 
a precondition for us to acquire in order to become “normal” persons in our social 
environment” (Jensen 2011a: 44), therefore “culture is, consequently, not just a 
product of cognition but just as much the precondition for cognition in an onto-
genetic perspective” (Jensen 2011a: 44). This is very similar to the evolutionary 
perspective of Tomasello (1999a, 1999b) who has extensively argued that culture 
is a biological adaptation that enables people to acquire new skills and infor-
mation quicker and by spending less energy on it than otherwise necessary.  
This kind of an approach has caused researchers in the biocultural perspective 
to draw a lot of attention to embodiment, to the role of narratives and to the 
importance of practices for the human mind (Geertz 2010b; Jensen 2011a; Geertz 
2011). Also, in addition to these aspects Jeppe Sinding Jensen has focused on the 
phenomenon of ‘normative cognition’ (Jensen 2010, 2013). As Jensen notes, 
collective norms have thoroughly (re)shaped and moulded these aspects of human 
cognition. In other words, “normative cognition transforms human individuals 
into social persons. At the individual level normative cognition functions in the 
internalization of social norms and cultural models and at group level in the 
construction of society” (Jensen 2010: 323). Quite a lot of empirical research has 
been done here as well, focusing especially on the ways how culture and cognition 
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are very closely related in religious practices such as fire-walking and otherwise. 
For example, see Konvalinka et al (2011), Fischer et al (2014), Bulbulia et al 
(2013) and Xygalatas et al (2013). 
 
 
1.1.4. Attempts at synthesis and other recent developments 
The full diversity of different approaches in the evolutionary study of religion is 
definitely not limited to what I have described thus far and there have been some 
rather intriguing developments in addition to the ones I have described in the 
previous sections. Here I am going to highlight a few of them. 
First of all, the most significant among them is Ara Norenzayan’s attempt to 
present a unified synthesis of the evolution of religion (Norenzayan 2013). In it 
he relies on cognitive as well as ecological research programmes to bind them 
together into a general theory about the evolution of religion. In this sense his 
theory is neither cognitive nor behavioural, but an attempt to present the two as 
complementary, rather than as competitors. In short, based on research in the 
cognitive science of religion he argues that the capability for religiosity appeared 
as a by-product of ordinary cognitive functions (as described in section 1.1.2.). 
This made it possible for religious intuitions to appear and become the basis for 
beliefs and practices. This in turn became an important part in a rapid cultural 
evolution that resulted in the appearance of societies that believe in ‘Big Gods’. 
Those who feared big gods more were more cooperative, using displays of 
devotion and hard-to-fake signals (as discussed in section 1.1.3.) to communicate 
their faithfulness to the rest of the society. This way belief in big, moralizing gods 
became a very important causal factor for the appearance of big societies where 
a certain amount of anonymity is always inevitable. Having said all of this, 
Norenzayan emphasizes repeatedly that the latter part of his argument is one of 
cultural evolution and not biological-genetic evolution (Norenzayan 2013: 29–
32, 94–105, etc.) and that he does not think that Big Gods were the sole reason 
for the appearance of large-scale societies. Norenzayan’s theory has been 
criticized quite a lot and in some instances rather heavily (for a good overview 
see Skjoldli 2015), but it has been widely praised for being the first attempt to 
genuinely bring together all the different lines of research in this field (Barrett, 
Greenway 2014; Kiper, Meyer 2015, etc.).  
Norenzayan’s is definitely not the only attempt at a synthesis. More recent 
work by the behavioural ecologists also puts a lot of emphasis on accommodating 
cognitivist research within their ecological research programme (see especially 
Sosis, Kiper 2014; Purzycki, Sosis 2013). They highlight the overwhelming con-
centration on beliefs and mechanisms of belief formation in the cognitive 
approaches, but emphasize the need to study all aspects of the larger, complex 
phenomenon of religion (Sosis, Kiper 2014: 262–263) as cognitive mechanisms – 
for example, HADD, the theory of mind and attractiveness of counterintuitive 
ideas – are not enough to explain the appearance of the phenomenon as a whole 
(Sosis, Kiper 2014: 263–265). Therefore, they understand ‘religious phenotype’ 
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as “the coupling of ritual behavior and supernatural agency attribution” (Purzycki, 
Sosis 2013: 105). 
Aside these attempts at a synthesis there is also a growing trend in the cognitive 
science of religion to look for ways how to overcome the premise of the com-
putational model that most of the cognitive programme has thus far relied on (Day 
2004a; N. Barrett 2010; Schüler 2014b: 20–28). As they point out, the problem 
with such a model is that it concentrates too much on the inner functions of a 
mind, ignoring the actual natural, social and cultural environment where that 
mind is living (Day 2004a: 105–109, N. Barrett 2010: 589–599). Therefore, these 
approaches look at various ways how to incorporate alternative research methods 
and perspectives into the cognitive science of religion. For example, Matthew 
Day emphasizes the difference between online and off-line cognition (Day 2004a: 
109–117) and talks about the importance of examining religious systems through 
the lens of cultural and social embeddedness (Day 2004b), while Nathaniel 
Barrett proposes a kind of an interactive model to overcome the problems of the 
computational model (N. Barrett 2010: 599–603). In a way their concerns are 
rather similar to those of Lluis Oviedo who in a recent article criticizes the 
cognitive perspective for focusing overly too much on the unconscious and 
intuitive aspects of religiosity and therefore fails to sufficiently account for the 
conscious thinking processes that also play an important role in religiosity 
(Oviedo 2015: 31–33). To overcome that he argues in favour of adapting the dual 
processes model that has received quite a lot of attention elsewhere in psycho-
logy, but has not been applied to religiosity yet in any notable way (Oviedo 2015: 
33–42). He looks for ways how this could be done to study the full extent of 
religious cognition (Oviedo 2015: 42–51). Lastly, some researchers have begun 
to study how – or to what extent – one could possibly apply these cognitive research 
perspectives on specific historical developments (Martin 2006, 2012, 2013; 
Martin, Sørensen 2014), but this kind of attempts are riddled with many problems 
(Gervais, Henrich 2010; Kundt 2007; Whitehouse 2005).11 
 
 
1.1.5. Most significant commonalities  
In my preliminary outline of the field of studies in the beginning of this chapter I 
pointed to the ‘evolutionary framework’ as the most noteworthy characteristic of 
all these difference research perspectives. And this is certainly the most signi-
ficant commonality among them – whether they attempt to do that through the 
cognitive science or through the behavioural ecology or through other approaches, 
the underlying framework is always derived from the evolutionary theory and all 
explanatory elaborations are specified in such a way that they would fit with that 
background. Perhaps most explicitly this is exemplified by the programmatic 
article of Joseph Bulbulia and Edward Slingerland who wish to understand 
                                                                          
11  At the time of writing this I have not (yet) had access to Turner et al (2017), but it deserves 
to be noted as one more recent, important study on this topic. 
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religious studies as a life science and thus emphasize the theory of evolution as 
the starting point of all such research (Bulbulia, Slingerland 2012: 567–572). This 
is something that should be very apparent in my review of all the relevant research 
programmes – in one way or another they are looking for explanations of religiosity 
that point to an evolutionary cause of the phenomenon they are trying to explain. 
This is of particular importance also because in these research programmes 
the evolutionary theory is understood as the basis that makes it possible to reach 
a complete explanation of religiosity. As Edward Slingerland notes, many have 
“turned to the cognitive science of religion precisely because, conceived very 
much in the Victorian spirit of unified inquiry, it promises to bring our field back 
to an older model of integrated inquiry” (Slingerland 2014: 122). Slingerland 
understands this as a consilience of all the sciences where study of culture and 
religion is no longer methodologically and conceptually separate from the natural 
sciences, but instead they are all integrated into one complete scientific approach 
(Slingerland 2008a; Slingerland 2014; Slingerland, Bulbulia 2011: 307–312; 
Pyysiäinen 2004: 2–27). Similarly, in a response to his critics, Ara Norenzayan 
understands the evolutionary perspective as “a vehicle that consolidates different 
perspectives and facts, so that the contours of the whole elephant begin to emerge, 
bringing about some measure of consilience” (Norenzayan 2015: 63). Elsewhere, 
Xygalatas has discussed this in terms of integrating research perspectives con-
cerning religion into one synthetic approach (Xygalatas 2010) – as he understands 
this, it would not be replacing any of the traditional humanities perspectives, but 
rather would complement them with theories, methods and technologies from the 
natural sciences. Such an integration of different sciences is essential to make a 
complete explanation possible. Complete explanation itself, however, is centrally 
important because study of religion should not limit itself to studies of localised 
cultural and historical contexts – it has to be capable of addressing universal 
questions and proposing causal explanations (for example see Sørensen 2005; 
Lawson, McCauley 1990: 14–44, Wiebe 2012, etc.).12 Such an objective therefore 
includes distinguishing the main structures of religion – primary causes, basic 
mechanisms, common characteristics and main forms – to give a full picture of 
religiosity that can account for and explain the existence and main traits of any 
specific religious phenomenon.13 Because of this William Grassie has compared 
                                                                          
12  The most straightforward declaration comes from Sørensen: “in order to understand 
religion we need explanatory theories. Even if attempting to understand religious phenomena 
in their localised cultural and historical context is a laudable endeavour, this cannot be the sole 
purpose of the scientific study of religion. We need to address the universal questions raised 
above and this cannot be done by means of localised interpretations” (Sørensen 2005: 467), 
noting also that “explanatory theories not only enable us to address such general questions but 
also to fertilise local interpretations by supplying a more solid terminological grounding and 
presenting new potential lines of enquiry” (Sørensen 2005: 467). 
13  This does not mean, though, that all of them are advocating a strongly reductionist model 
where a complete explanation means finding the evolutionary causes of everything and 
declaring cultural, historical or other such explanations insufficient. McCauley (2014) for 
example opposes such an approach, instead arguing in favour of explanatory pluralism. 
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this field of research to linguistics, arguing that “the new sciences of religion 
should be understood as akin to the field of linguistics, seeking the “grammatical” 
structures of religion in general based on a careful analysis of particular religions” 
(Grassie 2008: 139). Partly this also explains why the outlined research pro-
grammes often treat each other as competitors – most of them either already 
understand their current proposal as a complete explanation or at least as the 
fundamental basis for an eventual complete theory. 
Another significant feature all these theories share has to do with how they 
conceptualize their object of research – religion. This is significant, since it is the 
primary difference between these research programmes and all the approaches 
that focus on culture. They focus on a research object that is understood rather 
differently from the ways how researchers of cultural evolution deal with their 
object of research. But, as is well known by now, “religion” is not a designation 
of a natural kind or an empirical object that one can just find wherever one goes; 
rather it is a second-order, generic concept, a tool (Western) scholars have used 
among other general concepts, such as culture, politics, etc. (Fitzgerald 1997, 
Smith 1998, Schilbrack 2010). However, adopting one set of conceptual tools over 
others can have far-reaching influence on the empirical research itself – it can 
shape the questions one asks and thus include some aspects or exclude other 
aspects. In this sense conceptualizing their research as cognitive science of religion 
or as behavioural ecology of religion has definitely had a significant influence on 
their research programmes and has also caused them to clearly distinguish them-
selves from all the evolutionary research of culture.14 Thus, Jonathan Z. Smith’s 
remark about the role of the concept of religion in the study of religion is very 
accurate: “it is a second-order, generic concept that plays the same role in 
establishing a disciplinary horizon that a concept such as “language” plays for 
linguistics or “culture” plays in anthropology” (Smith 1998: 281–282). Because 
of this one could understand one’s approach as studying religion in a “piecemeal 
fashion” (Barrett 2007a: 768–769, Barrett 2011b: 231–232). Or, one could 
emphasize the need to “fracture” religion as it is merely a shorthand designation 
and an impure research subject (Jensen 2016). Or, one could point to the existence 
of recurring features (myth, ritual, taboo, symbols, etc.) – all related to each other 
in comparable ways in different parts of the world – and therefore emphasize the 
need for a complex explanation that takes into account this “whole”, instead of 
just treating all its aspects separately (Sosis 2009: 319–322). Regardless of which 
approach one prefers, the differences between them are minor compared to the 
overwhelming similarities. In the end they all wish to explain and study the 
phenomenon of religion (or religiosity or religiousness) in an evolutionary frame-
work. This is the disciplinary horizon of the cognitive, behavioural and other 
evolutionary approaches towards religiosity. It makes it possible to differentiate 
                                                                          
14  I have elaborated on this further elsewhere, arguing (based on examples from empirical 
research) that categorisations are our primary tools of research and “categorising one’s object 
of study is the primary methodological act in the human sciences” (Peedu 2016: 120). 
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oneself from approaches that focus on “culture” or “society”, but it also highlights 
the existence of competing explanatory paradigms. 
Lastly and I would argue that most significantly all of these evolutionary 
approaches towards religiosity share a remarkably similar understanding of 
scientificity. Furthermore, they consider this particularly important for their 
research. This deliberate emphasis on the scientificity of their research is very 
significant for the wider scope of this thesis. Therefore, I am going to devote a 
separate section to the analysis of their understanding of scientificity. Before I 
turn to that it should be noted that obviously every single one of these commo-
nalities is not present in every single research programme or theoretical hypo-




1.2. Concepts and ideals of science and scientificity  
in the study of religion 
Although contemporary evolutionary scholars’ defence of a scientific approach 
towards religiosity has certainly been very visible, it is far from the first time that 
scholars of religion have found it important to emphasize the scientificity of their 
research. In this one can go back at least as far as Max Müller (1882), but the 
debate over the meaning of the scientificity of the study of religion has always 
been present in one form or another. To highlight this I am first going to look at 
how scientificity and ‘scientific study of religion’ have been understood by 
scholars who are advocating a cognitive or more generally an evolutionary 
approach towards religiosity. For comparison I am then going to highlight some 
of the ways scientificity of the study of religion was understood in the 20th century 
before these new approaches appeared. All of this is relevant for the wider 
question of ‘positioning the scholar’. Any kind of a scholarly (self-)positioning 
always includes an understanding of scientificity – how is one’s scholarship 




1.2.1. “Science”, “scientific” and scientificity  
in the recent evolutionary research programme 
This understanding of the scientificity of their research includes several distin-
guishable themes and ideas that reappear in multiple different places. First of all, 
the true ideal of scientific research here is predictably based on the natural 
sciences. True scientific research is about presenting hypotheses and testing those 
hypotheses empirically (which primarily and preferably means experimental 
research), thus in the end arriving at conclusive evidence, enabling scientific 
progress (Slingerland, Bulbulia 2011: 308–312; Wiebe 2012: 181–189, but from 
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earlier times also see Wiebe 1975). Strictly humanistic (philological, anthropo-
logical, hermeneutical) approaches towards religiosity are understood as 
unsuccessful and unscientific, lacking in interdisciplinarity, in capabilities of 
implementing the scientific method and in willingness to cooperate with other 
scholars (Slingerland 2014: 121–122; Bulbulia, Wilson, Sibley 2014; Martin, 
Wiebe 2013: 478). Furthermore, postmodernist and constructionist trends in the 
religious studies are considered dead ends that have nothing to offer and have not 
shown ability to bring about scientific progress (Slingerland 2014: 122; Wiebe 
1997, especially 167–168, 172–174). Thus, it has been argued that religious 
studies have been too isolated, have been limited to the confines of the humanities 
and because of that have a bad reputation (Xygalatas 2010).  
Evolutionary perspectives and particularly the cognitive science of religion at 
the same time are portrayed as ways how to establish a genuinely scientific study 
of religion or as ways how to “science up” religious studies in general (Barrett 
2011b: 229; Xygalatas 2010; Bulbulia 2013a; McCorkle 2008). This they under-
stand as a vertical integration of the religious studies to the natural sciences where 
humanities adapt themselves to the conceptual and methodological understandings 
and practices of the natural sciences or as a synthesis of different sciences. 
Effectively this means that evolutionary psychology, behavioural ecology and 
other related sciences are seen as primary and fields like history, comparative 
religion and anthropology are considered valuable only insofar as they are 
capable of establishing a connection to these primary sciences (Slingerland 2008a, 
2014; Pyysiäinen 2004: 2–27; Xygalatas 2010; Taves 2010).15 In any case, ideally 
a higher level of consilience should be established (Slingerland 2014, Noren-
zayan 2015). All of this I already pointed out in the previous section as this is 
essential to arrive at the desired complete explanation. Complete causal expla-
nations are here understood as central to the scientific enterprise.16 Several 
scholars have emphasized the necessity of adopting methodological naturalism 
for this vertically integrated consilience to be possible (Slingerland, Bulbulia 
2011; McCorkle, Xygalatas 2014; Bulbulia 2007: 621–623; Bulbulia, Slingerland 
2012: 567–569; Wiebe 2012: 173–174).17 These “scientifications” of the study of 
religion are all necessary to turn study of religion into an academic discipline that 
is analogous to other academic disciplines and therefore properly scientific. 
Religion should not be regarded as anything special, rather it is just one 
                                                                          
15  A noteworthy exception here is Harvey Whitehouse (2004b: 332–334) who disagrees with 
kind of insistence on modifying the theoretical agendas of anthropology, history and com-
parative religion to those of evolutionary psychology, arguing instead that historical and 
ethnographic research is valuable in itself as well. 
16  However, see also chapter 6 where I return to this issue of completeness and analyse the 
feasibility of integrating all the different approaches into one coherent complete picture. 
17  For the larger question of ‘positioning the scholar’ this is of particular interest in general 
(and not just in relation to their understandings of scientificity), thus I am going to return to 
this concept in a lot more depth later on. For now it is just important to keep in mind that this 
is idea is central to how scholars in the evolutionary perspectives understand how they are 
treating their research objects and what kind of issues one ought to study or avoid.  
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phenomenon among other comparable phenomena and it can be studied in the 
same way. Explaining it does not require special tools or theories or methods 
(Martin 2000; Jensen 2011a: 32). Furthermore, study of religion should be solely 
interested in acquiring knowledge about religion and should not be involved in 
social advocacy, nor should it focus on reflection and values and the scholar of 
religion should definitely not function as a public intellectual or as a spiritual 
teacher (Wiebe 2006; Martin, Wiebe 2012b). 
However, they have not just limited their elaborations on truly scientific study 
of religion to specific theoretical and methodological requirements. Rather, they 
have also put a lot of effort on a kind of a historical argument – placing their 
preferred form of religious studies in the wider context of the history of the 
discipline and emphasizing its importance in that context. In general, modern 
evolutionary approaches are portrayed as a way scholarship has returned to the 
“to the desires set by Max Müller, Edward Tylor and Émile Durkheim (as well as 
other contemporaries)” (McCorkle, Xygalatas 2012: 153).18 Martin and Wiebe 
also argue in a similar fashion – cognitive science of religion is a return to the 
true ideals of the founders of the discipline (Martin, Wiebe 2012a: 589–590; 
Martin, Pyysiäinen 2014). Much of the scholarship from the time period between 
the ‘founding fathers’ and the newly established evolutionary approaches is at 
best regarded as somewhat relevant – they “have a role to play in a comparative 
and scientific academic study of religion” (McCorkle, Xygalatas 2012: 153) – or 
at worst is considered a misleading path, a failure of nerve (Wiebe 1984) and a 
kind of a crypto-theology (Martin 2008: 95; McCorkle 2008: 12–13). The works 
of Otto, van der Leeuw, Smart and Eliade are seen as not properly scientific, but 
faith-imbued, whereas the original founding fathers of the “Religionswissen-
schaft” tradition were propagating properly scientific ideals (Martin, Wiebe 
2012c: 69; Martin 2012). Similarly, the likes of Clifford Geertz are found lacking, 
as they are supposedly only interested in (thick) descriptions and symbolic inter-
pretations, but not in genuine explanatory theories of religion (Lawson, McCauley 
1990). Thus, modern evolutionary approaches are depicted as a tool and as a 
method for a proper integration humanities and natural sciences, making it 
possible to reach causal, explanatory theories of religion in general, but at the 
                                                                          
18  The list of “approved” early scholars somewhat varies depending on the author. Müller, 
Tiele and Durkheim are certainly always included. Martin (2008: 95) also speaks approvingly 
of Jane Harrison. McCorkle and Xygalatas also speak positively of Frazer, Weber, James and 
Freud (McCorkle, Xygalatas 2012: 149). Also the “Mental Culture” collection of articles – 
which classic theorist is included and which is not – is rather enlightening in this regard 
(Xygalatas, McCorkle 2012). However, it is largely following the same list of authors whom 
I have already mentioned here. Some have gone even further back in the history though. 
Robert N. McCauley, for example, argues that David Hume “is probably the best known intel-
lectual ancestor of recent cognitive and evolutionary approaches to religion” (McCauley 2016: 
462). Elsewhere Michael Ruse also argues that Hume’s ‘The Natural History of Religion’ is 
the foundational text of naturalistic study of religion, highlighting Hume’s influence of Darwin 
and other later scholars (Ruse 2014: 39–41), insisting that “any account of the evolutionary 
origins of religious belief starts with David Hume” (Ruse 2014: 39). 
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same time, they are also portrayed as a return to the ideals of the founding fathers 
of the religious studies discipline itself!  
In conclusion one can say that the propagators of this ‘new scientificity’ 
understand their programme as not just a way how to integrate knowledge and 
methods from the evolutionary psychology and biology into the study of religion, 
but as a way how to, ideally, transform the whole discipline of religious studies 
itself. Therefore, it is also conceived of as a way to turn religious studies into ‘a 
proper scientific discipline’; everything that has come before is suspect and 
valuable only insofar as it meets the criteria of this new scientificity. It should be 
kept in mind though, that not everybody in the field has explicitly expressed all 
of the abovementioned ideas and certainly some ‘ideologists’ have been more 
active in spreading these ideas. Still, the fact that except for a few specific 
individuals19 and their arguments concerning some details of the overall picture, 
other researchers in the field have not found it necessary to dispute these claims. 
This indicates that even if people do not completely agree with them, they do not 
find such views particularly problematic either. Having analysed their views it is 
now useful to turn to the earlier, ‘Religionswissenschaft’-based ideas about the 
scientific character of the study of religion. These earlier understandings of the 
scholarly character of the discipline also deserves a brief look to better understand 
the debate about scientificity and to place it in a wider context. 
 
 
1.2.2. In comparison: scientificity of research in earlier scholarship 
Even though representatives and advocates of this evolutionary-psychological 
study of religion like to depict themselves as ‘heralds and practitioners of true 
scientificity’, discussions about the scientific character of the discipline actually 
have a long history, going back much farther than one would suspect from their 
writings.  
Elaborations on what it means for a study of religion to be scientific are 
already very much present in the writings of Max Müller (1882, 1895: xii–xxxiii) 
and have persisted ever since. Even the title, ‘scientific study of religion’, has 
already been in regular use at least since the late 1940s when the Society for the 
Scientific Study of Religion was founded (followed by founding of the Journal 
for the Scientific Study of Religion in 1961) by more empirically-experimentally 
minded psychologists and sociologists than most of the researchers of religion 
back then (Wildman, Sosis, McNamara 2012: 102–103).20 At the same time, there 
                                                                          
19  See my notes about Whitehouse (2004b) and McCauley (2014) above. 
20  I will not be analysing the conceptual developments of that subfield of the study of religion 
much further here as I am not attempting a complete historical analysis of all conceptions of 
‘scientificity’ throughout the history of the scholarship in this thesis. Also, concentrating on 
the ‘Religionswissenschaft’-centred tradition instead is a lot more illuminating because this is 
the tradition advocates of the new scientificity are harshly criticising and in many ways 
opposing (see especially Martin, Wiebe 2012c: 69–70). Even a superficial look into the 
discussions relevant in that subfield reveals that much of the discussion there is rather similar, 
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is a long and influential tradition of scientificity centred on the concept of 
‘Religionswissenschaft’ (sometimes translated into English as ‘science of 
religion’ as well, but mostly the form ‘history of religions’ has prevailed, inaccurate 
as it may be). Rather interestingly and in a remarkably similar way (to the con-
temporary conceptions), here insistence on the fundamentally empirical nature of 
the scholarship is similarly at the centre of the conception itself. This is very much 
present in the writings of Joachim Wach (1988 [1924]: 81–100) almost a century 
ago as he emphasizes the need to distinguish between empirical study of religion 
and philosophical discussions about religion, but also continues to be a central 
topic later on. For example, Reinhard Pummer (1972: 93–99) insists on empirical 
research as the foundation of any kind of research, objecting to all interpretations 
of religious matters which do not rely on empirical sources.21 Even more recently 
Wouter Hanegraaff (1995: 99–108) has emphasized empirical research, opposing 
both the (for him) essentializing tendencies of the Eliadean tradition and the 
reductionist approach as propagated by Robert Segal. By now one should have 
noticed a certain pattern here: emphasis on empirical research regularly functions 
as an argumentative tool to criticize those with a different understanding of the 
empirical character of their research. After all, in this new insistence on empirical 
research and proper scientificity, it is exactly the likes of Wach, Pummer and 
Hanegraaff who are criticized for lacking proper scientific character and being 
too isolated to humanist interests and research perspectives. The difference 
between this earlier understanding and the newer understanding therefore does 
not that much have to do with matters of empirical research or the lack of it, but 
rather is concerned with determining what kind of research counts as properly 
empirical research and what kind of research does not count as such.  
Another important aspect of this new insistence on scientificity is its emphasis 
on the need to study religion in the same way as all other aspects of human life 
are studied. However, even a quick look at earlier research reveals that this very 
same insistence is also present there. For example, in an article published more 
than 60 years ago E. O. James argues that the study of religion is “a science of 
religion in which the available material is recognized to be capable of investi-
gation in a noticeably similar way as the data of any other aspect of human 
culture, irrespective of the truth or falsity of particular beliefs and practices” 
(James 1954: 92). This he places at the very centre of his treatment of the 
scientific study of religion, emphasizing it as one of the key differences between 
                                                                          
also emphasizing balance, objectivity and accuracy of understanding, interpreting and 
explaining and therefore talking about the reliability and trustworthiness of social scientific 
knowledge (compared to that advocated and developed through other means). For one such 
depiction of the social scientific study of religion and knowledge derived through such study, 
see Barker (1995). 
21  And in the context of his era ‘empirical research’ in ‘Religionswissenschaft’ of course 
primarily meant the historical-philological approach to religion. ‘Empirical documents’ above 
all meant any kind of textual documents, but secondarily also archaeological and other histori-
cal artefacts. Concerning this, see also Rudolph (1981). 
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theological and scientific approaches towards religiosity.22 The same theme 
persists in the more recent literature on this topic as well – religion ought to be 
studied the same way as any other human characteristic or phenomenon, there is 
nothing special about religiosity (e.g. Stausberg, Engler 2011b: 4; Dubuisson 
2016: 26; etc.). There are good reasons to suspect, though, that “studied the same 
way” has often meant quite different things in different argumentations and 
discussions. The same way compared to what? – is perhaps the central question 
here. The answer to this question to an extent guides the criteria of scientificity 
of any field of study or discipline. This is also closely accompanied by the strong 
insistence that study of religion ought to be focused solely on acquiring knowledge 
about religion – spiritual matters or practical applications of this knowledge are 
not part of the discipline itself (Pummer 1972: 116; Lease 2000). Furthermore, 
complaints about the lack of interdisciplinarity and repeated calls for the 
integration of different methodologies have persisted for decades as well 
(Pummer 1972: 118–121; Pye 1982; Kippenberg 1984, etc.). The need for proper 
explanatory theories of religion is also emphasized in earlier elaborations on the 
scientificity of the discipline.23  
As one has probably noticed, there is little to no difference between arguments 
presented by advocates of this new scientificity and arguments presented by 
earlier scholars, even though one would think from reading ideologists of the new 
                                                                          
22  It should be noted though, that in case of James there is perhaps some substance to the 
later criticisms that he is not actually sticking to his initial claims and is being somewhat 
crypto-theological. After all, in the very same article he criticizes Durkheim for studying 
religion as a social phenomenon, instead arguing that it is rather directed towards Ultimate 
Reality (James 1954: 96–98) and later on also argues that “Religion is essentially a human 
reaction to the ultimate facts and meaning of life, and constitutes a living reality for those who 
accept its premises and presuppositions. To regard it merely as a branch of anthropology or 
sociology, and still less of psychology, would be to fail to recognize its true significance as a 
human discipline” (James 1954: 104). One can of course argue that given the time period when 
he was writing this, James also had to defend the very existence of the study of religion as an 
academic discipline to gain institutional support for it, but that can hardly account for the 
whole of it. 
However, also it should be noted that this kind of insistence of has been part of the Religions-
wissenschaft-tradition for a long time (if not always). For example, even 25 years earlier 
Joachim Wach argued very similarly: “In any case, there can be no doubt that in studying 
foreign religions the history of religions must proceed in a manner that is analogous to the 
other humanistic studies. The history of religions cannot simply be equated with these studies” 
(Wach 1988: 160). But, he also immediately followed this up with the insistence that religious 
expression follows its own laws, thus it needs to be based on “categories specifically suited to 
the subject that it studies” (Wach 1988: 161). Furthermore, he also insists that religious expe-
rience relates to the absolute, is beyond description and all expressions of it are in the end 
inadequate (Wach 1988: 160–161).  
23  For example, Pummer explicitly complains about the lack of proper theoretical inferences, 
saying: “Neither historical positivism nor speculative philosophy of religious history can be 
the methodical principles of Relgionswissenschaft. What is needed are explanatory theories 




scientificity that there is a major difference. But, this does not mean that there are 
no differences. The actual differences have to do with how central concepts are 
understood – substantial differences are not really about the arguments them-
selves. Old arguments have been given a new content, one could say. For the 
advocates of the new scientificity cooperation between different humanities’ 
disciplines no longer counts as proper interdisciplinarity. For them integration 
with natural sciences is necessary for a properly interdisciplinary study. The 
situation is similar regarding the issue of “have to be studied the same way” – the 
phrase now appears to mean thorough application of life sciences. Nothing can 
be studied properly in separation from the life sciences, explanatory theories are 
not possible in a form that does not go beyond humanities and social sciences. 
Scientificity, therefore, is not inherently present in the humanities, no matter how 
thoroughly and carefully one applies their methodologies, scientificity of research 
only exists in the humanities only insofar as it adopts the methodological, con-
ceptual and theoretical ideals of the natural sciences.24 
As the last comparison from earlier scholarship we can look at the detailed 
analysis of the ‘scientific study of religion’ by Ninian Smart. He has devoted 
many of his writings to this (e.g. Smart 1973, 1978), but perhaps the clearest and 
most succinct explanation can be found in Smart (1973: 158–159). There he 
formulates a six-part criterion of the scientific study of religion: (1) it is not 
determined by a position within the field – that is, it begins neither from a theo-
logical nor from an atheistic standpoint, (2) it does look for theories, but it does 
not begin by building theories into phenomenological descriptions, it adopts 
methodological neutralism in descriptive matters, (3) descriptions begin from the 
position of the participants and attempt to delineate the way things appear from 
their point of view, (4) it is scientific in the sense of having an analogy to the 
experimental method – the use of cross-cultural comparisons, (5) it makes use of 
such methods as may be available in the disciplines that are connected to the study 
of religion, (6) it incorporates dynamic and static typologies, which attempt to 
illuminate and explain religious phenomena, but always stays in touch with the 
particularities of historical traditions.  
Now, it should be quite apparent that in some aspects this is rather similar to 
the currently prevalent concepts of scientificity, yet in others it is fundamentally 
different. Its focus is on empirical material and it values the integration of dif-
ferent methods and methodologies, yet at the same time it emphasizes methodo-
logical neutralism (or ‘methodological agnosticism’ as Smart elsewhere describes 
this – I will come back to this in the next chapter) whereas propagators of the new 
scientificity insist on methodological naturalism. It also argues in favour of an 
analogy between the use of experimental method and cross-cultural comparisons 
whereas none of the advocates of the new scientificity would take this analogy 
                                                                          
24  Again, it should be noted that there are exceptions to this. For example Wildman, Sosis 
and McNamara (2012: 101) concede that the discipline of history is among the more 




seriously. In a sense it could be said that whereas earlier Religionswissenschaft-
centred tradition was seeking something that all sciences shared and thus tried to 
base its proper scientific character on that or tried to look for methodological 
analogies to the methods of the natural sciences, this new scientificity comes with 
a deliberately hierarchical conception of sciences where physics and chemistry 
are the ideal sciences and everything else is truly scientific only insofar as they 
are capable of adopting the same methods, theoretical bases and conceptual tools 
as these ‘true’ sciences.25 This has made a few critics note that in such a case it 
would appear that it is impossible for humanities disciplines to be scientific 
(Taves 2012; N. Barrett 2010: 585–586). 
Particularly notable here is the fundamental difference between insisting on 
the sole acceptability of methodological naturalism compared to valuing metho-
dological neutralism/agnosticism as a way how to avoid adopting a specific view 
(and thus fundamentally ruling out methodological naturalism).26 This is some-
thing I will be returning to in several of the following chapters, thus I will not 
expand upon it further right now. 
 
 
1.2.3. Scientificity and the difference of scientific study and theology 
Rather interestingly one noteworthy aspect of the discourse on scientificity is that 
it continues (often, if not in fact most of the time) to serve as a way to demarcate 
study of religion from (Christian) theology. This was central to the earlier 
discourse on the scientific character of research and this is something that has 
continued to be a major part of the scientificity discourse right now too. 
For example Smart (1973: 8–17) agrees that the scientific study of religion is 
polymethodic, pluralist and lacks clear borders, thus his clarification remains 
relatively vague. But, with one exception – other things may be vague, but 
                                                                          
25  To an extent this is possibly also a case of ‘lost in translation’. ‘Wissenschaft’ in German 
and ‘science’ in English do not quite mean the same time. Humanities are easily part of the 
‘Wissenschaften’ in German, yet in the Anglophone world humanities most certainly are not 
part of the sciences. Still, it should be obvious from the discussion in this chapter that this 
definitely cannot explain the whole debate. As noted, many in the English-speaking world 
have also talked about a scientific study of religion (for example I highlighted the writings of 
Ninian Smart) without the need to regard natural sciences as genuine sciences and humanities 
as inevitably lacking in that regard. However, with that said, it is certainly true that issues of 
translation probably do also play a role here – even Joachim Wach’s reluctance to translate 
‘Religionswissenschaft’ into ‘science of religion’ or anything like that, instead choosing 
‘History of Religions’, noted a certain tension that has always existed in the English-speaking 
academic study of religion. 
26  I very much suspect that if Ninian Smart was alive today he would describe methodo-
logical naturalism as “determined by a position within the field”, comparable to theology and 
fundamentally different from the methodological neutralism that he considers “not determined 
by a position within the field” (Smart 1973: 158). 
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scientific study of religion is fundamentally different from any kind of theology.27 
Elsewhere this took the form of insisting on the one and only “religionswissen-
schaftliche method” (Schimmel 1960: 236) as the essence of the scientific 
approach and arguing against any possibility of cultural or regional variation in 
the study of religion (Werblowsky 1960, see also Oxtoby 1968 and Wiebe 1981: 
48–58 concerning this discussion issue). This is all described very accurately by 
Donald Wiebe as he notes in one of his earlier writings:  
 
“The ‘science of religion’ is, then, a label intended primarily, it seems, to 
designate that attitude on the part of certain scholars to treat religion, 
insofar as that is possible, free of (theological) bias or prejudice (prae + 
judicium: a judgment that has been passed before the issue has been 
subjected to test or trial). It suggests then that the foundations of the study 
of religion must be intellectual rather than practical or, as Smart puts it, 
they must be concerned with the truth about religion and not the truth of 
religion” (Wiebe 1978: 10, italics in the original).  
 
The noteworthy difference here is that while earlier scholars (as just exemplified) 
used the label to emphasize one specific distinction, these newer scholars are 
convinced that the programme of scientificity they are offering actually does live 
up to the name and is thus genuinely scientific. For them adopting methodological 
naturalism is absolutely necessary, because that is seen as the foundation of all 
biological sciences. Therefore, for compatibility, cooperation and integration it is 
vital for scholars of religion to adopt methodological naturalism in the same way 
(Bulbulia, Slingerland 2012: 602; Martin, Wiebe 2013: 482; Bulbulia 2013b: 
224–225). However, curiously enough this as well is understood as a way how to 
clearly distinguish study of religion from any kind of theological agenda which 
is found to be still present implicitly and explicitly (for example see Wiebe 1984, 
1986; Martin 2008: 95, 2012; Martin, Wiebe 2012c: 69). Thus, discourse about 
the characteristics of a genuinely scientific study of religion continues to function 
as a way to demarcate study of religion from theology. 
As a few scholars have noted this has brought about a situation where scienti-
ficity continues to be used simply as a rhetorical device for blanket criticisms of 
earlier scholarship:  
 
“When the conceptual adequacy of “religion” as an analytical category is 
scrutinized, there are no comparative investigations of the nature and 
function of scientific categories. When reductive “scientific” explanations 
of religion are espoused, there is little consideration of the debates on 
reductive methodology within the sciences. Without actual investigation 
into scientific practices, science as a standard for the study of religion is 
used as little more than a disciplining rod” (Cho, Squier 2008: 422).  
                                                                          
27  He writes: “Doing theology, in the proper sense, is articulating a faith. … But in the study 
of religion itself, theology is part of the phenomenon to be understood. … The historian of 
architecture need not be an architect. Likewise, a person articulating or defining a given faith 
is part of the ongoing process of that tradition” (Smart 1973: 6–7). 
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This they relate to the larger discussion concerning the relationship of theology 
and science and point out that implicitly this talk of scientificity is a variation of 
that (Cho, Squier 2008: 434–443). Therefore, although new evolutionary 
approaches have certainly adopted many of the theoretical premises and proce-
dural methods of the natural sciences, talk about the scientificity of their research 
also serves other significant purposes. They are not just trying to advocate in 
favour of widespread acceptance and integration of methods and perspectives 
thus far relatively unused, they are also advocating a specific way how scholars 
should approach their research topic and how they should treat and think of their 
research topic. Therefore, this is not just as matter of scientificity, this is also a 
question of methodology – something I will look into in the next chapter.  
 
 
1.2.4. A few additional critical notes about  
this new understanding of scientificity 
However, before concluding this chapter I would like to point out two more things 
that stand out about this new concept of scientificity. First of all, as I noted earlier, 
for many advocates of this new scientificity humanistic approaches towards 
religiosity are not considered properly scientific and knowledge derived through 
such means is considered incapable of bringing forth a scientific progress in 
religious studies (any kind of hermeneutical practice is often particularly 
suspicious).28 Yet, at the same time researchers in the cognitive science of religion 
and in the behavioural ecology to a large extent rely on the results of such “herme-
neutical” scholars! There is no shortage of examples for this. Most explicitly one 
can see this in Wilson (2005) who openly declares his reliance on the Encyclopedia 
of Religion (edited by Mircea Eliade). Elsewhere one can also see this in Dominic 
D. P. Johnson (2005) who relies on ethnographically collected data and tries to test 
an evolutionary hypothesis based on that. In any case, these are merely the most 
explicit examples. This is not limited to just a few specific research perspectives or 
methods. Without hermeneutical research experimental scholars (whether 
cognitively or behaviourally inclined) would not know what they are studying. We 
would have very limited knowledge about other cultural contexts in general.  
This conflict in their views has been brilliantly highlighted by Hubert Seiwert 
in his remark about the reliance on earlier hermeneutical research by the cognitive 
science of religion researchers (2012: 28–33), especially when he argues that:  
 
“whether human beings maintain … a belief cannot be discovered by 
methods of the natural sciences without relying on hermeneutics. We have 
to understand the meaning of what people say, write or express in some 
other way, and we have to assume they have intentions. Without under-
standing meanings and intentions, there is no way of discerning religious 
behaviour. We cannot know if depositing flowers in front of an inscribed 
                                                                          
28  Detailed descriptions of these views and all the relevant references can be found at the 
beginning of section 1.2.1. 
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stone is somehow related to beliefs in supernatural agents or not, when we 
ignore meanings and purposes. Only after we have identified religious 
behaviour hermeneutically can we start trying to explain it by natural 
causes” (Seiwert 2012: 32).  
 
Therefore, as many others have pointed out in various other debates and discus-
sions, hermeneutical research is the fundamental basis for all other subsequent 
research questions, topics and perspectives (Long 1978; Kippenberg 1984; Joy 
2000a; etc.). Thus, as depicted and defended right now, the ideal of the new 
scientificity carries in its centre a contradiction – it wants to be more scientific 
than all earlier research concerning religion, yet at the same time it heavily relies 
on earlier scholarship practices and data in its research. If I were to use their 
conceptual logic, I could say that they are basing their research on unscientifically 
acquired knowledge and in many cases one could show how distinctions derived 
from earlier scholarship are determining the results of their research.29 If they 
want to continue with this kind of a concept of scientificity they have to overcome 
this contradiction somehow or modify their concept so that it no longer results in 
such a contradiction. 
The second issue I want to briefly touch upon here is their depiction of history. 
As noted earlier30 there is a widespread understanding among evolutionary and 
cognitive scholars that even though the founding fathers of the discipline (Müller, 
Tiele, but often also Durkheim is emphasized) advocated a genuinely scientific 
discipline, later scholars in the religious studies did not value the same kind of 
research practices and thus diverged from this path of proper scientificity. It 
should be noted that this kind of a depiction of the history of the discipline is not 
limited to the advocates of this new, ideal scientificity. As one will notice from 
my earlier description of it, Wiebe was talking about it already long before the 
cognitive science of religion came along. But also, similar views can be found 
elsewhere as well. For example, Cristiano Grottanelli and Bruce Lincoln (1998) 
also applaud the likes of Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Malinowski (Grottanelli, 
Lincoln 1998: 311–316) and consider the subsequent trends in the ‘comparative 
religion’ or ‘Religionswissenschaft’ a downfall both institutionally and theoreti-
cally (Grottanelli, Lincoln 1998: 316–320). 
Yet, there is a major problem with such a portrayal of historical development: 
actual historical research does not agree with it. As Arie L. Molendjik (2005) 
repeatedly emphasizes, scholars in the end of the 19th century understood discipli-
nary borders rather differently from our contemporary conceptions and the first 
professorships of religious studies were not really founded to establish a genuinely 
scientific study of religion. Nor were Tiele or Müller really advocating the kind 
of views these modern ideologists of scientificity claim.31 Instead this portrayal 
of historical developments appears to play the role of identity development – it 
                                                                          
29  For one such example, see Peedu 2016. 
30  See the end of section 1.2.1. 
31  For more about views and ideas of these ‘founding fathers’ see also Kippenberg (1997), 
Sharpe (2003: 20–96), Kitagawa, Strong (1985), Masuzawa (2003), etc. 
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helps to distinguish valuable historical scholars whom one should pay attention 
to from those whom one should avoid and thus it establishes a shared canon and 
a shared list of values (Gilhus 2014; Peedu 2018). Specifying a certain narrow 
kind of ‘scientificity’ as the central ideal and practical goal of all research, 
establishing a shared understanding of history and scholarship and putting in 
place an understanding about how a researcher should relate to his/her object of 
research all function as ways how to pre-establish the kind position and attitude 
a true scholar of religion ought to have.32 This in turn is very much related to the 
question of methodology that I will turn to in the next chapter. 
 
 
1.3. Conclusion & looking ahead 
I have tried to show in this chapter how on the one hand these new cognitive and 
ecological research programmes are working towards studying religion as a 
universal phenomenon, striving towards generalizing explanatory theories. The 
application of cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, behavioural ecology 
and other related discipline here all serve the purpose of determining the funda-
mental underlying basis of religiosity. And in this sense their usage of ‘scientific’ 
is nothing particularly noteworthy. Or as one commentator has noted:  
 
“Biological, cognitive and neurological schemes compete – and sometimes 
collaborate – to provide various scientific models to “explain religion.” 
“Scientific” basically means here that they build from empirical evidence 
and apply the most fitting theoretical frame, or the one with the most 
heuristic power with which to account for the available data” (Oviedo 
2013: 460).  
 
In this sense their usage of ‘scientific’ appears almost trivial – of course scientific 
research approaches its object in such a way. On the other hand, as I show in the 
second half of this chapter, their usage and understanding of the concept is rarely 
just about such practices. Rather, they see it as much more than that. It functions 
as an identity marker, as means how to distinguish oneself from anything even 
potentially theological and as a way of establishing an epistemological position. 
It is this latter that I will be returning to in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
Next, however, issues of method(ology) need to be looked at since matters of 
scientificity and epistemology are always related to how one understands 
method(ology). 
 
                                                                          
32  Stuckrad takes this even further as he notes that he is “struck by the religious connotations 
that regularly underlie these narratives. In many cases, scholars who were trained in theology 
decades ago, present their ‘turn’ to cognitive study of religion in words that resemble conversion 
stories, marking a completely new (scholarly) identity. In their role as adepts of a new cult 
they have the tendency to preach the gospel and to distinguish clearly between in-group and 
out-group” (Stuckrad 2012: 55). 
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2. Method(ology) in the study of religion 
The second issue in need of clarification before moving on to specifically epistemo-
logical questions in the subsequent chapters is method(ology). Discussions and 
treatments of method and methodology are inherently complicated in the study 
of religion. A proper, systematic and reproducible method(ology) is typically 
seen as the very foundation of all kinds of scholarly and scientific research. Thus 
if one aims to make sense of the self-understanding and research practices of a 
discipline, one needs to have a clear picture of the ways method and methodology 
as such are understood in that discipline or field. Yet, as I will shortly show, there 
is no shared understanding of method as such, nor does any method have a 
particularly privileged position. Method appears to be the essential requirement 
to attain and maintain scientific status and quality of research, yet discussion of 
method itself is witness to notable diversity. Meanwhile many (Stausberg, Engler 
2011b: 14, Lambek 2014: 146–148, Jensen 2011b, etc.) emphasize the close 
interrelatedness of method and theory, of the interdependence of data and theory 
and thus the close relations of method and epistemology, yet oftentimes these 
topics are still treated separately. Here I intend to give an overview of the 
method(olog)ical debate of the study of religion and show the extent to which 
these self-proclaimed discussions of method actually have little to do with 
method in any strict procedural or clearly definable way, but rather deal with 
larger matters such as research approaches, the scientific status of the discipline 
and the position of the scholar. It is especially the latter which I find particularly 
relevant for the subsequent discussion, but to understand the wider methodo-
logical context of this matter of positioning it is important to take a closer look at 




2.1. Diversity of ‘method’ and ‘methodology’ 
Michael Stausberg and Steven Engler begin their introduction to the Routledge 
Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion (Stausberg, Engler 
2011a) by noting:  
 
“It is generally agreed that methods, together with theories, concepts and 
categories, are foundational for modern science: knowledge accepted as 
‘scientific’ must be based on empirical materials (data) gathered by using 
methods that are accepted as ‘scientific’, and their analysis must proceed 
following rules based on ‘scientific’ methods by engaging concepts and 
theories accepted by the respective academic community” (Stausberg, 
Engler 2011b: 3).  
 
Similarly, Michael Pye considers methodological order and integration as 
absolutely vital characteristics of a scientific discipline, insisting that a scientific 
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discipline is “a methodically ordered approach to the study of a field” (Pye 1999: 
189), later stressing the necessity of the methodological integration of different 
specific methods in the study of religion (Pye 1999: 195–200). Insistence on a 
proper method has always carried a certain emphasis in the study of religion, thus 
Stausberg and Engler, and Pye echo a sentiment with a long history. This goes 
back at least to Max Müller as he found it essential to declare over a century ago 
that comparison and classification are the fundamental practices of scientific 
research: “all higher knowledge is acquired by comparison and rests on com-
parison. If it is said that the character of scientific research in our age is pre-
eminently comparative, this really means that our researches are now based on 
the widest evidence that can be obtained, on the broadest inductions that can be 
grasped by the human mind” (Müller 1882: 9) and also that “all real science rests 
on classification and only in case we cannot succeed in classifying the various 
dialects of faith, shall we have to confess that a science of religion is really an 
impossibility” (Müller 1882: 68). Method therefore functions as a kind of a 
structuring mechanism, specifying rules and procedures that enable scholars to 
carry out research in comparable ways and also evaluate others’ research and its 
reliability and trustworthiness.  
What I find particularly noteworthy here is that although clearly defined and 
organized method has always been the ideal in the study of religion, the actual 
discussion on method(s) and methodology has been very diverse and compli-
cated, with anything as specific as ‘factor analysis’ (Boyd 2011) to as general as 
‘religio-historical’ (Bleeker 1971) being treated and analysed as ‘method’ in the 
study of religion. Much of the discussion on method has thus revolved around the 
question whether there is a method specific to the study of religion? In recent 
times it has been common to indicate that there is no method unique, particularly 
special or specifically essential to the study of religion33 (Rudolph 1981: 102; 
Stausberg, Engler 2011b: 4; Jensen 2011a: 32; McCauley 2014: 13–15; Dubuisson 
2016: 26; Gothóni, Sakaranaho 2016: 10).34 From an historical perspective, this 
is obviously a response to earlier attempts to define what is unique about the 
method of the study of religion or which method is particularly fundamental or 
essential to the study of religion. For example, Joachim Wach understood 
                                                                          
33  However, there are exceptions to this. While these researchers take it for granted and find 
nothing negative about the lack of a unique method, not all agree. For example William 
McCorkle (2008) considers this lack of “a methodology of its own” (McCorkle 2008: 16) 
highly problematic and indeed one of the major flaws of the religious studies (McCorkle 2008: 
16–17) and the primary reason for why much of the intellectual community supposedly does 
not take religious studies seriously. Furthermore, he believes that religious studies “in prin-
ciple could be unified by a method” (McCorkle 2008: 16) and argues that cognitive sciences 
could provide such a methodology (although he agrees that definitional problems would still 
plague the field regardless). 
34  It should be noted, though that while Kurt Rudolph agrees with the statement that there is 
no method unique or particularly special to the study of religion, he also insists that philo-
logical-historical method is essential to the study of religion, even if inadequate by itself and 
ideally supplemented by the ‘comparative-systematic method’ (Rudolph 1979: 98–100, 109). 
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hermeneutics as such an essential method without which understanding other 
religions and therefore doing high level research is simply not possible (Wach 
1967: 12–15).35 Also, C. J. Bleeker insisted that each discipline has its own method 
and the method generally results from its object (Bleeker 1971: 9), later on insisting 
that the method of history of religions is “the principle of scholarly impartiality, 
of purely historical research” (Bleeker 1971: 13). Similarly, Eliade argued that 
the methodology of the historian of religions is different from that of all other 
disciplines in the sense that it is uniquely focused on the religious symbols (Eliade 
1959: 88–92).36  
Yet, there are good reasons to believe that all these scholars do not quite mean 
the same thing when they use the word ‘method’. For Stausberg and Engler 
methods are “techniques for collecting and analyzing, or enacting … data in 
scientific or scholarly research” (Stausberg, Engler 2011b: 5), Daniel Dubuisson 
criticizes the use of “analysing”, “comparing”, “discussing” and so on as desig-
nations of method, finding them all lacking in definite and definitive method 
(Dubuisson 2016: 27–28), while suggesting that we ought to “set up a critical 
method with a strong analytical dimension” (Dubuisson 2016: 28). Meanwhile 
Kurt Rudolph (1979, 1981) discusses “philological method”, “historical method” 
as well as “historico-critical method”, “comparative method”, “sociological 
method”, “psychological method(s)” and “phenomenological method” and Jensen 
(2011a: 37–48) emphasizes the difference between “inside-out” and “outside-in” 
methodologies.37 It is also noteworthy that he considers these both methodologies 
and theoretical paradigms at the same time (Jensen 2011a: 39). 
What should be apparent by now is the diversity of the whole ‘method-discus-
sion’ in the study of religion. Stausberg and Engler want to limit the usage of 
‘method’ to clearly specifiable procedures and techniques and while others are 
                                                                          
35  Wach understood “pure psychological, pure sociological, and pure typological answers” 
(Wach 1967: 13) as such research approaches which do not help us, because they lack a 
hermeneutical dimension, while co-operative (with hermeneutics, that is) psychological, 
sociological and typological approaches were acceptable. 
36  Specifically, he writes: “Moreover, the very procedure of the historian of religions is not 
identical with that of the psychologist, the linguist, or the sociologist. It is just as dissimilar to 
that of the theologian. The historian of religions is preoccupied uniquely with the religious 
symbols, that is, with those that are bound up with a religious experience or a religious conc-
eption of the world. … But the historian of religions uses an empirical method of approach. 
He is concerned with religio-historical facts which he seeks to understand and to make 
intelligible to others. He is attracted to both the meaning of a religious phenomenon and to its 
history; he tries to do justice to both and not to sacrifice either one of them. Of course, the 
historian of religions also is led to systematize the results of his findings and to reflect on the 
structure of the religious phenomena. But then he completes his historical work as pheno-
menologist or philosopher of religion.” (Eliade 1959: 88) 
37  The “inside-out” perspective aims to “explain religion on the basis and as the result of innate 
cognitive capacities and mechanisms inherited from our evolutionary past” (Jensen 2011a: 
37), whereas the “outside-in” perspective draws attention to our social and cultural environ-
ment and emphasizes that “human brains and cognitive systems are conditioned by that which 
comes to us from the outside” (Jensen 2011a: 39). 
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certainly not denying this usage of the concept, they are considerably expanding 
it as well – in the end to such an extent that it indeed becomes difficult to say how 
one can distinguish between ‘methodology’ and ‘theoretical paradigm’. In that 
sense Rudolph’s usage is very close to earlier scholars (Wach, Bleeker, Eliade) – 
discussing approaches as general as ‘sociological’ and ‘psychological’ as 
‘methods’ indeed blurs the line between methods and theoretical paradigms. And 
it is just this usage which also enabled Annemarie Schimmel to talk about “the 
religionswissenschaftliche method” (1960: 236) in her summary of the discussion 
that took place at the 1960 IAHR congress (Schimmel 1960). 
But this kind of diversity in the discussions of method is prevalent in the study 
of religion in general, not just in the select few articles I have highlighted thus 
far. To begin with, there is the relatively strict meaning of method, where it 
signifies a specific procedure or technique. In that sense content analysis (Nelson, 
Woods Jr 2011), factor analysis (Boyd 2011), experimentation (Barrett (2011a) 
and interviewing (Bremborg 2011) can be treated as specific methods of the study 
of religion – these have obvious rules and regulations to follow and they can be 
spelled out in a rather detailed manner. Of course, most of the time these also 
make use of other methodological tools (for example interviewing is always 
going to involve a certain amount of hermeneutics). Things become more compli-
cated when we look further. In recent decades discourse analysis has gained quite 
a bit of attention as an important method for the study of religion (Taira 2013; 
Stuckrad 2013), however as Titus Hjelm notes, “in the sense of method [discourse 
analysis] remains a largely untapped source” (2011: 135). Still, it is important to 
note that discourse analysis is not and probably cannot be portrayed or treated as 
a clear procedure or technique to follow. Thus, Kocku von Stuckrad understands 
discourse analysis at the same time as a methodology and as a more generic 
research approach which would enable rethinking the study of religion in general 
(Stuckrad 2014: 1–3, 13–18; Stuckrad 2003).38  
A similar kind of ambiguity is also present in discussions concerning several 
other ‘methods’. Earlier I already noted the importance of hermeneutics for the 
study of religion and typically hermeneutics is understood as one of the methods 
of the discipline (for example Stausberg and Engler (2011a) locate it under the 
section ‘methods’, alongside factor analysis, content analysis, interviewing, 
structuralism, etc.). Yet, this is not without its problems, since Ingvild Saelid 
Gilhus (2011) is quick to note that “hermeneutics is both a method and a philo-
sophy of interpretation. The method can neither be satisfactorily employed nor 
explained without being firmly rooted in theories of interpretation” (Gilhus 2011: 
276). She continues by arguing that because the issue of understanding and thus 
hermeneutics is present in all research practices, “one might even ask if herme-
neutics really is a method” (Gilhus 2011: 276). Therefore, even though it is possible 
to limit one’s understanding of hermeneutics to a specific method, it is inevitably 
                                                                          
38  The final goal of this would be turning “the academic study of religion into a metatheory 




related to a wider philosophical perspective – and more importantly, it is an 
unavoidable part of all research that deals with human beings. After all, even 
experimental research in the cognitive science of religion requires interpretive 
skills and practices from the researchers who carry out experiments to be able to 
communicate with their test subjects. 
This dilemma of ambiguity reappears when one looks at fieldwork. In con-
temporary study of religion it is probably one of the most popular ‘methods’ to 
use, yet understanding it as a ‘method’ has its ambiguities. As Graham Harvey 
(2011) notes, doing field research is a complicated “hybrid activity” (Harvey 
2011: 240) which requires the combination of various kinds of participation and 
observation, asking questions, checking facts and so on. Therefore, if one is going 
to understand fieldwork as a method, one would have to accept it as a method 
which also includes various other methods within itself. Fieldwork can take the 
form of participating, observing, interviewing and interpreting, but it is also 
possible to include behavioural and psychological experiments, statistical analysis 
and free-listing as parts or aspects of fieldwork.39 
Similar issues appear in treatments of ‘philology’ (Thomassen 1999; 2011) 
and ‘history’ (Smith 1968; Rüpke 2011) as methods of the study of religion, for 
they both mean something far more extensive in practice. Thus, even though 
Thomassen (2011) compiles a whole list of issues, questions and topics a proper 
philological study entails, he is still forced to conclude that philological inter-
pretation is rather a practice, than something that could be “operationalized as a 
positive methodical procedure” (Thomassen 2011: 352). ‘History’ as well func-
tions as a more general research approach, similarly to fieldwork that can also 
include and accommodate other methods, more specific or equally general.40 
Therefore, although history, philology, hermeneutics, fieldwork and discourse 
analysis are complex practices and often function as large-scale research 
approaches rather than specifically definable procedural methods (such as 
interviewing, factor analysis or experimentation) it has been common to treat 
them as methods just the same.  
This is not at all uncommon in the study of religion. Talking about ‘socio-
logical,’ ‘psychological,’ ‘historical’, ‘philological’ and other such generic descrip-
tions – that we would otherwise often call fields of research or disciplines – as 
methods has been present in the discussions concerning the methodological issues 
of the study of religion for quite some time now. As noted previously, Rudolph 
(1979, 1981) talks about ‘sociological method’, ‘psychological method’, ‘histori-
cal method’, etc. But he is not alone; by doing this he joins a longstanding practice 
of treating research approaches as methods. Eric J. Sharpe (1971: 12), Pummer 
(1975: 173–175), Bruce Alton (1986: 156), Pye (1999: 189–192), Geertz and 
                                                                          
39  As examples such practices as parts of fieldwork research, see Soler 2012; Purzycki, 
Arakchaa 2013; Purzycki 2013; Fischer et al 2014. 
40  For example Rüpke (2011: 286) emphasizes the relevance of discourse analysis, herme-




McCutcheon (2000: 6) and Aaron Hughes (2013: 2–3) also talk about method in 
such a way. Sometimes there is reason to believe that this is done for the sake of 
generalization,41 but I do not think it can be explained solely as a matter of gene-
ralization, since even the generalized form this would still imply that there are 
methods somehow particularly inherent or essential to sociology, psychology or 
philology.  
In addition, there is the ever-present and extensive discussion over the use, 
usefulness and practice of the comparative method (Smith 1971; Carter 1998; 
Saler 2001; Jensen 2004; Freiberger 2011; Annus 2014; etc.).42 It has been called 
the dominant method of the comparative religion for the first half of the 20th 
century (Sharpe 1988),43 as well as the underlying basis of the study of religion 
(Freiberger 2011) or historical humanities in general (Annus 2014). Comparison 
has at times appeared both problematic as well as advantageous. It has appeared 
problematic as on many occasions the practice of comparison has forced disput-
able classificatory schemes and interpretations on the studied phenomena. Yet, 
on the other hand, scientific research without comparison either produces trivial 
knowledge or is simply impossible, since ideas, things or knowledge in general 
never appears to us completely separated from all other ideas or things that we 
have observed. As Jensen has succinctly put it: “What cannot be compared or 
generalized cannot be an object of scientific or scholarly scrutiny, nor can it be 
an object of philosophical reflection” (Jensen 2016: 469). This has led Paul Roscoe 
to note that the whole discussion about comparative method in the study of 
religion is not even that much about method as it is about the underlying a priori 
assumptions concerning the nature of humanity and cultural processes (Roscoe 
2008).44 This ubiquity and inevitability of comparison has caused Stausberg 
(2011a) to argue that instead of analysing and treating comparison as a method 
                                                                          
41  I would suggest this is most probably the case with the Geertz & McCutcheon article as 
they use plural form: “Scholars in the study of religion apply historical, archaeological, 
linguistic, textual (e.g., philological, structural and semiotic), philosophical, sociological, 
psychological, ethnographic, anthropological, and art historical methods. These methods 
having been developed by separate disciplines and do not constitute what is special about the 
comparative study of religion” (Geertz, McCutcheon 2000: 6). In the other highlighted articles 
the usage is far more straightforward, also using singular form, not plural (so specifically 
‘sociological method’, not just ambiguously ‘sociological methods’). 
42  It is worth noting that among them Smith (1971) has put a lot of effort on documenting 
and referencing much (if not most) of the earlier literature on comparison, thus the biblio-
graphy of his article is also very useful as a reference list for pre-1970s discussion about 
comparison as such. 
43  But as Sharpe also notes, at the same time no one found it necessary to actually discuss 
methodological issues (Sharpe 1988: 246)!  
44  More specifically: “debates about the comparative method are not really about the validity 
of the method at all. Rather, they are disputes about the validity of the comparativist assumption 
that the surface manifestations to be explained are all expressions of the same underlying, 
obscure, or obscured explanatory entity or process. Comparativists assert this essential uni-
formity. Their critics demur. Obscured by disputes about ‘method’, in other words, are implicit 
quarrels about the nature of humanity and of cultural process” (Roscoe 2008: 738). 
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we should rather think about it as “research design, i. e. as a framework for the 
collection and analysis of data and the analysis of research problems” (Stausberg 
2011a: 34). Thus “comparative research design” for Stausberg is rather a kind of a 
setting in which specific “techniques or tools for the collection of data” 
(Stausberg 2011a: 34) can be used.45 Discourse analysis, content analysis, philo-
logy, hermeneutics, historiography, phenomenology, etc. are all examples of such 
techniques and tools for Stausberg. Therefore, although treatments, analyses and 
critiques of ‘the comparative method’ are ever-present in the study of religion, 
discussing comparison as a method is somewhat problematic and questionable, 
since the act of comparison as such is an inevitable part of all research and thus 
discussing ‘comparative method’ amounts to treating ‘method’ as something 
even more generalized than it appears in discussions of method which treat 
‘sociological’, ‘psychological’, etc. as designations of methods. 
Alongside aforementioned discussions, phenomenology is also oftentimes 
treated as a method. However, this discussion of ‘phenomenological method’ is 
rather twofold.46 On the one hand discussions of the phenomenological method 
have concentrated on the matters of understanding and interpretation – how to 
understand and interpret the religious phenomena one wishes to make sense of? 
Bleeker (1959), Penner (1970), Smart (1973: 18–38), Dhavamony (1976) and 
others discussed this extensively back when phenomenology of religion was still 
far more part of the scholarly mainstream than it is today. How to avoid unjusti-
fiable and misleading (value) judgments about the supposed object of study and 
how to approach it in a way which would make it possible to genuinely under-
stand it? – these have been the main questions of ‘method’ in this discussion. 
Therefore, one could say that much of this discussion predominantly deals with 
topics we would consider hermeneutical – what should one do to adequately and 
fairly understand the other? – but also with the wider question of one’s perspec-
tive or attitude towards ‘the research object’. 
On the other hand, these discussions about phenomenological method have 
concentrated on questions of classification and categorization. The main focus is 
therefore the systematic study of the forms of religion, investigating all the con-
ceptions, rites, myths, traditions and other aspects from a comparative morpho-
logical-typological point of view (Hultkrantz 1970; Widengren 1969). Although 
                                                                          
45  I find this conceptualization very helpful and in my subsequent usage of the concept I will 
be using it the same way as Stausberg presents it here. 
46  Ingvild Saelid Gilhus (1984) also distinguishes between these two main approaches in the 
phenomenology of religion. However, some have even gone further. For example Douglas 
Allen (2005) considers it possible to distinguish between four different meanings of ‘the 
phenomenology of religion’: first of all the term may mean nothing more than an investigation 
of observable objects, facts and events; secondly (from Chantepie de la Saussaye to Widengren 
and Hultkrantz) it can mean the comparative study and classification of religious phenomena; 
thirdly (Brede Kristensen, van der Leeuw, Wach, Bleeker, Eliade, Waardenburg) it has meant 
a whole separate discipline within the religious studies and lastly he distinguished a philo-




understanding the phenomena is important here as well, this should be achieved 
through the use of extensive comparative material and “no specific intuitive 
quality is needed to grasp this purport, but just a general perception of the world 
of religion and of the logic of the religious conception and feeling” (Hultkrantz 
1970: 80). 
And although phenomenology of religion has been extensively criticized47 
both discussions of ‘method’ have continued until today, with Dale W. Cannon 
(1993), Thomas Ryba (2009), James V. Spickard (2011) and Jason Blum (2012) 
mainly focusing on the analysis of the hermeneutical perspective and Jensen (2004) 
and Gilhus (2004) mainly dealing with questions stemming from the categorizing 
and classificatory perspective in the phenomenology of religion.48 Overall, dis-
cussions about the ‘phenomenological method’ are remarkably similar to the 
aforementioned discussions which consider it possible to talk about ‘philological 
method’, ‘historical method’, ‘sociological method’, ‘psychological method’, etc. 
Here as well phenomenology is at the same time understood as a theoretical 
paradigm and as a method(ology). Or in other words one could say that by under-
standing phenomenological approach as a method one is putting a theoretical 
paradigm into practice by utilising it as a general research design (within which 
more specific procedures and approaches, for example categorization or herme-
neutics, are applied to make sense of the research object).  
Understanding method as something significantly more generic than a simple 
procedure or a specific research design also makes it possible to treat many other 
topics as issues of method. For example, Bruce Lincoln’s well-known “Theses 
on Method” (Lincoln 1996) says little about any specific practical procedures or 
how to set up (design) one’s research practice, instead it mainly focuses on how 
scholars should approach religion as a research object, how one should treat it 
and what questions one should ask. This has caused at least one commentator to 
note that these theses do not say much about method or methodology, but rather 
they “attempt to inculcate an attitude, a way of being in the world of academia 
(but not only that world)” (Geller 2005: 19).49 This is something Lincoln later 
agreed with as well, noting that his ‘Theses’ is “less a discussion of method than 
an attempt to foster an attitude: one distinctly more critical and less empathetic 
than is elsewhere standard in our discipline” (Lincoln 2005: 62). It is this wider 
meaning of method that makes it possible to treat a whole variety of issues as 
‘methodological’. For example, in his discussion of methodological issues, 
Pummer (1975) focuses on understanding, explanation, comparison, phenomeno-
logical method and other such topics. In a similar fashion Wiebe (1981: 44–58) 
analyses the autonomy of religious studies, its difference from theology and 
                                                                          
47  For a succinct and accurate summary of the criticisms, see Allen (2005: 199–203), but also 
Ryba (2000: 164–171; 2009: 277–281). 
48  I have also analysed the latter of the two discussions in more detail elsewhere, focusing on 
the contemporary usefulness and usability of the categorization side of the phenomenology of 
religion. See Peedu (2015a). 
49  Later on Engler and Gardiner also agree with Geller, also finding it remarkable how little 
time these theses on ‘method’ actually say about method (Engler, Gardiner 2013)! 
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social sciences, the significance of ‘understanding’ and other such issues as aspects 
of methodology. Pye (1999: 202–203) also focuses on the issues of comparison 
and contextualizing as topics of methodology.50 Lastly, it is worth noting that this 
more generalized understanding of methodology also allows Sharpe (1971: 4–5; 
2003: 20–58) to argue that the theory of evolution in practice functioned as the 
unifying, all-sufficient method for the new science in the second half of the 19th 
century. 
Lastly the concept of ‘methodology’ has one more notable usage in the study 
of religion. This occurs in the concepts of ‘methodological atheism’, ‘methodo-
logical agnosticism’, ‘methodological naturalism’, etc. Now, it is clear that these 
are certainly not meant as method(ologie)s in the sense of procedure or technique, 
but it is also doubtful that there is much use in trying to understand these as a 
research approaches or practices comparable to ‘philology’ or ‘fieldwork’. For 
example, in a recent prominent introduction to the evolutionary research on 
religion, Slingerland and Bulbulia (2011) describe methodological naturalism as 
an assumption that religion is an entirely human phenomenon and therefore 
“seeks to understand religion in purely naturalistic terms” (Slingerland, Bulbulia 
2011: 308) Explaining further, they also argue that “methodological naturalism 
does not require that any scholar embrace atheism. However, the scholarly study 
of religion does require scholars to bracket their commitments when they pursue 
their scholarly work, which is to be framed in a manner that is broadly consistent 
with the other disciplines that investigate our world” (Slingerland, Bulbulia 2011: 
308) and therefore “methodological naturalism is not a doctrine; it is rather a 
practical rule of thumb that is favored because it works” (Slingerland, Bulbulia 
2011: 312). While this portrayal of methodological naturalism is problematic and 
disputable (and I will dispute this later on!), it for now serves as a good example 
how this ‘methodological’ conception is depicted in the current evolutionary 
sciences of religion.  
Methodological agnosticism on the other hand is understood as “agnosticism 
about the existence or otherwise of the main foci of the belief system in question” 
(Smart 1973: 54) and therefore “methodological agnosticism cannot exclude the 
possibility of the truth of some religion R” (Smart 1973: 57).51 Therefore, these 
‘methodologies’ are understood as practical guidelines to use in epistemological 
matters, but they do not offer a concrete research practice to follow (as anthropo-
logical fieldwork, philological history or other comparable approaches do). In a 
sense these ‘methodologies’ are comparable to the theses of Bruce Lincoln,52 
because it is more accurate to describe them as “attempts to inculcate an attitude”, 
                                                                          
50  And it is worth reminding – as I already noted earlier – that he talks about ‘sociological’, 
‘psychological’, ‘historical’, etc. as designations of methods. 
51  It is worth noting that Smart did want to understand this as a ‘method’ (and not just as a 
‘methodology’), since he also writes: “I wish here to establish a method of looking at the 
objects of religious experience and belief which neither brings heaven down to earth nor takes 
a step into metaphysics and theology” (Smart 1973: 49).  
52  I will come back to this noteworthy similarity in section 2.4. 
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if I were to reuse the rather accurate way Geller (2005: 19) described Lincoln’s 
theses. 
However, while the goal of this compact overview has been to show the extent 
and diversity of all the different, but interconnected discussions of method, the 
more important question here is rather what to make of this all? How should one 
makes sense of this diverse plurality of meanings ‘method’ and ‘methodology’ 
have obtained in the various discourses and discussions? This is the question I 
intend to pursue next, to also highlight the importance and relevance of 
methodological topics for the subsequent issues I am going to discuss later. 
 
 
2.2. How to make sense of this diversity? 
As I highlighted in the previous section, method(ology) has been understood, 
analysed and practiced in a variety of different ways in the study of religion thus 
far. In their compact description of this situation Geertz and McCutcheon (2000: 
4–8) simply argue that the study of religion “is a composite field of study” 
(Geertz, McCutcheon 2000: 4) and it is “based on a methodological pluralism” 
(Geertz, McCutcheon 2000: 4) and while this is certainly accurate, it is not 
particularly helpful. Stausberg and Engler on the other hand have tried to make 
sense of this situation by distinguishing methods and methodologies. Therefore 
they define methods as “techniques for collecting and analyzing, or enacting … 
data in scientific or scholarly research” (Stausberg, Engler 2011b: 5) and 
methodology as “the application and discussion of the underlying principles of 
these procedures … Methodology refers both to general technical issues 
regarding methods (i.e., case or sample selection, data collection and analysis), 
and to the theory and conceptualization of methods” (Stausberg, Engler 2011b: 5). 
However, as it quickly becomes apparent from the general set up of the Handbook 
(Stausberg, Engler 2011a) and from their own discussion as well, this distinction 
is hard or impossible to enforce consistently. For one they have categorized 
‘grounded theory’ as a method, yet quickly admitting that it “is both a method 
and a more general (methodological) view on the relationship between theory, 
data and method” (Stausberg, Engler 2011b: 13), while also talking about “the 
methodological tools of discourse analysis” (Stausberg, Engler 2011b: 13), even 
though discourse analysis is listed under methods and in their definitions 
methodology appears to be the more general, overarching concept and method 
the more strictly defined procedure. Similarly, they are forced to conclude that 
field research is rather a “methodological scenario rather than a single method in 
a stricter sense” (Stausberg, Engler 2011b: 13), even though field research as well 
is listed under methods. And as I highlighted already in the previous section, in 
the actual articles their attempt to distinguish methods and methodologies is 
undermined furthermore, since neither philology (Thomassen 2011), herme-
neutics (Gilhus 2011), field research (Harvey 2011) nor history (Rüpke 2011) 




Possibly it could be argued here that the contradiction can be solved simply 
by treating these as methodologies instead of methods, but even that would not 
solve the actual ambiguity, since we would then have to discuss discourse analysis, 
structuralism, semiotics, grounded theory and so on. In the end we would have 
an overcrowded methodology section and a rather sparsely populated methods 
section. The real problem is that in such a categorization many of the most 
influential methods in the study of religion end up being both methods and metho-
dologies at the same time. History, discourse analysis, field research and some 
other influential method(ologie)s do not properly fit into such a categorization. 
But also I am rather sceptical about the usefulness of distinguishing between 
methods and methodologies, because throughout the discussion of method(ology) 
in the study of religion one can find people using these concepts interchangeably 
or without much effort to consistently distinguish them from each other. Going 
against this tendency to draw a clear line would be very hard to achieve on a 
wider scale. All in all, this approach does not appear to help with making sense 
of the whole issue. 
One alternative here might appear to be distinguishing methods as tools for 
approaching the supposed object of study from methods as tools for studying 
available data about the supposed object of study. From this perspective archae-
ological retrieval of (ancient) artefacts, philological deciphering and study of 
ancient texts (and the development of their composition), as well as experimental 
studies in psychology or surveys in sociology can all be understood as ways to 
retrieve data about religiosity as a phenomenon. At the same time, hermeneutical 
interpretation of the retrieved data, analysis of the experimental results or more 
generalized comparison between different separate data-sets would be understood 
as studying data about the object of the research.  
This kind of a distinction is noteworthy, since it was prevalent in the study of 
religion for quite some time: first all the available data should be gathered, syste-
matized and classified and then we can deal with its interpretation. A comparable 
distinction is present in Max Müller’s Introduction as he argues for the dual 
division of the science of religion into comparative theology and theoretic theo-
logy (Müller 1882:16–17, 74, 146), where comparative theology concentrates on 
“the historical forms of religion” (Müller 1882: 17) and thus should simply deal 
with “the facts such as we find them” (Müller 1882: 74), while theoretic theology 
“has to explain the conditions under which religion, whether in its highest or its 
lowest form, is possible” and thus it “ought not to be taken up till all the evidence, 
that can possibly be gained from a comparative study of the religions of the world 
has been fully collected, classified, and analysed” (Müller 1882: 17). Similar senti-
ments are still echoed in various statements a century later. For example, Kees 
W. Bolle (1967) argues that history of religions deals with materials that are hard 
to arrange and is therefore “always inductive rather than deductive, empiricistic 
rather than aporioristic” (Bolle 1967: 95) whereas any kind of “ultimate questions” 
should be dealt with only later on, but they should not interfere with the empirical 
part of the study. Also, in the same collection of essays Charles S. J. White emphati-
cally notes that “Methodology stands out as the single most important problem 
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for the historian of religions. Let us be frank about it. There is no lack of material 
for our speculations. The researchers in the various linguistic and other humanistic 
disciplines have recorded an enormous amount of relevant data which, aside from 
whatever other uses they may have, apply to the work of the historico-religious 
interpreter as well. Without an adequate method for handling these materials, our 
uses of them become mere improvisations” (White 1967: 161).53 A similar 
distinction between objective facts about religion and subsequent interpretations 
and theories also appears in Helmer Ringgren’s article about objectivity in the 
study of religion (Ringgren 1970). 
Now, it is true that the distinction Müller, Bolle, White and Ringgren emphasise 
between empirical data about religion and later interpretation of it is not exactly 
the same as the distinction between studying the supposed object and studying 
data about the supposed object (since for them the eventual theoretical evaluation 
should also deal with the questions of truth) but the underlying idea – we can 
distinguish objective, empirical facts from later interpretations – is still very 
similar. Differentiating between study of object and study of data reinforces an 
analogous distinction – it still presumes that we can somehow distinguish between 
the object itself and data about it.  
As I already noted earlier in the thesis, this is an idea that has come under 
severe criticism in the past few decades. Most famously, Jonathan Z. Smith has 
argued that “there is no data for religion” (Smith 1982: xi, italics in original). 
While Smith’s idea has provoked a lot of discussion54 and it certainly does leave 
room for interpretation, it also points to something essential (which has been 
analysed and elaborated in much more detail in the subsequent decades): we 
cannot draw a fundamental distinction between data and our understandings of 
data. Religion as a phenomenon is not something we have inductively derived 
from the empirical material; it is a conceptual tool that we have chosen to formulate 
a distinguishable phenomenon of the multifariousness of the world around us 
(Smith 1998: 281–282).  
But if we accept this theoretical conclusion, then we also have to give up the 
attempt to distinguish theory-independent empirical facts from later analysis and 
the distinction between retrieving data about the supposed object of study and the 
analysis and interpretation of retrieved data. What we wish to retrieve, what we 
                                                                          
53  He also follows this up with a further insistence on the need for a proper methodology: 
„This problem is particularly acute for someone who, besides being a historian of religions, 
with the implication that he is a generalist, aspires to be a specialist in some phase of man's 
religious history. Such a specialist is required to concern himself not only with the formal 
character of the religion described in the literature but with the lived experience of one religion 
in the midst of its cultural realization, if, indeed, it continues to be a living religious expression. 
Hence he enlarges the problem of method. He must know how to be a specialist against the 
background of, or in a way that contributes to, his function as a generalist. This small problem 
in the specialist's field method is thus related to the larger concern for an adequate general 
theory of historico-religious methodology” (White 1967: 161). 
54  Engler (2004), Day (2005), Schilbrack (2010) and Hart (2016) are but a few more recent 
examples of this extensive discussion. 
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wish to find for later analysis, is already guided, interpreted or in some cases 
determined by the analytical and interpretive questions which we wish to ask at 
‘a later stage’ of research. Or as Jeppe Sinding Jensen describes this: “data are 
theory dependent. Data are produced and ‘sifted’ from the streams of experience 
by means of theories, concepts and models” (Jensen 2011b: 47).55 
One recent rather notable attempt to make sense of this methodological diversity 
comes from Patrick Hart who draws attention to the history of the ‘method’ 
concept and analyses its current usage. He distinguishes between two major usages 
of the concept: first there is idea that methods are procedures or processes that 
the scholar has chosen to attain an object, but secondly there is also the idea that 
method involves “the disposition, comportment, or attitude that we bring towards 
the subject matter” (Hart 2016: 16). Furthermore, he argues that this attitude or 
disposition can affect our selection of specific procedures, but our choice of 
procedures can also affect the attitude that comes with it (Hart 2016: 16). Whereas 
Stausberg and Engler (2011a, 2011b) have tried to take a normative position and 
suggest how the field of scholars ought to understand the concepts of method and 
methodology, Hart has rather looked at the actual complexity of the usage.  
By doing that I think Hart has drawn attention to something I already dis-
cussed in the previous section and what I find very significant: the discussion of 
method is never just about method as a procedure or even just about method as a 
general research design (and it is even less about when and why should one use 
which method). Rather, significant proportions of this discussion deal with 
questions of attitude, perspective and disposition. Interestingly enough, some 
have drawn attention to this some time ago. Willard Gurdon Oxtoby noted already 
in 1968 that the debate about method is not so much about method as it is about 
the ‘scientific status’ of the discipline – what are the scientific principles of the 
study of religion (or whether there are any at all) (Oxtoby 1968). Similarly, as I 
already highlighted in the previous chapter, Donald Wiebe (1978) noted a decade 
later that the methodological debates in the study of religion are rather focused 
on how to carve out a standpoint for the ‘science of religion’ and therefore to 
differentiate it both from the social sciences and from theology. Therefore 
‘science of religion’ as a label rather functions as way how to establish an attitude 
free of (theological) bias or prejudice (Wiebe 1978: 10).56  
In his discussion of method and methodology in the study of religion Eric J. 
Sharpe notes something similar when he argues that “the Religious Studies 
enterprise seeks to erect or discover a “high place” from which the student can 
survey and analyse the world of religion without actually submitting to the 
                                                                          
55  Elsewhere elaborating further: “Theories are not given by facts, but facts are produced 
relative to theories. The philosophy of the natural sciences has shown that inductivism is logi-
cally flawed because the theory-dependence of observation means that the idea of verification 
with reference to ‘un-interpreted’ empirical evidence is impossible …. Theories and evidence 
(data) are mutually constitutive. Generalizations are the results of theoretical reflections on 
what is considered to count as evidence within a given theoretical definition-space” (Jensen 
2011b: 44). 
56  Later on he discusses these same topics again in Wiebe (1981: 44–58). 
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conditions of any part of it” (1988: 249), concurrently arguing that much of the 
methodological debate is actually focused on determining how to erect or 
discover this “high place” for the emerging science and not so much about method 
in any specific, procedural or technical sense. He continues this by arguing that 
although we might have different ways how to describe this place, we do “pre-
suppose that we occupy a rather special vantage-point, and that we have in fact 
arrived at certain conclusions about the desirability of being there – and about the 
necessity of not submitting to transcendental authority as a condition of getting 
off the ground in the first place” (1988: 249).57 The word, attitude, is very signi-
ficant here as this leads us straight into the theses on method as presented by 
Lincoln (1996), which as I showed above, is also largely an exposition of an 
attitude. This discussion of attitude and position (i.e. that ‘high place’) has con-
tinued as a steady part of the methodological discussions in the study of religion 
up until today. For example, Jörg Rüpke (2011) devotes much of his discussion 
to distinguishing academic study of history from popular history and public 
historical narratives, emphasising the crucial role of methodology in it and 
therefore arguing that the academic study of history “is defined by its ethos as 
conforming to the standards of a science, at least as far as possible without losing 
its function as an orientation for a future” (Rüpke 2011: 288, emphasis by me).58 
However, it is important to notice that these discussions about the correct 
attitude, ethos or position are closely related to the discussions about methodo-
logical atheism, methodological naturalism and methodological agnosticism. As 
briefly noted previously (and this is a topic I will return to in more detail later 
on), these characterizations of methodological self-understandings are also 
treated as ways how to position oneself – which arguments one should pursue and 
which arguments one should not pursue, what kind of judgments one should make 
and which judgments one should refrain from. In other words these are attempts 
to expound and elaborate on that ‘high place’. We can admit the impossibility of 
true objectivity, but this does not mean that we should just succumb to extreme 
                                                                          
57  Furthermore, in a book of his he argues that one of the fundamental premises of the study 
of religion is the possibility of studying religiosity without presuming the trueness or falseness 
of the studied phenomenon beforehand (Sharpe 1983: ix–xiv), describing the position of the 
scholar of religion in the following way: “It follows (and this may be harder to grasp) that the 
student of religion is in most cases engaged on a different quest from that which motivates the 
spiritual pilgrim. His quest is an intellectual quest for explanations which do not do violence 
to profound convictions, and not a spiritual quest for deepened commitment (though this is 
not to say that the two may not overlap)” (Sharpe 1983: xi). 
58  Elsewhere René Gothóni also talks about the attitude of the scholar of religion: “The Study 
of Religions scholar’s attitude towards religion and religiosity is thus somewhat paradoxical, 
S/he is supposed to get involved and to meddle in ‘other people’s’ affairs without committing 
him/herself to anything except a simple, sincere and sensitive search for the meaning of the 
concepts and terms. In doing this, s/he is also expected perpetually to commute intellectually 
between involvement and detachment, while concurrently avoiding any kind of emotional 
commitment. Only by becoming this kind of commuter do we generate repetitive reflection, 
which eventually sharpens our discernment and provides US with a distinct understanding of 
the matter at hand” (1995: 50). 
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relativism and all-encompassing subjectivism – these discussions attempt to 
overcome just that. As such, debates about the ‘neutrality’ of religious studies 
(Donovan 1990, Cannon 1993, Byrne 1997, Hyman 2004, Porpora 2006, etc.) are 
also very closely related to the hereinbefore discussed concepts, even though this 
is conceptually not understood as a discussion of method(ology). In this regard 
discussions of method(ology) are also directly or indirectly discussions of 
epistemology. The two are inevitably intertwined, in matters of method as 
procedure or technique as well as in matters of methodological self-positioning.59 
Based on this analysis of the method(olog)ical discussion and some of the 
ways scholars have tried to make sense of this I wish to propose a threefold 
categorization which should help to make sense of the diversity of method(ology) 
present in the study of religion, but more importantly, it should also highlight the 
epistemological aspect of all the discussions of methodology. This categorization 
can understood as a distinction between three different dimensions of the wider 
methodological discussion – all of these dimensions intersect with each other, 
they are interrelated and they are simultaneously present in all academic research. 
However, this categorization is certainly not meant as a description of ‘how 
things really are’, rather I consider it an efficient way how to make sense of the 
multiple discussions and applications of ‘method’ and how all of these are inter-
twined with each other. One could say that it is meant as a kind of a heuristic 
toolbox for thinking about matters of method. 
The first dimension of method has to do with a clearly definable practice that 
follows specific, explicit rules. The ‘generality’ of this practice can vary from 
very specific techniques to more generally defined practices – which still follow 
clear procedural rules. On the one end of the scale we have very strict procedural 
techniques such as factor analysis. Subsequently, network analysis (adams 2011), 
free listing (Stausberg 2011b), surveys (Navarro-Rivera, Kosmin 2011) and 
experimental research (Barrett 2011a; Schjoedt 2009; Andersen et al 2014)60 
among other similar methods also follow clearly specifiable rules of practice. 
However, at the other end of the scale we can find methods which cannot be 
                                                                          
59  Lambek (2014, see especially 146–148) explicitly emphasises and discusses just this point, 
also noting that “behind questions of methodology lie those of epistemology and hence it is 
here we have to begin in order to reach a deep understanding of the relationships among the 
various disciplines that study religion” (Lambek 2014: 146). Interestingly enough, Stausberg 
and Engler agree: “Ultimately, each research method carries a specific philosophical baggage, 
and by constructing a certain kind of data, all research methods facilitate certain kinds of 
analysis and thereby privilege certain kinds of perspectives. With some methods, the various 
philosophical and theoretical backgrounds remain more visible than with others. ... The 
methods sometimes appear as practical applications of the theoretical paradigms” (Stausberg, 
Engler 2011b: 14). However, they have not followed through with the logical conclusions of 
this and have still persisted with their dual categorization – as if method, methodology and 
epistemology can be treated separately.  
60  It should be noted that Barrett (2011a) actually talks about experimental methods – plural– 
but it would seem that this is merely a way to emphasise that many different experimental 




defined as narrowly but which we can still clearly describe as following proce-
dural rules. For example, discourse analysis in ‘the narrower sense’61 and inter-
viewing (Bremborg 2011) are therefore also methods in this sense – they cannot 
be delineated as specifically as factor analysis or experimental research, but they 
are still procedural practices with specific rules. Perhaps the most complicated 
cases are archaeological methods in researching religion (Raja, Rüpke 2015: 1–8; 
Rüpke 2011: 294; Jonuks et al 2013) and anthropological fieldwork – they are 
understood both as generalized research approaches, but also as specific procedural 
practices.  
In archaeology Tõnno Jonuks (2005) serves as a good example of treating 
archaeology strictly as a generalized research approach, saying little about 
technical archaeological procedures as such. Thereby he also has little to nothing 
to say about excavation techniques and related issues in the “methods” section 
(Jonuks 2005: 45–46), instead he discusses the usefulness (or uselessness) of the 
phenomenological method which has dominated the study of prehistoric religion 
in the past. Alternatively, Anthony Clark (1990) and Mark Aldenderfer (1998) 
understand archaeological methods in the sense of procedural techniques to 
follow. Similarly, with fieldwork, where it is at the same time possible to talk 
about fieldwork as a generalized research approach within which it is possible to 
adopt multiple different procedural techniques as well as in the narrower sense of 
specific rules of action and techniques to follow in the practice of participant 
observations or structured observations (Stausberg 2011c).  
The reason for this might have to do with the close interrelationship of partici-
pant observation and fieldwork – although other procedural methods are also 
usable in the fieldwork setting, participant observation as such tends to be by far 
the most widespread and dominant method in the fieldwork context and thus 
fieldwork is often equated with participant observation. In any case, both field-
work and archaeological excavations can be seen as types of a general research 
design within which it is possible to use many different methodical techniques. 
However, this leads us beyond understanding method as a clearly definable practice 
with specific rules and into the second dimension – method as a research approach. 
The second dimension of method(ology) deals with the general research 
approach that a scholar has chosen to pursue to accomplish one’s goals. Methodo-
logy in this sense functions as an overarching research design which enables the 
accommodation and use of multiple different procedural practices. When philo-
logy, history, fieldwork, hermeneutics, structuralism, discourse analysis or 
semiotics are declared ‘methods’ of the study of religion, then the meaning of this 
phrase is closer to saying that these practical research designs can guide us in our 
study of the phenomenon we are interested in.  
                                                                          
61  As I noted before (see section 2.1.), discussions about ‘discourse analysis’ in the study of 
religion can be both discussions of method as well as discussions about discourse analysis as 
a generalized research approach for the whole study of religion. Thus, when we are talking 
about method as a clearly definable practice with procedural rules to follow, we are talking 
about discourse analysis in the narrow sense (and not as a research paradigm). 
 
59 
The third dimension of the methodological debate concentrates on the question 
of positioning. What kind of a position does the scholar occupy in relation to 
one’s research focus? What kind of a position does one inevitably occupy? What 
kind of judgments or arguments should one avoid? Discussions of methodological 
naturalism, methodological agnosticism, methodological atheism, objectivity, 
neutrality and so on are all closely related to each other here. Yet these are largely 
epistemological debates and therefore this discussion of methodology is rather a 
discussion of epistemological methodology or methodological epistemology, than 
a discussion of specific research designs, technical or structural procedures. I find 
it very useful to think of this as a matter of (self-)positioning. Obviously not meant 
in the literal sense, talking about positioning allows one to show how discussions 
of ‘attitude’, ‘ethos’ or ‘scientificity’ (if I were to use a very compact term) are 
all closely intertwined. And with regards to the rest of this thesis it is these latter 
two usages and discussions of ‘method(ology)’ which deserve a closer look. 
  
 
2.3. Method as a research approach 
Previously I noted how a significant proportion of the discussion about method 
is actually about something a lot more generalized than specific procedures. 
Although this has been treated as an integral part of the wider methodological 
discussion, I believe it is practically useful to see this as a somewhat separate 
debate, or a debate taking place on a different dimension, so to say. As I explained 
earlier, this dimension of the methodological discussion understands method-
(ology) as an overarching research approach. Philology, history, fieldwork, 
hermeneutics and discursive study are here excellent examples of such research 
designs. As highlighted earlier, introductions to these approaches have persistently 
struggled with the idea that they are described as ‘methods’.  
This caused Hjelm (2011: 135) to emphasise that he will not be discussing 
discourse as a (meta)theoretical concept, but rather as a specified method.62 
Gilhus (2011) also is doubtful of the usefulness of treating hermeneutics as a 
method, suggesting instead that hermeneutics is rather a philosophy of inter-
pretation (Gilhus 2011: 276). In a similar vein Thomassen (2011: 352) does not 
find it useful to describe philology as a method, instead preferring to describe it 
as a practice. Harvey (2011: 240) rather talks about field research as a hybrid 
activity. All these struggles with method as an activity that follows specific proce-
dural rules stem from the historical circumstances due to which more general 
approaches and questions concerning specific procedures have been both treated 
as discussions of method. 
To avoid this confusion and to clearly distinguish general programmes from 
specific procedures, it is far more useful to think of these are research approaches. 
Philology as a research approach highlights certain materials and prefers to 
                                                                          
62  Obviously wishing to distinguish his usage of discourse analysis from the more 
generalized usage propagated by Stuckrad (2003, 2013). 
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pursue some questions over others – sometimes due to historical traditions and 
habits in the discipline, but sometimes because philology as an approach is simply 
better equipped to deal with some questions rather than some others. Content 
analysis, discourse analysis (in the stricter sense, as described by Hjelm (2011)) 
and other procedural methods which deal with texts can all be used within the 
philological approach, whereas the use of experiments or the use of the various 
techniques common in archaeology is simply not possible or practical. Fieldwork 
as a research approach on the other hand enables both hermeneutically inclined 
methods as well as behavioural and psychological experiments, if the researcher 
so wishes. Yet, the application of philologically inclined techniques (for example 
content analysis or discourse analysis in the stricter sense) is not as usable or useful 
there. For one, it is unlikely that one can do thorough philological research and 
fieldwork at the same time and secondly, because philology and fieldwork focus 
on different kinds of manifestations of human religiosity, even more, they have 
access to different aspects of it.63 Aside philology and fieldwork there are several 
more or less widespread research approaches in the study of religion – discursive 
study of religion in the wider sense, historical research, archaeological excavations, 
experimental research, structuralism as well as semiotics are oftentimes all treated 
as methods, but as research approaches one can think of them as overarching 
research designs, each of which includes a general set of guidelines to follow and 
goals to pursue. Some research approaches have more in common than others, 
but it is rarely possible to accommodate or apply both simultaneously or even in 
the same overall research project.  
Oftentimes parallel discussions dealing with ‘research approaches’ (e.g. 
Oviedo 2016, Szocik 2015, Sakaranaho 2010, Krech 2000, Levine 1998, Sharma 
1991) are analysing questions very closely related to the discussions that take place 
under the heading of ‘method(ology)’. Therefore discussing philology, history, 
experimental research, etc. as research approaches rather than method(ologie)s also 
serves the added benefit of highlighting the importance of a significant parallel 
discussion, which is very closely related this dimension of the methodological 
discussion.64 However, while ‘psychological’, ‘sociological’ and other names of 
disciplines (which are also practised independently) have oftentimes been 
described and treated as methods, I do not find it practically useful or meaningful 
to describe these as research approaches. Psychological research can take an 
experimental form as well as a hermeneutical form, sociological research can be 
based on quantitative surveys as well as on qualitative interviews and participant 
observations. And while it is true that this kind of earlier usages also talk about 
                                                                          
63  Fieldwork can “access” only what presently exists, whereas philologically it is also possible 
to study ancient texts – if I were to highlight just one example. 
64  It should be noted though, that the word ‘approach’ or even ‘research approach’ is used in 
many different ways, thus I certainly do not mean to say that the whole ‘diversity of approaches’ 
is relevant for these discussions, but simply that a significant proportion of closely related 
discussion also takes place under this title. 
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research approaches under the title of ‘method’, they are too ambiguous or general 
to be practically useful or meaningful.  
On a similar level of abstraction a lot has been said lately about naturalistic study 
of religion and constructivist study of religion, depicting these as competing 
research paradigms (e.g. Schüler 2014a, 2014b, Oviedo 2016, King 2013, 
Bulbulia, Slingerland 2012) which have drastically different understandings of the 
study of religion and therefore are in conflict about a number of things. Obviously, 
these also do entail research approaches and procedural methods and certainly 
some research approaches and procedural methods are more common under one 
generalized paradigm than other. However, I would not describe these as research 
approaches because of the same reasons as I did not suggest that we should under-
stand ‘psychological’, ‘sociological’ and other such designations as research 
approaches. Here as well we are dealing with something far more generalized and 
all-covering than the approaches I have previously highlighted. A constructivist 
paradigm can be philological, semiotic as well as fieldwork-based, while 
naturalistic can be experimental, fieldwork-based as well as historical. In addition, 
it is worth noting that I am not aware of any cases of analysing or discussing or 
treating constructivist or naturalistic study of religion as ‘method(ology)’. How-
ever, in the wider discussion the idea of ‘method’ is occasionally invoked. For 
example, Hanegraaff (1995) in his criticism of Robert Segal and his proposal of 
a reductive study of religion (Segal 1983) has emphasized ‘empirical method’ as 
a general approach, strongly distinguishing it from “positivist-reductionist” and 
“religionist” pursuits (Hanegraaff 1995: 99–108). Here as well ‘method’ acquires 
a very general meaning, implying a complete research paradigm as such and thus 
rather discussing the study of religion in the most general sense, comparable to 
previously mentioned constructivist and naturalistic paradigms. 
This leaves us with just two more cases that deserve attention in this section: 
what of ‘comparative method’ and ‘hermeneutics’? As exemplified earlier both 
of these are regularly presented and understood as central to the study of religion 
in general. Yet, at the same time comparison and interpretation are inevitable 
parts of any research (Stausberg 2011a; Gilhus 2011) – academic research on 
religion always involves some kind of comparison and one always has to make 
interpretive decisions. Because of this one can easily ask whether there is even 
any point to talking about a comparative research approach or a hermeneutical 
research approach? However, I think when it comes to the study of religion there 
are reasons why we can also think of hermeneutical and comparative approaches 
as overarching research designs. 
As I pointed out earlier, the literature on ‘comparative method’ is extensive – 
much of it focuses on the premises of comparison, on the underlying assumptions 
and on the inevitability of comparativeness. And certainly in the most trivial 
sense all academic research is comparative. However, in the study of religion 
emphasizing the comparative method has also served as a way to prioritize a 
certain kind of research – one where comparativeness is prioritized as the primary 
goal in itself. This is a situation Michael Stausberg has described in the following 
way: “comparison is most often not practised as a separate method, but as a 
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research design, i.e. as a framework for the collection and analysis of data and 
the analysis of research problems. Comparative research designs use different 
kinds of techniques or tools for the collection of data (i.e. methods in a narrower 
sense), for example discourse analysis, content analysis, document analysis, philo-
logy, hermeneutics, historiography, phenomenology, surveys, etc.” (Stausberg 
2011a: 34). I find this description dead-on. Going back to at least Max Müller 
comparativity has been emphasized as a goal in many studies – wide-scale 
comparison is here understood as an approach, as a research design that makes it 
possible to highlight questions, similarities and differences which would other-
wise go unnoticed. Much of the earlier classification and categorization oriented 
phenomenology of religion (Widengren 1969, Hultkrantz 1970, etc.) was pre-
occupied with this and it continues to be valued in much of the contemporary 
research – including scholars such as Grottanelli and Lincoln (1998) who are 
otherwise very critical of earlier phenomenological trends, but still find it positive 
that in the increasingly specializing academic environment study of religion has 
maintained a more comparative approach than most other neighbouring disciplines 
(Grottanelli, Lincoln 1998: 320–321). Of course, this has caused some to complain 
that research under the heading ‘history of religion’ actually is far more interested 
in classification and categorization than in history (Smith 1968: 9–12),65 but this 
rather points to confusions the usage of some titles (such as ‘history of religions’ 
in the American context) causes and is not really indicative of fundamental 
problems with the research itself. Comparative research is therefore the kind of 
research that values comparison far more than other studies which concentrate on 
a specific region or tradition or a group of people and prioritize learning as much 
as possible about this ‘research object’. In the comparative approach no research 
object is more interesting or more important in itself, every object of research is 
interesting only when compared to other objects of research. 
With hermeneutics we find ourselves in a similar situation. On the one hand 
in the simplest form interpretation is inevitable in all kinds of research, yet on the 
other hand, as Gilhus (2011: 276) notes, hermeneutics is also understood as an 
all-encompassing philosophy of interpretation. Yet, in the context of the study of 
religion hermeneutics has also been understood in ways very similar to fieldwork, 
philology or the comparative approach. When interpretation and the understanding 
of meanings becomes a goal in itself, when higher value is seen in understanding 
the meanings of religious ideas and practices, then we can say that we are dealing 
with a hermeneutical research approach. In such a case specific procedural methods 
are treated as necessary tools for procuring the meaning of the studied phenomenon.  
Earlier I mentioned Joachim Wach as a representative and apologist of a 
devotedly hermeneutical approach, but Mircea Eliade is just as noteworthy of an 
example.66 Although Wach and Eliade have been harshly criticized and focus on 
                                                                          
65  For a more general overview of the various criticisms see Roscoe (2008). 
66  For example one can look at his relatively provocative essay about the hermeneutical 
importance of the history of religions (Eliade 1961). From an historical perspective Jacques 
Waardenburg (1997) also emphasizes hermeneutics as a significant research approach in 
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meaning and interpretation is not so often understood as a value in itself, there 
have been some recent noteworthy attempts to retrieve or re-establish the 
credibility of the hermeneutical approach. For example, both Spickard (2011) and 
Blum (2012) have presented attempts to rethink phenomenology as an approach 
to religiosity and have thus emphasized it as a way how to re-establish herme-
neutical study as research approach in the study of religion. ‘Empirical pheno-
menology’ as Spickard depicts and practices it, should be clearly differentiated 
from the earlier phenomenological approaches in the study of religion though – 
as Spickard himself does as well, when he argues that the likes of Mircea Eliade 
and Ninian Smart were not genuinely phenomenological, but only applied aspects 
of phenomenology in their work (Spickard 2011: 334–336).67 Blum also wants to 
clearly distinguish his position from the position of the earlier phenomenologists, 
but he takes a somewhat different approach in doing that. However, in short it 
can be said that although their depictions of phenomenology differ in many 
important aspects (the details of which are not relevant in this context), they are 
both talking about an approach centred on hermeneutics under the heading of 
‘phenomenology’.68  
Here one could ask why have I not described phenomenology as one such 
research approach in the study of religion? The reason is relatively simple and 
straightforward: a variety of different research perspectives were practised under 
the heading of ‘phenomenology of religion’. As I noted earlier, Allen (2005) has 
distinguished between four different meanings of the concept, from distinctively 
philosophical to purely classificatory. Furthermore, oftentimes the essential char-
acteristics (‘epoche’ for example) of the phenomenological method are rather 
described as tools to maintain neutrality (see Bleeker 1959, Bleeker 1971: 14–20; 
Dhavamony 1976: 66–67; Cannon 1993: 159–166; Cannon 1994). Because of 
this multiplicity of meanings phenomenology has (had) in the study of religion 
and the complex history I do not find it practically useful to try to think of pheno-
menology as a unified or/and coherent research approach. However, discussions 
of neutrality in the phenomenology of religion do play a significant role in the 
                                                                          
earlier scholarship, describing it as one of the two main lines of scholarship in the early study 
of religion and expressing regret that the exaggerated claims of some hermeneutical scholars 
caused the approach as a whole become suspect. 
67  It should be noted, though, that by doing this Spickard is simply taking a position in the 
debate over the real meaning of ‘phenomenology’ within the phenomenology of religion. 
Spickard prefers an understanding closely related to Husserl’s philosophy, whereas most of 
the proponents and practitioners of phenomenology in religious studies have preferred a 
noticeably different understanding of phenomenology and have thus not practiced pheno-
menology in a particularly Husserlian perspective (see James 1985 and Murphy 1994). 
68  As Blum succinctly puts it: “the phenomenologist of religion attempts to interpret or 
understand religion, which is to say that he seeks to disclose the meaning or meanings of it as 
they are constructed, perceived, and experienced within consciousness, or from the perspective 
of the religious subject. … The phenomenologist is interested, first and foremost, in the 
experience of that which the subject takes to be transcendent, rather than in the transcendent 
itself” (Blum 2012: 1030, emphasis in original). 
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third dimension of the methodological debate in the study of religion – that of 
positioning the scholar.69 
 
 
2.4. Method or rather positioning the scholar? 
Earlier I highlighted the significant proportion of the discourse on method(ology) 
that in actual practice deals with matters such as ‘the high place’ of the scholar, 
the ‘attitude’ of the scholar or the ‘ethos’ of the scholar. In other words, who is the 
scholar in relation to one’s research interest and how should one think of one’s 
position as a scholar? In addition to the discussions of Sharpe that I cited in length 
earlier,70 similar discussions can be also found in the writing of R. J. Zwi 
Werblowsky, who has argued that “the student of comparative religion operates, 
by definition, from an archimedic point outside religion, though obviously inside 
some secular, cultural, and possibly ideological system—no matter what religious 
commitments he chooses to make as an individual believer” (Werblowsky 1975: 
152).71 Discussions concerning the exact meaning of this and about the actual 
applicability of one or another position for the scholar of religion have been ever-
present in the study of religion for at least the last half a century. 
Lincoln’s theses on method (Lincoln 1996) are arguably the most famous 
recent example of this that also makes use of the concept of ‘method’ as he lays 
out the attitude scholars of religion should harbour in relation to religion as their 
research object. Yet, this debate also extends much farther and this is exactly what 
I want to draw attention to in this section. Lincoln is far from being alone in 
analysing matters of attitude (Geller 2005: 19; Lincoln 2005: 62) as those central 
to the study of religion. As I earlier noted, Rüpke (2011: 288) also argues for 
something very similar when he emphasizes the ethos of the academic study of 
religion. Also, as I noted already in the previous chapter, more than three decades 
earlier, Donald Wiebe was discussing the label ‘science of religion’ and found 
that it is primarily used “to designate that attitude on the part of certain scholars 
to treat religion, insofar as that is possible, free of (theological) bias or prejudice” 
(Wiebe 1978: 10, emphasis in the original). Later on he also talked about an 
“intellectual ethos” as he described and applauded the naturalistic framework for 
the study of religion as an intellectual ethos (Wiebe 1989), noting that “such a 
naturalistic approach to the study of religion simply treats religion as an element 
of culture like any other and does so by rejecting the assumption that it is 
necessary ‘to believe', in some sense or other, what the devotee believes in order 
to understand” (Wiebe 1989: 305). In the mid-20th century Joseph M. Kitagawa 
                                                                          
69  In the following chapters I will be using the concept of ‘religion approach’ always in the 
sense I have described it here, thus also suggesting one or another approach like the ones 
exemplified here (but not necessarily limited to them).  
70  See section 2.2. 
71  In the subsequent discussion Werblowsky deliberately emphasizes the contrast between a 
scholar of religion and a theologian, who operates from within a religious tradition, attempting 
to give a reasoned account of it.  
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argued in a similar fashion, suggesting that aside a sympathetic understanding of 
other religions and critical attitude towards one’s own religion, the third essential 
quality of the study of religion is “the “scientific” temper” (Kitagawa 1959: 15; 
emphasis by me). There are good reasons to suspect that Rüpke and Wiebe do not 
understand the ethos of the study of religion in quite the same way, but the dif-
ference between them is nothing fundamental. Discussions of ‘method’, ‘attitude’ 
or ‘ethos’ are conceptual tools used to debate the position of the scholar and the 
justifiability of one or another way of understanding the scholar’s relationship 
with his or her supposed object of study. 
As emphasized earlier, it is important to notice that discussions concerning 
methodological naturalism and methodological agnosticism also deal with 
questions closely related to these very same matters. As I briefly described earlier, 
Slingerland and Bulbulia (2011) understand methodological naturalism as an 
assumption that religion is an entirely human phenomenon, thus methodological 
naturalism merely a practical rule of thumb about what to assume and what not 
to assume about religion as an object of study.  
Thus Slingerland and Bulbulia portray methodological naturalism as a practical 
rule of thumb, elsewhere (Bulbulia, Slingerland 2012: 569) also depicting it as a 
monistic perspective in the sense that it rejects dividing the world into separate 
realms of physical nature and mind and assigns a near-zero probability to any 
theory which implies any kind of supernatural causation. They argue that a 
methodological naturalist should reject all doctrines which rely on ideas about 
the existence of phenomena not accessible to everybody. Many other share their 
understanding of methodological naturalism, treating it as a way of conceptualizing 
a shared understanding of the kind of assumptions that are allowed, the kind of 
theoretical arguments one can present and the kind of arguments one should not 
present. For example, Gregory W. Dawes (2011) also depicts naturalism72 as 
agreeing to a shared list of procedural requirements, thus also arguing that these 
procedural rules requirements can be clearly distinguished from the metaphysical 
commitments. Similarly to Slingerland and Bulbulia he also presents these 
procedural requirements as a demand that “any proposed explanation should be 
testable against a body of evidence that is accessible to any capable observer” 
(Dawes 2011: 8), while also insisting that this involves no a priori commitments 
to any kind of specific metaphysics (Dawes 2011: 9). Elsewhere also, among 
                                                                          
72  Conceptually Dawes finds the concept of “methodological naturalism” problematic, 
arguing that it “confuses epistemological and metaphysical considerations” and therefore “plays 
into the hands of its theological opponents” (Dawes 2011: 6). However, as I showed above, 
his defence of naturalism and the procedural rules is very similar to what is elsewhere 
presented as methodological naturalism. 
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critics (Blum 2011)73 and proponents (Bradie 2009)74, methodological naturalism 
is understood as a matter of following specific procedural rules when it comes to 
epistemological and metaphysical matters.75  
Concerning the concept of methodological agnosticism we find ourselves in a 
rather similar situation. The best-known proponent this epistemological self-
positioning has been Ninian Smart (1978, especially 75–78, 136; 1973, especially 
49–59). Here as well ‘method’ means abiding by a set list of procedural rules in 
epistemological matters. Since many of the things religious people claim can be 
neither proved or disproved within the limits of academic practices, adhering to 
a methodological agnosticism means sticking to an agnostic position in these 
matters – they might be true or they might not be – and thus avoiding judgments 
and presumptions about these matters in the research itself. Oftentimes such an 
agnosticism is described as an act of “bracketing” one’s feelings and attitudes to 
make “use of empathetic imagination” (Smart 1978: 76) to understand and 
interpret the research focus in a fair manner.  
Many others have also adapted this position in the study of religion. For 
example, Eric Sharpe also emphasizes the central importance of agnosticism as 
he presents the necessity of studying religion in a way which does not apply “the 
criteria of ‘truth’ and/or ‘falsehood’ to any of the material under consideration 
(Sharpe 1983: ix).76 Similarly, Hanegraaff has insisted that scholars  
 
                                                                          
73  More specifically noting that “within religious studies, naturalism prohibits reference to 
God or gods, ancestral spirits, magic, etc. as causal agents or explanations, and generally resists 
any suggestion that such entities have real existence” (Blum 2011: 85) and: “although 
methodological naturalism does not necessarily deny the existence of supernatural pheno-
mena, it operates on a naturalistic basis, if only for reasons of methodological rigor” (Blum 
2011: 85). 
74  To be more specific he understands methodological naturalism in the following sense: 
“Appeals to divine agency are ruled out on the grounds that they do not advance our under-
standing of natural phenomena in any way. They explain nothing and do not provide us with 
any grounds for making predictions about anything” (Bradie 2009: 130) and therefore “at a 
minimum, science’s commitment to methodological naturalism is a commitment to the 
demand that the explanatory features we adduce in attempting to account for the workings of 
the world are such that they give rise to certain expectations that we have some reason to 
believe will make a discernable difference to our intersubjective experiences” (Bradie 2009: 
136). 
75  Although not present in the writings of the religious studies scholars who defend the 
position of methodological naturalism, elsewhere both ‘naturalism’ (Halvorson 2016: 139) 
and ‘methodological naturalism’ (Forrest 2000: 14) have been described as attitude. They both 
point out that naturalism is not a solidified doctrine or a system of thought, but rather a method 
or a program that is open to modification in case of new scientific findings. 
76  The other two of his basic presumptions about the study of religion are: “The first is that 
the area of ‘religion’ is capable of being, if not strictly defined, at least outlined as a field of 
study. The second is that the study has an intrinsic value of its own, which is not necessarily 




“are dependent on believers expressing their awareness of a meta-empirical 
reality in empirically perceptible ways (words, images, behaviour etc.) but, 
qua scholars, they do not themselves have direct access to the meta-
empirical. Because they can thus neither verify nor falsify its existence, or 
any claims made about it, methodological agnosticism is the only proper 
attitude” (Hanegraaff 1995: 101). 
 
However, as such these discussions about attitude, ethos, methodological 
agnosticism and methodological naturalism deal with problems and questions very 
similar to earlier debates of objectivity and contemporary debates about neutrality. 
In his succinct analysis, Helmer Ringgren also presented the ‘objectivity’ of the 
study of religion as a matter of avoiding personal preferences and values in matters 
of scholarly study and presenting facts of research as they are (Ringgren 1970). 
Few if any would nowadays agree that the study of religion (or any scientific field 
of study, for that matter) is or can be genuinely objective. Even in the study of 
religion criticisms of objectivity already preceded the aforementioned article by 
Ringgren, as Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1959: 44–54) argued that truly detached 
academic reporting on various matters is an unrealistic ideal, thus study of 
religion should be far more dialogical than it has been in the past. Having 
generally abandoned the concept of objectivity in the more recent decades this 
debate has moved towards analysing the ‘neutrality’ of the discipline in general 
or the scholar more specifically (Donovan 1990, Byrne 1997, etc.). There also it 
is a matter of epistemological self-positioning, as some descriptions of the 
scholar’s self-positioning are found preferable to others.77 
Elsewhere this discussion about the self-positioning of the scholar can also 
take other forms. As noted earlier, Lincoln himself agreed that his theses attempt 
to lay out an attitude which is more critical and less empathetic than otherwise 
common in the study of religion (Lincoln 2005: 62). Lincoln is certainly not alone 
in this, as McCutcheon in his provocative essays also strongly argues in favour 
of a far more critically minded study of religion than is typically common 
(McCutcheon 1997). However, discussions of attitude towards the research object 
have been around for some time. Already a couple of decades earlier Werblowsky 
pointed out the complicated relationship scholars of religion have with their 
object of study (Werblowsky 1975: 154–155), noting how on the one hand you 
cannot be as positively attached as say theologians or musicologists, on the other 
hand you cannot be as critical as scholars of alchemy or astrology commonly are. 
The scholar of religion should position oneself somewhere in the middle, between 
these two opposing poles of the scale. But invoking such a scale itself and sug-
gesting different positions on it also includes suggestions about the kind of 
epistemological presumptions, arguments and self-interpretations are preferred or 
allowable. 
                                                                          
77  Byrne, for example, finds the concept of ‘methodological naturalism’ very problematic, 
arguing that it is basically a position of implicit atheism and if religious studies were based on 
this kind of paradigm it would be “a weapon in the hands of secularism, aiding those who 
would expose religion as an illusion” (Byrne 1997: 343). 
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Lastly, these matters of self-positioning are also prominently present in some 
hermeneutical discussions. For René Gothóni (2000: 124–130) it becomes an 
issue in the fieldwork context – on the one hand you need to participate in the 
actions, yet on the other hand, you need to keep your distance. Gothóni notes how 
emphasis on a thorough understanding of pilgrimage practices led himself to feel 
and behave as a pilgrim for a short period of time (Gothóni 2000: 124–127). 
Gothóni is not alone in this. For example, Philip H. Ashby argued (citing Colling-
wood as the originator of the idea) a few decades earlier that a proper under-
standing of past (religious) contexts requires the re-enactment of the past, thus 
the scholar “must re-enact the past, engage in the religious longings of others now 
dead and of others who are his contemporaries. He must re-enact in his own being 
the religious striving, searching, and response of that which, as investigator, he 
seeks to understand” (Ashby 1967: 146). In the subsequent discussion Ashby 
emphasizes empathy and notes that this act of re-enactment does not mean that 
the scholar is required to “believe, to accept as true in an ultimate sense, that in 
which I am attempting to participate” (Ashby 1967: 147). It would seem Gothóni 
holds a rather similar hermeneutical position, even though he is mostly focusing 
on a fieldwork situation, whereas Ashby was discussing historical-philological 
research.  
The discussion I have presented thus far has been essential to make their share 
topic of discussion and debate explicitly visible. Although the problem of under-
standing one’s situation as a scholar and its relationship to the supposed object of 
study has been treated in many different ways, using many different conceptual 
tools, I find it far more useful to think of this as a matter of self-positioning. When 
conceptualized as a question of positioning the central question at hand in these 
discussions – who is the scholar as a scholar and how does, has, will or should 
(s)he relate to his supposed object of study? – takes centre stage. Discussions 
about the ethos of the discipline or about the neutrality of the discipline or about 
methodological agnosticism or naturalism are more closely related to each other 
than it has perhaps been apparent in the past and it is very useful to think of them 
as part of the same dimension of the whole ‘field’ of methodology. 
These epistemological matters of self-positioning are inevitably present in all 
scholarly research. The scholar always has a position and it always comes with 
epistemological presumptions. Some positions are more common in some research 
perspectives. As Kevin Schilbrack notes:  
 
“In order to study religions, one must at least implicitly have answered 
certain questions about what one takes to be real and not real, knowable 
and not knowable, and good and not good. In other words, scholars of 
religion, like all human beings, live and act with certain metaphysical, 
epistemological, and axiological presuppositions” (Schilbrack 2005: 44).  
 
And although Schilbrack does not make use of the concept of ‘method(ology)’, 
in the study of religion much of this discussion has taken place under the heading 
of ‘methodology’. While some have tried to rethink the concepts of method and 
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methodology, I have here instead preferred to present a more coherent and 
practically useful way to use these concepts (whose histories are long and 
complicated). It is true that describing it as a discussion of positioning instead of 
as a matter of method, ethos or some other mentioned concept can also appear as 
an attempt to dictate the use of words, but by doing this I am not so much saying 
that other scholars should definitely modify their usage of the conceptual tools as 
I am suggesting an alternative. I am sure many will also continue to discuss this 
as (separate) matters of methodology, attitude or neutrality. Regardless of the 
exact conceptual usages, it is for now important to keep in mind how closely these 
discussions are related to each other.  
 
 
2.5. Positioning and scientificity 
Before concluding this chapter and turning to epistemological matters the 
interrelationship of the two big topics I have been analysing thus far in this thesis 
deserves a brief look. On the one hand I have noted that the study of religion 
regularly comes with a certain understanding of scientificity – what is it about 
research that makes it scholarly reliable. Here contemporary scholars from the 
field of the cognitive science of religion have placed a lot of emphasis on their 
understanding of the scientific character of proper research, yet at the same time 
there is a well-established ‘Religionswissenschaft’-based understanding of the 
scientificity of academic scholarship. On the other hand we have elaborate 
discussions about method(ology), its application and role in and for the study of 
religion. The obvious and inevitable question here has to do with the connection 
and relation of these two aspects. How do conceptions of scientificity, research 
approaches and self-positioning interrelate? 
Previously in this chapter, in section 2.3., I noted how every research approach 
is more compatible with certain specific procedural methods. Therefore, 
philological research is more likely to take place and acquire useful knowledge 
by applying a certain set of procedures whereas in experimental psychology 
researchers are very likely to make use of a very different set of procedural 
methods. The question of scientificity is clearly part of this picture. How one 
understands the character of one’s research and the ideal end-result one would 
like to reach has a major influence on what kind of an approach one adopts and 
what kind of procedures one prefers to make use of. However, at the same time 
this also works the other way around. Research approaches come with (implicit 
or explicit) goals and ideal states of research that they would like to reach. In 
combination with the select procedures, research approaches thus develop 
understandings about the character of proper scholarship. In short, what I am 
arguing here is that actual research practices guide our understanding of the 
scientific character of research itself, not just the other way around. Concepts and 
ideals of scientificity do not exist or persevere independently from actual 
research. All in all it is this intersection of different research approaches, 
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procedures and understandings of scientificity that brings about the multiplicity 
of meanings method(ology) can acquire. 
Moreover, at the centre of this stands the scholar – the actual practitioner of 
research. As I emphasized in this chapter, the scholar always needs to clarify 
his/her position in relation to his/her supposed research object, method(ologie)s, 
research perspectives and other relevant matters.78 What is particularly interesting 
here is that contemporary proponents of ‘scientific methods’ argue (as I have 
exemplified in the previous chapter and in this chapter) that in a scientific study 
of religion only a very specific epistemological position is available to the scholar 
in order to study religion in the same way as we study any other human pheno-
menon. In addition, that epistemological position (‘methodological naturalism’) 
is decidedly different from what has been commonly understood to lie in the 
centre of the academic study of religions in one form or another (‘neutrality’, 
‘methodological agnosticism’, ‘impartiality’, etc.). Yet, as shown, they argue that 
for a genuinely scientific study of religion that relies on the natural sciences and 
the theory of evolution, methodological naturalism is the only thinkable and even 
possible way to do it. If this turns out to be true it would either require splitting 
the study of religion into multiple separate disciplines or would require a major 
transformation of the existing discipline.79  
 
 
2.6. Conclusion & looking ahead 
In this chapter my aim has been to portray the complexity of method(olog)ical 
matters in the study of religion, highlight the conceptual and theoretical diversity 
of the discussion and propose a three-dimensional scheme to use in analysing this 
debate. As noted earlier, this scheme is not meant as a ‘true description how 
things are’, but rather merely as a heuristic tool. Each of these three dimensions – 
procedures, approaches, positions – is always present in all scholarly research. 
Some combinations are more common than others. For example, philological 
procedures, hermeneutical approach and agnostic position often go hand in hand. 
Alternatively, experimental procedures, evolutionary approach and naturalist 
position are a rather common combination. Following the same research approach, 
using the same procedures, but preferring to position oneself differently is very 
likely to lead to different results. This is a situation Bruce Alton has described 
very accurately:  
 
“That is to say, there is a weblike circularity about the relationship between 
our questions, our methods and our answers. Briefly stated, the important 
strands are as follows. Our aims or questions justify, or operate to help in 
the selection of, our methods; and our methods applied to data justify our 
answers and their verification. But equally, our explanations will be 
                                                                          
78  I will return to this issue of positioning very thoroughly in the seventh chapter. 
79  I will return to the issue whether and what kind of a ’shared foundation’ of scientificity 
could be possible in the sixth chapter. 
 
71 
constrained by our methods: that is, certain outcomes cannot be generated 
by certain methods. And methods are constrained by the type of questions 
we ask” (Alton 1989: 420, emphases in original).  
 
Yet, as I already noted in the very beginning of this chapter, a proper, trustworthy 
method(ology) is widely understood as one of the basic foundations of scientific 
research. But, as I also have noted, academic research is accompanied by dis-
tinctively different understandings of scientificity that in turn can heavily 
influence how we understand our own research, what kind of method(ologie)s we 
prefer to adopt and how we visualize goals of our research. Thus, how we 
understand our method(ology) has a very important role to play in the study of 
religion. As I have detailed in this chapter, treatments of method(ology) have 
expanded in many different directions and have therefore become something 
much more than discussions on method in the very strict sense of the meaning 
(that is, a strict procedure). A very significant part of the methodological discussion 
has dealt with the epistemological position of the scholar. Many scholars have 
emphasized the close connections between methodological and epistemological 
issues, but a closer look will reveal that these seemingly separate aspects are even 
more intertwined than that. These issues are not just closely related, but at times 
analyses of methodology are directly dealing with epistemological questions and 
fundamentally cannot separate matters of method(olog)ical practice from these 
epistemological issues. By this I do not mean to argue that everything method-
(olog)ical is actually epistemological or better thought of as epistemological or 
that epistemological aspects are central to every detail of method(ology). 
Certainly there are method(olog)ical issues, choices of application and problems 
that are not primarily or even in any major way epistemological. However, there 
are also no method(olog)ical issues that have no epistemological aspect to it at 
all. Methodological choices and epistemological choices are too interrelated for 
that. To better understand the context of this methodological-epistemological 
discussion I have analysed the method-debate and proposed one way how to 
better make sense of the whole thing. Most of the epistemological issues are 
inherently and most importantly present in the discussions that deal with the 
question of positioning.  
I will return to these matters in the subsequent chapters as there are some in 
the study of religion who would argue that some research perspectives are 
inevitably bound to specific epistemological positions and their theoretical basis 
does not allow for any alternatives. To determine whether this is indeed so and 
thus, whether study of religion requires ‘a major overhaul’ in its epistemology 
and methodology if it wants to include evolutionary approaches we need to take 
a closer look at related epistemological issues and how they been treated thus far 
in the context of the evolutionary approaches and whether evolutionary theory 









PART II –  
EVOLUTION, EPISTEMOLOGY AND  






3. The problem of epistemological presuppositions and 
inferences in the cognitive, behavioural and  
other evolutionary approaches 
Issues of scientificity and methodology are just one part of the complex situation 
of scholarly self-positioning. As repeatedly noted in the first part of this thesis, a 
thorough analysis of the epistemological aspects of the position of the scholar of 
religion is necessary to get a full picture of the problem at hand. Thus in this 
chapter I am going to focus on the epistemological inferences and presuppositions 
present in behavioural and cognitive sciences of religion. Much of the epistemo-
logical discussion concerning religion has focused on the debate whether one can 
infer anything epistemologically noteworthy from the empirical research carried 
out thus far in the behavioural and cognitive sciences of religion. In the first 
section of this chapter I am going to give an overview of these discussions, 
because they have indeed been central to the whole epistemological discussion. 
Yet, when it comes to the methodological-epistemological position of the scholar, 
the question of presuppositions and presumptions is more immediately relevant 
than that of inferences. Because of that in the second and third section of this 
chapter I will focus on the issue of presuppositions. More specifically, in the 
second section I will be dealing with a certain combination of presuppositions 
that I would describe as the atheistic presumption. This presumption plays a 
major role in the forming of the basic research questions and the kind of potential 
answers these can and cannot receive. Subsequently in the third section of this 
chapter, I will take a look at the concept of naturalism. This is important, since 
naturalism is typically brought out to justify presuppositions that in effect amount 
to the presumption of atheism. All of this is necessary to, so to say, set the stage 
for the fourth chapter where I am going to look at whether epistemological 
positions can be evolutionarily justified or dismissed, placing special attention on 
the question of religion. 
 
 
3.1. The cognitive science of religion and  
the question of epistemological inferences 
Much (if not, most) of the discussion concerning the epistemological inferences 
has focused specifically on the theistic (Christian) God (Barrett 2007b; Leech, 
Visala 2011a; Näreaho 2014; etc.), yet many of these concerns are also important 
for the more generalized discussion concerning religious conceptions of the world 
as well. The reason for this widespread interest in the possible epistemological 
inferences likely resides in the ambitious and outspoken claims many of the 
cognitive researchers have made.  
For one, Scott Atran begins his well-known book by describing religion as a 
“counterfactual” phenomenon that includes “cognitive commitments to factually 
impossible worlds” (Atran 2002: 4). Furthermore, he continues by describing 
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religious beliefs as “anomalous” (Atran 2002: 4) and “materially false” (Atran 
2002: 5) and suggest that everybody, “whether they are religious or not, implicitly 
knows that religion is costly, counterfactual, and even counterintuitive” (Atran 
2002: 5). Even more straightforward are the conclusions of Jesse Bering, who 
describes religion as “one of natural selection’s most successful hoaxes ever” 
(Bering 2011: 8), subsequently analysing it as an illusion (Bering 2011: 44–75) 
humans believe only because human minds have been evolutionary designed to 
believe such things, not because it is actually true. Placing a lot of emphasis on 
the cognitive ‘theory of mind’ functionality (Bering 2011: 167–190), he argues 
that the illusion of God “is an inherent part of our natural cognitive systems” 
(Bering 2011: 200) and “one very important solution to the adaptive problem of 
human gossip” (Bering 2011: 192). Thus, he concludes that religion is a useful 
illusion and the existence of God is very improbable (Bering 2011: 190–196). 
Elsewhere Joseph Bulbulia has argued that based on available psychological data 
and a Bayesian probabilistic approach the likelihood of religious beliefs being 
true is very low (Bulbulia 2013b). Similar arguments can be also found in 
numerous other works, but with the exception of Bulbulia this is mostly limited 
to the cognitive science of religion. Researchers from behavioural ecology and 
other approaches have mostly avoided any arguments about the epistemological 
inferences of their research. For example, a few behavioural ecologists have 
argued that religious beliefs are not permanent states of mind nor homogeneously 
present in the whole community, and neither are they put forth as propositional 
claims about the world, thus it would be misguided to analyse religions as such 
or “evaluate religions as though they offer objective truth claims” (Sosis, Kiper 
2014: 257). 
Still, in the context of the cognitive science of religion this has remained a hot 
topic for some time. Here I am going to review some of the most common argu-
ments – ones that have received the most attention in subsequent epistemological 
discussion. In addition, it is true that these arguments have been discussed and 
argued over in numerous slightly different ways, but for the sake of clarity, I am 
going to generalize them into five most common arguments. However, this 
classification is not intended as any kind of a “true typology” of the complexity 
of arguments that have been presented. This classification is merely a tool 
necessary for presenting a clear overview of the existing arguments in a way that 
enables following the argumentative strand in an easy way as well as helps to 
highlight the main directions these arguments have taken. But obviously these 
arguments are in many ways related to each other and one could certainly also 
present alternative classifications and thus analyse them through a different 
typology. Out of these five here it is definitely the first two that have received most 
attention and weight, one could quite easily argue that the by-product argument 
(3.1.4.) and the conflicting beliefs argument (3.1.5.) are merely more specific 
forms of the unreliability argument (3.1.3.) and there is certainly merit to such an 




3.1.1. The genetic-historical argument 
The first argument concentrates on the historical background of a specific belief 
or conviction. It relies on all the available data we have about the evolutionary, 
cognitive and historical background of a belief to indicate that causal factors 
which brought about this belief relied on the kind of factors that give no reason 
to believe that this belief appeared, because it was at some point in history brought 
about by the state of affairs that this belief itself describes. In other words, if 
research into the background of a belief or a conviction establishes no causal link 
between the belief and its object, this is supposedly an argument against its truth-
fulness. Aku Visala has highlighted the presence of such an argument in the 
writings of Steven Mithen who presents his data and then concludes that “there 
appears to be no need to invoke a moment of divine intervention that initiated the 
start of a revelation. For me, therefore, there is no supernatural, no God to be 
revealed” (cited in Visala 2017: 438). Yet as Visala (2017: 438–439) and others 
(Kahane 2011; Murray 2010; Leech, Visala 2011b; Leech, Visala 2012) are quick 
to point out, one cannot simply infer the non-existence of supernatural beings 
from the mere fact that someone has established a causal explanation for that 
belief that does not directly involve the causal participation of a supernatural being. 
It is possible to assess the content of beliefs (or propositions) independently from 
the causes that brought about the spread of this belief (Leech, Visala 2012: 168–
169; Visala 2017). Every belief humans hold inevitably has some kind of a 
historical background, beliefs do not just appear out of nowhere. We could very 
well highlight a number of other common beliefs and views – for example we 
could point to the social and cultural causes that have led to the appearance of 
contemporary science – but we would not be willing to dismiss science simply 
because such historical explanations exist. Thus, the existence of causal expla-
nations in itself is not enough to disprove the beliefs, understandings or convictions 
we might be or are holding. For that one would need to present additional argu-
ments and proofs. One argument that is closely related to the genetic argument is 
the one I would describe as the sufficient explanation argument. 
 
 
3.1.2. The sufficient explanation argument 
What I would describe as the sufficient explanation argument focuses on 
establishing an explanation for the existence of a belief or a conviction. Here 
results of the cognitive and ecological research are used to present a detailed, full 
explanation of the emergence and development of human religiosity. Relying on 
the cognitive science of religion one can argue that we can account for the 
existence of religious beliefs and practices relying on such cognitive mechanisms 
as HADD, TOM,80 counterintuitiveness, memory functionality (as shown by 
                                                                          




Whitehouse) and so on. Furthermore, placing all of that into the context of the 
evolutionary development of the human species one can supposedly present a 
sufficient explanation for the existence of religiosity without any need to include 
supernatural (beings) in that account. As noted, such an argument is rather closely 
related to the genetic argument – the supposed explanation both of these rely on, 
after all, is the same. Also, it is more often implicitly suggested by cognitive 
scholars than presented in explicit detail (Eyghen 2016).81 But, whereas the 
genetic argument is typically metaphysical (Kahane 2011: 105–109) – arguing in 
favour of the non-existence of supernatural entities – the sufficient explanation is 
rather arguing that based on all the available data it does not make sense to believe 
in the existence of supernatural entities since we can properly account for the 
existence of beliefs about them without any need to include further hypotheses 
about the actions of ‘external agents’ (Eyghen 2016: 970–971).  
Yet, as several scholars are quick to point out, forming an explanation of 
religiosity in itself does not encompass a justification or refutation of religious 
belief (Murray 2009; Jong 2013). Murray for one notes that in such a case 
naturalists would also have to prove that religious beliefs would exist indepen-
dently from the existence (or non-existence) of God. Explanation as such in itself 
does not take us that far (Murray 2009: 173–176). And in addition to that Jong 
notes how all of this can also be explained as the way how God as chosen to 
communicate with us. For that as well we would need some kind of psychological 
mechanisms, otherwise it would be impossible. Therefore, such a ‘full explanation’ 
for a theist can just as well be the explanation of how God has made it possible 
for us to believe in God and communicate with God (Jong 2013). Therefore, 
overall, the fact that it is possible to achieve detailed explanations of religiosity 
that account for its historical development and its multiple dimensions (social, 
psychological, philosophical, cultural, etc.) in a strictly naturalistic manner in 
itself says nothing about the existence or non-existence of supernatural entities. 
 
 
3.1.3. The unreliability argument 
The unreliability argument is perhaps the most intriguing one, since it directly 
addresses the question of what can we learn from evolutionary research about the 
epistemological reliability of our cognition. In short, this argument points out 
how religious beliefs are by-products of cognitive mechanisms that have a strong 
tendency to produce false positives (especially HADD) – they are ‘overly eager’, 
so to say – and this should make us suspicious of our religious intuitions. Therefore 
it is argued that they are simply the result of epistemologically unreliable cognitive 
mechanisms.82 This argument is often accompanied by specifically evolutionary 
                                                                          
81  For example, he notes that this kind of argument is implicitly present in the writings of 
Daniel Dennett. 
82  Clark and Barrett (2011: 665) highlight Dennett and Dawkins as defenders of such an 
argument, among others. 
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arguments that emphasize survival and reproduction as the priorities of 
evolutionary selection and suggest that cognitive mechanisms, which have made 
it possible for us to develop religious beliefs, are not properly truth-tracking enough 
to produce accurate beliefs about the supernatural, thus our religious beliefs are 
most probably not accurate. Occasionally these have been treated as two clearly 
separate arguments (for example, see Murray 2009: 169–171, 176–178), but since 
they are very closely related and are overall presenting the same argument (even 
if forming it slightly differently), they can be analysed together just as well. 
To begin with the second part of the argument, if presented without any 
additional specifications this kind of an argument would also apply to the large 
majority of other aspects of the human life. If accuracy is indeed only relevant to 
the extent that is necessary for basic survival and reproduction, then perhaps our 
cognition overall is flawed? But then this argument faces the problem that by this 
logic empirical science itself would also become questionable and suspicious.83 
To overcome this problem of generalization one would need to make a far more 
detailed argument. This is where one can easily bring in the first part of the 
unreliability argument – supposedly our cognitive mechanisms are particularly 
over-eager and thus produce unusually many false positives. While this kind of a 
specification makes it possible to distinguish more narrowly the focus of the 
argument and avoid the “but then this also applies to science” counter-argument, 
it does not completely solve the problem. After all, even if we limit ourselves to 
such cognitive functions as HADD and TOM we are still faced with the problem 
that supposedly (that is, according to the common understanding of the cognitive 
science of religion) these cognitive mechanisms became common in human popu-
lation, because they were beneficial for human beings. TOM, after all, is under-
stood as the basic mechanism that makes it much easier for us to comprehend and 
analyse other human beings. If one were to argue now that actually TOM and 
HADD are very unreliable, then what about its supposed usefulness in social 
context? After all, if they indeed were producing so many false positives as to be 
epistemologically unreliable, why has the evolutionary selection process not 
selected against such faulty and energy-consuming mechanisms? Also, as noted 
by Kahane, “the role of the off track process in the explanation must be such that 
it leaves no space for the contribution of processes that would, in this context, 
track the truth” (2011: 106). In other words, this kind of a specified argument 
would not just have to show that one or another cognitive mechanism is epistemo-
logically unreliable, it would also have to show that the possibility of epistemologi-
cally more reliable mechanisms compensating for this mechanism’s inadequacy 
is fundamentally out of question. 
                                                                          
83  For an influential analysis of this matter, see Wilkins and Griffiths (2013) who are basically 
arguing that we can show why evolutionarily it makes sense for our daily common sense 
beliefs to be truth-tracking as that would greatly benefit us in the evolutionary process and this 
benefit can be shown to also help us in our scientific practice. However, for a more extensive 
analysis of this matter – how reliable our common sense understandings can be assumed to 
be? – see section 4.1.4. 
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Thus even such a specified argument is problematic as it calls into question 
the evolutionary usefulness of the mechanisms overall (Leech, Visala 2012: 174). 
How are we to judge the epistemological accuracy of these cognitive mechanisms 
without already assuming to know how many agents are there in the world or 
without using these mechanisms to make that judgement? Furthermore, as Justin 
L. Barrett and Ian M. Church note:  
 
“perhaps [false positive] occasions are vastly outnumbered by our failures 
to detect agents and agency all around us. To judge the accuracy of a device, 
a sure standard is required against which to judge the device’s measure-
ments, and it is not at all clear what the sure standard for the presence or 
absence of agents and agency is. If it is true that the world is populated by 
hard-to-detect spirits, then we may be failing to detect agents all the time” 
(Barrett, Church 2013: 323).  
 
Therefore the central problem with this argument really has to do with the 
presumptions we rely on in our judgments concerning the accuracy of the relevant 
cognitive mechanisms. Without a way to independently evaluate the reliability of 
the mechanisms we cannot even make an argument in favour or against their 
reliability without already assuming to know the answers regarding all sorts of 
metaphysical matters.84  
Moreover, one could look at this issue from a very different perspective as 
well and argue that even though our cognitive capabilities do indeed seem limited 
and relatively unreliable, this simply indicates that they are imprecise, but not 
fundamentally flawed. In such a case “humanity’s incipient and primitive moral 
and spiritual impulses, behaviors, and corresponding judgments may be truth-
aimed but coarse-grained” (Clark, Barrett 2011: 666–667). Therefore, “the initial 
function of the god-faculty, if there is a God, may be to make humans aware, in 
the most ordinary of circumstances, of the sacred dimension of reality, rather 
than, for example, clearly defined Judeo-Christian conceptions of God” (Clark, 
Barrett 2011: 667).85 In other words, this kind of a counter-argument points out 
how the unreliability of the cognitive mechanisms does not really tell us a whole 
lot about the correctness of religious beliefs, because it might just as easily be a 
sign of our spiritual imprecision. High-level religious competence in epistemo-
logical matters most likely has never been among the primary selection preferences 
of the evolutionary selection process, thus our cognitive mechanisms might be 
unreliable indeed, but at the same time still ‘heading in the right direction’.  
Overall, there are two ways how to counter this argument. On the one hand, 
one can point to all the other instances where these supposedly unreliable mecha-
nisms are considered reliable and highlight the inconsistency or on the other hand, 
one can show how this unreliability is merely a sign of our cognitive limitations 
in spiritual matters and not proof of its fundamental erroneousness. In any case, 
                                                                          
84  I will return to this issue in far more detail in chapter 4. 
85  A similar argumentation can also be found in Barrett, Church (2013). 
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the unreliability arguments in its current forms do not appear to achieve what they 
wish to achieve.  
 
 
3.1.4. The by-product argument 
Another relatively widespread argument is based on the common conclusion that 
religiosity is a cognitive by-product. As noted in my initial overview, much of 
the cognitive science of religion regards religiosity as a cognitive accident, a by-
product of cognitive adaptations that also became possible through these adapta-
tions, but it was never directly selected for in the evolutionary process. Thus, 
when it comes to religious beliefs our cognitive faculties (with special emphasis 
on HADD and TOM) were never really intended to produce such religious 
beliefs. For many this is enough to argue that religious beliefs are not accurate – 
our cognitive faculties became capable of developing and processing such beliefs 
accidentally, thus as argued by Paul Bloom, religious beliefs are “an incidental 
by-product of cognitive functioning gone awry” (cited in Clark, Barrett 2011: 
662).86 
However, as many are also quick to point out, this argument elicits far bigger 
problems than the mere question, whether religious beliefs are epistemologically 
accurate, because the possibility of developing religious beliefs was never directly 
selected for in the evolutionary process (Murray 2010: 477–478; Clark, Barrett 
2011: 662–664). If showing that something was not directly selected for – that it 
is not an evolutionary adaptation – is enough to argue that it must be epistemo-
logically unreliable, then religious beliefs are far from the only things that would 
become suspect. Large parts of our contemporary culture and society rely on a 
combination of cognitive processes that certainly did not initially appear to per-
form these tasks. The most notable example here is modern science in general. 
Science as developed and practised today is just as much a cognitive by-product 
of cognitive faculties and mechanisms.87 If we are going to question religious 
beliefs like that, we could just as well question evolutionary biology, theoretical 
physics and so on. Yet, this is most probably a consequence that propagators of 
this argument are not that willing to accept. 
Furthermore, this very well highlights the complexity of human development. 
Many if not most of our cognitive functions and capabilities initially developed 
as adaptive responses to one problem or another, but also most if not all of them 
have been later adopted for other uses as well. Richard Sosis has thus emphasized 
that even though specific cognitive, emotional and behavioural elements might 
                                                                          
86  Elsewhere Clark and Barrett (2010: 185–188) also analyse the presence of this argument 
in Scott Atran and others. 
87  The fact that science most certainly is not an intended product of evolutionary selection is 
a widely recognized position in the cognitive science of religion as well, as for example 
witnessed by the well-known book by Robert N. McCauley, titled Why Religion Is Natural 
and Science Is Not (McCauley 2011).  
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have initially developed for different kinds of usages, they were later on exapted88 
for use in the complex system that is human religiosity (Sosis 2009: 323–324).89 
Thus, as aptly summarized by Kelly James Clark and Justin L. Barrett: “Cognitive 
faculties can and do legitimately extend beyond the domains for which they were 
“designed.” Most of our cognitive faculties do double duty: their original, primitive 
survival-enhancing duty and their much later reflective, expansive, life-enhancing 
manifestations” (Clark, Barrett 2011: 664). In sum, the by-product argument should 
be rejected, because we would then also have to reject most of the things that 
argument is based on (research data from evolutionary psychology, evolutionary 
biology, etc.) and because human cognitive faculties do not have to be specifi-
cally designed for every issue they encounter to be able to reliably deal with them. 
 
 
3.1.5. The conflicting beliefs argument 
While not as common and as widely discussed as the previous arguments, this 
argument has also received some attention (see especially Murray 2009: 172–173). 
Basically. the argument takes the following form (Murray 2009: 172): religious 
beliefs are the products our cognitive mechanisms as determined and documented 
by the cognitive science of religion. Yet, as historians and anthropologists have 
shown, human cognitive tools give rise to all sorts of beliefs, many of which are 
mutually incompatible. Thus, religious beliefs arising from theses mechanisms 
cannot be true, since they are in conflict with each other. 
Yet, as several commentators have noted, this argumentation is far too simplistic 
to be convincing (Murray 2009: 172–173; Leech, Visala 2012; Leech, Visala 
2011a). After all, in its most straightforward form it assumes that religious beliefs 
spawn directly from our cognitive organs without any cultural or social modi-
fication. Yet, this is not how cognitive science, evolutionary psychology or any 
other related life science understands the development of the human being. 
Culture plays a huge part in human life as well as in the evolutionary development 
of humans (Donald 2000, Geertz 2010a, Tomasello 1999a, etc.). The cognitive 
science of religion itself as well has shown that our cognitive mechanisms are not 
so rigid as to only produce the exact same results everywhere. HADD only 
produces a tendency to assume something and TOM only enables us to interpret 
certain behavioural signs as indications of directly unobservable mental processes, 
but neither provides humans with fully fleshed out beliefs. To go from such 
cognitive mechanisms to a worldwide diversity of worldviews and beliefs, 
                                                                          
88  To elaborate on the concept of ‘exaptation’, Sosis understands it as a “preexisting trait that 
acquires a new role for which it was not originally designed by natural selection /…/. Import-
antly, exaptations have functional effects but exapted traits are not modified when taking on 
their new role; if they are, adaptive modifications are known as secondary adaptations. 
Exaptations can emerge in two ways. First, they can emerge as an unintended consequence or 
byproduct of selection for another trait. These are non-adaptations that are coopted for a 
functional effect” (Sosis 2009: 323). 
89  For a similar argument see also Dow (2006: 84). 
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cognition requires a lot of “input” from the cultural context. In other words: “the 
diversity is actually produced by the cultural information that elaborates the basic 
intuitions produced by the cognitive mechanisms. The mechanisms themselves 
only produce certain intuitions to which different kinds of elaborated cultural 
constructions can then attach themselves” (Leech, Visala 2012: 174). However, 
if so, then the fact that we have a multitude of conflicting beliefs in this world is 
no longer a counter-argument to the reliability of cognitive faculties that have 
brought about these beliefs. Human cognitive faculties make it possible to 
develop religious beliefs, but this basic capability in itself is open-ended enough 
that it leaves room for many kinds of beliefs to appear. What exactly humans end 
up believing depends on their cultural environment. 
 
 
3.1.6. A few concluding comments 
Overall, this kind of arguments have led scholars to conclude that none of the 
existing debunking arguments can convincingly show the falsity of religious 
beliefs (or that their validity is impossible). Therefore, one could say that there 
appears to be a practical consensus that existing cognitive research on religion has 
little to nothing to say on metaphysical matters regarding the existence of super-
natural entities.90 Although, this does not necessarily mean that such debunking 
arguments are fundamentally impossible. It is possible that results of future 
empirical research accompanied with new kinds of theoretical arguments can 
indeed present bigger challenges than these current arguments. Still, as things are 
right now these arguments have not had much success. It should be noted, though, 
that this does not mean that it is fundamentally impossible to argue against 
religiously held beliefs based on natural sciences. Such arguments are entirely 
conceivable, especially in situations where religious communities rely on beliefs 
about the specifics of the natural world (such as the literally taken versions of 
“the world is 6000 years old” or “Earth is at the centre of the Universe”, etc.), but 
such beliefs would not be disputed based on the cognitive science of religion, 
rather they are debunked based on research from various natural sciences. Here I 
have focused solely on arguments derived from the ‘new sciences of religion’ and 
more specifically from the cognitive science of religion, since no one has really 
tried to derive elaborate debunking arguments from the behavioural ecology or 
from other evolutionary approaches to religiosity. 
As I already pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, the main reason for 
reviewing these arguments and their related discussions has to do with how much 
attention they have received both in scholarly literature as well in more 
                                                                          
90  Aside already discussed and highlighted works, see also Barrett (2007b), Murray, Goldberg 
(2009), Sukopp (2010) and Jong, Kavanagh, Visala (2015). 
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popularizing essays.91 Yet, the argumentation concerning the unreliability 
argument is remarkably similar to many of the issues that will shortly become 
very relevant for the overall perspective of this thesis as well. After all, they touch 
on the major question – whether evolutionary theory as such can be used to justify 
any epistemological positions? In the context of this wider perspective I will 
return to these issues in the fourth chapter. 
However, before turning to such issues there is another aspect to this larger 
topic of epistemology and the new research programmes in need of attention. 
Contrarily to the issue of inferences this aspect is relatively overlooked or at least 
rarely analysed in proper detail. What I have in mind is the issue of epistemo-
logical presuppositions in the new approaches and especially the matter of the 
supposed costliness of religiosity. This matter of presuppositions is a lot more 
directly important for the discussion of scholarly self-positioning as well, since 
positioning is specifically a matter of deciding which kind of presuppositions to 
base one’s research on and which kind of presuppositions to avoid. As I intend to 
show, the basic assumption – religion is an evolutionarily costly phenomenon 
whose costliness requires a special explanation – runs through much of the research 
literature in the evolutionary research programmes. Moreover, this presupposition 
is regularly presented as an epistemological presupposition.  
 
 
3.2. The issue of epistemological presuppositions  
in the evolutionary approaches to religiosity 
Even though it has become common to argue that these new approaches are relying 
on a presumptive atheism (in addition to my own analysis in the earlier sections 
of this chapter, see also N. Barrett 2010, Schröder 2014: 41–45, Schüler 2014: 
13–16, De Cruz 2016: 489–491, etc.), in many cases scholars do not really follow 
up this with detailed explication of this presumptive atheism and how it comes 
about. Therefore, what I intend to do here is analyse one central presupposition – 
the presumptive costliness of religion – that can be found throughout this field of 
research and show how it functions as a epistemological presumption, even though 
most of the time it is not explicitly presented as such.  
 
 
3.2.1. The widespread presumption of costliness 
The idea that religiosity is costly to human beings has been persistently present 
throughout this whole field of research right from the start. In Lawson and 
McCauley’s (1990) initial attempt at presenting a cognitive approach towards 
religiosity, they argue that “not only are religious rituals symbolic, but they seem 
                                                                          
91  After all, one of the more influential articles to implicate that debunking arguments can be 
derived from the cognitive science is Paul Bloom’s article in the widely read non-academic 
magazine, The Atlantic (Bloom 2005). 
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to be actions without instrumental value” (Lawson, McCauley 1990: 137). Similar 
sentiments about the economical and practical uselessness of religiosity can be 
found in many other works as well. Atran (2002: 4–5) for example places the 
costliness of religiosity at the centre of his basic understanding of religion, saying 
that it is one of the three central characteristics of religion, subsequently arguing 
that religion is “materially expensive and unrelentingly counterfactual” (Atran 
2002: 4), therefore religious practice “is costly in terms of material sacrifice” (Atran 
2002: 4), “materially false” (Atran 2002: 5) and “costs resources that rarely are 
fully repaid” (Atran 2002: 6). Rüdiger Vaas (2009: 25–26) also understands 
religion as the greatest challenge to human sociobiology. For him religion similarly 
is a problem, since from an economic perspective religiosity appears as a “surplus 
luxury” (Vaas 2009: 25) and “the time and effort expended on it could be saved 
and better invested in seeking food and mates and raising one’s own offspring or 
the progeny of close relatives” (Vaas 2009: 25). Likewise, David Sloan Wilson 
argues that religion “often appears dysfunctional, because the costs are so con-
spicuous. Religious folk are expected to give their time, their money, their identity, 
and even their lives when necessary” (Wilson 2002: 162). Subsequently he 
emphasizes the opportunities religious people have to give up and the added costs 
of adopting beliefs and practices that remain inexplicable to outsiders (later 
emphasizing the practical benefits of altruism and cooperation, thus group-based 
adaptation).92 
Elsewhere, Edward Slingerland puts forth almost exactly the same line of 
thought as he notes that from an evolutionary perspective the very existence of 
religion “seems a bit odd” (Slingerland 2008: 453) and that religion includes “the 
expenditure of vast amounts of time and resources for no obvious material benefit” 
(Slingerland 2008a: 453). Similarly, Uffe Schjoedt finds that religion “is charac-
terized by excessive and non-functional behavior” (Schjoedt 2013: 474) and thus 
phenomena like prayers, rituals, pilgrimages and so on are “causally disconnected 
from immediate and tangible rewards” (Schjoedt 2013: 474). This Schjoedt 
contrasts with secular actions that he argues are “motivated and compensated by 
concrete and tangible rewards” (Schjoedt 2013: 474). Boyer and Liénard (2006) 
have pursued this line of thought even further, arguing that rituals in general are 
an evolutionary puzzle, since they involve a notable waste of time and resources 
(Boyer, Liénard 2006: 612). 
And of course the very idea – from an evolutionary perspective religiosity is 
a costly phenomenon – lies at the centre of the costly signalling theory of religion, 
as highlighted in section 1.1.2. (Sosis 2003, 2006; Bulbulia 2004a, 2014; Sosis, 
Bulbulia 2011; Sosis, Kiper 2014). Since I have already described the costly 
signalling theory in some detail earlier I am not going to go into it as thoroughly 
again here. The supposed futility of this historically extremely persistent and 
widespread phenomenon is the central evolutionary problem that requires 
explanation – without it there would be no need for the theory itself. But by 
                                                                          
92  Sansom (2003) has also highlighted how the theory put forth by Wilson relies on the 
assumption that religiosity must be costly to human individually. 
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explaining this costliness, one has also explained religion as such. I have 
highlighted all these examples from the works of the more cognitively oriented 
scholars to show that this kind of a premise is definitely present in other research 
programmes as well. It is definitely not just limited to the costly signalling theory.  
 
 
3.2.2. Optimality, foraging and costliness 
It is important to notice how this understanding of costliness evolutionarily relies 
on an idealized conception of optimality, in other words – what the perfectly 
optimized organism would do (Maynard Smith 1978; Parker, Maynard Smith 
1990; El Mouden et al 2012)? Also, on a more general level such an approach 
very much relates to the optimal foraging theory that is quite well known and 
widely applied in the evolutionary research (Pyke, Pulliam, Charnov 1977; 
Winterhalden 1981).93 As noted by Parker and Maynard Smith, optimality theory 
relies on the premise that adaptation is a pervasive feature of all organisms and it 
can be best analysed from the perspective of natural selection (Parker, Maynard 
Smith 1990). This is something that should appear familiar to anyone acquainted 
with evolutionary research on religion. Whether religiosity is an adaptation or 
how it relies on adaptations has at times even been the central question to the 
whole field of studies (cf. Sosis 2009; Pyysiäinen, Hauser 2010; Powell, Clarke 
2012). However, as noted by Parker and Maynard Smith (1990: 27–29), the 
criterion of optimization is something researchers themselves must choose. Also, 
one has to make assumptions about the fitness consequences of the different 
strategies. So, as noted by Maynard Smith, “in foraging theory, the common 
assumption is that the animal is maximizing its energy intake per unit time spent 
foraging” (1978: 34).  
I would argue that much of the evolutionary study of religion also relies on 
this kind of an assumption of optimality – ideally human beings would always 
try to gain as much energy and material resources with as little effort as realisti-
cally possible for the human species.94 And, from such a perspective, many things 
in human culture do not quite have immediately obvious uses. However, this is 
                                                                          
93  It deserves to be mentioned that at least in one instance such an emphasis on the idealized 
concepts of perfection and optimality have made a commentator note that such arguments in 
evolutionary biology are remarkably similar to theology. Indeed, he argues (with the help of 
many examples and thorough analysis) that in many cases evolutionary biologists are utilizing 
implicitly theological arguments when they develop such theoretical models (Nelson 1996)! 
94  In addition to all the examples I have already discussed, it is worth mentioning that in his 
famous book Boyer (2001: 120, also 150–155) argues that there are two essential types of 
goods for humans (without which existence is impossible): information about the world around 
them and the willing cooperation of other humans. Obviously, this is very similar to the 
optimality and costly foraging perspective – there as well information about the world is 
essential for the organism. The more you know about the world the better you can plan your 
resource gathering, all in all spending as little energy as possible to obtain as much resources 
as possible.  
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not an empirically observable fact or an inevitable consequence of the evolu-
tionary theory. Rather, it is simply a common assumption that much of the optimal 
foraging approach relies on. This is something Pyke, Pulliam and Charnov also 
noted in their classic article:  
 
“In general, there is no recipe for determining just what the currency and 
constraints should be in a particular situation, and it will always be the job 
of the naturalist to understand the biology of an animal sufficiently well to 
know which currency is being optimized. In almost all optimal foraging 
studies to date the currency has been assumed to be the net rate of energy 
intake, and the basic hypothesis has been that this intake rate will be 
maximized” (Pyke, Pulliam, Charnov 1977: 138).95  
 
And in most studies this certainly makes sense. However, most research that 
focuses on optimality is also not dealing with topics such as religious beliefs. This 
is a theoretical choice a researcher has to make, but without such theoretical 
choices, empirical research is not possible.  
 
 
3.2.3. The epistemological costliness of religiosity 
Now, having made that choice and having decided that only energy96 and eco-
nomical and material benefits can count as a currency in the study of human 
beings, advocates of the new evolutionary approaches are indeed facing the basic 
problem that religious beliefs and practices do not really appear to help humans 
in any notable way. Religiosity does not appear to increase fitness, evolutionarily 
speaking. But, this definitely does not mean that religious people do not have 
elaborate reasons why this or that practice is vitally important. However, for these 
evolutionary researchers such explanations are unacceptable, since they involve 
references to phenomena that are understood as being more than this material 
world here or wholly beyond this material world here. Evolutionary researchers 
describe such explanations simply as invocations of “somewhat unusual onto-
logical assumptions” (Lawson, McCauley 1990: 137) or explicitly as errors of 
judgement and “religious mistakes” (Bulbulia 2007: 622). In such an evolutionary 
perspective there is simply no room for any kind of explanations of religiosity 
that included anything not strictly naturalistic-materialistic.97 Proper evolutionary 
explanations from this perspective may involve only naturalistic phenomena and 
                                                                          
95  Furthermore, the genuinely optimal way of foraging has never existed and cannot ever 
exist. It is a theoretical ideal wholly dependent on the model the researcher has constructed 
(for criticism of this issue, see van der Steen 1999). 
96  Generally, this means energy acquired through eating. 
97  One explicit example from David Sloan Wilson’s well-known book: “Along with Durkheim, 
I predict that most enduring religions survive on the basis of their secular utility. Their design 
features include belief systems that, no matter how otherworldly, have the effect of motivating 




thus depicting religious phenomena as costly is not limited just to economical 
costliness, but also entails the suggestion that religious beliefs must be epistemo-
logically costly.  
In this sense, this application of the idea of costliness is also notably different 
from its usage in the evolutionary biology. Scholars there focus on ‘energy 
intake’ and on how much (or how little) time and effort it took to acquire that 
energy. At the same time biologists also rely on their knowledge about animal 
behaviour – and as far as we can tell animals are indeed looking for sources of 
energy. In other words, the ‘currency’ of the practice is the same both for the 
researched species and for the researcher.98 But not so, when we come to 
religiosity! Here researchers rely on the presumption that the currency cannot be 
what religious people themselves understand as such. This leads us to the 
assumption of epistemological costliness. 
Occasionally this insistence on the epistemological costliness is also put forth 
in explicit detail. Joseph Bulbulia has been the researcher who has most thoroughly 
pursued this line of argumentation. His depictions of religiosity as costly are not 
just limited to issues of economical and practical sub-optimization. He also raises 
the question of epistemological costliness, in other words: “how can they go so 
badly wrong without injuring themselves, in the way schizophrenics do?” (Bulbulia 
2009: 45).99 This is an issue of epistemological costliness – if ‘supernatural expla-
nations’ of beliefs, practices and events are fundamentally ruled out and people 
still insist on them, then they must be understanding the world wrong. But in such 
a case religiosity is not just economically costly, but also epistemologically 
costly. This is where Bulbulia picks up an argument that very much reminds 
evolutionary epistemology, noting that such a tendency to “systematically err in 
their judgements” (Bulbulia 2007: 622) is puzzling, because “cognition evolved 
to enable agents to get the world right” (Bulbulia 2007: 622). If this is indeed the 
case, then “selection should have weeded out cognitive features that allow us to 
produce religious mistakes” (Bulbulia 2007: 622). Heavily relying on Durkheim, 
Wilson has also pursued this same line of thought, emphasizing the broad 
adaptiveness of human capacity for thought, but then arguing that religion “has 
no function and can be costly to the extent that it misrepresents the world and 
leads to inappropriate behaviors” (Wilson 2002: 53), because “religious belief is 
such a poor representation of the natural world, its “secular utility” must reside 
elsewhere” (Wilson 2002: 54). This is the argument of epistemological costliness 
in its most explicit form – if only naturalistic explanations are possible and 
religious explanations are not naturalistic, then from a naturalistic-evolutionary 
perspective religious beliefs are indeed epistemologically costly. Based on such 
a logic religious people are spending significant amounts of cognitive resources 
                                                                          
98  Just to be clear, it should be noted that this in no way contradicts the existence of costly 
signalling among animals – signalling can be costly just as well when the ‘currency’ of the 
practice is energy for both parties. 
99  He immediately notes, though, that despite this mind-boggling problem, there is no reason 
to think that religious people are not sane. 
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to hold on to views that do not bring about any advantages in the evolutionary 
selection.100  
The question, whether or to what extent cognition indeed did evolve to help 
people “get the world right” is something I will return to in explicit detail in a 
subsequent chapter as I analyse evolutionary epistemology, but for now it is 
important to see how such economic and epistemological presuppositions of cost-
liness are very closely related to each other. After all, those economic costs would 
not be that costly at all, if it were not for the presumption that the benefits people 
claim to receive from religious practices (the good will of (a) divine being(s) or 
other such explanations) cannot possibly be true. Religious beliefs and practices 
begin to appear costly when we assume them to be wrong and thus also useless. 
But if the explanations religious people themselves offer to explain their 
behaviour, turned out to be right, such behaviour would be everything but costly. 
Rather, it would turn out be extremely efficient. After all, if going to the church 
every Sunday, following all the necessary ethical norms and having faith in God 
is all it takes to gain eternal life, then these are but minor investments compared 
to the expected, eventual profits. Or, we could think of analogous examples from 
various other religious traditions. In any case, presumptions of economical 
costliness and epistemological costliness are inherently intertwined in the new 
evolutionary sciences – without epistemological presumptions religious practices 
would not appear economically costly. 
 
 
3.2.4. A few concluding comments 
There have been a few attempts to reconceptualise religion as an evolutionary 
phenomenon in such a way that it would not inherently assume the costliness of 
religion. Murray and Moore (2009) most notably highlight the way the costly 
signalling theory relies on both the assumption of practical costliness and the 
assumption of epistemological costliness (Murray, Moore 2009: 230–231). Sub-
sequently they argue that the costly signalling model relies on a rather proble-
matic conception of the origin of religion and it is far easier to show that religion 
is not a case of costly signalling, but a case of index signalling101 and therefore 
religion can be shown to be a form of signalling that does not include inevitable 
costs. However, such discussions are the exception, not the rule. Mostly 
                                                                          
100  Of course, as one might suspect, this is nothing new to the study of religion. Many earlier 
accounts of religion have relied on rather similar presumptions, they have simply presented 
them differently. As Gavin Flood notes: “The history of religions in many naturalist accounts 
(such as Freud’s) is inevitably the history of error which must be explained in the light of 
Enlightenment reasons: a view that is behind traditional sociological and psychoanalytic 
studies of religion” (Flood 1999: 70). 
101  Index signalling means the kind of signals that are impossible to fake. These signals are 
always and inevitably true, whenever and wherever one encounters them. Furthermore, it is 
also immediately obvious too all involved parties that they are true. For a straightforward 
example of such a signalling, see Sosis (2006: 66). 
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evolutionarily oriented scholars have not found it necessary to question or even 
analyse how they are presuming the costliness of religion.  
Instead, these researchers have regularly emphasized the validity of methodo-
logical naturalism as the basis of all scientific research and have justified these 
assumptions of costliness as inevitable parts of the research position. Of course, 
one could also portray this whole story the other way around – first highlight 
methodological naturalism as the premise and then show how the presumptions 
of costliness arise out of it. But, here I have chosen the alternative path – first 
look at the detailed assumptions as they appear in actual research approaches and 
then look at the reasons how these researchers have justified their presumptions.  
Obviously, relying on some kind of underlying assumptions is inevitable in 
scientific research. These assumptions form the foundational basis of one’s 
research. However, even so one needs to justify one’s premises – or in other 
words, favouring one or another epistemological position – and show that the 
assumptions are preferable to other assumptions one could alternatively rely on. 
This is exactly the case here.102 And this is what various scholars have indeed 
done – there are extensive discussions concerning ‘naturalism’, ‘methodological 
naturalism’ and ‘metaphysical naturalism’ in various adjacent disciplines. There-
fore, to properly evaluate the justifiability of (methodological) naturalism as the 
basis of evolutionary research on religion (and the exclusion of alternatives), these 
discussions and arguments deserve a closer look. 
 
 
3.3. Naturalism in evolutionary research –  
as a presupposition and as a position 
Predictably, discussions about the many types of naturalism are very extensive, 
stretching over multiple disciplines and acquiring distinct forms in most of 
them.103 Thomas Sukopp (2007) for example talks about ontological, methodo-
logical and epistemological naturalism.104 For Sukopp ontological naturalism 
means the assertion that there is nothing beyond the natural realm, the world, 
cosmos, universe is all there is, whereas epistemological naturalism asserts that 
if knowledge-generating processes are part of the one and only natural world and 
rely on scientific methods, then we should trust science in its ability to sometimes 
answer epistemological questions (Sukopp: 2007: 79–80). On the other hand, one 
of the leading naturalistic philosophers, Gerhard Vollmer (2007) proposes an 
elaborate, twelve-point list of the main positions of naturalism which (curiously!) 
                                                                          
102  For example, ‘methodological agnosticism’ has always been regarded as a strong alternative 
position to ‘methodological naturalism’ (or ‘methodological atheism’ for that matter). All of 
these I already described and analysed in the second chapter and I will return to these choices 
again in the last chapters. 
103  For a thorough overview of the diverse and extensive debate about naturalism see the two 
collections of articles, Gasser (ed.) (2007) and Clark (ed.) (2016). 
104  On top of that, he does note that some also distinguish metaphilosophical and analytical 
naturalism (Sukopp 2007: 78).  
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at the same time emphasizes ‘as little metaphysics as possible’ and the need to 
rely on ‘realism’ among its central points (Vollmer 2007: 209–41). In addition, 
Vollmer also declares the scientific method the most trustworthy way to acquire 
knowledge, the material-energetic nature of all that exists and so on (Vollmer 
2007: 29–41). In other words, even well-known naturalists cannot quite agree on 
the exact characteristics of naturalism. Still, in the context of the issues raised in 
the previous chapters, such disagreements are only relevant for the purposes of 
being aware of the wider background discussions. After all, the form of naturalism 
we are interested here is the one advocated by the evolutionary scholars of 
religion as highlighted in the second chapter of this thesis (but in relation to their 
conception of scientificity also in the first chapter). As shown, that concept of 
methodological naturalism is similar to Sukopp’s concept of ontological 
naturalism, as they emphasize the need to understand religiosity as a solely human 
phenomenon and insist that scientific research should only presume the existence 
and causal relevance of naturally occurring phenomena; supernatural or supra-
natural or non-natural phenomena should not be included in scientific research or 
scientific explanations. However, they also emphasize that they are only using 
this position as a methodological premise or as a kind of an epistemological 
starting point, and they are not actually advocating ontological naturalism as 
such. They argue that they are not making ontological claims, they are merely 
using a simple set of ontological premises to establish the starting point of their 
research.105 In other words, they are not so much denying the existence of the 
presumptions (and the subsequent conclusions) that I highlighted in the previous 
sections of this chapter, as they are claiming that these are vital and inevitable 
characteristics of any properly scientific research program. For the sake of clarity 
and precision I have decided to split this complex set of arguments into separate 
parts that can be highlighted and analysed one by one.  
 
 
3.3.1. The universal acceptance argument 
The first and possibly the simplest argument has to do with the widespread 
commonality of naturalistic research practices – if scientific practice in general 
relies on such a premise, then this must be acceptable for the study of religion as 
well. Basically, the naturalistic premise is justified through its prevalence – “this 
is the way we do science”. One can find this assertion in Bulbulia (2007: 621–
623), but also in many other research papers and systematic treatments. All of 
this I have already highlighted in section 1.2.1., so there is no need to take up all 
those arguments and premises again.106  
                                                                          
105  Again, for a detailed explication of their position with detailed references and quotations, 
see the discussion in the second chapter. 
106  Also see Ruse (2005) who similarly argues that methodological naturalism “is what natural 
science is all about” (Ruse 2005: 84). 
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In the context of the epistemological issues, it is here important to notice that 
this argument does not even try to justify naturalism epistemologically. Quite 
obviously, the supposed scientific consensus in itself says little to nothing about 
the assertion’s epistemological justifiability. The more fundamental justification 
for this argument should be derived either from additional, specifically epistemo-
logical arguments that indeed do show that we should prefer the naturalistic 
premise in our scientific endeavours to alternative possibilities. Otherwise, as 
bluntly argued by Roger Trigg (1998: 33–36, but see also 46–47, 76–80), we 
would end up with a kind of an implicit scientism where scientific practice is 
justified through its faithfulness to a specific ideology and vice versa.  
Advocates of naturalism have indeed proposed such additional arguments as 
well. Before turning to those arguments another aspect of this argument deserves 
some attention. Namely, it relies on an understanding that generally science is 
done in the same way across diverse fields, asking for the same fundamental 
questions and measuring success with the same criterion. As noted in 1.2.1., this 
‘measuring stick of scientificity’ is based on a selective and idealized under-
standing of the natural sciences. All other fields of research should thus strive 
towards the ideal most closely attained in the natural sciences. Yet, it is not quite 
so obvious that this is definitely true. Finding universal laws of nature might be 
deliberate and almost common practice in physics, but one would be hard-pressed 
to say what the universal laws of nature are in biology.107 Furthermore, as 
methodically explicated by Carol E. Cleland (2001, 2002), there are many natural 
sciences – geology most notably – that are not experimental in that sense at all. 
Instead, these sciences rely on a rather different scientific procedure than 
explicitly experimental sciences. For Cleland this gives cause for arguing that 
there are fundamental methodological and epistemological differences between 
historical (geology, biology, astronomy, paleontology, archaeology, etc.) and 
experimental sciences.108 
                                                                          
107  ‘Evolutionary selection’ or other evolutionary mechanisms would not really qualify as 
rules of nature as they do not really predict anything. But that is the whole point of general 
laws of nature in physics – to be able to predict what will happen when (except for quantum 
physics, of course). Evolution, on the other hand, is supposed to be deliberately unpredictable. 
No matter how well evolutionary biology knows the processes of evolutionary selection, 
adaptation, mutation and so on, all of this still does not make it possible to predict what any 
species will develop into in the next fifty thousand or five hundred thousand years. Evolu-
tionary biology can merely tell us what basic evolutionary processes are part of this develop-
ment, it cannot predict the end result (like, for example, physics can predict the expected 
remaining lifespan of our Sun).  
108  As she puts it: „In summary, although there is overlap, there are nonetheless fundamental 
methodological differences between historical science and experimental science vis-à-vis the 
testing of hypotheses. These differences in methodology reflect the fact that experimentalists 
and historians typically find themselves in very different epistemic situations. Experimentalists 
are primarily concerned with evaluating repeatable generalizations. Their research is focused 
on generating predictions from a single (sometimes complex) hypothesis, and manipulating 
repeatable test conditions in a lab while controlling for extraneous factors that might produce 
false positives and false negatives. Scientists engaged in prototypical historical work, on the 
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Furthermore, advocates of naturalism like to emphasise the need to find causes 
for the religious phenomena we are studying. Finding the true cause(s) of the 
studied phenomenon is supposed to be a general common feature of all scientific 
research. Yet, this supposed general commonality of all science is severely 
complicated by the general lack of interest in ‘causes’ in contemporary physics. 
Hans Halvorson summarizes this in a blunt manner: “if you open any textbook of 
quantum field theory, you will find no use of the word “cause.” But if funda-
mental physics is not seeking the causes of things, then science doesn’t generally 
seek to discover the causes of things … causation isn’t a central notion in funda-
mental science” (Halvorson 2016: 146).109 What Halvorson instead considers 
central to all scientific research is its systematicity: “systematicity is in fact the 
feature that distinguishes scientific knowledge from other forms of knowledge” 
(Halvorson 2016: 137). For him above all science is a systematic way of acquiring 
truths about the world around us: “scientific method – when it’s working well – 
systematically generates truths about the natural world” (Halvorson 2016: 147).110 
As such, Halvorson as a physicist and as a philosopher of science quite clearly 
disagrees with these advocates and their presumed common characteristics of 
scientific research. But, the point here is not that we should prefer one set of a 
common characteristics to another, rather this supposed universal commonality 
is not as easily (if at all) definable as advocates of this argument make it sound. 
As noted, even within natural sciences different disciplines include distinctively 
separate emphases and goals. Yet, the naturalist here could well argue that all this 
might be true, but with regards to the presumption of naturalism all the natural 
sciences are in an agreement, regardless of their other disagreements. Because of 
that, additional epistemological arguments also need to be looked at. 
 
 
3.3.2. The successfulness argument 
Another argument often used to justify naturalism in the cognitive, behavioural 
and other evolutionary approaches to religion appeals to the successfulness of 
natural sciences and suggests that this success in itself shows how and why 
naturalism ought to be preferred to alternative positions. Basically, it is argued 
                                                                          
other hand, are primarily concerned with evaluating hypotheses about particular past events. 
They cannot reproduce these events in a lab. They can, however, look for present-day traces 
of them, and search for a smoking gun that unambiguously sets apart one hypothesis as the 
best among the currently available explanations for the traces thus far observed” (Cleland 
2002: 486–487). 
109  Reutlinger (2017) also points out many additional ways how scientific explanation does 
not have to be causal at all. Causal explanations for him do play a role in scientific research, 
but they are far from the only option for a researcher. 
110  It should be noted that Halvorson is far from being alone in this. Elsewhere Hoyningen-
Huene (2013) has developed a book-length defence of the thesis that increased level of 
systematicity is the universal feature that distinguishes scientific knowledge from all other 
types of knowledge. 
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that natural sciences have shown themselves to be progressive sciences that 
accumulate knowledge, discard implausible interpretations and converge on a 
specific set of widely-accepted views. Contrarily to this the current situation in 
humanities (and thus much of the study of religion) is described as a “methodo-
logical confusion and malaise” (Slingerland 2014: 122). Naturalism is therefore 
justified through practice – it has turned out to be a successful way of researching 
the natural environment in many other sciences, thus it must be getting enough 
things right about the world around us.111 However, study of religion “has for the 
most part yet to produce any progressive research programs” (Slingerland, 
Bulbulia 2011: 312). Naturalistic study of religion would then also justify itself 
through its successfulness. Religious studies can offer empirically testable 
hypotheses that can then be tested to bring about a cumulative intellectual growth 
and make it possible to distinguish scientifically reliable knowledge from mere 
speculation (Slingerland, Bulbulia 2011: 308–312; Bulbulia 2013a: 144–153). 
This in practice would justify the application of naturalism – we would no longer 
be stuck in this hopeless plurality of views and would actually have a proper metho-
dology that made it possible to evaluate all the different existing approaches 
based on the same standard. Thus, naturalism ought to be accepted and adopted 
in the study of religion so that this discipline as well would develop into a 
progressive science. 
Yet, such a justification of naturalism has several problems, all of which in 
one way or another are related to the question how should we assess the 
successfulness of different religious studies research programmes? In the context 
of similar experimental research hypotheses, the answer to this can be fairly 
obvious and this is what the advocates of this argument have emphasized as well. 
However, religious studies is a far more diverse and complex discipline than, say, 
strictly experimental psychology. A simple analogy with experimental natural 
sciences does not give us a clear criterion for evaluating analogous anthropo-
logical fieldwork projects. Furthermore, how to assess the successfulness of 
comparable interpretative analyses of textual sources is even less clear than that. 
Of course, for persistent naturalists hermeneutically inclined philological and 
(cultural) anthropological research is not proper academic research anyway as 
they do not include scientific hypotheses or other distinctive features of scientific 
research (for example see Bulbulia, Wilson, Sibley 2014: 168–170; for criticism 
of such views see Taves 2012, but also section 1.2.2. in general).  
Simply dismissing some prominent research does not solve the problem of 
proper criteria as the successfulness argument emphasizes the need to integrate 
and synchronize all existing sciences. Simply throwing out all approaches that do 
not fit the proposed ideal would not so much justify the application of naturalism 
                                                                          
111  Among well-known naturalists who are not specifically focused on the study of religion 
Vollmer (2007: 41–43) also argues in a similar fashion, suggesting that although naturalism is 
rather a philosophical position than an empirically proven hypothesis, it is justified through 




as suggest that the ideal is reachable by abandoning large parts of the discipline 
as we know it right now. This of course might not be that problematic at all, if it 
were not for the issue that there are good reasons to argue that approaches not 
driven by hypotheses have actually been remarkably successful in the past century 
or so – but yes, only if one adopts a somewhat different criterion for measuring 
success. Namely, philological research (while, to an extent, relying on 
archaeology) has managed to uncover, decipher and interpret thousands and 
thousands of new textual sources in the past few centuries that have become 
essential for our understanding of many past and present cultures and religions. 
Without all the knowledge we have gained through such research we would know 
very little if anything about many past religious traditions or about the past of still 
existing religious traditions. The same goes for anthropological research – 
although mostly not hypothesis-driven and instead largely hermeneutical and 
descriptive, without all that anthropological work we would know very little 
about the religious beliefs and practices of most people in the world. In other 
words, these disciplines have made unknown or forgotten events, worldviews and 
groups of people knowable and analysable. It is therefore entirely possible to 
show just how successful these disciplines have been, but one would then 
highlight that ‘success’ not by appealing to the uncovering of fundamental causes 
or by its ability to conclusively rule out alternatives, rather attention would be 
drawn to our immensely expanded and improved knowledge about other cultures 
and religions of the world.  
It is of course true that despite all that success, philologically or anthropo-
logically inclined interpretive research often struggles with ruling out alternative 
interpretations and there appear to be multiple, competing interpretations and 
explanations for most religious phenomena. Yet, the fact alone that we can be 
arguing over the proper interpretation of some Sumerian myth or some vernacular 
Indonesian religious practice clearly proves that textual and anthropological 
research programmes have had quite a lot of success – without them such dis-
cussions would be impossible as we would not know much anything about 
Sumerians or indigenous Indonesian peoples anyway. Furthermore, as emphasized 
and highlighted already earlier – much of the research in these new sciences of 
religion relies on the existence of this abundance of ethnographic and philological 
data.112  
In other words, these research programmes are unsuccessful and not progressive 
only if we evaluate them based on the very strict and narrow criteria of the 
naturalists. If so, this argument becomes dependant on accepting a specific 
conceptualization of ideal scientific practice, but if one does not accept that, one 
can rather easily show how non-naturalistic research programmes have had a lot 
of success. As such, the successfulness argument cannot be considered particularly 
successful. If it were true that non-experimental and non-hypothesis-driven 
research indeed has not had any notable success (regardless of which academi-
cally acceptable criterion one used to measure it) and found itself at a standstill, 
                                                                          
112  Concerning this see also section 1.2.4. and Peedu 2016. 
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then this argument would have a point, but as it is right now, it relies on accepting 
numerous other presumptions and clauses to become convincing. And what is 
even more perplexing, proponents of this argument are themselves extensively 
relying on data derived from the academic fields of research that they elsewhere 
dismiss as problematic and inadequate. 
 
 
3.3.3. The argument of ‘no ontology’ 
This argument takes a rather different path than the previous two. Instead of 
trying to justify the choice of (epistemological or metaphysical) presumptions, it 
argues that they are in fact not even trying to defend or justify naturalism, but are 
merely using it as a methodological starting point, as basic guidelines for research. 
In other words, this argument takes us back to the issue of ‘methodological 
naturalism’ that I initially analysed in the context of all the different meanings 
‘method(ology)’ has (had) in the study of religion. There113 I pointed out how it 
would make sense to talk about ‘methodological naturalism’, ‘methodological 
agnosticism’ and other analogous ‘methods’ as ways of self-positioning and not 
as choices of method(ology) in the narrow sense of the term. However, ‘methodo-
logical naturalism’ as portrayed by its advocates is not merely an attempt at 
describing their epistemological standing point, it also serves as an argument in 
defence of naturalism.  
As I noted earlier, it is argued that methodological naturalism is not in itself 
really a doctrine or a metaphysical position, it merely functions as a basic 
rulebook of sorts as it is typically argued. This basic rulebook is said to reject any 
kind of supernatural causation in theories and hypotheses and emphasizes the 
need to be able to test any proposed explanations against openly available evidence 
(see also Dawes 2011, Bulbulia, Slingerland 2012). However, in this context it is 
important to note that at the same time methodological naturalism is claimed to 
be practically free of any deliberate ontology. Bulbulia and Slingerland (2012: 
567, 569) equate minimal ontological commitments and methodological 
naturalism. McCauley similarly argues that contemporary naturalistic approaches 
“remain noncommittal with regard to the array of metaphysical assumptions in 
which religions and their believers routinely traffic” (McCauley 2016: 462). 
Furthermore, this methodological perspective is supposed to inspire “caution, if 
not outright abstemiousness, with regard to related metaphysical and epistemo-
logical issues” (McCauley 2016: 462).  
This is in effect what the argument of no ontology is about: methodological 
naturalism is not a metaphysical, ideological or philosophical position, it makes 
no claims about what the world around us is actually like. It merely uses a basic 
set of propositions as methodological guidelines to put in place a frame of 
reference to enable empirical research. If so, then naturalism as advocated and 
                                                                          
113  See section 2.4. 
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practised is not really a problem, since it is merely used as a toolbox to advance 
research. 
Is this actually true? Can one position oneself as a methodological naturalist 
without also in practice be(com)ing a metaphysical naturalist? This is something 
many have been rather sceptical about (Trigg 1998: 76–80; Gasser, Stefan 2007; 
Blum 2011; Slife, Starks, Primosch 2014; McLaughlin 2005). The problem is 
fairly straightforward. If we are going to do research in such a way that we 
exclude the possibility anything non-natural interacting (causally or otherwise) 
with anything in the natural world, we are in effect presuming the kind of world 
where events, agents and other phenomena that are not strictly natural have no 
practical relevance. Therefore, whenever anyone invokes the relevance of anything 
like that, an alternative explanation needs to be found for this that can explain the 
situation without the need to include that non-natural aspect. In this way it might 
still just be a ‘methodological’ commitment, but effectively such a research 
approach treats the world as if metaphysical naturalism is true. In theory it does 
not completely exclude the possibility of a ‘supernatural incursion’ at any point 
in time or space, but all its hypotheses, empirical research and theories are built 
on the assumption that actually everything we see in the world can be explained 
solely through shared experiences and empirical research and therefore this 
theoretical possibility is not particularly important. Or as Slife, Starks and 
Primosch describe this situation: “Supernatural events, in this case, are presumed 
to be not only unimportant in themselves but also separable from the natural so 
that they do not need to be taken into account to fully understand the natural” 
(Slife, Starks, Primosch 2014: 342). There is no room for ‘miracles’ or ‘super-
natural causes’ of any other events, the world as studied and depicted by the 
methodological naturalist appears for all intents and purposes the same as that of 
the metaphysical naturalist. With the minor exception of the very beginning. The 
‘deist option’ is still available for the religious person who wants to place the 
naturalist theories into one’s own larger framework, but all other options are in 
practice ruled out.  
Yet, this is hardly a proper position of ‘no ontology’. If in actual practice the 
only difference between methodological naturalism and metaphysical naturalism 
comes down to the nuance that a methodological naturalist is leaving the door 
open for the theoretical possibility that (s)he could be potentially rebutted by a 
supernatural phenomenon, then the true difference between a methodological 
naturalist and a metaphysical naturalist is not exactly noteworthy. This is also 
why another commentator has noted how it makes little sense to argue that 
methodological naturalism acts as a set of rules to follow:  
 
“This term is something of a misnomer: it can be misleading because it 
seems to suggest that naturalism or materialism is being used heuristically, 
as an assumption to be legitimated by its producing fruitful hypotheses and 
successful research programs. But naturalism is not a heuristic, it is a 




Methodological naturalism as portrayed by its advocates in/for the study of 
religion is indeed rather a set of presuppositions to be relied on epistemologically 
whenever struggling with multiple alternative explanatory choices. All in all we 
arrive at a situation where methodological naturalism and metaphysical naturalism 
do differ in theory, but unless a deliberate and obvious ‘incursion by supernatural’ 
takes place there will never be notable differences between them in practice. This 
has caused many to argue that there is no point in differentiating metaphysical 
naturalism from methodological naturalism since in actual practice they have the 
same result (Gasser, Stefan 2007: 159–161; Slife, Starks, Primosch 2014: 342; 
Näreaho 2014).114 
Thus, the argument of no ontology remains rather unconvincing. Methodo-
logical naturalism does come with a specific set of ontological commitments and 
it does base all its research on those ontological presuppositions. To claim that 
these amount to “minimal ontology” and an avoidance of metaphysics is rather 
misleading. However, there is one additional major argument that naturalists can 
still appeal to, even if naturalism does indeed come with metaphysical commit-
ments, is not universally accepted in all sciences and has not shown itself to be 
the only way to have a successful research programme. Namely, the naturalist 
can still argue that when it comes to evolutionary research, naturalism is in effect 
inevitable and there is no viable alternative to it in a practical research setting. 
 
 
3.3.4. The argument of inevitable necessity 
The argument of inevitable necessity is again one of those arguments that does 
not so much try to justify naturalistic self-positioning epistemology as it tries to 
show why we cannot do without naturalism. In this sense, it is often very closely 
linked to the universality argument I analysed in section 3.3.1. Indeed, Michael 
Ruse explicitly connects these two arguments in his presentation of this argument 
(Ruse 2005: 83–84). In short the argument of inevitable necessity proposes that 
one cannot do evolutionary research without a naturalistic basis. The evolutionary 
theory is a theory about the development and change of biological organisms that 
can be observed and studied above all through the naturalist perspective according 
to which we can indeed make sense of them by seeking for the natural mechanisms, 
causes and functions of their behaviour. No other research perspective has had 
anywhere near as much success in applying the basic theoretical principles to 
actual research questions, thus if we want to pursue evolutionary research, we 
have to do it naturalistically (Ruse 2005, McLaughlin 2005). This does not justify 
naturalism epistemologically or metaphysically, it merely points out that we have 
                                                                          
114  It should be noted though, that almost only scholars of religion present this kind of an 
argument of no ontology. Among philosophers, one can easily find those who argue that 
metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism are practically very closely related. 
For example, see Forrest (2000) who even argues that the extensive practical usage of 




no other choice if we choose to do evolutionary research. Or as Peter McLaughlin 
puts it:  
 
“Scientific naturalism is not a heuristic justified by its utility but the 
presupposition of a certain kinds of intellectual activity – which activity 
itself may of course be justified by its utility. This doesn’t make naturalism 
as a metaphysical position right; it only makes the assumption of naturalism 
inevitable in certain kinds of practice” (McLaughlin 2005: 20–21).  
 
As one might expect, this line of reasoning is not without its problems either. 
Halvorson (2016: 138–142) analyses this extensively. He notes how defining 
natural things is not as easy as it might seem. First, one cannot limit natural things 
simply to those entities that current scientific theories include, because then we 
are committing to an extremely conservative stance that does not leave room for 
any future scientific discoveries. Secondly he points out how one cannot define 
natural entities in terms of time, space, energy or mass either, since even contem-
porary science defies such simplistic intuitions (think of quantum wavefunctions 
or photons for example). And thirdly he also argues that defining natural entities 
as those that are not supernatural, would amount to a definition that is problemati-
cally dualistic and negative – it does not really tell what natural objects are as it 
suggests what they are not. In conclusion Halvorson argues that the definition of 
a natural entity tends to be always slightly changing – as soon as a new scientific 
theory can incorporate some entity, it begins to be viewed as natural! – and 
therefore naturalism is more like an attitude, a stance or a research programme 
(Halvorson 2016: 139).115 This obviously is a problem for the argument of 
inevitable necessity, since in the context of this argument (but really, also in 
context of all the previous arguments as well) naturalism or more specifically 
methodological naturalism is portrayed as a specified and principally unchanging 
set of epistemological rules and guidelines for theoretical and methodological 
choices. 
Nevertheless, even if the naturalist manages to overcome this problem – 
perhaps by arguing that even though naturalism may be always slightly shifting, 
depending on what empirical research can discover116 – there is another, far more 
                                                                          
115  Elsewhere, Roger Trigg has also argued very similarly, pointing out how “reality should 
not be arbitrarily confined to what is accessible to human science. Modern physics, whether 
in quantum theory, chaos theory or elsewhere, can provide many examples of aspects of 
physical reality which are in principle beyond our reach. A physicalism or naturalism which 
makes science, and perhaps merely present-day science, the arbiter of what exists, is pursuing 
a dangerous course. It is making reality once again depend on human judgments and not the 
other way around” (Trigg 1997: 111). 
116  In fact, in one instance Joseph Bulbulia argues something like this: “Science assumes 
methodological naturalism. We do not stipulate the gods out of existence. But we begin with 
the idea that nature is secular and see how far this assumption takes us. For all we know 
naturalists of the distant future will appeal to gods in their explanations for our belief in them. 
But for now, our aim is to produce a good explanation from minimal assumptions about the 
complexity of the world” (Bulbulia 2007: 621). 
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difficult problem for their arguments. This has to do with mathematics. If 
(methodological) naturalism is to operate only with natural entities, natural 
functions and natural causes, then how exactly does this include “mathematical 
objects” that much of science relies on? How does one justify the inclusion of 
these objects that cannot be studied empirically? In fact, this is the reason why 
one well-known evolutionary theorist has argued that evolutionary theory and 
evolutionary research actually violates the requirements of methodological 
naturalism (Sober 2011). This is a problem many others have also wrestled with 
over the years, but the situation right now is still rather pessimistic – one can 
either naturalistically justify the use of only a small part of mathematics or none 
at all (Roland 2016). This is something that has also caused Sober’s criticism of 
methodological naturalism and has motivated many to agree with him (for a more 
recent take on this problem see also Elliott 2017). As Sober and others note, 
numbers appear to be Platonic entities that cannot be properly included into a 
strictly naturalistic and empirical criteria of justifiability. Sober goes so far as to 
argue that basically numbers can be understood as kind of supernatural entities 
that the evolutionary theory relies on just as much as it relies on genes, organisms 
and populations. Yet, if so, it does not make much sense to argue in favour of 
methodological naturalism as the basis of evolutionary research, since evolu-
tionary research has never limited itself to naturalistic entities anyway (Sober 
2011). Quite obviously evolutionary biology cannot do without mathematics. 
 
 
3.3.5. Where does all of this leave us? 
Now, I find it quite likely that the problem of mathematics is probably the 
strongest counter-argument against the concept of methodological naturalism, 
since one would need to come up with a way of showing how complex mathe-
matical tools are actually empirically observable or in some other way ‘cognizably 
present’ in the natural world to overcome this problem. However, in the context 
of the evolutionary study of religion, epistemological issues are central to the 
whole discussion. And with regards to epistemology the central question really 
does become whether evolutionary theory itself leads to any specific epistemo-
logical conclusions or not? After all, we do need mathematics, but perhaps 
evolutionary theory as such – even with the inevitable inclusion of mathematics – 
leads inevitably to one or another epistemological conclusion? Perhaps evolu-
tionary theory necessitates a particular kind of a philosophical position and 
casting aside such a position would be in conflict with the inner logic of the theory 
itself? If that turned out to be true, quite obviously evolutionary research would 
have to take that into account and either keep that in mind or deliberately base 
one’s empirical research on that conclusion. One could call this also an alternative 
version of the last argument – naturalism is inevitable for evolutionary research 
because evolutionary theory calls for a naturalistic basis (in which case it is also 
possible that evolutionary theory and actual biological research practice – which 
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includes mathematics – are perhaps to an extent in conflict with one another). 
This is an issue I intend to analyse thoroughly in the next chapter of this thesis.  
But for now it has been important to see that none of the more common 
arguments used to justify the adoption of methodological naturalism in the study 
of religion have shown that only methodological naturalism can be justified as 
the basis of the academic study of religion. Neither have they conclusively shown 
that naturalism is the only option for an evolutionary study of religion. Of course, 
one cannot conclude from this that naturalism is a fundamentally inadequate 
position for a scholar of religion, but it does not appear to be a privileged one, as 
some have argued. However, as noted, the argument that naturalism is the only 
option for an evolutionary study of religion could yet find further support if one 
was able to show that a naturalistic epistemological position can be derived from 
the evolutionary theory. 
 
 
3.4. Conclusion & looking ahead 
In this chapter I have focused on the epistemological issues that have mainly 
come up and are central to the cognitive and behavioural approaches to religiosity. 
As shown, much of this discussion indeed deals with the question whether one 
can derive any epistemological inferences from such evolutionary research. With 
minor and largely insignificant exceptions (like beliefs about specific, empirically 
measurable phenomena) the current scholarly consensus – and with good reason – 
proposes that one cannot infer anything epistemologically notable from the 
cognitive science of religion (or from any of the other evolutionary approaches 
either). Yet, as I have tried to highlight in the subsequent sections of this chapter, 
the real issue here is not so much one of inferences as one of presumptions. The 
current set of assumptions largely assumes naturalism and thus finds religiosity 
epistemologically costly. This is only so, because the explanations religious people 
themselves offer are rejected as invalid or inapplicable from the naturalistic 
perspective.  
Typically, this naturalistic set of presumptions has been justified by arguing 
that naturalism is a scientific necessity for scholars of religion. In the latter 
sections of this chapter I thoroughly analysed arguments that have been presented 
in defence of (methodological) naturalism as the basis of all academic research 
and pointed out why many of the arguments at a closer look become problematic 
or simply insufficient. The universal acceptance argument merely says that we 
should do what many others do, but that in itself is not enough to justify anything. 
The successfulness argument is probably true to the extent that in several sciences 
the naturalistic basis has indeed had quite a lot of success. But, it is entirely 
misleading to argue that alternative research perspectives have not had any real 
success. Quite the opposite, in fact. The argument of no ontology has simply 
turned out to be wrong, or to be more precise, technically true, but in such minor 
detail, that in actual practice this truthfulness is not really applicable. Lastly, the 
argument of inevitable necessity has turned out to be quite problematic, since 
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‘natural’ is not exactly a static and clearly defined category; furthermore, 
scientific practice includes mathematical tools that cannot really be naturalized.  
All of this leaves us in a situation where methodological naturalism as a 
position does not actually appear to have as strong of a justification or foundation 
as its advocates have tried to argue. It certainly has not shown itself to be the only 
viable, reliable, academically justifiable option as some have tried to argue. 
However, it is also clear that it is not completely unjustifiable either. One cannot 
deny all the important and thought-provoking research that has relied on a 
naturalistic basis in one way or another. Therefore, we should rather focus on the 
question dealing with the justifiability of pursuing research solely from a 
naturalistic self-positioning that would supplant alternative positions, including 
in research approaches where those have had quite a lot of success as well. This 
is where the “relationship” of epistemology and evolution becomes directly 
relevant. If one can show that a philosophical position can be derived from the 
evolutionary theory or that evolutionary theory gives reason to believe that one 
or another epistemological position is more likely to be true than others, then that 
becomes a very strong argument in favour of that specific position, in general, 
but also specifically as the basis of all evolutionary research. Because of that in 






4. Evolution, epistemology and religiosity 
Most of what I have already written and discussed deals with the evolutionary 
theory in one way or another, also addressing various epistemological issues in 
one way or another. All throughout this religion has been the setting or the over-
arching question that all the discussions and analyses relate to or attempt to make 
sense of. However, what I have not directly addressed nor included in the 
discussion thus far is the research programme that has approached the question 
of evolution and epistemology head on. Whether we derive any (and if so, what 
kind of) epistemological inferences from the internal logic of the theory of 
evolution and available biological research is something researchers and theo-
reticians have argued over for some time. To get a full picture of the issues related 
to (methodological) naturalism, new evolutionary approaches towards religiosity 
and the position of the scholar of religion one needs to also look into research 
done in the evolutionary epistemology. After all, as already noted previously, if 
we discovered that it is indeed possible to justify one epistemological position 
over another based on the evolutionary theory, that would have major reper-
cussions for the study of religion as well.  
Therefore, in this chapter I intend to focus on two main things. First of all I 
am going to take a thorough look at the evolutionary epistemology and show what 
kind of approaches and research questions have dominated that research pro-
gramme, as well as highlight why (as things stand right now) we cannot justify 
any specific epistemological position based on the theory of evolution. To a large 
extent I am going to be relying on my two earlier, long and thorough articles 
(Peedu 2015c, 2015d). There I have focused solely on the evolutionary epistemo-
logy and dealt with all its aspects in much more detail than I am going to be doing 
here, so for a more in-depth analysis of evolutionary epistemology one ought to 
definitely take a look at those articles.117 In this chapter, additionally, I am going 
to highlight all the notable treatments of religion and religiosity in the evolu-
tionary epistemology, in other words, how researchers in this approach have 
explained religion.  
Lastly and most significantly, however, I intend to present an alternative con-
cerning religiosity that is based on evolutionary epistemology and wholly 
consistent with the theory of evolution, yet also most certainly not naturalistic in 
the sense propagators of methodological naturalism insist that evolutionary 
theory necessitates a naturalistic perspective. This is going to be essential for the 
next chapter where I am going to show why the possibility of such alternatives 
relates to a longstanding theoretical issue – the Duhem-Quine thesis of under-
determination – from the philosophy of science. 
                                                                          
117  Presenting an equally thorough and extensive analysis of evolutionary epistemology here 
would simply make this chapter unnecessarily long and thus potentially mislead those who 
might then assume that this thesis is centrally about evolutionary epistemology. The discussion 




4.1. Evolutionary epistemology and  
the possibility of philosophical inferences 
At first it is necessary to specify what is here meant by ‘evolutionary epistemo-
logy’ as such. As it happens, the label/name does not designate just one research 
perspective, but rather multiple similar ones, not all of which are relevant in this 
context. As Michael Bradie (1986) has very succinctly pointed out, ‘evolutionary 
epistemology’ stands for two noticeably different lines of research. On the one 
hand evolutionary epistemology has meant the kind of research that relies on 
knowledge about humans as biological organisms as its basic frame of reference. 
In such a case, evolutionary mechanisms must be also at work in the development 
of human cognitive capabilities and it must be possible to determine the reliability 
and aptitude of our cognitive capabilities and mechanisms based on what we 
know about their evolutionary development. Bradie calls this the evolutionary 
epistemology of mechanisms. On the other hand ‘evolutionary epistemology’ has 
also designated a relatively different line of research. There the focus has been 
on science118 as a phenomenon and researchers have tried to analyse and explain 
the historical development and success of science (as a social, cultural and 
historical phenomenon) by making use of evolutionary analogies and explanatory 
models. Bradie calls this the evolutionary epistemology of theories. I will focus 
only on the first of the two, since issues of evolution and epistemology here are 
relevant only as dealt with there.119 
Later on Bradie (2004, 2011) has also further specified his concept, splitting 
both research programmes into two sub-perspectives and describing those 
analogously as ‘ontogenetic’ and ‘phylogenetic’ ways of addressing the larger 
research questions. However, while his earlier distinction between the two main 
lines of research in evolutionary epistemology has been widely accepted and 
adopted in subsequent discussions, researchers elsewhere have not adopted this 
further specification. Furthermore, most of the researchers in the evolutionary 
epistemology have always tried to connect and unify the two sub-perspectives, 
thus I do not find it useful to adopt this further specification here.  
In short, it can be said that at its most basic level evolutionary epistemology 
relies on the premise that evolutionary selection favours the development and 
spread of such characteristics and features that in one way or another improve the 
survival and reproduction of the biological organism. This indicates that the 
development and functionality of the sensory and cognitive processes of human 
beings should be also strongly influenced by this basic inclination. Because of 
that researchers have asked, what does this say about our cognitive mechanisms 
and abilities as such and whether we can perhaps answer important epistemo-
logical questions – as analysed by philosophers – based on evolutionary research. 
                                                                          
118  Mostly just on natural science though. 
119  From this point on, whenever I talk of ‘evolutionary epistemology’ I specifically have in 
mind the approach that deals with epistemological issues related to the reliability and 
development of our cognitive capabilities – unless I specifically say otherwise. 
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In this sense discussions in the evolutionary epistemology rely heavily on natural 
sciences, especially biology. Researchers in this field often spend large parts of 
their research papers and books discussing the specific functionalities of (human) 
cognitive mechanisms – still, knowledge as such remains essential to their 
discussions.120 The central premise of such analyses of empirically researchable 
cognitive mechanisms is that evolutionary selection must have favoured organisms 
and species that were better adapted to the environment. However, knowledge 
about the environment is essential for survival and reproduction – the better you 
know your environment, the easier it is to find food, avoid dangers and find mates. 
Evolutionary selection must have preferred organisms with more advanced 
capabilities of acquiring information about the environment over those who were 
not as capable in that. Therefore, useful knowledge improves the fitness of the 
organism and it can be considered an evolutionary adaptation. (Campbell 1982; 
Lorenz 1977; Vollmer 1990; Wuketits 1990; Plotkin 1997a, etc.) 
Some have even gone so far as to equate evolution and cognition process 
(Wuketits 1986) or life and cognition (Heschl 1990), but regardless of the exact 
phrasing, understanding knowledge-acquiring as central to all evolutionary 
processes is fundamental to the evolutionary epistemology. Also, it is generally 
assumed in the evolutionary epistemology that knowledge acquired through 
natural sciences is trustworthy and can be used as the basis of subsequent research. 
This is important to keep in mind, because evolutionary epistemology must 
inevitably assume the reliability of some knowledge to make research as such 
possible. Despite that, it is obvious that even knowledge we have acquired 
through the research methods of the natural sciences still relies on the same 
cognitive capabilities and mechanisms as all other knowledge-gaining processes. 
This choice has both made detailed research and argumentation possible as well 
has invited various criticisms of their proposed conclusions. In the subsequent 
sections I am going to look at these issues. However, before that it is important 
to give some context, since everybody cannot be assumed to be familiar with the 
specifics of the evolutionary epistemology. To do that I will give a short historical 
overview of the main trends and developments of this research programme. 
 
  
4.1.1. A short overview of the history of evolutionary epistemology 
It is useful to distinguish between two main periods in the development of the 
evolutionary epistemology. The first extending from the beginnings in the 19th 
century and Charles Darwin until 1974, when Donald T. Campbell published his 
foundational article (Campbell 1982) and gave the research programme a name 
and a focus. And the second stretching from Cambpell’s article until now. 
Research on these epistemological issues in the earlier period – from the few 
                                                                          
120  It should be noted, though, that scholars in the evolutionary epistemology use and under-
stand “knowledge” in a slightly different way than is common elsewhere. I will come back to 
this in section 4.1.2. 
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speculative ideas Darwin had in relation to epistemological questions until 
Campbell’s work in the 1970s – remained relatively unsystematic and lacked the 
conscious focus and pursuit of a coherent large-scale picture that the later 
research from 1970s to 1990s possessed. It is worth keeping in mind that the 
earlier period of the evolutionary epistemology is only really part of the complete 
picture through the lens of Campbell’s article. Without that later focus earlier 
research would not appear to represent different forms of the same thing either. 
Still, this did not stop earlier researchers and theorists from speculating on similar 
topics – after all, the seeds for it were already present in the writings of Charles 
Darwin. Although he never really went deep into what the evolutionary develop-
ment of human beings would mean for the evaluation of humans’ cognitive 
abilities, he did foresee the potential for research regarding this kind of questions.121 
In the second half of the 19th century, various notable thinkers tried to develop 
Darwin’s initial suggestions further. Most probably Thomas H. Huxley was the 
first to discuss the possibility of explaining cognition based on the Darwinian 
evolution as noted by Henry C. Plotkin (1991: 482), but Herbert Spencer became 
a far more influential advocate for the development of evolutionary explanations 
of human psychology (Wuketits 1987a; Markl 1987). Beside those various 
evolutionary theoretical proposals concerning human cognition were also put 
forth by the likes of Mach, Helmholtz, Boltzmann, Poincaré and others (see 
Flamm 1987; Čapek 1968; Markl 1987; etc.), but the other most significant 
theoretician on this subject in the late 19th century was most certainly George 
Simmel who devoted a separate article (originally published in 1895) on this topic 
and also clearly differed his contemporaries in his views on the issue (Coleman 
2002; Hooker 2013). For Simmel practical utility was at the centre of all know-
ledge acquiring processes. Whatever we know is never just a representation of 
our natural living environment, but has always been learned due to its practical 
usefulness (Simmel 1982).122 
However, analyses of such issues by the scholars of late 19th century remained 
general and epistemological topics were only addressed as much as it was 
necessary in the context of their larger interests and goals. In the early 20th century 
                                                                          
121  For example in the first edition of On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection 
he notes: “In the distant future I see open fields for far more important researches. Psychology 
will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power 
and capacity by gradation. Light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history” (Darwin 
1859: 488). 
122  For example, quite notably he argues: “When we say that our concepts must be true for 
the actions based on them to be useful, we have no evidence for the truth of our concepts other 
than the actual benefit we have obtained from these actions. … We can determine only whether 
actions arising from such knowledge are useful or harmful. We might say instead, therefore, 
that there is no theoretically valid ‘truth’ on which we can base appropriate actions. Rather, 
we call these concepts true which have proved to motivate expedient and life-promoting 
actions. … The truth of concepts need no longer rest on its agreement with any kind of reality. 
Truth becomes that quality of concepts which makes them the cause of most beneficial action. 
Whether the content of these concepts is similar to an objective order of things or related to 
them in any way remains underdetermined” (Simmel 1982: 64). 
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various scholars123 did pursue similar topics under the rubric of “biological 
epistemology” (see Danailov, Tögel 1990 for a brief overview), but conversely 
to the continuing influence of the 19th century scholars, these scholars and their 
ideas from the early 20th century have not had much relevance for the discussions 
of the late 20th century. 
A new period of interest began with Konrad Lorenz in 1941 as he published 
an intriguing article in which he argued that Kant’s concept of a priori can be 
interpreted biologically (Lorenz 1982). It should be noted, though, that the article 
only began to receive widespread attention in the 1970s and 1980s. In sum, Lorenz 
argued that Kant’s ideas can be explained by contemporary biology, interpreting 
a priori knowledge as the biological limitations different species have acquired 
through the evolutionary selection. Furthermore, for Lorenz the hooves of horses 
and fish fins are examples of inborn knowledge that living organisms naturally 
possess (Lorenz 1982: 124–125). Without such innate knowledge it would be 
impossible for living beings to survive in this world. In the subsequent decades 
Donald T. Campbell became the most notable scholar of evolution and epistemo-
logy. He was centrally interested in showing that the process of blind variation 
and selective retention is universal to all knowledge acquiring processes. In other 
words, for Campbell all knowledge acquiring takes place in such a way that the 
initial “fragments of knowledge” appear randomly (or: blindly) and the sub-
sequent selection determines what will be retained and preserved and what will 
fade away (Campbell 1960). For Campbell this process is the basis of the whole 
evolution of life, from virus-like organisms to contemporary physicists. Further-
more, for Campbell this process is progressive – physicists know far more about 
the world than early proto-organisms. 
In addition to Lorenz and Campbell researchers and theoreticians here and there 
also discussed similar ideas, but the genuinely active period for the evolutionary 
epistemology only began with Campbell’s aforementioned foundational article 
(Campbell 1982). There Campbell argues that at minimum an evolutionary 
epistemology would be the kind of epistemology that takes into account every-
thing we know about the evolutionary development of humans. He understands 
evolutionary epistemology primarily as ‘descriptive epistemology’. As such, for 
Campbell knowledge acquiring is a hierarchically differentiated process where 
unconscious instincts form the lowest level of knowledge and contemporary 
scientific knowledge is the highest level of knowledge (Campbell 1982: 76–92). 
But Campbell does not limit himself just with that kind of a descriptive approach. 
He argues that based on all we know about the development and evolution of 
human cognitive capabilities it is possible to argue in favour of the epistemo-
logical correctness of hypothetical realism (Campbell 1982: 101–104). Realism 
for Campbell is hypothetical, because proper, scientific knowledge is never final 
and always open to further improvement and corrections.  
                                                                          




Campbell’s article quickly becomes very influential and most of the discussion 
topics, research questions and other aspects of the developing research pro-
gramme in general can be derived from his writings. In addition to Campbell, 
later research in evolutionary epistemology also relied heavily on Lorenz who 
publishes a much more extensive discussion of his earlier ideas concerning the 
possibility of analysing all epistemological issues through the lens of biology 
(Lorenz 1977). Similarly to others he also argues in favour of hypothetical 
realism as the epistemological position we should adopt based on what we know 
about the evolution. 
Alongside Campbell and Lorenz another influential advocate of the evolu-
tionary epistemology in the 1970s was Gerhard Vollmer who published his own 
take on evolutionary epistemology in 1975 (Vollmer 1990). Overall, his analysis 
of the matter was on the one hand more detailed than that of Lorenz, but on the 
other hand also far more ambitious than that of Campbell. Vollmer argues that 
science has developed far enough that we can now evaluate the cognitive know-
ledge-acquiring abilities and capabilities of humans based on natural sciences and 
thus solve epistemological problems with the help of natural sciences. Vollmer 
also argues in favour of hypothetical realism, which causes much of subsequent 
debate in the 1980s and 1990s to analyse this shared position of all the major 
theoreticians of the 1970s.124 Although effectively arguing in favour of realism, 
similarly to Lorenz, Campbell and others, Vollmer as well emphasizes the “hypo-
thetical” part, because he as well sees all scientific knowledge as inevitably and 
always limited, enabling only a partial explanation of the world. In this sense 
calling it “hypothetical” is their way of saying that potentially in future researchers 
might find evidence for dismissing this epistemological position. In short advocates 
of hypothetical realism are arguing in favour of a straightforward scientific 
realism – simply with a small clause added to it. 
Although much of the debate in the 1980s continued to be focused on the 
theoretical side of research, such ambitious claims highlighted the need to look 
for ways how to empirically analyse and test the claims of the many theoreticians 
of the evolutionary epistemology (Riedl 1984: vii; Plotkin 1987a, 1988a, 1991; 
Wuketits 1997a). On a general level, it could be said that in the 1980s there two 
main research perspectives dominated the field. On the one side there was the so-
called Austrian school centred on the Konrad Lorenz institute (Rupert Riedl, 
Erhard Oeser, Franz Wuketits, Robert Kaspar, etc.) and Gerhard Vollmer in 
Germany whose views largely coincided with the Austrian school. On the other 
side there was the somewhat more heterogeneous group of Anglo-American 
researchers such as Donald T. Campbell, Michael Ruse, Henry Plotkin and Michael 
Bradie. But despite emphasizing the importance of and need for empirical 
research, actual research in the evolutionary epistemology in the 1980s continued 
                                                                          
124  A short summary of subsequent sides of debate: Vollmer (1998, 2004, 2012) continues to 
argue in favour of it alongside Lütterfelds (1987), Oeser (1988) and Wuketits in his earlier 
writings (Wuketits 1988, 1990: 34–40). Others have found their arguments unconvincing or 
simply wrong: Ruse (1989, 1990), Bradie (1989, 1990), Falk (1993), Thomson (1995), etc.  
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to be largely theoretical. This is rather well highlighted by the activities and 
writings of the Austrian-German approach to evolutionary epistemology – most 
of them are philosophers or theoretical biologists in their academic background 
and research interests. Later on this caused criticisms such as that of Callebaut 
and Stotz (1998) who argued that the main problem with evolutionary epistemo-
logy is its unnecessarily excessive focus on the ideas of the founders of the 
research programme and a general lack of actual empirical case studies.125 Of 
course, advocates of evolutionary epistemology such as Vollmer (1990), Wuketits 
(1990), Riedl (1984) and Lorenz (1977) argued that there was lots of empirical 
evidence to support their claims, but by this they meant the existing body of work 
in biology and other natural sciences in general. In all the research they refer to, 
none of it is testing specifically the hypotheses put forth by evolutionary 
epistemologists.126 As such the Austrian-German approach can be characterized 
as adopting existing knowledge in natural sciences as the fundamental basis of 
all analysis and then trying to deduce philosophical conclusions out of that body 
of knowledge. 
The most noteworthy alternative to that school of thought comes from Henry 
Plotkin who developed a hierarchical scheme of the knowledge-acquiring process 
(Plotkin 1982, 1987b, 1988b, 1997a). Throughout his research Plotkin is centrally 
interested in developing a scheme that can be tested empirically (Plotkin 1988a: 
439–444). Plotkin understands all knowledge acquiring capability as adaptions. 
Furthermore, rather similarly to Lorenz he also understands all adaptations as 
knowledge – hands and legs as we have them embody knowledge about the 
environment we find ourselves in. In that sense for Plotkin, learning and acquiring 
information means the incorporation of that new knowledge into the knower – 
this is a process that also inevitably changes the knower oneself as well (Plotkin 
1997a: ix–xv). This kind of an approach makes Plotkin noticeably different from 
other evolutionary epistemologists of the 1980s and 1990s. For Vollmer (see 
especially Vollmer 1984) studying the human capability of acquiring knowledge 
means the analysis of “what are humans capable of sensing?” (which results in 
extended discussions of the capabilities and limitations of all human senses), but 
for Plotkin the central question is rather “what are humans capable of learning?” 
Plotkin finds this far more important because humans are not just passive 
receivers of knowledge through their senses. Rather, whether we actually acquire 
any knowledge from everything we perceive through our senses depends on our 
learning capabilities. Thus, to understand fully how living organisms are able to 
acquire new knowledge i.e. learn Plotkin finds it vital to develop a universal 
theory of learning (Plotkin 1982: 443–444). This is what he pursues in great 
extent in his subsequent research as he aims to develop a four-level scheme of 
                                                                          
125  See also Plotkin (1997b) and van der Steen (2000). 
126  One popular way of making use of existing research was, for example, the comparative 
analysis of the cognitive organs of different species (see Bartley 1987: 34–38; Bechtel 1990: 
72–73; Oeser 1996: 18–19). 
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human learning.127 Overall, Plotkin’s project differs from others in that its basic 
hypothesis about learning and adaptation should be empirically testable, yet at 
the same time he does not really find discussions about the possibility of deducing 
hypothetical realism or any other position from evolutionary epistemology 
particularly interesting nor is it really clear how the empirical study of his larger 
project would tell us anything about those larger philosophical issues that are at 
the centre of the discussion elsewhere in evolutionary epistemology. 
By the 1990s interest in evolutionary epistemology began to waver. The 
persistent lack of proper empirical research proposals certainly played a part in it, 
but the questionable ability of evolutionary epistemology to give actual answers 
to classical epistemological questions also began to really weigh on the research 
programme overall (Clark 1987, Hösle 2005). Thus in the 1990s on evolutionary 
epistemology slowly began to lose its popularity or delved into (meta)analysis of 
the research programme itself and what is it actually supposed to be about (for 
example see Oeser 1996; Heschl 1993, 1995; Plotkin 1987a; Hardcastle 1993; 
etc). In addition to that many have recently argued in favour of one or another 
form of functionalism128 instead of (hypothetical) realism (Wuketits 1995, 1997b, 
2000, 2006; Diettrich 1997, Derksen 1998, de Regt 1998). Among other reasons 
this has probably come about due to a change in how the relationship of the 
environment and the organism is understood in biology – living beings are no 
longer viewed as simply passive objects of the active forces of the environment, 
but rather as active and important participants in that process.129 Furthermore, 
researchers began to pay more attention to the issue that organisms are not just 
generalized knowledge-acquiring mechanisms (within their sensory and cognitive 
limitations of course), but are predisposed to focus on specific things in their 
learning and knowledge-acquiring (Plotkin 1997a: 162–163). In addition, the 
evolutionary priority of survival and reproduction led many of the aforementioned 
scholars to question whether any form of realism really is what the evolutionary 
selection is guiding human beings towards. Acquiring knowledge is not bene-
ficial in itself, but only insofar as it helps us survive and reproduce.130 
Although various paths of argumentation and theory have been discussed in 
the subsequent recent discussions as well – such as the possibility of using 
evolutionary epistemology in a Reidian approach of common-sense philosophy 
(Boulter 2007a, 2007b; De Cruz, De Smedt 2012) or as an attempt to develop an 
applied evolutionary epistemology out of the previously theoretical discussions 
(Gontier 2010, 2012, 2013) – none of these have really attracted interest 
comparable to the extensive discussions and theoretical pursuits of the 1970s and 
1980s. It could be said that in a way evolutionary epistemology has reached the 
                                                                          
127  He distinguishes between the genetic level, the developmental level, the individual 
learning level and the socio-cultural level. For an extended review and analysis of this see 
Peedu (2015c: 34–36). 
128  And in some instances actually rather similarly to what Simmel was saying a century ago. 
129  As one influential paper in that regard see for example Lewontin (1982). 
130  For a more thorough review of the functionalist position see Peedu (2015c: 38–39). 
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point where the major arguments put forth in evolutionary epistemology have not 
received wider acceptance (instead rather, extensive criticism) and yet, the basic 
evolutionary premises evolutionary epistemology relies on have not been and 
cannot be questioned either. To better understand this curious and yet noteworthy 
position evolutionary epistemology finds itself in, I am now going to look into 
some of the central issues of evolutionary epistemology. 
 
 
4.1.2. “Knowledge” in evolutionary epistemology 
The issue of “knowledge” is perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of 
evolutionary epistemology. Discussion over the concept itself has mostly dealt 
with questions such as what is knowledge from an evolutionary perspective or 
what should be conceptualized as knowledge when we look at the evolutionary 
development and selection of human beings (as well as other living organisms)? 
I would argue that it is justifiable to distinguish between two main conceptions 
of knowledge in the evolutionary epistemology, both of which I have already 
noted in my historical overview of evolutionary epistemology. 
On the one hand we have the kind of approach that understands knowledge 
very similarly to the conceptualizations of knowledge in Western philosophy and 
cultural history. Knowledge here means an apprehension of the way of things are; 
describing something as knowledge indicates representative or confirmed 
information concerning the world we find ourselves in and it may be conceptually 
expressible (but not necessarily so). If one conceptualizes knowledge in such a 
way, then it is possible to differentiate between knowledge and the acquiring of 
knowledge, as well as between the acquiring of knowledge, the comprehension 
of knowledge and the storing of knowledge. This is the way knowledge has been 
primarily conceptualized by the Austrian and German representatives of the 
evolutionary epistemology as they have tried to work out ways how to biologize 
philosophical epistemology (Wuketits 1986; Wuketits 1990; Vollmer 1984; 
Vollmer 1990).131  
On the other hand, those who have equated adaptation with knowledge have 
developed a remarkably different perspective on “knowledge”. If the previous 
approach understood knowledge primarily as information that the organism is 
either capable of acquiring and mastering or not and capable of understanding 
and applying or not, then conceptualizing knowledge as adaptation brings about 
a significantly different understanding of “knowledge”. Lorenz (1977: 21–25; 
1982: 124–125) is the first to interpret knowledge in this way as he talks of the 
knowledge acquiring process as an adaptive process. As noted previously, in such 
                                                                          
131  It should be noted, though, that when they talk about ‘epistemology’ and the biologization 
of classical philosophical problems, they above all have in mind Cartesian-foundationalist 
epistemology. Although they never explicitly discuss this question, it is probably justifiable 
to suggest that they presume all other approaches to be easily biologizeable as well once 
Cartesian-foundationalist epistemology has been biologized.  
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a case horse hooves can be conceptualized as innate knowledge of the surrounding 
environment that the horse is going to find oneself in. Plotkin (1987b; 1988b; 
1997a) has developed this much further. Plotkin is fundamentally opposed to the 
idea that knowledge could be viewed as a kind of a “thing” that one can acquire 
and store. In other words, he does not think that it is biologically justifiable to treat 
knowledge as storable information. Knowledge for Plotkin in the most general 
sense is the constantly changing relationship of the living organism and the 
environment (as well as the constantly changing relationship of the different parts 
of the living organism itself). In general, it could be said that if Wuketits does not 
differentiate between cognition and knowledge, Plotkin does not differentiate 
between knowledge and adaptation and in this sense, indeed, horse hooves, fish 
fins or even human intestines can be conceptualized as knowledge.132 From this 
perspective conceptually expressible knowledge (including knowledge as it is 
traditionally understood in philosophy) is only a rather small and limited (and 
often quite secondary) aspect of everything that can and should be understood as 
knowledge.  
But Plotkin also differs from the other approach because his goal is to develop 
evolutionary epistemology into a natural science. In this sense Plotkin’s concept 
of knowledge also greatly complicates proper disciplinary dialogue with philo-
sophy and the project of biologizing epistemology as well. After all, as argued by 
Vehkavaara (1998), if one were to conceptualize knowledge in such a way, then 
it might not really say a whole lot about the truth(fulness) of knowledge as that is 
traditionally understood in philosophy. If knowledge is understood as the structural 
order (and compatibility) of the different parts of the whole, then it is only possible 
to evaluate the successfulness of the actions that this structure of knowledge has 
made possible, but it is no longer possible to apply the classical concept of know-
ledge – “knowledge” is simply no longer “information about the world”. The only 
criteria available for the evaluation of knowledge in such a situation is the 
successfulness of its application (Vehkavaara 1998: 215–216), but that does not 
tell us whether it is also a representation of the way things are in the world or not.  
Of course, Plotkin might not find that problematic at all, since direct bio-
logization of philosophical epistemology has never been a significant part of his 
project. For him philosophical knowledge is simply a narrower aspect of 
knowledge as such. Still, adapting this kind of a concept of knowledge would 
probably become a problem for those who still thrive towards biologizing philo-
sophical epistemology, since it would make it impossible to talk about the truth-
directness133 of knowledge or about the evolutionary necessity of understanding 
                                                                          
132  After all, the physical make-up and structure of the intestines can be seen as knowledge 
about available edible materials in the world! 
133  I use the concepts of truth-direct and truth-directness to indicate the basic idea in evolu-
tionary epistemology, that even if the sensory organs and cognition of the living organisms 
are not able to acquire completely accurate information about the surrounding environment, 
evolutionary theory still implies that living organisms (humans included) cannot be com-
pletely wrong either. What we know about the world has to be accurate to an extent, otherwise 
survival and reproduction would be impossible. But as such our knowledge of the world is 
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the world. For Plotkin knowledge is simply a useful concept for interpreting and 




4.1.3. Can one study epistemological issues empirically? 
Whether epistemological issues can be studied empirically or not has been another 
central research question in the evolutionary epistemology. The reason for this is 
fairly obvious: if one wants to really take the more ambitious claims of the 
research programme seriously, then it is not enough to show how such and such 
inferences are the logical consequences of the evolutionary theory. Biology is an 
empirical discipline, if one wants to biologize epistemology with the help of 
evolutionary theory, one needs to show how epistemological questions are 
empirically researchable.  
This is where the limitations of the evolutionary epistemology – as it has been 
pursued thus far – become apparent. Despite persistent insistence that their theo-
retical programme is empirically researchable (Vollmer 1990, Riedl 1984, etc.), 
there are no notable examples of that. Evolutionary epistemology has always 
depended on all sorts of empirical research done in the cognitive and biological 
sciences, trying to deduce epistemologically relevant bits and pieces from those. 
However, such research projects are not focused on the central hypotheses of the 
evolutionary epistemology. 
A quick look at the attempts to empirically study epistemological issues can 
make this particularly apparent. At least since Lorenz (1977), researchers in the 
field have argued that the comparative study of the cognitive abilities is the way 
one can study epistemological issues empirically. The basic idea is simple: since 
we know that the cognitive capabilities of different species (but to lesser extent 
different organisms as well) vary, then detailed comparative studies of their 
abilities should reveal their knowledge-acquiring capabilities as well (Campbell 
1982; Plotkin 1987a; Bartley 1987, 34–38; Oeser 1996, 18–20; Wuketits 1997a, 
59–62; Barth 2012, 89–91). Giurfa (2012) with his comparative analysis of the 
learning abilities of bees and other social insects and Huber and Wilkinson (2012) 
with their comparative study of human and animal cognitive abilities serve as 
good examples of such research. 
Yet, how can one really deduce philosophical conclusions from such research? 
Without additional hypotheses or knowledge these studies remain merely infor-
mative looks into the development and functionality of various cognitive organs. 
Such research projects do not really tell us how accurate or truth-directed these 
organs are; furthermore, there is no way how to conclude from them whether 
                                                                          
probably rather limited. Therefore, truth-directed(ness) indicates that even if our knowledge 
is partial and limited (in ways we cannot easily, if at all, predict or analyse ourselves!), what 
living organisms generally or humans specifically know about the world has to at least be ‘on 
the right path’. 
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human knowledge relates to the world in a pragmatic way, in a realistic way or 
in some other way. Still researchers in the field of evolutionary epistemology 
claim that it is possible to argue in favour of one or another epistemological 
position based on this type of comparative research. For this they rely on the basic 
assumption that all the cognitive abilities of all organisms are basically 
commensurable (Campbell 1982; Bartley 1987: 36–38). ‘Commensurable’ here 
means that sensory and learning capabilities of all living organisms can be 
evaluated using one big measuring criterion to determine how accurately or 
inaccurately one or another organism has understood the world around itself.  
This presumption of commensurability is of course consistently usable when 
we focus on just one sensory ability – obviously we can quite easily determine 
that dogs’ sense of smell is far superior to that of humans. However, how can we 
really determine whether bats’ echolocation or electric fishes’ electrolocation 
enables a “more accurate” understanding of the world? Due to similar problems 
Christensen and Hooker (1999) are rather critical of Campbell and other evolutio-
nary epistemologists who have followed him. None of them have been able to 
present convincing criteria for the evaluation of different ‘epistemic capabilities’, 
but without that a proper comparison of aforementioned electric fishes and bats 
(not to mention, humans) remains unfeasible. Generally for evolutionary 
epistemologists the decisive tool for measuring the accuracy and ability of various 
sensory and cognitive capabilities should be existing scientific knowledge about 
the world, but for that one would need to presume the superiority of human sensory 
and learning abilities (including about abilities we do not possess ourselves!). 
Also, one would have to presume the superiority of scientific knowledge over all 
other types of knowledge. But if so, then the claim that humans understand the 
world better than the electric fish is not so much proven as it is assumed.134 
Therefore, such research comes with two major problems for the evolutionary 
epistemologists. First of all, it is very circular – the supremacy of humans is first 
presumed and then scientific knowledge is used to show how others are inferior. 
Secondly, the comparative study of cognitive abilities does not tell us anything 
about the correctness of hypothetical realism, pragmatism, functionalism or some 
other generalization about the character of human knowledge. Thus, at least as 
things stand right now there is no empirical proof (or disproof) for any one of the 
aforementioned epistemological perspectives.135 
                                                                          
134  Aforementioned Barth (2012) is an excellent example of this. First he assumes that humans 
know what the world is really like and then he evaluates how correctly organisms have sensed 
colours or vibration or other things in one or another situation (Barth 2012: 91–94).  
135  It should be noted, though, that empirical research into such questions is probably at least 
theoretically possible. For that we would need significantly larger, more complex and longer 
experiments than anything undertaken right now. At minimum a proper empirical study of the 
issues raised by evolutionary epistemology would entail an experiment where the appearance 
and disappearance of all the potentially cognisable phenomena has to be under the full control 
of the experimenter. In other words, the experimenter has to have a full control over the 
environment where the experiment takes place. The experimenter has to be able to summon 
all sorts of phenomena that he wishes to use to affect and manipulate the environment within 
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4.1.4. How much do we actually need to know? 
The whole issue becomes even more complicated once we take a more detailed 
and nuanced look at what the evolutionary theory actually implies about cognitive 
abilities. After all, the capability of understanding the world and acquiring know-
ledge about the world is not in itself evolutionarily important. It is only important 
as far as it helps with things that play an essential role for organisms in the evolu-
tionary selection, namely survivability and reproduction. Developing knowledge 
acquiring abilities more advanced than what is necessary for those two central 
goals is simply not relevant, even if they did enable a better comprehension of 
the surrounding environment. Because of that we can only say that at best human 
knowledge about the world should be truth-directed. However, one has to keep 
in mind that describing knowledge as truth-directed does not specify the sense in 
which this directedness is understood – all the options are still open, from 
representationalist realism to constructivist functionalism. 
This aspect of the whole issue has made researchers very interested in 
determining how much accurate knowledge is actually possible, necessary or 
useful for humans (or for living organisms in general). Sharp criticisms of the 
central idea – information about the world is vitally important – have been among 
the central reasons why this question has received as much attention has it has. 
These critics have pointed out that in many cases acquiring representationally 
accurate or even truth-directed knowledge might not be useful for the living 
organism, or alternatively are simply too costly136 (Wilson 1990; Hardcastle 1993; 
Derksen 1998; Sullivan 2009; O’Hear 1997, 57–66; O’Hear 2012; Zehetleitner, 
Schönbrodt 2015). Lastly, it has to be kept in mind that such criticisms of the 
knowledge-favouring interpretations of the evolutionary theory are centrally 
focused on the idea of representative knowledge. 
                                                                          
the test area. Furthermore and far more troublingly for contemporary science: such an experi-
ment should probably last for at least a few hundred years (but for stronger and more 
conclusive results thousands if not tens of thousands of years might be necessary). Whatever 
the exact length, it has to be long enough for an evolutionary selection to take place so that 
one can then evaluate the effect one’s manipulations have had on the studied organisms. 
Lastly, the organisms that participate in the experiment cannot be aware that they are actually 
living in an experiment. By now it should quite obvious why this kind of an experiment is 
highly unlikely to ever happen and anything less than this would have results of questionable 
usefulness for the evaluation of the issues raised in evolutionary epistemology. 
136  The aspect of costliness is here centrally relevant, because all information-acquiring 
processes take time and energy. But acquiring energy also takes energy and time. Additionally, 
the regular normal functioning of the living organism (its organs, etc.) takes energy as well. 
Because of this acquiring more detailed or more closely truth-directed knowledge might 
simply turn out to be too costly for the organism (including situations where at least principally 
the organism would be capable of acquiring more knowledge or better knowledge, but prefers 
not to, because that would go against its more important preferences). Alternatively, a living 
organism could have developed into such a form that it is fundamentally incapable of acquiring 
truthful or even truth-directed information about one or another thing. In such a case the 
costliness of greater knowledge-acquiring capabilities is centrally relevant as well. 
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These criticisms point out various situations where the cognitive limitations 
of living organisms become most apparent.137 Zehetleitner and Schönbrodt (2015) 
have highlighted situations where erroneous beliefs can turn out to be beneficial. 
For example, monkeys systematically avoid snakes of certain colours – presuming 
that they are poisonous – even though not all this kind of snakes are poisonous. 
Yet, overall it is still beneficial for them to avoid this kind of snakes in general. 
This is also an excellent example of the cost-benefit balance: acquiring more 
nuanced knowledge about the poisonousness of snakes would require a signi-
ficant amount of energy and effort, thus making it too costly. Instead, monkeys 
prefer to follow a simpler, but also significantly less costly rule of the thumb.  
Similarly, by relying a hypothetically possible scenario Wilson (1990) 
highlights a theoretical possibility concerning humans. He points out that it is 
entirely possible for a new gene to appear and cause a change in the behaviour of 
humans that is beneficial, yet evoking entirely incorrect assumptions about the 
situation. For example, we might have two peacefully co-existing groups of 
people. This new gene might cause one group to become increasingly suspicious 
of the other to the point where they consider the other group an existential threat 
to their own well-being. All of this regardless of the actual peaceful relations they 
have always had. Thus, they decide to eradicate the neighbouring group and since 
they experience a heightened sense of fear and danger they are more motivated 
to fight and because of that succeed in eliminating the neighbouring group of 
people. Yet, all of this would be based on an incorrect assumption about the 
hostile nature of other people, yet it did result in a major success for their own 
group as they gained from land and resources solely for their own future benefit.  
Elsewhere Sullivan (2009) has pointed out the limited nature of our visual 
sense of the world. He argues that it is practically useful for humans to think of 
the world as a place that is comprised of objects and their characteristics. If our 
eyes were more advanced (in other words, if we could see microscopic pheno-
mena), things we consider coherent objects would no longer appear as such 
(Sullivan 2009: 74). One can also find similar arguments in many other adjacent 
fields of research. After all, many of the things researchers in the cognitive 
science of religion have pointed out would also apply here. One can just think 
about the Theory of Mind, its central role in human cognition and the subsequent 
flaws of thinking that come with it.138 O’Hear has even found it possible to 
develop such arguments further and propose that based on the evolutionary 
development of humans we can only argue for the epistemological competence 
of humans in the context of the prehistoric savannah living environment, but we 
cannot deduce anything about the reliability of more modern ways of pursuing 
knowledge (including contemporary scientific practices!) (O’Hear 2012: 87–88). 
                                                                          
137  It has to be kept in mind here that all knowledge-acquiring processes of all organisms are 
always to some extent limited. Absolute knowledge would require limitless energy. 
138  See for the relevant discussions in Leech, Visala (2011b: 554–555), Barrett, Lanman 
(2008: 115–116), Bulbulia (2004b: 658–661), but also see section 1.1.1. 
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Although focusing on specific cases, these examples set the stage for signi-
ficantly more far-reaching arguments, since all of them in different ways related 
to the larger issues of the practical limitations an organism inevitably must face 
and the limitations caused by the energy requirements that come with every action 
and choice. Timothy Shanahan (2008) has highlighted some inevitable structural 
limitations faced by all organisms by asking – why do zebras not have machine 
guns? Surely, they could defend themselves far better if they had developed 
natural defensive weaponry? Yet, if we look at how zebras have developed as 
organisms and their fundamental body structure, it becomes apparent that they 
have simply taken a very different evolutionary path. Developing biological 
defensive weaponry would of course improve their survival abilities, but it is also 
biologically impossible for them at this point of their biological-structural 
development.  
The same issues are also present when we look at the epistemological abilities 
of living organisms in general: there is simply not enough time and energy to 
fully concentrate on such things, nor do very advanced world-comprehending 
capabilities appear to offer equally beneficial evolutionary benefits and thus 
overall organisms’ world-understanding capabilities are likely to remain limited, 
fragmented and restricted. After all, as Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1993) and 
Nicholas Rescher (1990: 112–117) have pointed out, increased epistemological 
capabilities are only useful if the amount of energy spent on them is not bigger 
than what they gain in better comprehension of the world. And in this sense in 
many situations it may be evolutionarily more beneficial to be stupid than smart 
(Hardcastle 1993: 177–178)! Or as Wuketits puts it: 
 
“For example, an earthworm will never exhibit the same behavioural 
capacities as a dog or an ape. The earthworm’s “world picture” is much 
more primitive than that of dogs or apes. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that the earthworm is less fit; it might be that, under certain circum-
stances, the earthworm is fitter than dogs, apes, or other “higher” animals” 
(Wuketits 1990: 63–65).  
 
Elsewhere Steve Stewart-Williams (2005) also shows how frogs might not be 
able to see anything else but the movement of things, but for them that is 
adaptationally enough.  
Finally, a more systematic approach towards this issue can be found in Johnson 
et al (2014) where they distinguish between five main ways how evolutionary 
selection can possibly prefer false beliefs. First, there are adaptive misbeliefs – 
things that make one evolutionarily more successful, but are not necessarily true 
(Johnson et al 2014: 210–212). From the examples I highlighted one can here 
especially think of Wilson (1990), but also Zehetleitner and Schönbrodt (2015). 
Secondly, there is the error management theory perspective – evolutionary 
processes prefer the kind of approaches that are not too costly, thus it is likely to 
prefer solutions that are not quite correct, but which at least make it possible to 
avoid major mistakes (Johnson et al 2014: 212–215). The previously highlighted 
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discussions of Hardcastle (1993) and Rescher (1990: 112–117) very much relate 
to this aspect. Thirdly, there is the issue of deception – in some situations it might 
turn out to be beneficial to mislead others and thus increase preference towards 
false beliefs (Johnson et al 2014: 215–216). Fourthly, one can think of the 
potential epistemological consequences of the signalling theory as advocated by 
Rappaport, Sosis and others: from such a perspective signalling ‘correct things’ 
to the community can turn out to be more beneficial than actually pursuing ‘true 
beliefs’ (Johnson et al 2014: 216–217). Lastly, he also points out the influential 
human inclination towards imitating others. Should any of the earlier paths lead 
to misleading beliefs, humans are very willing to imitate each other and adopt the 
beliefs and behaviours they encounter among others (Johnson et al 2014: 217–
219). Even more recent discussions this matter of truthfulness of beliefs and 
biological constraints has also been analysed by Wilkins and Griffiths (2013) who 
note that ‘truth-trackin’ should be seen as a certain kind of ecological interaction 
with the environment thus, for example, it is comparable to the efficiency of 
foraging or other such matters of efficiency, thus leading to the generalization 
that in light of inevitable limitations and costs: 
 
“the evolutionary optimum of ‘truth tracking’ should be defined as obtaining 
as much truth and as little error as possible, given the intrinsic trade-offs 
between them, with the balance determined by the value of the truths and 
the cost of the errors, and with possible solutions constrained by the cost of 
cognitive resources” (Wilkins, Griffiths 2013: 138) 
 
In general, all the specific cases as well as the theoretical arguments here show 
how complicated the whole issue genuinely is. However, they do not funda-
mentally undermine the central tenets of the evolutionary epistemology. It is easy 
for the evolutionary epistemologist to argue that one or another example is merely 
a specific case in relation to one type of cognitive ability or one species and actually 
our very ability to recognize such situations proves humans’ higher cognitive and 
epistemological abilities and thus gives further strength to their science-centred 
argumentation. This is pretty much how Wuketits (1990) and Stewart-Williams 
(2005) have argued following such examples. 
Of course one could accuse such an argumentation of deliberate circularity, 
but even if we leave that aside evolutionary epistemology still faces major 
problems with regards to the original question: how much do we actually need to 
know? Thus far researchers in the evolutionary epistemology have not been able 
to come up with clear criteria for (a) identifying the absolute minimal necessary 
amount of cognitive-epistemological abilities,139 (b) evaluating the general level 
of trustworthiness of human knowledge,140 (c) or general criteria for the evaluation 
                                                                          
139  Either specifically for some species (for example, humans) or in general. Either one would 
be an improvement compared to the current situation. 
140  Since the trustworthiness of the epistemological capabilities of all other organisms are 
always evaluated from the human perspective, this is centrally relevant for the evaluation of 
all the epistemological trustworthiness of any or all living organisms. 
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of the cognitive-epistemological capabilities of living organisms.141 However, 
without such criteria explanatory schemes offered by evolutionary epistemologists 
remain competitive theoretical hypotheses that cannot be tested or controlled. 
This, of course, does not disprove any of those hypotheses either, but the field of 
research as it stands right now is lacking a proper foundation for differentiating 
between more and less convincing perspectives. 
 
 
4.1.5. Is it possible to justify any specific philosophical positions based on 
the evolutionary epistemology? 
Possibly the hottest and certainly the most persistent debate in the evolutionary 
epistemology is focused on whether we can find conclusive support for any 
specific position or “ism” from the evolutionary theory. For some (for example 
Vollmer) this question is indeed so central that all other issues evolutionary 
epistemology deals with are only relevant so far as they help to solve this one. 
In general, as already noted in the historical overview, there are two prevailing, 
competing views in this matter. On the one hand, many argue in favour of 
hypothetical realism, from Campbell (1982) to Vollmer (1990), Oeser (1988), 
Riedl (1984) and Wuketits (1988). In sum, they argue that having truth-directed 
knowledge about the world is so important for living organisms in their pursuit 
of maximizing survival and reproduction that the information they acquire about 
their living environment has to be adequately representing the place they find 
themselves in. Living beings must have realistic knowledge of the world around 
them, even if only in limited amounts and on select issues. Therefore our know-
ledge of the world must be of the ‘representative realism’ kind. Furthermore, the 
trustworthiness of scientific knowledge is central to their pursuit, thus they also 
insist that scientific knowledge serves as a realist representation of the world.142 
They prefer to call this position not just realism, but hypothetical realism because 
scientific knowledge is incomplete and in principle could be falsified, thus their 
position at best will always remain hypothetical. 
Defenders and advocates of the pragmatic and functionalist positions143 
(Derksen 1998; de Regt 1998; O’Hear 1997; Diettrich 1997; and also Wuketits in 
his later writings (1995, 1997a, 2000, 2006)) rely on the same basic premises, yet 
reach a rather different conclusion. They put far more emphasis on the dynamic 
                                                                          
141  This is obviously closely related to the criticism of Christensen and Hooker (1999) that 
I highlighted in the end of the previous section considering the general lack of criteria for the 
comparative evaluation of different cognitive abilities. 
142  It should be noted that because of this, if it did turn out that our knowledge of the world is 
actually pragmatically or functionally inclined and not a realist representation of the world, 
the theorists in support of this position would also see it as a major problem for the represent-
ativeness of scientific knowledge as well. 
143  I am here going to analyse them together because at a closer look they are actually very 




and flexible relationship of the organism and the environment, they point out the 
notable and inherent cognitive limitations of all organisms and they stress the 
need for practically useful knowledge (not just knowledge of the world as such). 
And therefore they argue that our knowledge acquiring abilities are primarily 
pragmatic. These abilities are not meant for understanding the world as such, nor 
are they able to gather knowledge about everything that happens around us. It 
could be said that for the pragmatist, representative knowledge of the world would 
simply be too costly to acquire in the complicated situation living organisms find 
themselves in. By this they are not excluding the possibility of situations where 
realistic representation of the world might actually turn out to be pragmatically 
useful, but they would argue that these are merely isolated exceptions and in 
general realistic knowledge about the world is not worth the effort. 
However, it is true that it is possible to derive both perspectives from premises 
the evolutionary theory offers us. Yet, both of them also share the problem that 
neither side has managed to prove the erroneousness of other side’s arguments. 
Furthermore, thus far it has not been possible to empirically study, prove or dis-
prove either one of the two perspectives. It would appear that in the context of 
the limited nature of our research methods, it is theoretically possible to derive 
all sorts of different conclusions out of the evolutionary theory, without really 
being able to exclude alternatives either. This has caused many to argue in favour 
of the inevitable philosophical ambivalence of the evolutionary theory (Bradie 
1990: 33–38; Stein 1990; McLaughlin 2005). De Cruz and De Smedt (2013) have 
indeed taken this so far as to show that in principle it is possible to derive both 
supportive as well as dismissive arguments from the evolutionary theory in 
favour or against every single position. 
I will return to this in the second half of this chapter as I look into the issue of 
religiosity and evolutionary epistemology, but here it is important to note that as 
long as the two aforementioned issues – the lack of proper criteria for the 
evaluation of the knowledge-acquiring process and the lack of empirical research – 
have not been overcome, one cannot really prove or disprove any one of the 
epistemological or metaphysical positions one might deduce from the theory of 
evolution. However, all of this still does not prove wrong the basic premise of 
evolutionary epistemology. Even in this uneasy situation, the evolutionary epi-
stemologist can still argue that if the theory of evolution is true, some variant of 
the presented arguments must be true. This does not really tell us much, since it 
still leaves the door wide open for all sorts of positions. Yet, even here many of 
the evolutionary epistemologists would object to my arguments, noting that 
empirical research is possible and there has been plenty of it. By doing this they 
are not disputing my claim that there has not been any direct research into the 
hypotheses raised in evolutionary epistemology, rather they are arguing that 
natural sciences have proven to be so reliable in the human knowledge acquiring 
pursuit, that we can simply rely on everything done in natural sciences regardless 
of the circularity arguments raised against such a perspective. This is an argument 




4.1.6. The issue of circularity – is science a reliable basis or not? 
As noted, it is central to the evolutionary epistemology to presume that scientific 
knowledge is the most trustworthy type of knowledge available to humans. 
Because of that it is assumed to be justifiable to treat it as the basis of all sub-
sequent epistemological research. Quite predictably, this way they open them-
selves to the criticism of circularity. However, they do not see this as a problem.  
In its classical form this argument can be found in Vollmer (1990: 165–170) 
as he argues that scientific knowledge has made it possible to go beyond our 
humanly limitations and thus reach objective knowledge. Scientific methods 
make it possible to observe and study things that would remain inaccessible for 
human beings if we relied solely on our own sensory abilities. Obviously, this has 
caused many to argue that evolutionary epistemology does not have anything 
noteworthy to say to or about philosophy, since they are merely interpreting 
scientific knowledge based on their premises and goals, but they are not 
answering any philosophical questions nor solving any of them (Falk 1993, 
Thomson 1995, etc.). Yet, evolutionary epistemologists do not see this criticism 
as much of a problem, since they have never denied the existence of this kind of 
a circularity in their programme. They draw attention to two main reasons why 
they think this kind of a circularity is actually justifiable. 
First, they are very eager to note how classical philosophical epistemology has 
never really managed to start from a ‘complete zero’ either (Vollmer 1990: 211–
217; Vollmer 1987; Bradie 1989: 401–403); instead suggesting that this kind of 
a perspective is unachievable anyway. As one evolutionary epistemologist notes, 
even Descartes relied on the best scientific knowledge available at his time, thus 
we as well ought to rely on everything available to us (C. U. M. Smith 1989). 
Therefore, they argue that classical epistemology has failed to reach its goal and 
evolutionary epistemology ought to be considered the more preferable approach 
that is actually capable of achieving its goals and solving the problems it presents 
(Riedl 1984: 5–12; Heschl 1993). 
Secondly, they are also focusing on situations where circularity is actually a 
positive feature. Vollmer (1987: 183) highlights the way we produce hammers – 
with other hammers of course. De Cruz et al. (2011: 526–530) on the other hand 
point out how we distinguish edible objects from non-edible objects – here relying 
on all the earlier knowledge is also very useful. Basically, they are arguing that 
this kind of a logic also applies to scientific knowledge and thus reliance on all 
earlier scientific research is justifiable (Vollmer 1987: 182–188). Vollmer does 
not find it problematic either to argue that based on scientific knowledge our 
ability of induction is an evolutionary adaptation and thus it is a truth-directed 
and an epistemologically useful function (Vollmer 1990: 158–161). 
Still, there are good reasons to disagree with such arguments. As noted previ-
ously, these arguments about the reliability of science suggest that scientific tools 
have made it possible for humans to go beyond our normal cognitive limitations. 
Knowledge about things we cannot directly observe with our own sensory abilities 
has been “packaged” into such a form that humans as well can learn about them 
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and observe them. Both telescopes and microscopes serve as classical examples 
here. Yet, to justify this one ought to either show that scientific research tools are 
indeed trustworthy auxiliaries for epistemological pursuits, or at minimum one 
ought to at least show that at least with our cognitive abilities no problems or 
limitations can be detected regarding these scientific tools. Unfortunately, evolu-
tionary epistemologists have not done this and as Clark (1986) points out, they 
have instead very successfully highlighted the cognitive limitations of human 
beings for all such endeavours. All the knowledge humans can acquire must 
always be presented in such a way that our limited cognitive abilities are able to 
receive and understand them (Clark 1986: 155). Basically, if one is to argue that 
science makes it possible for humans to overcome one’s limitations, then science 
should be able to “translate” too complex knowledge without losses into such 
knowledge that we can comprehend. Yet there are reasons to be hesitant about 
this. For one, how could we actually determine to veracity of this “translation” to 
find out whether knowledge was indeed “repackaged without losses”? And 
secondly, as some have noted based on studies of simple cases, technical instru-
ments used in science might not be as unquestionably reliable as evolutionary 
epistemologists make them seem after all (Ratliff 1971).144  
Also, it should be apparent by now that evolutionary epistemology does not 
offer any strong arguments in favour of the remarkable representativeness of 
scientific knowledge either. As Rolston (1995) very succinctly notes in his criti-
cism of Wuketits (1990), evolutionary epistemologists one the on hand want to 
show how all human knowledge is influenced and dependant on our biological 
background and the process of evolutionary selection, yet on the other hand they 
argue that human knowledge in its scientific form has superseded one’s limitations 
and thus reached a level of trustworthiness. But if one is really going to take the 
evolutionary argumentation seriously, then it is rather problematic to argue at the 
same time that humans have actually partly overcome their biological develop-
ment in some aspects of their activity! Of course, advocates of evolutionary 
epistemology could still argue that isolated cases do not disprove otherwise 
widespread reliability, yet the bigger problem here is that we would still be 
lacking proper methods for distinguishing such ‘isolated cases’ for the supposed, 
more general field of cases with which there are no problems. 
Furthermore, turning back to the specific arguments presented in defence of 
circularity, it is important to notice how the actual circularity researchers are 
practising in the evolutionary epistemology differs from the examples they have 
used to justify it. When we produce new hammers by using existing hammers, 
the production of hammers is the goal of our activity. The same applies to the 
                                                                          
144  Furthermore, as neurological studies have shown, understanding or recognizing something 
also includes an inevitable destruction in information, since even the simple act of recognizing 
someone’s face leads to the ignoring all the data unnecessary for that act of recognition. This 
same neurological behaviour of recognition and ignoring is thus also inevitably present in 




example of distinguishing edible objects from non-edible objects, where goal is 
clearly to acquire of energy. In both cases we are – within our cognitive limita-
tions – capable of determining whether the process was successful or not. But in 
evolutionary epistemology it is commonly presumed that scientific knowledge is 
the representative depiction of the world around us and based on the evolutionary 
theory they argue that our knowledge of the world most probably presents the 
world through the lens of hypothetical realism. In other words, this perspective 
first presumes that human knowledge represents the world in a realist manner and 
based on that argues that humans have a tendency to acquire representationally 
realist knowledge about the world. Yet, in all of this, it is not at all clear how we 
should be evaluating the successfulness of this circular process. Indeed, how can 
we determine whether this process did give us new or additional knowledge or 
not? In this sense, the actual circularity they practice is noticeably different from 
the examples they have used to justify this process. Unlike the processes of 
hammer-production and food-finding, the realist interpretation of scientific 
knowledge and the subsequent inference of realism based on that does not offer 
us clear criteria as to how we evaluate the successfulness of this process. Success 
should here mean an increased or improved understanding of the world, but due 
to the inevitably limited position of the human being we are simply not capable 
of evaluating the successfulness of the circular process in such a situation. Or, at 
least no one has thus far managed to come up with a way how we could do this. 
 
 
4.1.7. In conclusion: evolutionary epistemology, the current situation 
The analysis I have presented in this chapter thus far should indicate just how 
complex the current situation is. On the one hand, there are several clear 
conclusions one can make about the necessity and usefulness of truth-directed 
knowledge for all living organisms in the evolutionary development. On the other 
hand, we are lacking proper methods, tools and conceptual criteria for the proper 
evaluation of that developmental process. For the advocates of evolutionary 
epistemology this has caused much stress, since their research programme has 
not had as much success with biologizing traditional philosophical epistemology 
as they have hoped and thus it has not succeeded in replacing philosophical 
epistemology. Yet, evolutionary epistemology has not managed to establish for 
itself a solid empirical foundation either and thus researchers in the natural 
sciences view it with equal suspicion.145  
In a way, all of this might make some argue that evolutionary epistemology is 
a failure as a research programme. After all, it has not managed to reach any of 
its initial goals, nor has it managed to develop itself into an empirical research 
programme or/and into a way to biologize epistemology. Nevertheless, this 
                                                                          
145  For a more thorough analysis of the issue whether evolutionary epistemology really is an 




failure can be a very intriguing conclusion in itself. For one, a negative result does 
not mean scientific irrelevance or that nothing of importance has been learned 
through it. After all, if researchers at CERN had never found the Higgs boson, 
that in a way would have been a failure, a negative result as well. Still, it would 
have also been a very significant result. And in this sense the most notable result 
of the evolutionary epistemology is the negative result: due to the limitations of 
human cognitive abilities it is not possible (right now or maybe never) to answer 
philosophical questions by relying on research in the natural sciences. Theoretical 
possibilities remain, but it is not possible to study these empirically.  
Additionally, this “negative result” also has one very significant conclusion 
for the larger issues I have dealt with in this thesis. Namely, based on all existing 
research one cannot derive conclusive arguments in favour of any specific position 
that would also rule out potential alternatives. In fact, it is hard to properly rule 
out any specific positions at all. This in turn means that at it could be possible to 
also develop perspectives that explain and justify religious perspectives and 
positions based on the theory of evolution. This is something I intend to look into 
more thoroughly in the remainder of this chapter as I highlight the true variety of 
possibilities available to an evolutionarily oriented researcher. 
 
 
4.2. Religion, evolutionary epistemology and  
the possibility of alternative perspectives 
The analysis I have developed thus far hopefully has highlighted the peculiar 
position an evolutionarily oriented researcher finds oneself in epistemologically. 
As I brought out in the earlier chapters, emphasizing a strictly naturalistic per-
spective is central to the contemporary ideas of scientificity in evolutionarily 
oriented research programmes. All sorts of theoretical arguments are also presented 
to justify that orientation and the general insistence on methodological naturalism 
as the only proper position for scientific research. Yet, as a closer analysis of 
these arguments quickly reveals, none of them have convincingly shown why 
methodological naturalism should be the only justifiable option for the study of 
religion. Furthermore, as extensive discussions and disputes in evolutionary 
epistemology have shown, one cannot conclusively show that evolutionary theory 
would have any specific metaphysical or epistemological consequences. Quite 
the opposite in fact.  
Here I intend to take a closer look at the outcomes this lack of specific 
conclusions will have in epistemological issues. Since overall I am dealing with 
issues immediately relevant for the study of religion, I intend to focus on the 
example of religiosity and the possibility of interpreting it from the perspective 
of evolutionary epistemology. Through such an example one can see even better 
how evolutionary theory is entirely open to options alternative to the currently 
dominating naturalistic perspective, yet these options also come with serious 
limitations with regards to practical research. For a thorough explication of this 
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situation I am initially going to give a short overview of the few existing treat-
ments of religiosity developed by evolutionary epistemologists. This will be 
followed by drawing attention to a few additional philosophical perspectives that 
are going to be very useful for the development of this alternative view on religion 
and lastly I will show how an entirely non-naturalistic interpretation of the evolu-
tionary theory is also possible with regards to religiosity. 
 
 
4.2.1. Existing analyses of religion in the evolutionary epistemology 
Religion or religiosity as issues to analyse and explain have not received much 
attention in the evolutionary epistemology. But there are a few cases that do 
deserve brief analysis. 
Among evolutionary epistemologists, Franz Wuketits has perhaps given this 
topic most thought. In his only article dealing specifically with this topic (Wuketits 
1987b) he argues that evolutionary epistemology has very important anthropo-
logical consequences (Wuketits 1987b: 217). Yet, in his subsequent discussion 
he concentrates on the supposedly unique human ability of self-consciousness 
and argues that the primary reason humans have developed religion and meta-
physics is the human consciousness of one’s own mortality (Wuketits 1987b: 
217–218, 220–222). This explanation is noteworthy for its complete lack of evolu-
tionary epistemology. He also invokes a rather similar explanation in his book-
length analysis of evolutionary epistemology, suggesting that religion is merely 
a solution for human existential needs (Wuketits 1990: 198–200). However, he 
does subsequently bring up evolutionary epistemology in that earlier article, yet 
only to suggest that one can evolutionarily disprove human metaphysical con-
ceptions and show how misled these are (Wuketits 1987b: 224–227).146 For 
Wuketits evolutionary epistemology is mainly focusing on knowledge that we 
would describe as ‘rational’ and predictably for him everything concerned with 
religiosity is thus categorized as ‘irrational’ (Wuketits 1987b: 227). Curiously, he 
is also, in the same article, arguing that evolutionary epistemology cannot say 
anything about the truthfulness of specific beliefs, but only about the origin and 
development of the processes through which we have acquired such beliefs 
(Wuketits 1987b: 226). Such obvious contradictions and the generality of his 
discussion overall indicates that he did not spend much time analysing the topic 
at hand. 
This kind of a lack of interest in treating religiosity from the perspective of 
evolutionary epistemology turns out to be a persistent theme in the field. For 
example, Campbell (1982, 1987, 1997: 21–22) also does not find the issues of 
religion and culture particularly interesting to consider and instead refers to the 
                                                                          
146  Of course, as I have highlighted in my extensive analysis of the topic, Wuketits is here 
being overly too optimistic about the prospects of evolutionary epistemology and at a closer 




theories of Boyd and Richerson147 as explanations of such matters. Similarly, in 
a more recent analysis of the issue, Stewart-Williams (2005) simply suggests that 
religion would be better explained through the cognitive theory of Guthrie (1995). 
Aside such instances, religion has received practically no attention in the evolu-
tionary epistemology, quite similarly to culture in fact. Both are overwhelmingly 
regarded as too complex topics to really analyse from an evolutionary perspective 
(Wuketits 1990: 123–127; Plotkin 1997a: 179–227; Campbell 1987; etc.).148 
Despite that at least Plotkin (1997a) does tackle the issue of culture head-on in 
his generalized, four-level theory of learning. After all, socio-cultural learning 
occupies the fourth level of that theory, indicating the kind of learning that is at 
the same time fastest in its adaptation to the changing environment (compared to 
the genetic level), but also the least reliable level (compared to the genetic level) 
concerning the trustworthiness of the acquired knowledge.  
This lack of interest in issues of religiosity (or culture for that matter) is quite 
disappointing. Obviously, knowledge is very much a matter of culture and religious 
knowledge as such is certainly just as much open to an evolutionary treatment as 
any other form of knowledge. Of course, if one were to adopt Plotkin’s per-
spective, then cultural and religious knowledge would become only a part of the 
wider epistemological dimension, since his perspective would significantly widen 
the concept of knowledge as such. But, even then religiosity would not become a 
topic so insignificant as to not warrant any attention. In my subsequent analysis I 
am going to highlight one provocative avenue available for someone interested 
in the analysis of religion from the perspective of evolutionary epistemology. 
 
 
4.2.2. Foundations for an evolutionary epistemologist  
perspective on religiosity 
Given this disappointing lack of or superficiality of interest in looking at human 
religiosity from the perspective of evolutionary epistemology, what kind of 
options could be available for the one who wanted to seriously analyse religiosity 
from this perspective?  
First of all, it is apparent that if such a perspective were to be developed, one 
should be primarily focusing on “religious knowledge” as such or on “religious 
worldview” more generally speaking. In other words, an evolutionary epistemo-
logy of religiosity should be directly addressing the issue of religious knowledge 
and its reliability from the perspective of the evolutionary theory. Furthermore, 
based on the earlier analysis of evolutionary epistemology, methodological 
                                                                          
147  For example, see Boyd and Richerson (1985). 
148  It should be noted, though, that there is at least one book-length treatment of the issue of 
evolutionary epistemology and religion (Lüke 1990), but this approaches the issue from a 
specifically theological perspective, therefore mostly analysing topics such as the interrela-
tionship of theology and evolutionary epistemology, the consequences of evolutionary epi-
stemology for theology (and vice versa) and so on.   
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naturalism and the limited support they offer, a deliberately alternative perspective 
on religiosity could also abandon the naturalistic premise that contemporary 
research generally relies on. This would not go in conflict with the evolutionary 
theory in any way. Strictly speaking, evolutionary theory does not tell us anything 
about the environment of the living organisms. Rather, it is focused on the effects 
the characteristics and changes of the living environment have on the living 
organisms and their abilities of reproduction and survivability (and also vice versa 
as living organisms are capable of changing their environment (to an extent)).149 
The naturalistic premise has been a common, practical tool for determining what 
kind of phenomena ‘actually exist’ or ‘do not exist’. But, naturalism is not inevit-
able to an evolutionary study and due to the philosophically ambiguous nature of 
the theory and its general lack of focus on the environment of the living organisms 
(aside for the fact that the existence of some kind of an environment is assumed) 
the evolutionary theory leaves it to the researcher to determine what the environ-
ment is actually like, what kind of causes, phenomena and characteristics play a 
role and what do not. If so, then it is possible for a researcher to argue that know-
ledge of “supernatural objects/phenomena”150 is having some kind of an evolu-
tionary effect on the behaviour of the living organism without going in conflict 
with the evolutionary theory.  
To pursue further with this line of argument it becomes centrally important to 
develop a clear and conceptually well-developed perspective on religious know-
ledge. One can then base a proper analysis of the evolutionary significance of 
religious knowledge on that perspective. Of course, it is possible to rely on all the 
research done in the various subfields of the study of religion thus far. But more 
specifically, from an evolutionary perspective one can also look into the cognitive 
and behavioural analysis of religious worldviews and analyse this as study of 
religious knowledge. Additionally it is important to notice the significance of a 
few closely related trends in philosophical epistemology. Namely, I have in mind 
                                                                          
149  One need only look at the main topics Shanahan (2004) or Sober (2000) focus on in their 
historical evaluation of Darwinism (selection, adaptation, progress and so on for Shanahan; 
creationism, fitness, units of selection, adaptationism, systematics and so on for Sober) to 
notice how evolutionary theory is not presenting anything but the most vague views about the 
environment of the biological organisms. All of these topics obviously assume the existence 
of the living environment, but beyond that say little to nothing about its characteristics. One 
could perhaps say that it only assumes the existence of a variety of environments, a relative 
lack of static sameness (in other words: the natural environment varies and changes from place 
to place, as well as over time) and the basic rule which could be summarized as: should there 
be living organisms in environments, their survivability and reproductive success will be 
determined by evolutionary mechanisms.  
150  One should very much think of this usage of ’religious objects/phenomena’ as merely an 
heuristic tool to convey the basic message of this discussion. It is meant merely as a conceptual 
signifier of anything that religious people understand themselves to be in contact with, or 
talking about or making sense of. Additionally one can also think of this as a signifier of 
anything the naturalistic presumption does not allow into evolutionary research perspective. 
(All of this does not mean that these two aspects are entirely the same, thought they certainly 
do overlap to a significant extent.) 
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Reidian epistemology, common-sense philosophy and the extensions of both of 
these into the epistemological evaluation of the cognitive science of religion. Due 
to their significant similarities with the evolutionary epistemology, Reidian and 
common-sense perspectives make it possible to conceptualize religious know-
ledge as something directly addressable through evolutionary epistemology. To 
make this easier to understand, a short look into Reidian philosophy, common-
sense perspective and related arguments is necessary. 
The philosophical reflections of Thomas Reid are something that for long 
received very little attention and little research was done on Reid.151 This has 
greatly changed in the recent decades, as researchers, philosophers and theorists 
from all sorts of backgrounds have begun to take notice of Reid’s philosophy 
(Kroeker 2015; Wolterstorff 2001: ix–x; Nichols, Callergard 2011; etc.). Of 
course, similarly to many other significant philosophers, Reid does not offer a 
complete, coherent and systematic theory either (Wolterstorff 2001: 1–3). Some 
of his ideas have received more attention than others, but here the most note-
worthy Reidian developments are those related to his epistemology, specifically 
to his famous doctrine of common-sense. This idea of common-sense philosophy 
is probably the best-known part of his philosophy, yet as Wolterstorff notes, it is 
probably also the least clear and most contradictional part of his philosophy 
(Wolterstorff 2001: 216–231). In a sense for Reid common sense notions are the 
kind of things we all take for granted and know. Common-sense notions are self-
evidently true for human beings. As human beings, we could not function if we 
did not already know these things, some basic knowledge is inescapably necessary 
to function in this world. Yet, as Wolterstorff shows, Reid’s ideas of common-
sense remained imprecise and it was never entirely clear what exactly qualifies 
as part of the common-sense and what does not. Thus, as he concludes his analysis, 
two quite different lines of thought were in conflict in his mind: “He thinks of the 
principles of Common Sense both as shared first principles and as things we all 
take for granted” (Wolterstorff 2001: 220; all italics are his). However, regardless 
of these problems this is the part of Reid’s philosophy that has undoubtedly 
received most attention and further argumentative developments in subsequent 
discussions in relation to both the theory of evolution and religiosity.152  
In the context of the wider discussions and arguments of this thesis, the most 
intriguing subsequent development of Reidian ideas comes from Stephen Boulter 
(2007b). Boulter argues that philosophy ought to move away from the Cartesian 
starting point and should instead rely on a common-sense perspective and treat 
                                                                          
151  In the subsequent treatment of Reid I am mostly going to rely on Wolterstorff (2001). 
Delving into the extensive writings of Thomas Reid himself is not necessary in this context as 
I am mainly interested in the later developments and interpretations of the Reidian, common-
sense perspective and these are not necessarily all consistent with all the details of Reid’s own 
ideas and arguments. Furthermore, a thorough study of Reid’s philosophy would simply go 
beyond the limits of this thesis as ideas inspired by his writings comprise only a small part of 
the whole work here. 
152  It should be noted that Reid himself never really found the question of religious knowledge 
interesting or noteworthy; it remains unclear, why (Nichols, Callergard 2011).  
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common sense beliefs as default positions for all kinds of subsequent discussions 
and arguments (Boulter 2007b: 18–25). Following Reid, Boulter argues that 
common sense beliefs are “those views regarding the nature of things which are 
presupposed by ordinary everyday beliefs and abilities” (Boulter 2007b: 27). In 
other words, these are the kind of views that underlie all our actions, understandings 
and conscious views. The intriguing aspect of Boulter’s argument – and also the 
part where he clearly differs from Reid as he makes use of contemporary develop-
ments in scientific research – is his application of evolutionary epistemology to 
justify the reliability and trustworthiness of these common sense beliefs (Boulter 
2007b: 36–49).  
His precise argument, as he presents it point by point, invokes most of the 
common arguments found in evolutionary epistemology: organisms need to be 
able to cope with their environment; this includes finding food, avoiding predators, 
finding mates and so on. For this, the organism needs to have both good bodily 
abilities as well as proper cognitive capabilities to guide one’s behaviour. Reliable 
cognitive capabilities are thus evolutionarily beneficial for organisms and the 
views and beliefs we have about the world influence (either positively or 
negatively) our ability to thrive in the world. Thus, overall it is evolutionarily 
preferable to have accurate beliefs about the world and natural selection will 
favour those who are more capable in their belief-forming processes. This leads 
Boulter to the conclusion that our common-sense beliefs are exactly those beliefs 
that evolutionary processes have forced us to adopt because these help us succeed 
in the world as they are true and reliable. (Boulter 2007b: 39–45)153 
As already highlighted in my earlier analysis of evolutionary epistemology, 
such an argumentation comes with many problems and evolutionary epistemology 
has not turned out to be anywhere near as successful a way to justify the reliability 
of any specific views about the world. But, despite that the similarity of argu-
ments between Reid and evolutionary epistemologists is noteworthy and one can 
certainly make use of the evolutionary theory to justify the existence of some kind 
of basic premises.154 The problem rather remains that both approaches have 
struggled with reaching specifics: evolutionary epistemology does support the 
conclusion that reliable knowledge about the world is something we have to have, 
but has failed to specify which beliefs are reliable and which are not; common 
sense philosophy on the other hand has struggled with specifying the exact list of 
these common sense beliefs. Still, this is not an insuperable obstacle in the context 
                                                                          
153  Boulter is not the only one to note the similarity between evolutionary epistemology and 
Reidian common sense philosophy. De Cruz and De Smedt (2013) also point this out, but 
contrarily to Boulter argue that evolutionary epistemology (and also reformed epistemology) 
rely on a Reidian interpretation of proper basicality whereas Boulter rather sees evolutionary 
epistemology as the premise that can justify a Reidian approach to epistemology. Furthermore, 
from the perspective of the history of philosophy, Daniel N. Robinson also argues that one can 
find ideas analogous to Darwin’s theory of evolution in in Reid’s treatment of the common 
sense and thus in a sense Reid’s perspective is Darwinian (Robinson 2014)! 
154  One can here, again, think of Lorenz’s and Plotkin’s arguments about hooves as such being 
innate, genetic knowledge about the world the horse will find itself after being born.  
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of this discussion as I am not planning to present an argument in favour of the 
truthfulness of something specific, but rather merely planning to show the 
possibility of it.  
Turning to the issue of religiosity and religious beliefs, Boulter strongly argues 
against including anything religious in that basic list of common sense beliefs. 
For one he points out the apparent lack of agreement between various religious 
communities to suggest that we are lacking universally assumed beliefs in 
religious matters and thus common sense says nothing about religious matters 
(Boulter 2007b: 28). However, considering his insistence on the fundamentality 
and unconscious reliance on these common sense beliefs, a culturally visible, 
conscious disagreement is not in itself enough to rule out religious beliefs in 
general. Because of that he does return to the topic of religious beliefs later on. 
There he argues that the issue of beliefs appears to be so complicated in the study 
of religion, lacking proper agreement or criteria for determining the basic 
religious beliefs that this simply does not make it possible to accept any religious 
beliefs as part of the common sense. Furthermore, he points out some of the 
research done in the cognitive science of religion to argue that there are no 
evolutionary justifications for including religious beliefs. (Boulter 2007b: 47–49) 
Yet, there are good reasons to find such an argument unsatisfactory. First of 
all, one can think of all the existing research in the cognitive science of religion, 
in the behavioural ecology of religion and in other related evolutionary approaches 
to religiosity. These research programmes point out how religiosity has developed 
evolutionarily and how humans have a natural tendency to think in ways we have 
chosen to describe as religious. As McCauley (2011) bluntly put it: religion is 
natural and science is not. Elsewhere others have also pointed out that despite all 
the internal disagreements about smaller details, these fields of research have 
thoroughly highlighted just how inborn religiosity as such is and thus how 
naturally capable our cognitive faculties are for dealing with religious matters 
(Clark 2010a; Clark, Barrett 2011; Geertz, Markusson 2010; etc.).155 This has 
motivated Clark and Barrett (2011) to argue that we can indeed present a Reidian 
interpretation of religious beliefs. They point out how contemporary research has 
highlighted the existence of ‘naïve physics’, ‘naïve biology’, ‘folk psychology’ 
and other widespread, prevalent and basically intuitive understandings we have 
about the world (Clark, Barrett 2011: 651).156 These they see very much in a 
Reidian perspective as our intuitive common sense beliefs about the world, but 
from such a perspective on the Reidian common sense and what should be seen 
as part of it, religiosity in one way or another should definitely be part of it as 
well. As Clark and Barrett put it: “with respect to belief in the divine, it seems 
                                                                          
155  But, see also sections 1.1.1. to 1.1.4 where I also highlight most of the research that points 
towards this conclusion. 
156  It deserves to be noted that Nichols and Callergard (2011) in their evaluation of recent 
Reidian interpretations of religiosity also argue that they find the interpretation of Clark and 
Barrett most intriguing and also the one Reid himself most probably would take seriously, if 
he were alive today. 
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plausible to suppose that we do, indeed, have a natural, instinctive religious 
sense” (Clark, Barrett 2011: 652).157  
Clark and Barrett use this to show why many cognitive-science-based argu-
ments about the supposed unreliability and untruthfulness of religious beliefs are 
inadequate and do not actually disprove anything. But, right now the most 
noteworthy part of their discussion is that this analysis of religiosity does not try 
to invoke any specific religious beliefs as such. Such an approach would probably 
run into the problems highlighted by Boulter indeed. Instead, they are talking 
about a natural, instinctive religious sense. I find this crucially important as it also 
makes it possible to avoid many of the problems evolutionary epistemology ran 
into as it tried to discern arguments in justification of specific ideas and positions.  
This is the approach I am going to pursue as well – it is better to think of 
religiosity as something we have a strong, innate potential for and a tendency 
towards – it is this cognitive talent, predisposition that I would generally describe 
as the instinctive religious sense. Humans have a tendency to approach issues in 
specific ways and think about things they come across through similar frame-
works. One can think of all the talk about HADD and ToM here as the most 
straightforward examples. Furthermore, humans have natural inclinations to 
focus on some issues (social relations, finding mates, finding food, etc.) more 
than others, but also, even more fundamentally, humans have well-developed 
cognitive capabilities to deal with various topics (literature, visual arts, politics, 
and so on). Thus, when we think of religiosity as a human universal and as some-
thing that we have a well-developed cognitive ability to deal with, this ability can 
be thought of as a potentiality for religious thought and behaviour that has 
developed evolutionarily and that we can thus analyse through the perspective of 
the evolutionary epistemology. From this perspective determining the relation-
ship of religiosity and the Reidian common sense philosophy is no longer a matter 
of finding any specific universally (and unconsciously) present religious ideas, 
but rather focuses on the predispositions and natural talents humans have for one 
or another thing, religiosity among them. This will be the basis of the hypothetical 
alternative that I will present in the next section of this chapter. 
 
 
4.2.3. A theoretical alternative to the current perspectives  
The discussion thus far has already highlighted many of the central aspects to the 
alternative that is theoretically available to the prevalent naturalistic perspective. 
First of all, abandoning the premises of naturalism opens up the possibility of also 
including non-naturalistic entities, mechanisms and causes into the bigger, 
explanatory picture. From such a perspective these kinds of phenomena can play 
                                                                          
157  Elsewhere, in more theologically oriented research this kind of discussions have led many 
to point out how much of the research in the cognitive science of religion actually has strong 
similarities to the theological concept of ‘sensus divinitatis’ in their conclusions about human 
religiosity as such. See Leech, Visala 2012; Clark, Barrett 2010; Clark 2010b.  
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a part in the evolutionary development of the living organisms, should they or 
biological organisms’ understandings of them and possible relations to them in 
any way improve or decrease the overall fitness of the organisms. Religious 
knowledge can be viewed and treated as any other knowledge – it is simply one 
of the ways human beings acquire knowledge about their living environment. It 
can theoretically be both beneficial or detriment for the human being, as any other 
knowledge humans acquire. As I have shown in the previous chapters as well as 
earlier in this chapter, the overwhelming majority of evolutionary researchers 
consider religiousness a natural, innate ability of the human being – a religious 
sense, as I named it previously. Furthermore, if it is such a universal ability, then 
it is justifiable to consider it part of the human common sense (that has developed 
evolutionarily over the course of history) – it is one of those things we have a 
natural inclination towards and based on evolutionary epistemology it cannot be 
completely misleading (but it could possibly be very limited). Additionally one 
could hypothesize that all of that which we like to classify “supernatural” is 
possibly in some sense discernible for humans. Now, if the discernibility of those 
supernatural or non-naturalistic phenomena had any positive evolutionary effect – 
in other words, if those capable of discerning those phenomena gained something 
from it – then it would start playing a part in the larger picture of evolutionary 
selection, fitness, reproduction and so on.  
In such a case one could legitimately propose an evolutionary hypothesis 
according to which the ability to acquire and discern knowledge – about the part 
of the world that we these days like to categorize as supernatural – developed 
because it turned out to be an evolutionarily beneficial aspect of human sensory 
and cognitive abilities for those who were able to determine how knowledge about 
the supernatural improves one’s fitness and thus such an ability gave these 
organisms an advantage over those that did not have it. Of course, this ability158 
would have to be cognitively quite limited because living organisms have much 
more urgent concerns (finding food, finding mates, avoiding dangers, etc.) to deal 
with. Furthermore, in the context of bodily limitations and the inevitable shortage 
of available time and energy it would be quite unlikely (but not impossible) for 
any organism to be very proficient or capable in this regard.159 Because of the 
same reasons as presented previously regarding comparable matters, it is just as 
justifiable to argue here as well that at minimum human comprehension of the 
                                                                          
158  It should be noted that there is no reason to assume that this ability would require any 
separate cognitive organ or function to exist. Clark and Barrett’s (2011) talk of an instinctive 
religious sense does not in any way necessitate the existence of a separate organ or function 
either. If one abandons the naturalistic premise, “this world” and “the supernatural world” 
would no longer be presented as radically separate and thus anything we categorise as super-
natural would simply be part of the same “complete existence” as everything else and thus we 
would be using those very same cognitive functions – very few if any of which are devoted to 
just one or a few issues or functions – to perceive and process everything and anything we 
would describe as supernatural or such. 
159  However, this obviously would also not rule out very rare ’anomalies’ – people with 
unusually potent abilities in these matters. 
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“supernatural” (in whatever form) should be at least in some sense or way truth-
directed.160 
This hypothesis also makes it possible to present hypotheses that are more 
specific. To use a very simple example, what if it turned out that going to the church 
every Sunday, living a “good Christian life”, participating in other activities of 
the church and generally staying faithful to the Christian values of the community 
guarantees one blessedness and an eternal life in the Heaven? The amount of 
energy and time required to do that is insignificant compared to the potential 
reward one can gain from it. After all, that would indicate a huge increase in the 
human survivability and overall fitness and all of this thanks to the human ability 
to discern supernatural phenomena. Of course, in such a case people would obtain 
that “benefit” only after their death in “the other world”, but still the ability to know 
about this possibility and the benefit one would gain from it would begin to 
greatly affect human behaviour and decisions already in “this world” and therefore 
taking supernatural phenomena into account would begin to have an effect on 
humans’ evolutionary development already in their current lives as well.161 In any 
case, this is merely one of the many more specific hypotheses one could propose 
and thus this should be seen as a distinguishable extension of the more general 
argument for the relevance and possibility of the religious sense as described 
above and not as an essential part of it. 
Of course, due to the likelihood that this ability would be quite limited as it 
does not help with the immediate concerns of evolutionary selection (surviv-
ability and reproduction), it could well be that even though humans are aware of 
“supernatural benefits” and thus change their behaviour because of that – which 
in turn begins to influence evolutionary development long-term – people also 
would have too limited of an understanding about what one actually has to do to 
acquire those benefits and thus there is no guarantee that any one is really “doing 
it right”. In this sense it could well be that acquiring religious knowledge is not 
immediately and clearly beneficial, but could possibly also be evolutionarily 
neutral or detrimental in some sense – we cannot really know, we would have to 
have “divine knowledge” to determine this. This limitation – the likelihood that 
no one is really “doing it right” –, however, could also be used as an explanation 
for the religious diversity as we see it in the world today, if someone wanted to 
pursue further with this kind of argumentation. This would not make any specific 
                                                                          
160  In the sense that humans could not be completely wrong, since explaining that would be a 
major evolutionary problem. Of course, naturalistic research have presented that problem as 
the very reason why religion deserves evolutionary attention, but there is a difference between 
simply assuming it and not taking it for granted as inevitable. 
161  Because of that, one should not view this as a hypothesis where “the life after death” begins 
to affect one’s life here and now. Rather, it is the ability to perceive supernatural, learn some-
thing about it and thus behave differently because of that knowledge that would play a role in 
the evolutionary development. Therefore, “life after death” cannot directly affect the organism 




hypothesis wrong, it would merely suggest that they are all incomplete or merely 
“looking in the right direction”. 
The hypothesis itself is wholly consistent with the evolutionary theory, yet 
non-naturalistic.162 Naturalists have excluded this possibility beforehand, but they 
have not proven that it is not possible or that it is inconsistent. But even more 
interestingly, it is worth noting that this same argument could be modified into 
an argument identical to the non-naturalistic argument, just wholly naturalistic in 
its formulation. In such a formulation the cognitive ability to acquire “religious 
knowledge” would be beneficial (and therefore) adaptive regardless of whether 
this information is accurate or not. After all, as I highlighted earlier section 4.1.4., 
knowledge does not have to be true to be evolutionarily beneficial and adaptive. 
In certain circumstances it is entirely possible for some knowledge to be false and 
beneficial at the same time. Because of that one can also think of this modified 
version of the non-naturalistic hypothesis as the one in which solely naturalistic 
phenomena and living organisms are included to make the argument as such 
work, but the overall setup leaves the possibility for the existence (or non-
existence) of the phenomena “religious knowledge” deals with open. Further-
more, this naturalistic alternative could be seen as adaptationist as well, since it 
would offer clear reasons why “acquiring religious knowledge” would be bene-
ficial for the organism, even if the knowledge as acquired is epistemologically 
wrong. But knowledge does not have to be correct to be beneficial – as shown 
previously as well –, it merely has to serve an evolutionarily beneficial purpose. 
In any case, there is no inevitably necessity to be a naturalist in evolutionary 
research and there is no inevitable necessity to presume the falsity of “religious 
knowledge” in evolutionary research. 
Yet, the non-naturalistic evolutionary hypothesis comes with the same 
problems that previously haunted concepts of hypothetical realism and various 
forms of pragmatism – this is just as uncontrollable as the previous hypothesis. 
One cannot prove the exclusivity or truth of any of these through evolutionary 
epistemology or/and empirical research. This is why my discussion is also 
consistently lacking argumentation in favour of any specific position – none of 
these has really managed to present stronger support than others. For that we would 
need to ascertain a specific criterion of evaluation163 and find a way how to study 
these issues empirically. Unfortunately, both of these issues appear unsolvable 
right now. Without them we are left in a situation where multiple – and widely 
different – epistemological alternatives are available to the researcher and the 
theoretical conclusions researchers are hoping to derive from their empirical 
research projects will always remain constrained by their epistemological 
foundations.  
 
                                                                          
162  That is, in the sense naturalists understand the naturalist/non-naturalist distinction. From 
the perspective of a “complete existence” view it would not be particularly useful to continue 
insisting on this distinction. 
163  As previously highlighted in 4.1.4. 
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4.2.4. Methodological and epistemological consequences –  
a few concluding thoughts 
All of this leaves the evolutionary study of religion in an ambiguous situation. As 
I have shown, evolutionary theory does not offer any conclusive evidence in 
favour of any specific position. Multiple different hypotheses can be presented 
and each one of them can be justified evolutionarily, but only to a point. Quite 
significantly, these justifications do not make it possible to exclude alternatives. 
Furthermore – and this also applies to the study of religion – naturalistic premises 
cannot be conclusively justified from an evolutionary perspective and to compli-
cate matters further, if one wants to, one can justify deliberately non-naturalistic 
premises just as successfully (which means, only to an extent).  
All in all, the naturalistic study of religion finds itself epistemology on a shaky 
foundation. Arguments in favour of methodological naturalism have not turned 
out to be as strong as has been claimed and the evolutionary theory does not offer 
as much hope as one might expect either. Yet, it can still claim to have had lots 
of success in formulating empirical research designs, carrying out experimental 
research projects and developing theories to make sense of all that empirical 
research. At the same time the hypothetical alternative I formulated in this chapter 
brings up significant questions concerning the possibility of empirical research in 
such matters. Clearly, it is one thing to show the possibility of such alternatives, 
but if they cannot be studied and the commonly practiced approach is empirically 
practicable, then it comes with the clear advantage of actual applicability instead 
of just speculating about the potential of alternatives.  
I find such a counter-argument rather likely, yet there is no reason to think that 
these arguments cannot be overcome. First of all, one can here point out that even 
if research into issues such as the relevance of supernatural causation or the post-
mortem consequences of our current choices cannot be directly assessed through 
empirically available means, this does not entirely rule out empirical research. 
After all, naturalistic research projects are possible without finite and conclusive 
knowledge about the natural world. Thus, one could pursue empirical research 
designs in a similar manner to the currently prevalent naturalistically inclined 
research projects, yet not rely on the naturalistic premises these projects rely on. 
But this is only part of the bigger picture here. Secondly and more importantly, it 
is important to notice that all the existing evolutionary research of religion does 
not exclusively relate only to the naturalistic research programme. Rather, given 
the limited amount of empirical research and the level of proof existing evolu-
tionary theories of religion would require for conclusive, final arguments, most, 
if not all, available empirical material actually lends itself to simultaneously 
possible alternative interpretations. I will highlight the methodological and 
theoretical consequences of this in the next chapter, as I highlight the relevance 
of the so-called Duhem-Quine thesis and the underdetermination debate in 





5. The underdetermination of scientific research and  
the evolutionary study of religion 
Thus far, in the two previous chapters of the second part I have concentrated on 
two major lines of discussion within the broader issue of evolution, epistemology 
and the study of religion. On the one hand, various arguments have been presented 
to either undermine the cognitive reliability of religious beliefs or to justify the 
naturalistic premises of the currently prevalent evolutionary research programmes. 
As I showed in the third chapter, none of the arguments put forth to criticise 
religious beliefs or to justify naturalism have been conclusively successful. Rather, 
there are strong reasons to argue that all of these arguments are epistemologically 
lacking and do not succeed in defending the claims they have set out to defend. 
To highlight this further I also showed in the fourth chapter how deducing 
epistemological positions and arguments in favour of those positions from the 
evolutionary theory has remained inconclusive (if not unsuccessful). Instead it 
appears that since one cannot conclusively deduce anything from the evolutionary 
theory in specific epistemological matters, it is entirely possible for one to argue 
in favour of an explicitly non-naturalistic, yet evolutionary perspective on religion 
as well. The goal of all of this has been the presentation and the evaluation of the 
methodological-epistemological problems with the cognitive-behavioural study 
of religion as currently constituted. I have focused on explicitly showing why 
certain arguments are not successful or reliable and how entirely different kind 
of arguments can be built on based on the very same foundations. 
What I intend to do in this chapter will be more exploratory than argumentative. 
I will not be so much presenting finite arguments164 as investigating a few potential 
paths one could take based on what I have shown thus far. After all, the issue of 
underdetermination is a huge topic in the philosophy of science, expanding in 
many directions and taking on many forms. For obvious reasons going into all of 
this is simply not feasible right now. Especially because, as far as I know, no one 
has yet seriously analysed the numerous theories and explanatory schemes con-
cerning religion from the perspective of the underdetermination debate, thus it 
would require going into completely uncharted territory, so to say. Still, in a 
situation where arguments presented to argue for the sole justifiability of a 
naturalistic research perspective have been found inadequate and where one can 
easily show how theoretical alternatives can be derived from the evolutionary 
theory, the underdetermination debate does become a rather intriguing and 
promising option for analysing this complex situation. Therefore, I am going to 
give a short overview of the underdetermination debate as it appears in the philo-
sophy of science and then discuss some of the most notable ways in which this 
could potentially help us make sense of the situation we are dealing with in the 
cognitive-behavioural study of religion. 
                                                                          
164  With the exception of section 5.3., one could say. I do venture into presenting a specific 
argument there. evolutionary 
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However, I will be dealing with underdetermination in a manner distinctively 
different from the previous two chapter as I will not be presenting detailed 
arguments in favour of one or another model of underdetermination. Rather, I 
will be relying on ideas concerning underdetermination as they have been argued 
and presented in the philosophy of science and should those arguments turn out 
inadequate in future discussions concerning the underdetermination of scientific 
research, thus would my proposals and suggestions likely as well. 
 
 
5.1. Models and concepts of underdetermination  
in the philosophy of science 
When dealing with the idea of underdetermination of scientific theories, one 
needs to always keep in mind that this is never just one issue or one line of argu-
mentation. Rather, it encompasses many different arguments and ideas. On a 
general level one could say that at the core of the concept of underdetermination 
one finds the idea that evidence available to us can be insufficient to determine 
what we should think of it – there is not enough data to conclusively argue in 
favour of any specific theory. Or as Kyle Stanford has exemplified this: “if all I 
know is that you spent $10 on apples and oranges and that apples cost $1 while 
oranges cost $2, then I know that you did not buy six oranges, but I do not know 
whether you bought one orange and eight apples, two oranges and six apples, and 
so on” (Stanford 2017). However, beyond this general notion, underdetermina-
tion quickly diverges in different directions and to complicate things further, there 
is no generally agreed upon ‘typology’ or ‘classification’ of underdetermination 
arguments. To see this in actual practice, it is enough to compare Stanford (2017) 
and Turnbull (2018) who are basically talking about the same things, yet cate-
gorizing them in clearly different ways. While there are also several other types 
of underdetermination in the philosophy of science, here I will concentrate on the 
two most interesting one’s for the purposes of my larger discussion – Duhem’s 
thesis, i. e. holist underdetermination and the idea of empirical equivalence. How-
ever, these two are also the two most famous and most significant types of under-
determination as well. I will discuss Duhem’s thesis to show how extensively and 
obviously this discusses topics very much discussed and debated in the study of 
religion already. And I will discuss the idea of empirical equivalence, because I 
will argue that this type of underdetermination is indeed the one most immedi-
ately relevant for the arguments and discussion presented in the previous 
chapters. Particularly I am going to highlight the relevance of underdetermination 
debate for the issue I raised in the conclusion of the previous chapter – whether 
it is possible to make use of the same empirical data for radically different kind 
of conclusions or not. I will show how the perspective of empirical equivalence 
can support and accommodate the idea that there is just as much empirical support 





5.1.1. Duhem's thesis i. e. holist underdetermination 
Although often also described as the Duhem-Quine thesis it is important to notice 
that even this specification is inadequate as Duhem and Quine held noticeably 
different views in several aspects. Pierre Duhem is the one I am going to start 
with here. Although he is not the first one ever to raise these issues (see Stanford 
(2017) for notes about earlier occurrences of similar ideas), he was the first to 
present detailed arguments. Duhem was primarily interested in physics and issues 
that come up in experimental research in physics. He notes how theory and 
experiment are always closely related, since all research is inevitably reliant on a 
theoretical base that makes “measuring” possible (Duhem 1998: 257–260). 
Furthermore, because of that one cannot test a specific hypothesis in isolation 
from the whole system (Duhem 1998: 260–264) and since we can never rule out 
the possibility of additional, alternative hypotheses, it is impossible to arrange 
“decisive experiments” that conclusively show what we should think of the 
evidence available to us (Duhem 1998: 264–266). In the subsequent discussion 
Duhem also points out how there are important physical hypotheses that scientific 
research relies on, but which cannot be experimentally tested (Duhem 1998: 270–
274). Most notably, he discusses the issue of mechanics with reference to 
Poincare (Duhem 1998: 274–277).165 Based on all of this Duhem concludes that 
if one encounters a problem in scientific research, it is not possible to determine 
“the exact location” of the problem experimentally and it is also not possible to 
present strictly logical arguments to determine when one should give up a 
hypothesis or when one should look for ways how to overcome the problems one 
is facing (Duhem 1998: 277–279).  
This kind of an argumentation has caused contemporary philosophers of 
science to call Duhem’s thesis the idea of holist underdetermination, since at the 
centre of the argument is the idea that one cannot test and analyse specific 
hypothesis and claims detached from the wider context that they rely on (Stanford 
2017, Turnbull 2018). This has been developed further by P. Kyle Stanford 
(2006) who delves deep into the 19th century biological sciences and among 
others brings up the example of Francis Galton’s scientific activity and theorizing. 
As Stanford shows, Galton is an excellent example why the holist character of 
scientific research enables one to indefinitely avoid abandoning one’s central 
hypothesis by constantly modifying and rethinking secondary hypotheses (Stan-
ford 2006: 80–104). However, one should not forget that Duhem’s analysis 
focused solely on issues one will encounter in physics and contrarily to later 
developments in philosophical discussions, Duhem himself did not explicitly 
argue in favour of a universal thesis (Ariew 1984: 318–320; Gillies 1998: 311–
                                                                          
165  In more detail he argues that “taken in isolation these different hypotheses have no 
experimental meaning; there can be no question of either confirming or contradicting them by 
experiment. But these hypotheses enter as essential foundations into foe construction of certain 
theories of rational mechanics, of chemical theory, of crystallography. The object of these 
theories is to represent experimental laws; they are schematisms intended essentially to be 
compared with facts” (Duhem 1998: 276). 
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315). At the same time, though, he does not exclude the possibility of analogous 
situations and problems in other sciences either (Ariew 1984: 323). 
 
 
5.1.2. Empirical equivalence 
Another way underdetermination argument has been often presented is that of 
empirical equivalence. The basic idea behind the empirical equivalence is that it 
is possible to develop alternative theories (which are not differently phrased 
variants of each other) that are addressing the available empirical data with equal 
success. Primarily this thesis has grown out of the provocative writings of Willard 
van Orman Quine (1975, 1998) who has strongly argued against the often-sup-
posed epistemological superiority of natural sciences (e. g. Quine 1998: 296–
299).166 As he argues, all scientific research is inevitably empirically under-
determined and empirically just as successful, yet alternatively conceptualized, 
theories will always remain possible for any formulated scientific theory (Quine 
1975: 322–328). Quine understands the empirical aspect of research as a set of 
observational sentences that are related to specific observations. Problems of 
scientific theorizing stem from two major limitations of scientific research: 
firstly, there is an infinite amount of everything observable,167 yet we obviously 
cannot hope to observe them all, and secondly, some things fundamentally cannot 
be observed directly, thus we have to rely on hypotheses about them based on 
indirect data.168 All of this results in Quine arguing in favour of a universal 
                                                                          
166  In one case also explicitly arguing that “for my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in 
physical objects and not in Homer’s gods and I consider it a scientific error to believe 
otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only 
in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. 
The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more 
efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of 
experience” (Quine 1998: 298). 
167  Quine himself talks here about ‘observational conditionals’, but I have here attempted to 
communicate the crux of his argumentation without needing to explain too much of his techni-
cal vocabulary. It can be noted, though, that he defines ‘observational conditional’ in the 
following way: “Instead of saying that the theory and the boundary conditions together imply 
the further pegged observation sentence, we could as well say that the theory implies, outright, 
a conditional sentence whose antecedent comprises the boundary conditions and whose 
consequent is the further pegged observation sentence. Such a conditional sentence I shall call 
an observation conditional. Its antecedent is a conjunction of pegged observation sentences 
and its consequent is a pegged observation sentence” (Quine 1975: 317–318; italics in original). 
168  Or as Quine himself puts it: “Here, evidently, is the nature of under-determination. There 
is some infinite lot of observation conditionals that we want to capture in a finite formulation. 
Because of the complexity of the assortment, we cannot produce a finite formulation that 
would be equivalent merely to their infinite conjunction. Any finite formulation that will imply 
them is going to have to imply also some trumped-up matter, or stuffing, whose only service 
is to round out the formulation. There is some freedom of choice of stuffing, and such is the 
under-determination” (Quine 1975: 324). But see also Turnbull (2018) about the wider 
discussion concerning the second point. 
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underdetermination – all scientific theorizing is always bound to be under-
determined, in fact all human knowledge is always and inevitably under-
determined, since we cannot fully encompass everything required to conclusively 
argue in favour of any specific theory (Quine 1998). In comparison to Duhem, 
Quine’s arguments are a lot stronger and more ambitious – Duhem did not regard 
his arguments universally applicable to all scientific knowledge (Gillies 1998: 
311–315).  
Still, the idea of empirical equivalence – when analysed in detail – becomes 
far more complex than what I have argued thus far and is far from being limited 
to the arguments presented by Quine (Bonk 2008; Turnbull 2018). To bring out 
just one important detail, Bonk notes how empirical equivalence in practice can 
mean many different things: do we have in mind same predictions, same obser-
vational consequences, or explanations of the same set of previously established 
empirical observations (Bonk 2008: 1–8)? The latter is especially relevant with 
regards to the issue of directly unobservable entities, since empirically equivalent 
theories can be sharing the same set of empirical consequences, yet positing 
fundamentally different unobservable entities as responsible for those observable 
consequences (Turnbull 2018). In any case, this kind of details always need to be 
specified whenever one is developing arguments based on empirical equivalence.  
The ambitious claims of Quine have been discussed in detail and criticized 
from many directions. The best known criticisms have been put forth by Laudan 
(1998) and by Laudan and Leplin (1991) who have mostly focused on Quine’s 
claims of universality and inevitability. They have found both claims lacking in 
justification, but since neither of the two issues is inescapably relevant for the 
subsequent discussions concerning theories of religion, I will not go into the 
details of such criticisms. It should be noted though, that even such defenders of 
Quine as Bonk (2008) have agreed that it is not really possible to argue that 
empirically equivalent theories inevitably exist for all existing and possible 
theories. However, there is a different type of criticism, put forth by Okasha 
(2002) that mainly focuses on how underdetermination arguments deal with the 
data-theory distinction and that criticism is indeed extremely relevant for any 
attempts to analyse the theories of religion from the perspective of under-
determination. I will return to this in a later section of this chapter. 
 
 
5.2. Underdetermination of the evolutionary perspectives on religion? 
One of the issues often brought up in philosophical discussions concerning 
underdetermination is the supposed lack of examples. This is a concern Laudan 
and Leplin (1991) bring up emphatically. Of course, this is something that can be 
debated. For one, Stanford who I just discussed, certainly does not think that there 
is any shortage of examples, but the argument as such rather has to do with the 
current scientific situation and not with things that happened 150 years ago. And 
in this critics indeed do have a point, but only to an extent. After all, if it is indeed 
so widespread, then why cannot the proponents of underdetermination just 
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highlight examples from any science? Still, as I noted, this criticism is correct 
only to an extent, since part of the underdetermination argument always has to do 
with “what we do not or cannot know yet” – alternatives do not have to be con-
sciously present for us at the time. After all, Stanford’s argument is specifically 
suggesting that there are most probably alternatives that we are incapable of 
conceiving – such alternatives by definition cannot be brought up to strengthen 
arguments against critics! 
Anyhow, what is notable about the discussions of underdetermination thus far 
is their persistent focus on natural sciences and furthermore, primarily on physics, 
with occasional treatments of chemistry or biology. This limitation is unfortunate 
and there is no reason why studies of underdetermination should limit themselves 
to a select few natural sciences. Plenty of potential material for analyses, discus-
sions and hypotheses could be found in other sciences as well. Bonk (2008: 28–
38) for example suggests that we could find lots of intriguing material for analyses 
of underdetermination from psychology. Here and now, however, I intend to 
discuss how one could also debate different types of underdetermination in 
relation to the study of religion.  
 
 
5.2.1. Duhem’s thesis and the study of religion 
Duhem’s thesis of underdetermination or holist underdetermination as it is 
typically called, could be developed further and applied in many ways in all of 
humanities and social sciences, despite the fact that this is not the case right now. 
Concentrating here on the study of religion, we can start from Duhem’s insistence 
that it is not possible to test specific hypotheses in isolation from the system as a 
whole. This is something scholars of religion clearly encounter in their research. 
Say one is studying contemporary religious developments in the West, with 
particular interest in a select few new religious movements. If one were interested 
in why people join such movements and faced with a proposal that aimed to 
explain that, one could in no way just determine the validity of the proposal 
detached from the wider religious studies research perspective one has based this 
specific research question on.  
After all, already asking such a question relies heavily on ways contemporary 
researchers understand their topic of research and contemporary religiosity. For 
one, describing these as specifically religious movements invokes a whole series 
of basic distinctions and a complex toolbox of concepts and research questions. 
One cannot simply analyse the issue of joining new religious movements, 
detached from the background assumptions, theories and hypotheses that make 
this question as such possible. The conceptual toolbox scholars rely on in the 
study of religion is not just a set of descriptive designators that we have either 
used correctly or not (i. e. something is a new religious movement or not), but 
rather a complex theoretical and methodological foundation that offers 
distinctions, research questions and so on; in other words, structured ways how 
to make senses of the messiness of life in general.  
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Discussing (and criticising) the ways how the relationship of data and theory 
has often been seen in the study of religion in the past, Armin W. Geertz also 
argues along the same path as he notes that “theory understood in this manner is 
much more than propositional statements purportedly subjected to falsifiability 
or confirmation by the facts. Theory in the sense proposed here becomes the basic 
framework for even conceiving of the object of study” (Geertz 1997: 35) and thus 
“all definitions in fact have proven to be […] compact versions of the theory or 
sets of theories informing the definition” (Geertz 1997: 35).169 This I would think 
appears very similar to the research situation described as holist under-
determination. Similarly to Duhem’s claim about the impossibility of decisive 
experiments in physics, one cannot conduct decisive empirical studies (whether 
experimentally, through fieldwork or textual hermeneutics or in some other way) 
in religious studies either. Coming back to the example I used earlier: there is no 
specific empirical research set-up that could conclusively prove the validity of 
one hypothesis (concerning the issue of why people join new religious move-
ments) over all other hypothesis. Furthermore, in the context of the humanities 
and how humanities formulate and postulate their research objects, there are 
reasons to believe that it could be hypothetically possible to view this whole thing 
in a completely different way as well, without ever invoking the concept of 
‘religion’, ‘new religious movements’, ‘conversion’ or the explanatory and causal 
arguments related to any one of these arguments and so on. 
Predictably, one can see similar issues come up in all the evolutionary research 
programmes (cognitive, behavioural or other). For one they are still very much 
relying on the same conceptual toolbox, thus they have adopted theoretical dis-
tinctions and positions implicit in those concepts as part of their research 
projects.170 However, evolutionary research projects clearly have their own issues 
that can be analysed from a holist perspective. As they are very much focused on 
determining the causal factors of human evolution regarding religiosity, they 
have to put together a scheme or a complete picture of the whole human evolution 
and more specifically, of the period hominids have shown to have cultural and 
religious traits. However, evidence available about the culture and religion of the 
times before written documents are sparse at best. Much of the context has to be 
deduced from vaguely relevant details that we do know or from complex schemes 
that work towards determining how human mind worked long ago based on 
evolutionary logic and how it works right now. Therefore, the central problem of 
holism is certainly present in all of the evolutionary research programmes as well. 
Furthermore, as I noted, Duhem also argues that there are central physical hypo-
theses (from example in mechanics and in geometry) that physics relies on, but 
                                                                          
169  In addition to Geertz (1997), see also Geertz (1999) for analogous discussion concerning 
the same issues and Jensen (2011b) for a more recent elaboration of such issues. 
170  I have previously briefly analysed this dependence already in Peedu (2016: 127), pointing 
out how cognitive science of religions heavily relies on the earlier work of more philologically 
inclined scholars (in either hermeneutical, typological or historical forms). The most explicit 
example of this can be found in Bering and Johnson (2005: 121) who rely on Pettazzoni’s 
work in their conceptual formulations of religion. 
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which cannot be experimentally tested. Considering the extensive reliance on 
indirectly derived hypotheses concerning early human evolution in the evolu-
tionary study of religion, one could probably easily apply the same analysis to 
these fields as well.171 For example, one can think of the famous, yet typical 
explanatory story presented to explain the emergence of HADD: supposedly it 
was always better to be safe than sorry in uncertain situations and thus humans 
became very eager to assume agency behind all sorts of stuff – otherwise they 
would have simply not survived when coming into contact with malicious agents 
(such as predators). Yet, this is merely a hypothetical story with no concrete 
empirical data to show that more or less this actually happened. And obviously 
one could also propose alternative hypotheses to explain the supposed pheno-
menon of HADD or perhaps conceptualize HADD itself in a completely different 
way.  
In any case, it is clear that what I have highlighted here are merely the select 
few cases and a basic framework, but this should be enough to bring forth the 
central idea and the potential conclusions and inferences that one could derive 
from the underdetermination thesis. However, while certainly explicitly present, 
I do not find this the most intriguing form of underdetermination to look at in the 
context of the study of religion. Much of what I have discussed thus far is obvious 
for scholars of religion anyway and whether we use the conceptual toolbox of 
underdetermination to explicate these issues does not appear to make much of a 
difference. I find the issue of empirical equivalence far more intriguing. 
 
 
5.2.2. Empirical equivalence and the study of religion 
It could be that initially the ideas presented by this form of underdetermination 
also appear rather obvious for scholars of religion. As noted earlier, when dealing 
with the issue of empirical equivalence one always needs to specify how exactly 
one understands or determines this equivalence. Bonk (2008: 1–8) notes how this 
can mean same predictions, same observational consequences or attempts to 
explain the same set of previously established empirical observations. I would 
argue that in the study of religion only the last variant is applicable. The study of 
religion has never been able to predict future religious developments with any 
real accuracy,172 nor do any major theories of religion really focus on suggesting 
observable consequences. When we are dealing with theories about religion, 
these largely agree on what the relevant set of empirically observable phenomena 
are and what kind of empirical observations should be analysed or/and interpreted 
or/and explained by the theoretical perspective. Because of this, when we talk 
                                                                          
171  Unless of course we do somehow develop research methods (time travel?) to determine 
what exactly and how happened 10 000 or 100 000 years ago, in which case this would be 
merely a case of transient underdetermination. 
172  One can here think of the supposed and widely believed idea of secularization and dis-
appearance of religiosity that by now has been mostly abandoned by sociologists of religion 
or has been fundamentally reconsidered and reconceptualised (for example see Stark 1999). 
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about empirical equivalence in the study of religion I find it most accurate to talk 
about the same set of previously established empirical observations as the central 
meaning of empirical equivalence. 
Concerning the specifics of Quine’s discussion, it is obvious that scholars of 
religion are also faced with far too many observable and researchable phenomena 
for researchers to ever fully cover all potentially available evidence. Furthermore, 
many of the things necessary for that theoretical ideal of a ‘complete coverage’ 
remain inaccessible for researchers. One can of course think of all the research 
concerning ‘religious experience’ here and the general lack of access to the 
experience itself. But in a similar fashion, questions about the mental states of 
people are (at least currently) unobservable in general. Therefore, this is not so 
much an issue of any specific experience as a general dilemma – any kind of 
belief as a mental state of mind cannot be directly observed either. However, the 
issues of experiential and mental states are just one of the many limiting factors. 
Oftentimes in the study of religion exact historical details also remain vague at 
best, since only a few select documents or material objects have survived to give 
us some indication about what happened at some time and place in the distant 
past and how people thought and behaved back then.  
Theoretical generalizations – and these cannot be avoided in the study of 
religion no matter how ‘strictly empirical’ one tries to be – will have to somehow 
deal with all these limitations and postulate hypotheses about the phenomena that 
remain inaccessible yet inevitably unignorable for the scholar of religion. How-
ever, the issue of inaccessibility is not limited to technical limitations (for 
example, we cannot directly observe what is going on in conscious minds), to 
historical limitations (for example, only a selective set of evidence has survived) 
or to other comparable issues. The issue of inaccessibility for scholars of religion 
is also very much an epistemological topic and this is where various research 
approaches begin to clearly differ in hypotheses they make about epistemologi-
cally inaccessible issues. Epistemological issues are definitely not limited to this, 
but right now I have in mind of course the very same issue that I extensively 
analysed in my previous two epistemologically focused chapters – what kind of 
presumptions about ‘supernatural’ can a(n evolutionary) scholar justify or not 
justify. I would call these ‘supernatural’ phenomena as one of those ‘inaccessible 
yet inevitably unignorable’ objects that scholars have to take into account – that 
is, hold some kind of a position in one way or another about them – but which we 
currently cannot study in any empirical way. Naturalistically formulated evolu-
tionary research programmes clearly do this in a different manner from those 
historical and anthropological research programmes that try to remain ‘neutral’ 
or ‘agnostic’ about these ‘supernatural’ phenomena. Christian theology on the 
other hand takes a rather different approach, occasionally also declaring super-
natural inaccessible, but oftentimes not entirely so – depending on which specific 
theological school of thought one is dealing with. Still, limiting oneself here to 
the research programmes and theories proposed in the study of religion, one can 
certainly argue that all theories concerning religion are inevitably under-
determined empirically in the sense that all of them have to rely on numerous 
 
145 
hypotheses about unobservable phenomena – as causes to observable phenomena 
or otherwise – that they have no direct empirical evidence about.  
The idea of empirical equivalence, however, also suggests that competing 
theories are not only underdetermined due to abovementioned limitations, but 
because we also cannot conclusively prefer one theory over another, since they 
are empirically equivalent and they merely differ in ways they make sense of the 
available empirical material. The decisive point here has to do with data – can we 
argue that the competing research programmes are really dealing with the same 
data or not? This question becomes a serious problem for the scholar of religion. 
Already in my earlier discussion of method I noted how analysing the methodo-
logical options available to scholars of religion cannot be built up on a distinction 
between the object and the interpretation of the object or in other words on the 
data/theory distinction.173 I also touched on this in my analysis of the holist 
underdetermination that fundamentally relies on the very notion that specific 
examples of ‘data’ cannot be analysed, tested or verified independently from the 
wider theoretical background. Samir Okasha’s criticism of underdetermination 
(Okasha 2002: 316–319) points out the same problem: insistence that we can 
clearly distinguish between sets of data and contrasting theories that aim to make 
sense of that data relies on the very same kind of data/theory dichotomy that 
contemporary philosophy of science has abandoned. In his criticism he points out 
how this becomes an insurmountable problem for global theories174 of the world 
as such.175 Simply put, if data and theory are not independent from each other, 
then in the case of global theories one cannot argue that they are both ‘dealing 
with the same data’. Rather, if the theoretical aspects of their approaches are 
clearly different, then there are good reasons to argue that their conceptualization 
and specification of data is also different. 
However, Okasha does not completely dismiss underdetermination due to this 
data/theory problem. His criticism is focused on global theories. In case of 
narrower (or in other words – less ambitious) theories, he agrees that arguments 
of underdetermination can still be presented without running into an inevitable 
problem. For this one needs to show how in specified research contexts it is 
possible to formulate data and theory in such a way as to make it possible to 
distinguish them in those research contexts (Okasha 2002: 316). Of course, this 
also means that one cannot present universal arguments of underdetermination 
that apply to all situations – every research topic and situation has to be dealt with 
individually. Nevertheless, this does make it possible to present underdetermina-
tion arguments.  
                                                                          
173  See section 2.2. about this earlier analysis. 
174  For Okasha a global theory „is a maximally inclusive theory of the world, which predicts 
correctly all true empirically testable statements that there are, and which thus contains all 
other (true) theories as subtheories“ (Okasha 2012: 312). In other words, it is a theory which 
cannot be view as part of any larger or more-inclusive theory or as a theory which does not 
offer any lines of argumentation about some part, type or aspect of data. 
175  He finds Quine a particularly obvious example of this, relying on distinctions and pre-
sumptions similar to the positivists (Okasha 2002: 318). 
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I would suggest that this is how we can talk about empirical equivalence in 
the study of religion as well. Theories of religion are also focusing on one specific 
phenomenon and not on the world as a whole. Therefore, in the context of 
studying this one phenomenon we can formulate what we understand as empirical 
evidence (i. e. ‘data’) and what we understand as an attempt to make sense of it 
on a more generalizing level. Even Jonathan Z. Smith notes alongside his in-
sistence that there is no data for religion, that “there is a staggering amount of 
data, of phenomena, of human experiences and expressions that might be 
characterized in one culture or another, by one criterion or another” (Smith 1982: 
xi), thus accepting that there is a whole lot of stuff out there that we might study, 
but none of it comes with any inevitable insistence to conceptualize it in one 
specific way and only in that one specific way.176 That is a choice scholars have 
to make. But, after we have made those choices, in specific research context our 
formulations of religion can begin to be similar enough to largely agree on what 
they regard as empirical evidence in need of generalization and analysis. If so, 
viewing this as a case underdetermination in the form of empirical equivalence 
becomes a viable path for those who want to make sense of competing hypotheses 
that are noticeably similar in many aspects, yet radically conflicting in some other 
crucial aspects.  
Coming back to the question I asked – are different research programmes 
really dealing with the same data or not? – one can say that in the context of the 
study of religion they are, if their basic understandings, delimitations and con-
ceptualizations concerning the evidence in need of analysis, explanation and 
generalization is similar in most central aspects. This is of course something, 
which needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and cannot be presumed a 
priori about any research programmes. Still, considering how study of religion 
for the past 150 years or so has largely retained a similar understanding and con-
ceptualization of religion as a phenomenon in need of study, analysis and 
explanation, I would hypothesize that theories presented in the study of religion 
during the past century or so mostly can be comparatively analysed through the 
underdetermination prism. Although, it could well be that this does not apply to 
the full extent to all theories and approaches that exist within the study of religion. 
After all, even in their most basic conceptualizations and approaches experimen-
tal perspectives on the cognitive foundations of religiosity can be very different 
from, say, the philological study of Sumerian religion, thus making such com-
parisons practically impossible. Still, except for such extreme cases I think com-
parisons remain possible. However, whether the same can be extended to under-
standings of religion in, let us say, Catholic theology or Hindu theology in 
                                                                          
176  Or to highlight another example, from around the same time, but in this case rather from 
the perspective of the sociology of religion, Robert Wuthnow also points out different ways 
how one can approach relevant empirical data in multiple different ways, reaching different 
results. Thus concluding that: “As a result, it is not necessary to search far in order to find 
examples of strikingly discrepant conclusions being drawn from the same data or from similar 
sets of empirical observations” (Wuthnow 1981: 17). 
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comparison to the prevalent theories of religion in the study of religion is far from 
clear and would require a completely separate analysis. I find it likely, though, 
that in such cases finding that similarity to establish the basic shared foundation 
necessary to conceptualize a similar or analogous understanding of theory and 
data will be far less likely. 
Overall, I do think one can analyse the situation in the study of religion from 
the perspective of empirical equivalence as well, even if it requires a very close 
analysis of the ‘theories’ and ‘data’ one is dealing with. I also think we can apply 
this perspective to the previously177 highlighted possibility of theoretical altern-
atives to the naturalistically formulated evolutionary theories of religion.  
 
 
5.3. Evolutionary theories of religion and the theoretical alternative  
as empirically equivalent theories of religion? 
Earlier in the fourth chapter I delved into the specifics of evolutionary epistemo-
logy, its ambitions and basic foundations, but also into its limitations and 
inconclusive results. Most significantly, however, I showed how naturalism is in 
no way epistemologically inevitable in an evolutionary research setting. Rather, 
it is merely a choice some scholars have made to delimit and define their research 
material and its epistemology. Additionally I showed how one can build an altern-
ative to the contemporary mainstream evolutionary theories of religion based on 
evolutionary epistemology, Reidian common-sense philosophy and related lines 
of thought.  
As I noted, this alternative would abandon the premises naturalism relies on 
and thus would open up the possibility of including non-naturalistic entities, 
mechanisms and causes into the explanatory scheme. In such a case, one can 
propose a theoretical alternative to the current evolutionary theories of religion 
that is in accordance with the evolutionary theory, but which at the same time 
presents a very different theoretical scheme of the whole issue. I will not repeat the 
argument from 4.2.3. in detail, but let it be noted that it argued for a hypothetical 
scenario where the capability of being religious developed evolutionarily because 
acquiring sensory and cognitive knowledge about entities, processes and causes 
we regard as “objects of religious belief” were actually beneficial for humans and 
thus improved the fitness of humans. From such a perspective religiosity as a 
human trait developed and spread into a universal characteristic, because it enabled 
people to better reckon with some aspects of the world than otherwise possible 
(mostly that means things we are likely to categorise as “supernatural” these days). 
Now, as I also noted, such evolutionary perspectives come with the same limita-
tion as all other epistemological positions derived from evolutionary epistemo-
logy – it cannot be empirically confirmed or controlled.  
However, it is important to keep in mind that much of the current evolutionary 
research on religion relies on naturalistic premises that cannot be confirmed or 
                                                                          
177  See section 4.2.3. 
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controlled any better either. Concentrating strictly on the available empirical 
material in need in explanation, naturalistic perspectives and the non-naturalistic 
alternative do not really differ in any significant way. Various evolutionary 
research programmes do of course differ in what kind of empirical data they 
consider significant (or how significant they consider it), but none of them 
radically rejects data acquired by proponents of the other research programmes. 
In fact, as highlighted previously, most of the time new research programmes 
even very much rely on the worldwide comparative data gathered, organized, 
classified and analysed by representatives of other, earlier research programmes. 
Research programmes differ in what kind of explanatory, conceptual and proces-
sual links they find most important. However, most of the theoretical, conceptual 
and methodological foundations are still the same or at least similar enough so as 
to agree on what is understood as data in need of explanation and what is 
understood as the theoretical explanation of that data. This also makes it possible 
to maintain the same kind of data/theory distinctions throughout the whole 
discussion and therefore (as noted in 5.1.2.) avoid the pitfalls highlighted and 
criticised by Okasha (2002). Basically, one can say that most of the available 
empirical materials lend themselves to simultaneously possible alternative inter-
pretations. Furthermore, a non-naturalistic alternative that treats ‘supernatural’ 
entities, mechanisms and causes as relevant (and thus does not consider them a 
priori dismissible) is also trying to make sense of that very same empirical 
material. It does not differ from naturalistic research programmes in invoking a 
different set of evidence, rather it proposes different types of unobservable pheno-
mena to make sense of the inevitably limited empirical material. But nothing in 
this empirical material itself inevitably necessitates a strictly naturalistic inter-
pretation of it, even if gathered by practising and deliberate naturalists. 
And I would argue that in this sense naturalistic evolutionary theories of 
religion and the hypothetical alternative described earlier are empirically equi-
valent theories of religion. They differ not in how they understand their research 
data, they merely make sense of the available data in a different way, but our 
empirical and epistemological limitations prohibit us from finding out which one 
of the epistemological alternatives is correct and which one is not. And in this 
sense naturalistic theories of religion remain dependent on their initial premises – 
without those their whole theoretical structure falls apart. But this means that 
naturalistic and evolutionary theories will always remain incomplete – they 
cannot hope to achieve a ‘complete explanation of religion’ without running into 
the problem that even their best confirmed explanatory proposals rely on accepting 
specific epistemological postulates. 
Still, one potential issue could be raised. Namely, one could argue that natur-
alistic theories of religion and the non-naturalistic alternative are rather global 
theories, not contextually detailed specific theories. After all, they are all dealing 
with empirically inaccessible entities in one way or another and these entities 
supposedly could have a major effect on our global world picture as such. But, if 
so, one cannot apply empirical equivalence to the theories of religion since these 
are global theories and thus one cannot establish analogous data/theory distinctions 
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within all of them. This argument certainly does make a good point, if the non-
naturalistic alternative were developed in full detail in any specific theological 
form. In such a case it would certainly acquire the ambitions of a global theory 
and thus its comparison to other theories would become a problem. However, 
such a development is not something that is inevitably necessary. Rather, that is 
merely an option one can pursue, but does not have to pursue. As long as one 
maintains the non-naturalistic alternative only as an explanation why humans 
have the cognitive capabilities to be religious, but does not attempt to present a 
specific set of conceptualizations and practices as the detailed form of that 
alternative, it is simply a theory about the development of one universal human 
characteristic and nothing more. Of course, it does include universal premises and 
invocations of directly inaccessible entities, but all scientific theories do that. To 
be a global theory one needs to present a global picture about the world as such, 
not merely include a few select globally relevant aspects in an otherwise rather 
specific and focused theoretical elaboration of just one phenomenon. Thus, I 
think we can avoid the problems of global theories in arguments of underdetermi-
nation and it is justifiable to view naturalistic evolutionary theories of religion 
and the theoretical alternative as empirically equivalent theories of religion, 
neither one of which can claim to be more strongly confirmed empirically than 




In the context of currently influential epistemological discussions it is definitely 
worthwhile to draw attention to the underdetermination of the competing theories 
and most significantly to the possibility of viewing comparable theories as 
empirically equivalent. Arguments presented to justify naturalism in the context 
of religious studies (or for evolutionary study of religion specifically) have not 
proven to be epistemologically as successful as naturalists would like to hope. 
Rather, these arguments have merely turned out to be convenient premises to 
build a research programme on, so that one can ask clear research questions 
(“why religiosity, if things are so and so?”) and propose hypothetical answers to 
these questions based on limited empirical research and the evolutionary frame-
work. However, if naturalism is neither conclusively justified nor inevitable, then 
this leaves the (ecological or cognitive) scholar of religion at a rather shaky 
position. This necessitates returning to the questions of methodology, positioning 
and scientificity as discussed in the first and second chapter, to better analyse the 
methodological and epistemological position of the scholar in light of the 
epistemological conclusions of the last three chapters. That is what I intend to 








PART III –  
POSITIONING THE SCHOLAR – EPISTEMOLOGICAL 
AND METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS AND 
POSSIBILITIES IN THE STUDY OF RELIGION 
 
Having come this far, it is time to return to the beginning, so to say. In the first 
two chapters I analysed the situation in contemporary scholarship, particularly in 
relation to the behavioural-cognitive study of religion with specific interest in 
ways scientificity and methodology has been understood (especially in relation 
to the epistemological dimensions of both). I was specifically interested in 
methodological naturalism as it has been presented by many cognitive and 
behavioural researchers. In the subsequent three chapters I focused on the justi-
fication of (methodological) naturalism and closely evaluated all the arguments 
in favour of it – going deeper and deeper into narrower and more specific details 
chapter by chapter. This has been necessary for a complete evaluation of all the 
arguments and possibilities presented by the advocates of methodological 
naturalism (as well as some possibilities they potentially could turn to). All in all, 
I would hope that this in-depth analysis has conclusively shown why there is no 
reason to consider methodological naturalism epistemologically-methodologi-
cally superior to alternatives. Yet, this is not just about methodological naturalism, 
there is a larger issue at play here – how should a scholar of religion position 
oneself? This conclusion concerning epistemological arguments in relation to one 
position among many does not directly answer that question. To address the 
question I will now return to the ‘grand scale’ previously dealt with in the first 
two chapters and analyse some issues directly related to the problem of positioning, 
followed by a comparative evaluation of the four of the most notable positioning 






6. The study of religion and the search for epistemological 
and methodological unity 
Oftentimes discussions of methodology, scientificity and positioning forget or 
ignore the actual diversity of the field. Discussions of scientificity or positioning 
thus focus on the discipline in general – they focus on the right or wrong choices 
for all the subdisciplines, research approaches and programmes in general. 
Conceptual, epistemological and empirical differences are seen as insignificant 
or at least nothing insurmountable. Yet, it is not necessarily obvious that we can 
just presume the insignificance of the differences unproblematically. However, if 
there are major differences, then perhaps there is no reason to talk about the 
position of the scholar of religion in general or about the scientificity of research 
in general.  
Indeed, the academic study of religion has diverged or branched in many 
different disciplinary, methodological and theoretical directions. Philological, 
anthropological, experimental and other researchers are all pursuing their own 
research practices with the aim of understanding religion as a phenomenon. The 
so-called ‘new sciences of religion’ – in their behavioural and cognitive forms – 
are perhaps the most noticeable new developments in the wider field of studies, 
most significantly because they are clearly advocating a rather specific way of 
doing research. Some have, I would say accurately, argued that in this sense these 
new sciences wish to act as a reform movement for the study of religion in general 
(Visala 2008: 127–129).178 This of course has brought about visible conflicts 
between practitioners of different research programmes and methodologies. 
Whether this situation results in a deepening rift between existing research 
approaches or not will have long-lasting consequences for the academic study of 
religion in general. 
Therefore, in this chapter I am going to analyse this (depending on one’s 
preference) possibility, presumption or ideal of unity. I will comparatively analyse 
a couple noteworthy proposals that try to establishing such a shared foundation 
for the discipline in general. To do this I will have to return to the issue of scien-
tificity, but while I mostly limited myself to a detailed depiction of the existing 
alternatives in the first chapter, I will here analyse them critically and evaluate 
their strengths and weaknesses. This will be followed by an analysis of the 
reciprocal translatability and integration of different research perspectives, since 
the ability to translate – and therefore apply – the results of different approaches 
across the discipline is vital for the existence of an actual, practical unity and also 
an inevitable necessity for the integration of different approaches as desired by 
some. This is necessary for the concluding discussion of methodological-
epistemological positions and their justifiability that I will turn to in the last chapter. 
                                                                          
178  Of course, in their talk about the need to ‘science up’ the study of religion (Barrett 2011b: 
229; Xygalatas 2010; Bulbulia 2013a; McCorkle 2008) they are themselves quite explicitly 




6.1. Establishing a foundation or witnessing an inevitable 
fragmentation? 
It is important to analyse how the shared foundation of the discipline is actually 
understood and whether that is merely an ideal or something which could be (or 
is) actually practised. This is vital for the subsequent discussion of positioning, 
since the viability and justifiability of positions also depends on how the discipline 
itself and its many subdisciplines and research programmes are understood to 
relate to each other. This brings us to the many attempts to explain how such a 
loosely related collection of various approaches can actually function and under-
stand itself as one coherent discipline. Elsewhere Gavin Flood has also talked 
about this in the form of a ‘metatheory’ that is supposed to be the foundation of 
the shared discourse (Flood 1999: 4–8), but here I prefer to talk of a foundation 
as that should metaphorically give a better picture of these attempts to formulate 
the basis that the discipline is supposedly about. 
As I showed in the second chapter, most typically this takes the form of 
emphasizing methodology. Proper scientific research is the kind of research that 
follows a systematic and reproducible methodology. Yet, this method-centred 
approach to the foundations of the discipline has always been plagued by the large 
variety of ways method(ology) has been understood by scholars themselves. It 
can mean a specific discipline in general (as in ‘Religionswissenschaftliche 
method’ or ‘anthropological method’ or etc.), it can mean a certain way of doing 
research (as in ‘phenomenological method’) and it can mean a limited set of 
specific procedural practices. Perhaps if conceptualizations of method(ology) had 
limited itself to such variants, arguments insisting on methodology as the founda-
tion of a discipline would be more convincing and more successful, but right now 
that argument will always run into the problem of the ambiguity. After all, 
understandings of methodology have never really managed to limit themselves to 
procedural specifications and discipline-centred formulations. Rather, these dis-
cussions have always looked further – Lincoln’s theses (Lincoln 1996) for one 
say practically nothing about any actual procedural practices and only a little 
about actual disciplinary preferences (and the same goes for all the talk about 
methodological agnosticism, naturalism and so on). I suspect this is also a reason 
for why appeals to a reciprocal and systematic methodology as the foundation of 
the discipline have never really had much concrete success – people of course 
agree, but at a closer look it becomes immediately obvious that they understand 
‘reciprocal and systematic methodology’ in very different ways. Additionally, 
this appeal to a clearly formulated methodology is further undermined by the 
immediately obvious problem that there is no methodological practice that is 
generally more important to the study of religion than all others. For example, 
anthropology emphasizes fieldwork, most of the natural sciences explicitly rely 
on experiment and archaeology is inevitably reliant on its excavation practices. 
Study of religion is among those disciplines that do not have method of its own 




Perhaps partly because of this methodological variety and impreciseness, 
attempts to explicate the foundation of the discipline have oftentimes also first 
looked for a good example and then built their argument on that example. In the 
Religionswissenschaft-centred tradition, I would argue, this example is an idea(l), 
rather than an actually existing discipline. As I showed in my earlier analysis,179 
the empirical nature of the scholarship is here understood as the unifying foun-
dation of all research. Far-reaching theoretical and philosophical discussions are 
frowned upon or should be simply avoided and most certainly one should avoid 
taking a position about the veracity of religious beliefs. In a sense this is an 
attempt to establish the foundation by formulating the general foundation of all 
scientific research, the kind of foundation which should ideally encompass all 
scientific disciplines, but which would not be fully embodied or practiced in any 
of them. Typically, proponents of the Religionswissenschaft-centred approach 
also defend the positional application of methodological agnosticism (e. g. Sharpe 
1983: ix; Hanegraaff 1995). The avoidance of taking a side is very much central 
to this approach, as it finds it essential to differentiate itself from theology and 
other deliberately evaluative perspectives.180  
While certainly influential, this approach does come with its problems as well. 
For one, its persistent emphasis on avoiding philosophical discussion has largely 
been unsuccessful and in actual practice has always included a set of theoretical 
premises, implicit rules of action and goals.181 For some time these implicit 
theoretical premises were explicitly phenomenological in actual research – some-
thing many of the critics of the phenomenological tradition have highlighted very 
well (e.g. Flood 1999).182 Besides, any kind of academic research is always and 
inevitably theoretical, no matter how ‘purely empirical’ one tries to be (Flood 
1999: 4–8; Schilbrack 2014; Jensen 2011b; Stausberg, Engler 2011b). Therefore, 
avoidance of philosophical discussion would merely result in the kind of research 
practice that needs all its practitioners to sign off on a specific kind of implicit 
theoretical basis that should not be analysed or discussed. Moreover, as the 
criticisms raised by the cognitivist scholars highlight (and as I pointed out in 
sections 1.2.1. and 1.2.2.), the problem with this kind of an insistence on avoiding 
theory is that it is thus also either insisting on no generalization at all or is again 
                                                                          
179  See section 1.2.2. 
180  This is something I analysed in detail in section 1.2.3. 
181  Although himself also occasionally a critic of the Religionswissenschaft-centred tradition 
(see Grottanelli, Lincoln 1998), Bruce Lincoln serves as a good example of the widespread 
scepticism towards any kind of ‘philosophical’ discussion in the study of religions as he pretty 
much completely dismisses Schilbrack’s analysis of ‘his philosophy’ (Schilbrack 2005) in his 
response to a symposium on his work (Lincoln 2005: 65–67). 
182  For the wider discussion concerning these criticisms, see also Gilhus (1984), Ryba (2009) 
and Allen (2005). 
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relying on a set of implicit premises to make indirectly generalizing claims about 
the world.183 
The most noteworthy critics of this approach come from the ranks of cognitivist 
researchers of religion. As I showed in section 1.2.1, for them the ideal form of 
science is not some generalization over all sciences as it is for the proponents of 
Religionwissenschaft, rather experimental natural sciences basically embody the 
scientific ideal all other sciences should strive towards. And from this perspective 
historical, philological, anthropological or even sociological and psychological 
study of religion is indeed scientific only if everything done from those per-
spectives is congruent – or as they say, vertically integrated – with everything 
already known by the ‘higher’ natural sciences (Slingerland 2008, 2014; 
Pyysiäinen 2004: 2–27; Xygalatas 2010). In more detailed arguments proponents 
of this model also insist that all scientific research must be done through presenta-
tion of hypotheses and their subsequent empirical testing – without that scientific 
progress is supposedly impossible (and also practically non-existent in the study 
of religion thus far) (Slingerland, Bulbulia 2011: 308–312; Wiebe 2012: 181–
189). Contrarily to the previous perspective’s general preference of methodolo-
gical agnosticism, proponents of this foundation argue in favour of the methodo-
logical naturalism, suggesting that this is absolutely necessary to fully embrace 
true scientificity (Bulbulia, Slingerland 2012: 602; Slingerland, Bulbulia 2011; 
Martin, Wiebe 2013: 482; Bulbulia 2013b: 224–225; McCorkle, Xygalatas 2014; 
Bulbulia 2007: 621–623). Yet, as I showed in detail, their arguments in favour of 
methodological naturalism are not nearly as strong as they appear to assume.184  
However, aside the adequacy of methodological naturalism – something I will 
assess in my comparative evaluation of the positioning choices in the next chapter – 
there are also a couple of other major problems this kind of a formulation evokes. 
First of all, insisting that the only true foundation of scientificity is that of the 
natural sciences in practice creates a model where humanities can be scientific 
only insofar as they are able to maintain a direct connection to those sciences. 
Strictly historical or strictly philological scholarship can never be scientific in 
itself, no matter how well it is done. Yet, all cognitive, ecological or otherwise 
experimental science inevitably relies on conceptual tools developed by the 
hermeneutically oriented scholars who establish the initial contact with object of 
interest, whether through philological studies, anthropological fieldwork or 
quantitative sociology. One needs to know quite a lot about one’s object of study 
before one can even begin to propose hypotheses and test them. And in case of 
humans, this preliminary knowledge is primarily derived hermeneutically. No 
experiment (cognitive or otherwise), quantitative observation (as for example 
astronomy in natural sciences) or other such method(ology) could tell us that one 
                                                                          
183  For example by insisting that religion is a human universal or by concentrating on ‘world 
religions’ or by claiming that religion is a distinctively separate and independent aspect of the 
world – all claims made by many scholars of religion during the past century. 
184  See sections 3.3.1.–3.3.5, but chapters 4 and 5 also act as significant extensions and 
specifications of the arguments presented in those sections. 
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or another human activity or conceptual framework is a case of religiosity. For 
that one relies on preliminary knowledge that is derived from disciplines and 
fields of research that advocates of this foundational proposition claim to be 
scientifically inadequate. Categorisations and definitions are theoretical tools we 
use and as things stand right now, these tools are not derived from the natural 
sciences.  
However, in such a case they are building their own ‘scientific foundation’ on 
something they have themselves declared unscientific. Of course, they could argue 
that they only accept reproducible hermeneutical work. At least one advocate of 
this kind of a scientificity has in fact argued something like that. Donald Wiebe 
notes: “the academic/scientific study of religion must aim only at understanding 
religion where “understanding” is mediated through an intersubjectively testable 
set of statements about religious phenomena and religious traditions” (Wiebe 
2000: 265). Yet it remains unclear what kind of intersubjective tests of statements 
are acceptable. Furthermore, even if that was clarified, this kind of an argument 
would still not escape the problem that for this to work it would require a fully 
inductivist philosophy where all the ‘facts’ are directly derived from empirical 
data and theories are then developed based on those ‘facts’. Yet, scientific research 
does not work like that, theories are not given to us by facts (Jensen 2011b: 44; 
Jensen 1993: 114–116). Thus, even if we accede that only a more limited set185 
of hermeneutically gathered data is scientifically acceptable, we would still face 
the problem that the structure of such a scientific research perspective is not that 
of a hierarchy where everything has to first grow out of the experimental natural 
sciences and then other knowledge can be built upon that. Rather, we would be 
dealing with the kind of a model where an initial set of hermeneutical knowledge 
and theoretical premises are still the basis of all subsequent research, just with the 
clause that the kind of knowledge more easily adaptable to experimental and 
quantitative research is considered preferable and is more likely to be relied on 
subsequently.  
However, in such a case we are not really dealing with a kind of “vertical 
integration” that still does not take hermeneutical research seriously on its own, 
but only insofar as it fits with the presumed theoretical premises of a clearly 
quantitative and experimental research approach. If so, then such scientific study 
of religion does not exist – all current cognitive, behavioural and other evolutionary 
research on religion is extensively relying on the hermeneutical research done by 
the philological, anthropological and other scholars who are ‘unscientific’ 
according to the advocates of this new scientificity and whose research cannot be 
smoothly reformulated into quantifiable definitions. Here one can think of the 
presumption that religion is a human universal or that we can speak of religion as 
                                                                          
185  That is, more limited than what is accepted in the Religionswissenschaft-centred perspective, 
not more limited to any kind of hermeneutical work in general. For example, I suspect much 
of what is described by anthropologists in their writings about their fieldwork does not really 




an easily distinguishable aspect of human life and thus study it as a separate 
phenomenon in need of explanation. Or we can look into the way cognitive 
scientists of religion are primarily interested in beliefs and ask where does this 
come from – finding the answer in the earlier tendencies in the study of religion 
as earlier philological and anthropological scholars were indeed primarily 
interested in beliefs (myths, tales, doctrines and so on). To conclude: proponents 
of this vertical integration and the ‘new scientificity’ in general rely on a 
significant amount of earlier research that they at the same time wish to dismiss 
as inadequate. Such a contradiction is clearly a major problem for this proposal 
as a whole and makes one ask whether this kind of a conceptualization is usable 
in actual research practices at all. 
Although, it should be noted that from a more general perspective there is very 
little new in the basic forms, structures and the rhetoric of their arguments. It has 
been quite common for some time now that those who want to ‘make study of 
religion into a better/proper/real scientific discipline’ will to argue that this can 
be accomplished by cooperating more with some other discipline, by integrating 
oneself more fully into other disciplines, by adapting major (new) developments 
of other disciplines or by paying more attention to some kind of new theoretical 
and/or methodological developments. Advocates of the new scientificity (who 
largely overlap with the practitioners of the cognitive science of religion186) are 
simply emphasizing the centrality of natural sciences, whereas others use this 
very same form of argument in very different ways. For example among others 
Morny Joy (2000b, 2001) has strongly emphasized the need to pay more attention 
to postcolonial, gendered and feminist perspectives so that scholars of religion 
can better comprehend their own position in the field and the limitations and 
possibilities of the discipline as a whole. Gavin Flood (1999) also presents a 
rather similarly structured argument as he finds the prevalent phenomenological 
character of the study of religion highly problematic and wants to reform the 
study of religion through the wider application of Bakhtin’s philosophy and other 
dialogical (and semiotic) approaches. Although paths taken by Joy and Flood are 
radically different from that of the ‘new scientificity’, they also wish to reform 
the discipline through the adoption of methodological and theoretical aspects of 
other disciplines. Whenever such an argument is presented, it is some other 
discipline that is somehow more sound, more reliable and more successful. 
Adopting more of it is supposed to in one way or another solve the problems study 
of religion is facing. But depending on one’s research interests and philosophical 
preferences, the exact disciplinary, methodological or/and theoretical direction 
varies. 
                                                                          
186  As noted earlier though, with at least one noteworthy exception: Harvey Whitehouse 
definitely does not support this kind of ideas about “scientifying the study of religion”. See 
Whitehouse (2004b: 332–334). One could suspect, however, that many of the practitioners of 
cognitive research projects who avoid participating in this kind of debates, also do not neces-
sarily agree with everything the proponents of the ‘new scientificity’ are advocating. 
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There are perhaps alternative paths the study of religion could also take, but 
which they have not pursued yet. Here I am merely going to point out one of them 
and the likely problem with it. I am in mind the view of science as proposed by 
Paul Hoyningen-Huene (2013). At the centre of his argument is the idea of 
systematicity. This for him is the key ingredient that helps to differentiate scientific 
knowledge from other kinds of knowledge – especially from everyday know-
ledge – simply by being more systematic (Hoyningen-Huene 2013: 14), although 
by this he does not mean that it is more systematic in some general sense, but 
rather that science relies on a higher level of systematicity (Hoyningen-Huene 
2013: 21). In his subsequent discussion he analyses nine different dimensions of 
the scientific endeavour (description, explanation, prediction, defence of know-
ledge claims, critical discourse, epistemic connectedness, ideal of completeness, 
generation of new knowledge and representation of knowledge), highlighting the 
high level of systematicity in all them. And while many in the study of religion 
would certainly find this kind of an approach attractive – after all, it would make 
it possible to show the scientific quality in the study of religion without the need 
to appeal to any external discipline, theory or methodology to justify the scienti-
ficity of the discipline – it does come with a certain problem that scholars of 
religion will likely find equally problematic.  
That is to say, it does not help the scholar of religion in the need to differentiate 
oneself from the theologians. As far as systematicity is concerned, I see little to 
no reason why or how one could claim that academic theology is inherently and 
inevitably less systematic (or ‘exhibiting a lower level of systematicity’) than 
other academic disciplines. Yet that is one of the central concerns in much (if not 
most) of the discussions of scientificity and positioning in the study of religion – 
how to differentiate oneself from theological approaches to religion. Whether we 
look at the attempts to build that foundation from methodology or by relying on 
an understanding of the foundations of science in general (whether in a general 
form as in the Religionswissenschaft-centred tradition, or in a more hierarchical 
form as argued by the advocates of the new scientificity), all of these approaches 
wish to differentiate the study of religion from theology and concurrently also 
guarantee that the study of religion remains (or becomes) alike all other scientific 
disciplines (however that is understood). This is also why discussions over the 
position of the scholar are regularly at centre-stage in the study of religion (whether 
directly or through such topics as the insider-outsider problem, postcolonialist 
problematics or debates about indigenous methodologies). However, since it is 
possible to differentiate the positioning debate from the foundation of scientificity 
debate, I am going to do just that and return to that later.  
Another interesting thing all these attempts to conceptualize and establish a 
foundation for the discipline have in common is that all of them are trying to 
account for and accommodate all the existing sub-disciplines and perspectives 
that are focusing on religion, but are avoiding theological scholarship at the same 
time. Even those who argue that setting up hypotheses and subsequently testing 
them empirically is the essence of science, do not (with only very few exceptions) 
go so far as to claim that philological-interpretative study of texts is inevitably 
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and fundamentally unscientific. They find most of the existing scholarship suspect 
and problematic, but not hopelessly so. Similarly in the other end of the spectrum. 
For example, Flood is rather critical of all reductionist and naturalist research 
perspectives (Flood 1999: 65–90) and similarly criticises the cognitive science of 
religion (Flood 1999: 57–63), yet neither is he interested in wholly dismissing 
such fields of research. He would rather just ‘reform’ them in a different way 
(Flood 1999: 77–79, 89–90, 146–150). 
Overall, at this point one can certainly argue that despite numerous attempts 
to establish a foundation for the discipline as a whole (or in fact, through the 
establishment of a foundation, turn a branching field of studies into a coherent 
discipline) it remains rather questionable whether any of these theoretical models 
can actually get this done or whether they could even theoretically account for all 
the existing research approaches. To do that one would require practical guide-
lines how to ‘convey’ or ‘transfer’ or ‘translate’ knowledge acquired through one 
approach to a (very or radically) different approach. This is something I am going 
to discuss next. 
 
 
6.2. Possibilities and problems of reciprocal translatability and 
integration 
As one has probably noticed, all these conceptualizations of scientificity are 
facing problems of integration and translatability. Some have tried to solve this 
by declaring one of kind of research superior to all other kinds of research, others 
have attempted to look for a generalized notion of ideal research and interpret 
different research programmes as merely alternative paths towards the same goal. 
As shown, one cannot quite consider any of the proposed solutions successful, 
yet the problem itself is essential. If different research approaches are not con-
gruent, commensurable, integrable or at least translatable, then study of religion 
will always remain fragmented and a generalized picture or theory that takes all 
the different levels and perspectives of research (evolutionary, psychological, 
cultural, social, philosophical, etc.) into account becomes an impossibility. In one 
way or another all the attempts to establish a generally shared understanding of 
scientificity are doing just that – they are trying to envision a way how we at least 
theoretically could visualise the final ideal state of complete knowledge about 
religion. While it is true that they are not so much dealing with the supposed 
contents of that completeness, but rather with envisioning the way(s) we should 
get there and what could perhaps be called the ‘structure’ of that completeness, 
establishing a vision of true scientificity also implicitly does try to tell what the 
sought for ideal should accomplish.  
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Now, granted, this is a huge topic. Something one could easily devote a whole 
separate volume on.187 Here I am going to limit myself to highlighting a few of 
the more fundamental problems and then discussing one specific example in more 
detail. But before that, just to be clear, I should note what I mean by ‘translat-
ability’ and ‘integration’. In short, when talking about translatability I have in mind 
the issue whether results, data or basic frameworks of one research approach (be 
it, hermeneutical philology, quantified sociology or cognitive science) can be 
reformulated in such a way that they can be utilized and practically applied in 
another research approach without losing the key contents or aspects of the 
original approach one derived them from. As with all issues of translation, this is 
not ‘measurable’ in detail and the successfulness of a translation cannot be 
evaluated in any quantifiable way, but the lack of fundamental quantifiability does 
not mean that one cannot evaluate the successfulness of a translation at all. 
Furthermore, obviously no translation is ever the identical twin of the original, so 
to a certain, ideally limited extent translating also changes the results, data or 
basic frameworks that one is trying to translate. Which aspects, parts, data or 
theory should be translated depends heavily on one’s conception of scientificity 
and the overall picture one is trying to reach.  
At the same time, by integration I mean the kind of research situation where 
one can adopt the results of another research approach into one’s own research 
approach. Integration in practice can take a variety of forms. On the one hand it 
could merely mean the application of ‘translated’ materials from another research 
approach (and in this sense translation and integration are certainly not in conflict). 
However, on the other hand and more commonly, integration means the 
application (and oftentimes modification) of the relevant materials and con-
ceptions of one approach to another in a way that depends on the conception of 
the ideal form of science that one is supposed to reach. Therefore, while 
translation with minimal losses is at the one end of the integrative spectrum, 
complete consilience and subjecting all other disciplines to the methodological 
and conceptual ideals of natural science lies at the other end of the integrative 
spectrum.188  
That may be the general picture of theoretically possible options, but the real 
question rather is how much of it is actually possible or useful. ‘Possible’ in the 
sense whether all research approaches really are inter-translatable or not and 
‘useful’ in the sense whether – if possible – the result of that integration actually 
accomplishes something notable on the grand scale – either as finding out some-
thing fundamental, new, significant or otherwise about one’s research focus. This 
is something many have expressed grave doubts about. For one, the ambitious 
                                                                          
187  And indeed, I would hope that someone does that! As far as I know, no one has yet 
thoroughly and systematically tackled this issue (at least as far as study of religion is con-
cerned). 
188  Consilience is an idea most famously defended by Edward O. Wilson (1998) of course. 
Beyond that and more specifically concerning humanities, this has been promoted by 
Slingerland (2008b) and in Sligerland and Collard (eds.) (2012). Specifically concerning study 
of religion this has been advocated by Slingerland (2014). 
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project of vertical integration and consilience as, for example, advocated by 
Slingerland (2014) suffers from many problems of integrability and its use-
fulness. As noted by Massimo Pigliucci (2016), when we talk of knowledge in 
academic research, we can mean very different things. There are things we can 
know about the moons of Jupiter through observation, yet there are also things 
we know based on the Pythagorean Theorem. Furthermore, in the study of music 
one can also come across knowledge claims such as ‘Beethoven’s music is of 
higher quality than that of Britney Spears’. How should one reduce all of these 
(and other) kinds of knowledge to that of biology, chemistry or preferably even 
to the ‘bottom level of reality’ (be it, quarks or strings or something else)?  
More specifically, in the study of religion this issue of integrability has been 
addressed by Anna-Konstanze Schröder (2014) and by Sebastian Schüler 
(2014b). Schröder (2014: 53–64) notes how many of the research approaches (for 
example the cognitive science of religion or psychology of religion more 
generally) rely on a ‘nomothetic-deductive’ research perspective that is built on 
a ‘model – operationalizing – data gathering – data analysis – data interpretation – 
theory’ (and back to the start) process and thus it is very hard to find ways how 
to make constructively oriented hermeneutical research compatible, integrable or 
even properly translatable into the conceptual language of such a nomothetic-
deductive research perspective.189 In hermeneutically oriented research (whether 
philological, anthropological or otherwise methodologically) there is no need to 
operationalize concepts in strict and experimentally applicable ways. Instead, 
concepts are useful and applicable only insofar as they enable communication, 
comprehension and understanding. Success in research is evaluated based on the 
ability to convincingly communicate meanings and intentions and motivations as 
these are present in the research material. This is very different from the experi-
mentally oriented research perspectives that evaluate success based on the ability 
to conceptualize research objects in such way that they would be testable in a 
quantifiable way. Schüler (2014b: 24–28) has suggested that some of these 
                                                                          
189  It should be noted that similar concerns about the division of approaches in the study of 
religion have been raised much earlier as well, although back then ‘the line’ was drawn 
somewhat differently. I have in mind Wuthnow (1981) and his discussions about the “two 
traditions” in the study of religion. In some respects similarly, but mostly from a rather dif-
ferent perspective he argues that the study of religion has been divided by competing 
intellectual presuppositions which have given raise to distinctively different research 
traditions. The first, he argues, builds on a Cartesian foundation, which assumes the radical 
separation of the subject and the world around him/her – the primary goal thus is the reuni-
fication of the subject and the object and thus the interest between the individual and the 
society. He sees Marx, Weber and Durkheim as the noteworthy followers of this tradition. The 
second he understands as a more wholistic approach where religion becomes one of the ways 
how humans in their search for meaning try to make sense of the world – thus also the interest 
in phenomenology, hermeneutics and symbols. Here Bellah, Berger and Geertz serve as 
central figures for him. Obviously one can categorize and systematize existing approaches in 
the study of religion in many different ways and Wuthnow’s approach has its virtues, but I do 
think that in the current situation, almost forty years after he wrote that paper, Schröder’s 
distinction is more accurate and describes the current problems better. 
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research perspectives may be more compatible than others. He notes how 
contrarily to the prevalent computational models of the cognitive science, dialogue 
and cooperation with cultural and hermeneutical research perspectives may be 
more easily attainable in case of the approaches that focus on embodied cognition 
and social cognition. This may be, but existing research thus far certainly does 
highlight how difficult it is to maintain compatibility and dialogue between 
research approaches that emphasize the constructionist nature of religion as we 
conceptualize, visualize and portray it in social and cultural life on the one side 
and experimentally-quantifiably oriented research on the other side. 
One of the best ways to highlight this difficulty is to look at the controversies 
surrounding the concept of ‘religion’. For constructively oriented anthropological, 
sociological and philological scholars there is no such independent, universal or 
distinct thing, object, sphere of existence or sui generis phenomenon as ‘religion’. 
Religion and other such generalizing concepts are at best heuristic tools we can 
use to make sense of the diversity of human ideas and behaviours we encounter 
in the world, but it is not something you can quantifiably measure or observe as 
‘a distinct entity/phenomenon/thing in the world’ (Bell 2000, 2006; Engler 2004; 
Schilbrack 2010, etc.).  
However, in the more quantifiably and experimentally oriented cognitive and 
behavioural approaches research hypothesis need to have clearly defined and 
measurable research objects for any kind of proper research to be possible at all. 
This has caused researchers of these approaches to look for specific ways how to 
conceptualize religion. Oftentimes this takes the form of identifying a few key 
characteristics and building the concept of religion as a whole based on that. For 
example, Pascal Boyer in a very straightforward manner focuses on ‘religious 
ideas, beliefs and concepts’ and develops his whole theory of religion based on 
such a delimiting focus (Boyer 2001: 4, but see also 62). In a similar fashion 
Bering and Johnson in their article about supernatural punishment (Bering, 
Johnson 2005) focus on beliefs about supernatural agents and subsequently pro-
pose a theory of religion. Alternatively, one can look at Bering (2011) who tries 
to explain religious beliefs, but in practice claims to be dealing with religion in 
general. Similar treatments, where belief in supernatural agents is the key element 
of religiosity and thus the ‘quantifiable hook’ we can use to look into the pheno-
menon as a whole, can be found in many other studies as well.190 In a sense, this 
approach works as a kind of an inverted pyramid, where religion in general is 
understood as a complex and wide-reaching phenomenon, but its large variety of 
aspects and dimensions can be explained through the most fundamental aspect(s), 
which is/are presumed to be the centre of religiosity as such. In the behaviourally 
oriented studies (such as the costly signalling theory of religion), research is 
instead focusing on ritualized behaviours and trustworthy communication, thus 
religion becomes ‘a way of packaging information’ (Finkel, Swartwout, Sosis 
2010: 305). In such a case all kinds of communicative, hard to fake signals 
                                                                          
190  For example, this is just as much present even in the cognitive studies of religious ritual, 
where the key element is still belief in supernatural agents (Lawson, McCauley 1990, 2002). 
 
164 
(behaviours, badges, bans) become the key elements, the ‘quantifiable hooks’ for 
the researcher. Therefore, the approach promoted by behavioural ecologists is 
significantly less focused on identifying one or two fundamental key elements, 
but it is still clearly different from the approach of the social and cultural con-
structionists, since ecologists are trying to make sense of religion as a system 
consisting of a recurrent set of core elements (belief in supernatural agents, ritual, 
music, emotionally charged symbols, etc.) and the coalescence of these elements 
is the focus of their adaptationist analysis (Sosis 2009: 320–321).191 
Quite predictably this kind of attempts to define religion in a quantifiable way 
have brought about various criticisms from those who are well-aware of the histori-
cally and culturally contingent character of ‘religion’ and other terms regularly 
used in the study of religion. Less so with the more complex and sophisticated 
approach of the behavioural ecology, but certainly the approach cognitive 
researchers have pursued has been extensively criticised. Some, for example, 
Saler (2004: 228–230) have criticised cognitivists’ tendency to concentrate way 
too much on supernatural agents, pointing out the problems with such an 
approach192 and instead advocating a more Wittgensteinian approach to ‘religion’, 
portraying it as a family resemblance rather than as a concrete phenomenon with 
a specific set of key characteristics (Saler 2004: 230–231). Armin W. Geertz in 
his review of Norenzayan (2013) also offers a similar criticism, pointing out how 
Norenzayan continues to apply the belief-centric conceptualization of religion 
that is so common in the cognitive science of religion, but which is also not 
acceptable for most historians and anthropologists of religion (instead preferring 
a more ritual-centred approach) (Geertz 2014b: 611).193  
Elsewhere others have gone even farther, pointing out how the cognitive 
approach through its depiction of religion as a distinct, clearly delimited entity 
with specific fundamental characteristics is basically a return to the sui generis 
approach to religion that so many in the social and historical perspectives have 
begun to move away from (Day 2010: 6–7; Hughes 2010: 301–302). In light of 
                                                                          
191  Furthermore, specifically in response to constructionist critics, Sosis argues: “Even if 
religion is simply a Western construct, it is a collection of cognitive processes and behaviors 
that form an appropriate unit of evolutionary analysis. Specifically, it is an adaptive system, 
similar to – but no less complex than – the respiratory, circulatory, or immune systems, all of 
which are also Western constructs and probably lacking in the lexicon of traditional 
populations, yet no less interpretable through an evolutionary lens. Rather than debate whether 
“religion” is a natural category and wallow in its murky definitional waters, we should 
recognize the religious system, consisting of a recurrent set of core elements, as the appropriate 
unit of evolutionary analysis (Sosis 2009: 320–321; emphasis in original). 
192  Basically, Saler argues that we could find ‘supernatural agents’ outside phenomena we 
commonly label ‘religious’ as well (Saler 2004: 228–230). It should be noted that Saler is not 
alone in this. Gothoni (1996) has also argued that ‘religion’ ought to be viewed as a family 
resemblance kind of concept and phenomenon. For the criticism of such arguments, see Geertz 
(1997). 
193  It is worth noting that Geertz was far from the only one who found Norenzayan’s con-
ceptualization and usage of ’religion’ problematic. This has been a recurring theme among the 
critics of Norenzayan. For an overview of these criticisms see Skjoldli (2015: 651–652). 
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the extensive constructionist criticisms, Day argues that we can at best use the 
category of religion as a heuristic tool that “should be treated a something akin to 
a “center of gravity” or an “equator”: an abstract tool that allows us to navigate 
the world a bit more efficiently. However, a science of religion makes as little 
sense as a science of equators for the simple reason that neither enterprise would 
have anything to explain” (Day 2010: 6–7, emphases in original). Such a heuristic 
approach regarding the concept of religion is of course widely accepted these 
days.194 Quite significantly, it also allows for rather straightforward comparisons 
of Eliaden phenomenology and cognitive science (Day 2010: 7), since both are 
conceptualizing ‘religion’ in noticeably similar ways, even if they are using it for 
very different purposes. I do believe that such criticisms are very much justified. 
‘Religion’ as most commonly used in the new evolutionary approaches is indeed 
portrayed as a distinct, coherent phenomenon with a specific set of characteristics 
and not as a practically useful scholarly device. The need to clearly define one’s 
object of research and conceptualize it in such a way that you can study it 
experimentally in a ‘piecemeal fashion’195 has probably brought about this kind 
of conceptualizations of religion as grand theories of the complex phenomenon 
in general are still the goal, even it is vitally necessary to narrow it down to small, 
quantifiable units for specific case studies.  
Thus far this ‘narrowing’ process in combination with the search for grand 
theories has come at the cost of conceptual credibility, as defenders of the 
cognitivist approach have simply seen hermeneutical and postmodernist research 
as stuck in a “methodological confusion and malaise” (Slingerland 2014: 122), 
instead themselves cherishing a “Victorian spirit of unified inquiry” (Slingerland 
2014: 122). Elsewhere, justification of the use of ‘religion’ has taken the form of 
emphasizing the need for general categories so that cross-cultural research would 
be possible at all (Slingerland, Bulbulia 2011: 314–316), but still conceptualizing 
religion itself in a remarkably essentializing way: “‘religion’ is probably best seen 
as a radial or prototype category, anchored by a central feature or cluster of central 
features” (Slingerland, Bulbulia 2011: 314).196 Rather interestingly Slingerland 
has at the same time agreed with a few critics that ‘religion’ most certainly should 
be characterized as a practically useful heuristic category, but not a direct desig-
nation of any concrete phenomenon (Slingerland 2008a: 450). Although, without 
a direct elaboration one can only wonder why he has not applied this agreement 
to actual research projects. And while one can certainly sympathize with the 
                                                                          
194  Elsewhere Bell (2000, 2006), Schilbrack (2013: 293), King (2013), etc. also support a 
heuristic approach to the concept of ’religion’.  
195  Just to be clear, this is a phrase researchers in the cognitive science of religion very much 
like to use themselves. For example, see Sørensen (2005: 467–470) and Barrett (2007a: 768–
769; 2011b: 231–232) as examples of emphasizing the so-called ’piecemeal’ approach. 
196  It should be noted that an argumentatively very similar approach is also used to justify the 
central use of the concept of ‘belief’ by Lanman (2008). There as well the use of the concept 
is justified through the long history of usage, through the need for generalizing research and 
by emphasizing a strict definition as if the long history of usage and a very clearly formulated 
definition can solve the problems highlighted by constructionist critics. 
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problem cognitive and behavioural researchers are facing as they need to specify 
their object of study (for experimental research to be possible at all), existing 
applications (and especially in cognitivist approaches) have not been successful 
in reconciling this need for specific definitions with the conceptual problematics 
that haunt such central conceptual tools of research.  
But this kind of a failure to take cultural and social analyses of religion (and 
‘religion’!) seriously is not just an example of the difficulties of interdisciplinary 
research. This also highlights the genuine difficulties of translating the basic 
frameworks as well as the results of cultural and historical research to experi-
mentally inclined evolutionary research projects. There does not appear to be 
reason to argue that this is merely a case of defining the same concepts somewhat 
differently or a case of requiring a different kind of conceptual toolbox, where 
emphasis is on one specific way of conceptualization. Rather, this appears to be 
a far more fundamental problem, where even the basic premises of research are 
distinctively different. Therefore, the situation is rather characterized by selective 
adoption and recontextualization of interesting elements from other research 
approaches. In this case ‘one’s own’ approach is always (whether implicitly or 
explicitly) seen as superior to all other approaches. But in this sense each approach 
is indeed integrating the elements they like, rather than actually attempting to 
translate them and retain the key elements as they were understood in that other 
approach. Alternatively, if the comparisons of the use of ‘religion’ in phenomeno-
logy of religion and cognitive science of religion – as highlighted before – are 
justified, one could also argue that cognitivist researchers have indeed translated 
a certain approach to religion into their own. However, instead of trying to 
develop a dialogue with current developments in the historical and social studies 
of religion they have returned to the approaches largely abandoned in con-
temporary research.  
Either way, current research practices and conceptual developments do not 
offer much enthusiasm in this regard and instead highlight some of the major 
difficulties any attempt to building a complete vision on cross-disciplinarily 
translated knowledge faces. Here I definitely do agree with Schröder (2014: 53–
64) in her suggestion that the issue of associating or combining or at least con-
necting the nomothetic-deductive perspectives with the hermeneutical perspectives 
appears to be one of the major future challenges in the study of religion. Further-
more, at least one notable anthropologist thinks that this problem cannot be 
solved (Lambek 2014: 146–148), since hermeneutically inclined philological and 
anthropological research approaches are just too different from the experi-
mentalists (such as psychologists).197 Although, despite this pessimism and the 
                                                                          
197  Specifically he argues that „Rigorous experimentalists discard their own past as soon as a 
better experiment or experimental result comes along. They also take an objectivist position 
or produce one by means of their methods; such a position is designed to put them in a different 
kind of relationship with their subjects, an explicitly external and possibly superior epistemo-
logical position rather than an equivalent one. In effect, it places them in a position of 
competition over matters of truth and certainty, hence the disputes between religion and 
science, the very disputes that the other approaches struggle to avoid or understand. As they 
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current lack of success in cross-disciplinary translation, the existence of continuous 
dialogue between such very different research approaches is significant in itself 
as well as noted by Hyman (2004).198 
Returning to the larger question of unity or fragmentation, the current state of 
affairs would seem to be one where actual practices very much fall short of the 
ideals of scientific unity and completeness that guide how researchers think of 
and justify those very same research practices. Nevertheless, even if disciplinary 
foundations have not been established through a unified understanding of scienti-
ficity, neither has current research given much hope for cross-disciplinary trans-
lation, one could potentially still argue in favour of specific formulations if it 
were possible to show that there exists some kind of a fundamental hierarchy of 
knowledge or an inevitably interdependency of different research perspectives 
which in turn makes it necessary to rely on one kind of a perspective rather than 
another. In the last section of this chapter I am going to briefly look at some of 
the potential arguments in such matters. Only after that is it possible to turn to the 
evaluation of the positioning options available for the scholar of religion. 
 
 
6.3. Formulating the big picture: hierarchies, interdependencies and 
visions of completeness 
Thus far in this chapter I have looked at how researchers have tried to formulate 
the foundation of the discipline by specifying the norms and requirements of 
properly scientific research. I also pointed out the shortcomings and problems 
each one of these has faced thus far. This in turn led me to the issue of translat-
ability – to what extent can one translate the basic frameworks, conceptual tools 
or eventual results of one approach to another? – and to a relatively pessimistic 
evaluation of the current situation (at least regarding the issue of translating 
conceptual tools from humanities to ecological and cognitive research pro-
grammes). I now intend to highlight three recurring aspects of all these discus-
sions and topics. In different ways these as well function as attempts to formulate 
the (ideal) unity of the discipline as they try to make sense of the ‘structure’ this 
unity should have. First, there is the issue of disciplinary interdependency – do 
different (sub)disciplines depend on each other and if so, in what way? Secondly, 
is research founded on, or inevitably reliant on a clear hierarchy of knowledge? 
Thirdly, what should the final picture of complete knowledge (that the field of 
study strives towards) look like and include? Obviously these are immense topics, 
                                                                          
naturalize religion, the kind of knowledge the purely objectivist disciplines produce is not 
fully commensurable with the knowledge produced by the hermeneutic disciplines” (Lambek 
2014: 147). 
198  To be specific, Gavin Hyman argues: „In the absence of a unitary theoretical account it 
may well be that “religious studies” (both the discipline and the institutional departments) will 
instead serve the practical purpose of being a “placeholder” within which dialogue may occur” 
(Hyman 2004: 216). 
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thus I am here going to limit myself solely to those aspects that directly relate to 
the conceptions and arguments I have dealt with thus far. 
To begin with the issue of disciplinary interdependency. This is something 
most researchers in the new evolutionary perspectives have made strong claims 
about.199 As discussed, evolutionary researchers insist that it is not possible to 
comprehend and analyse religiosity as a phenomenon without taking the eco-
logical and/or cognitive aspects of human development and biological make up 
into account. Historical, anthropological and sociological studies of religion are 
insufficient in themselves, religiosity can reliably be analysed, understood and 
explained only if we build those theories on cognitive and biological foundations, 
they claim. In addition these arguments are closely accompanied by claims that 
humanities are not truly scientific or only insofar as they are compatible with 
natural sciences.200 Yet, as I noted earlier in this chapter, despite such ambitious 
claims this conceptualization of scientificity comes with the glaring problem that 
they themselves are hugely reliant on earlier hermeneutically inclined philo-
logical and anthropological scholarship. This in turn leads us back to the argument 
various scholars from different backgrounds and perspectives have persistently 
argued: hermeneutics is the inevitable foundation of all research on religion 
(Wach 1967: 12–15; Long 1978; Kippenberg 1984; Joy 2000a; Seiwert 2012: 32, 
etc.).  
Still, I think the problem here is that in a way both sides of this debate are 
correct, but not to the extent they themselves would like to believe. Both sides 
begin with different questions and then try to generalize these answers to the 
study of religion overall. Those emphasizing hermeneutical ‘understanding the 
other’ as the inevitable foundation of all research are focusing on the question 
how study of religion is possible at all and what one needs to do to begin with 
such research. And indeed, in this sense all research begins with a hermeneutical 
search for understanding other people. Of course all researchers individually do 
not begin there, but for other kinds of research to be possible at all, someone 
needs to have done some (or preferably a lot of) hermeneutical research to begin 
with. How else would we know ‘what’s out there?’. On the other hand, those 
emphasizing the cognitive, neurological and biological dimensions, insisting that 
these dimensions are inevitably necessary for any attempt to make sense of 
religiosity, are obviously also correct. Human beings are biological creatures who 
inevitably incorporate their neurological, cognitive and other functional capabilities 
to all their activities, thoughts and so on. Thus, for a complete picture of religiosity 
as such, these sciences and what they can help us study do indeed offer us a 
chance to look at the foundation(s) of religiosity as such. 
The problem here is that neither of the two perspectives can really ‘overtake’ 
the other. Hermeneutics may lie at the very beginning of any kind of research 
concerning humans, but that does not mean that the hermeneutical search for 
                                                                          
199  As I highlighted in the first chapter, but also discussed from a specifically epistemological 
point of view in the third chapter. 
200  See sections 1.2.1. and 1.2.2. concerning this. 
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understanding is superior to other research approaches in all matters and questions 
concerning religiosity. Similarly, humans are obviously biological beings with 
cognitive functions and the human capability for religiosity inevitably depends 
on them (or grows out of them), but one cannot hope to derive the superiority or 
higher importance of cognitive and biological sciences from this obvious fact. 
After all, we can only start doing this kind of research once we have done quite a 
lot of basic hermeneutical, philological, anthropological and historical research 
to begin with. Without those we would simply not know what to study as we would 
lack even the basic conceptual framework that the study of religion relies on these 
days (and what the cognitive and ecological scholars have largely adopted for 
their own needs in forms convenient for them). 
This leads us straight into the second issue – that of hierarchy. And while 
advocates of the so-called new scientificity insist on a straightforward, linear 
understanding of hierarchy, what I have just highlighted with regards to the issue 
of interdependency also points to the need to rethink the hierarchy of disciplines 
in the context of the study of religion. After all, if psychology, ecology, biology 
and other relevant disciplines in some key aspects depend on philological, herme-
neutical and other related approaches in their research on religion, they cannot be 
more fundamental than the approaches they rely on. Therefore, I do not think 
there is any way to justify any linear, ‘ladder-type’ form of hierarchy. Rather, in 
the context of the study of religion it makes more sense to think of the inter-
relation of scientific disciplines in the form of a loop or a circle where none of 
them can be called somehow fundamentally primary. Even if one or another 
appears to be more fundamental in the context of some specific research per-
spective, this cannot be extended to the academic study of religion in general, 
regardless of the specific perspective. In this sense all the proposed ideal forms 
of scientificity function only as elaborations or explanations of the specific 
research practices of one or another approach or research group, but all of them 
lack the argumentative and practical strength to justify themselves beyond that. 
This of course will make one ask whether we can speak of any unified concept 
of complete knowledge – the ideal final state of the academic study – in the 
context of the study of religion at all? Perhaps one might argue that the under-
standing of the complete picture would differ, since the questions various 
researchers ask or the aspects they focus on also differ? This theoretically could 
turn out to be a possibility, but as things stand right now in the study of religion, 
I do not think this is the case, despite significant differences in ideas of scienti-
ficity, approach and positioning. As I noted in the end of section 6.1., all approaches 
to this issue of complete picture are emphasizing the need to accommodate all the 
sub-disciplines, research programmes and approaches. No one is dismissing any 
research approaches in general while discussing their vision. I would argue that 
this also very much unites them in their conceptions of the idealized final state of 
complete knowledge. Andrew Abbott has also analysed this issue from a more 




“Each major academic discipline has an axis of cohesion. /…/ Consider the 
disciplines interested in culture. The heart of anthropology is its method, 
ethnography. The heart of cultural studies is the conception of text, which 
derives from its parent disciplines in literary studies. The political scientists 
writing about culture are shaped by their discipline's central allegiance to 
the phenomenon of power” (Abbott 2002: 217–218).  
 
Something very similar is taking place in the study of religion, where the concept 
of religion lies at the centre of all the various sub-disciplines and approaches that 
the proponents of the different try to accommodate and adopt to their overall 
generalization. As Jonathan Z. Smith famously noted, “”Religion” /…/ plays the 
same role in establishing a disciplinary horizon that a concept such as “language” 
plays in linguistics or “culture” plays in anthropology. There can be no disciplined 
study of religion without such a horizon” (Smith 1998: 281–282).  
I would argue this also functions as the basis of a remarkably unified idea 
concerning the final end point study of religion would ideally reach. Obviously, 
approaches in existence right now address this ‘axis of cohesion’ or ‘horizon’ in 
quite different ways and thus highlight one or another aspect of religion, but still, 
religion in general is something understood rather similarly. It is still beliefs, 
rituals, communities, organizations, texts, doctrines, institutions and myths in one 
combination or another, from one perspective or another. Even those arguing in 
favour of abandoning the concept of religion are mostly just focusing on how to 
conceptualize and approach the phenomena we see in the world better, but they 
are not really arguing that such phenomena do not exist at all (Fitzgerald 1997 is 
an excellent example here). And in this sense ‘religion’ continues to very much 
define and delimit the idealized whole scholars of religion are focusing on. This 
whole typically consists of all the aforementioned aspects, from the very beginning 
of religiosity as a human trait and capability, including all the forms and ways it 
has ever existed up until today and potentially to the future, as long as religiosity 
continues to exist. In this sense, it is of course the kind of completion that in all 
likelihood we will never achieve, but as an ideal it will continue to influence and 
guide our research practices regardless of its achievability.201  
Of course the exact ‘structure’ of this complete knowledge will vary depending 
on how one understands the theoretical end goals of research. It can be structured 
as a theory of causal joints and functions, or it can be structured as a complete 
descriptive and interpretive whole that covers every detail as well as every 
generality. In any case, these two definitely do not exhaust all the possibilities 
(and they do not necessarily contradict each other either), but the point here is 
that the ‘things in need of the complete coverage’ are understood in remarkably 
similar ways. One could even speculate that if it were not so, the numerous (and 
sometimes radically) different research approaches would not have any need to 
justify their own conceptions of scientificity or position as preferable compared 
                                                                          
201  I have discussed these issues concerning the contemporary era and the Western society 
from a more general perspective more thoroughly elsewhere. See Peedu (2014). 
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to others. Only if one sees the other as potentially attempting to occupy or already 
occupying “the same turf” does one feel the need to justify one’s own perspective. 
 
 
6.4. Conclusion & looking ahead 
Therefore, overall what we see in the study of religion is a multiplicity of attempts 
to conceptualize the demands of a properly scientific study. None of these are 
without their problems, some more severe than others, but most significantly, 
they do want to clarify the same (kind of) issues. Yet, problems of translatability 
cast grave doubts on the question whether different research approaches can 
really be integrated as smoothly as many would like to see (or claim necessary). 
It could be said that in this situation a scholar finds itself faced with a 
(meta)theoretical foundation of the discipline that is at the same time very 
fragmented as well as noticeably unified, all depending on which aspect one 
wishes to emphasize or focus on. Nevertheless, there is certainly enough unity 
here that one can discuss the possibility of justifying one specific positioning 
choice for all the research approaches in general, even if finding such a shared 
position is likely to be very difficult. After all, such a position should make it 
possible to avoid biases and mistakes unacceptable for a scholar of religion, yet 
should also be applicable in the practical context of many different research 
approaches and situations (i. e. it should be more than simply a theoretical 
elaboration, but an actual guideline for research activities). As I earlier argued we 
should think of it as the act of self-positioning, inevitable for all researchers, 
though as I noted, it is often depicted as a methodological issue. In the last chapter, 
I am going to look into the possibilities of self-positioning currently available for 
scholars of religion and evaluate their feasibility, desirability and applicability. 
While I have analysed methodological naturalism in depth already in earlier 
chapters, simply criticising one position would remain shallow, if one did not 






7. The study of religion and the position(s) of the scholar 
Earlier in the second chapter I looked into the discussions concerning method-
(ology) in the study of religion, highlighting numerous different paths this 
discussion has taken and arguing in favour of a adopting threefold categorization 
to make sense of ways method(ology) has been discussed and understood in the 
study of religion. In the following chapters I have discussed a number of different 
issues and problems, all in one way or another related to the debates concerning 
epistemology, evolutionary study of religion, naturalism and scientificity. In 
other words, I have been dealing with the specific topics that are directly relevant 
for the issues I categorized as the third dimension of methodology – that of 
positioning.  
All those discussions have been necessary for a proper evaluation of the 
positioning options proposed in the study of religion. I have mostly focused on 
issues relevant for the justifiability of methodological naturalism, but that has 
been necessary, since the question I have been most interested in is whether the 
new evolutionary approaches to religiosity are indeed inevitably linked to any 
specific position or whether they inevitably necessitate one or another specific 
position. Some of these discussions are of course relevant with regards to other 
positioning options as well, but primarily I have indeed been interested in the 
justifiability of the epistemological arguments as presented in the evolutionary 
study of religion. To a degree this is obviously also a practical necessity – 
assessing all the issues and topics relevant for all the positioning options is simply 
too much to handle for any one study. Still, as long as the focus remains above 
all on the evolutionary study of religion and positioning, this has been a useful 
restriction. 
Based on these analyses I am now going to look into the dilemma of positioning 
a scholar as such. I will first highlight practical problem of our inherent limited-
ness in our search for reliable knowledge. This will serve as the basis for the 
subsequent comparative assessment of methodological naturalism and a select 
list of other positioning options that various scholars have proposed.  
 
 
7.1. The study of religion and the limits of access 
Before turning to the point-by-point assessment of methodological naturalism 
and its potential alternatives as self-positioning options for the researchers, I want 
to turn to the issue of limitations as they are inevitable or become inevitable for 
all human research. Of course I have already in one way or another discussed this 
extensively202 but when we look at this from a more generalized perspective we 
could simply say that researchers as humans are faced with their own human 
limitations. In the simplest sense this of course manifests itself as our cognitive 
                                                                          
202  Whether in the context of the epistemological or/and evolutionary justifiability of 
(methodological) naturalism or in the context of the ideal scientificity debate. 
 
173 
limitations, or as limitations of time and energy or as limitations of practical 
accessibility (most of historical data is forever lost to us), but all of this of course 
in such a general sense is quite trivially obvious. Our cognitive limitations are 
common knowledge in the cognitive science of religion (Barrett 1998: 608–611; 
Barrett 1999: 325–327; etc.). Elsewhere, similarly, limitations of time and energy 
are the very reason we specialize into different (sub)disciplines. Problems of 
accessibility and the selectiveness of available data are centrally covered in most 
books concerning the history of religions (for example see Eliade 1958: 4–10; 
Rudolph 1987: 9–52; Biezais 1978, etc.) and concerns about hermeneutics and 
the limits of understanding have a long history in the study of religion (Wach 
1988; Cannon 1993; Flood 1999; etc.)203 Another noteworthy limitation we 
always face in the study of humans and all things related to humans is that of 
‘ethical’ concerns in the most general sense – we are not willing to do laboratory 
(or otherwise) experiments with humans in the way we are willing to do that with 
mice and other test animals. This sets significant limitations as to what kind of 
knowledge we can acquire or what kind of experiments we can perform. Often-
times much of our research and discussion is relying on very indirect or speculative 
data exactly because we have no intention to do the kind of tests needed for more 
reliable data on humans. Obviously I do not find this as something we should 
reconsider, but one should keep this in mind when judging the strength and extent 
of the empirical data available in the study of humans (and thus also in the study 
of religion). 
Still, I find this significant and indeed the reason why we are faced with a 
positioning debate in the study of religion. After all, if the objective view of the 
pure mind from a distance was truly possible, we would have no practical need 
for any debates about the ‘position’ of a scholar – his/her position would be im-
mediately obvious. It is that “archimedic point outside religion” as Werblowsky 
(1975: 152) once neatly argued. But one can also think of limitations from a more 
general perspective and this is where issues of epistemological presumptions’ 
justifiability take centre stage. In this sense positioning is a matter of deciding 
what we can and cannot know, what kind of knowledge we can acquire and what 
we cannot acquire, or what we can make claims about and what we cannot make 
claims about. Our limitedness in these matters is inescapable and cannot be 
overcome (Weckman 1994: 217–219). This can become immediately apparent in 
debates and discussions about the ‘truth’ of religious beliefs or worldviews – how 
does one deal with situations where one cannot determine their validity? It can 
also become relevant as an issue of preliminary presumptions – who am I in the 
                                                                          
203  For example, Wach (1988: 107–114) finds research inevitably limited, since we can only 
understand other people and events to an extent, furthermore – we only have a chance to 
develop a closer contact with select few people. Similarly Cannon (1993: 171–175) finds the 
hermeneutical task always limited, since other human minds will always remain (to an extent) 
inaccessible for us, in a way transcendentally inaccessible even. Or as Flood (1999: 150–154) 
points out, study of other living people and their religiosity remains always incomplete, as the 
“non-closure of any biography inevitably has consequences for understanding others and, 
indeed, for the construction of any human science” (Flood 1999: 153). 
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wider picture and how do I relate to the supposed object of research. This has 
probably been most acutely discussed in anthropology as the complicated 
position of the researcher has become a central issue in the wider debate about 
status of the discipline and the reflexivity of the researcher. Ideally, a scholar of 
religion approaches one’s research with as few unconscious presumptions and 
norms as possible. This of course does not mean having no presumptions or no 
significant presumptions at all – that is a practical impossibility for a scholar of 
religion – but it does mean that one should at least be fully conscious of the way 
one is approaching one’s supposed object of study. And here becoming aware of 
one’s starting point and the (inevitable) consequences of that starting point 
functions as a way how a scholar also accepts one or another set of limitations for 
one’s research activity.  
At the same time, we also have to maintain compatibility with scientific goals 
generally valued and accepted in one’s research approach and discipline. Here 
concepts of scientificity also function as limitations, requiring the scholar to work 
in specific research contexts and thus making it necessary to adopt a position that 
is also ‘scientifically acceptable’. Not just any kind of knowledge is desired, but 
the kind of knowledge that is compatible with the scientific pursuit of knowledge. 
Of course, typically this debate tends to circle around the idea of ‘empirically 
acquired knowledge’ and what really counts as empirical – a debate that has a 
long history going back to the phenomenology of religion and beyond.204 Yet, 
what counts as empirical knowledge and what does not is very much dependant 
on one’s concept of scientificity and thus acts as a further limitation a scholar also 
has to manage and cope with.  
In general, justifying one or another position and pursuing research from one 
or another position is a kind of a balancing act. Initially, one has to face the 
inevitable limitations set about by our inevitable humanness and ask what kind 
of knowledge can we acquire at all. But also one needs to balance the kind of 
knowledge we seem to be able to acquire with the more specific requirements put 
in place through our goals of scientificity. Adding to this the impossibility of 
research without at least some kind of preliminary premises and conceptual 
foundations, the issue of positioning oneself to a significant degree functions as 
a matter of deciding what kind of presumptions are justifiable and what kind of 
                                                                          
204  Examples: Biezais (1978: 161–162) discusses the phenomenologies of Söderblom and 
Heiler and emphasizes the primacy of empirical research, thus anything that is not directly 
accessible empirically should not be speculated on. Hanegraaff (1995: 100–108) at the same 
time criticizes ‘religionists’ as well as ‘reductionists’, suggesting that they are not valuing 
empirical research itself highly enough and instead are setting certain philosophical assump-
tions (whether positive or negative) about the truth of the religious ideas above any kind of 
empirical data (or the lack thereof). And by ‘reductionists’ he has in mind researchers in the 
social scientific study of religion. And of course – as highlighted in sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 – 
all the cognitive and behavioural scholars also emphasize the need for empirically reliant 




presumptions are not justifiable. The ideal would thus be the kind of presump-
tions that manage the inevitable conflict between possibilities and ideals in the 
most acceptable manner, enabling the most reliable kind of knowledge that at the 
same time is also scientifically justifiable. Methodological naturalism as well as 
other positioning options have entered this debate as ‘candidates’ researchers can 
‘choose’ from.  
 
 
7.2. Methodological naturalism and its alternatives 
In the subsequent analysis, I am going to focus on some of the most noteworthy 
positioning options that have been put forth in the context of the study of religion. 
Although I have described and evaluated methodological naturalism and some of 
the arguments in favour of it from a couple of different perspectives already, I am 
going to summarize them here to place methodological naturalism into a wider 
perspective and evaluate its virtues and weaknesses in comparison to the 
alternative options some scholars have often argued in favour. Thus I am going 
to also look at methodological agnosticism, neutrality and the so-called dialogical 
position as potential alternatives to or ‘competitors’ for methodological natura-
lism. This selection is not intended to be all-inclusive, it is not the goal of this 
study or this chapter to cover all the existing options. After all, in my overview 
of the positioning dimensions of the larger methodological debate also included 
discussions about attitude, ethos and so on. However, since none of those have 
been developed further in much detail it would be hard to discuss them on equal 
footing with the abovementioned options and thus I am going to leave them out 
for now here.205 Rather, I have chosen perhaps the most influential option aside 
methodological naturalism (that of methodological agnosticism) and then a 
couple more that I find comparatively intriguing and quite revealing with regards 
to the bigger picture. Because of this I have also decided to not include ‘metho-
dological atheism’ as it has been advocated in the study of religion (though mostly 
just in the context of the sociology of religion) as I find this option so noticeably 
similar to methodological naturalism that little if anything could be comparatively 
learned from going into that option.206  
To begin I am going to briefly summarize the basis of the each position, 
though since I have already described the first two quite extensively earlier, I am 
                                                                          
205  The only potential exception could be Lincoln and his theses on method (Lincoln 1996) 
which has been subsequently discussed as well, but for now I find the four I have chosen 
comparatively more interesting. I suspect that adding Lincoln to this list would widen the 
comparative scope too much to maintain a clearly defined focus, thus I will not be dealing 
with him here. However, I certainly do agree that one definitely could just as well discuss 
Lincoln’s theses as a conceptualization of a positioning option as well, instead or aside any of 
the four that I will be focusing on.  
206  One can look into how Porpora (2006) and Cantrell (2016) have analysed methodological 




going to be especially brief with regards to them. In my subsequent analysis I will 
be focusing on some of the key issues necessary for the evaluation of any 
positioning option. First, of course there is the question of justification – how is 
such a position justified and why it should be preferred? – but also, what kind of 
presumptions are considered either inevitable or necessary in the context of this 
positioning option? Secondly, I will look at how the position under analysis 
understands the relationship between the researcher and the ‘religious insiders’ 
or religiosity in general. As noted before, we cannot somehow stand outside or 
above the world as researchers. All positions always function as a conceptualiza-
tion of the relationship between the researcher and the researched. Thirdly, I will 
be returning to the issue of scientificity and evaluate how suitable the position 
options are for acquiring knowledge compatible with the scientific ideals. But 
also, just as significantly – what kind of scientific ideals are entailed by one or 
another positioning option. Fourthly, I will be looking at the relevant criticisms 
of the position and its justifiability. And lastly, I am going to evaluate how widely 
each one of the positioning options could be applicable in the study of religion. 
As I have occasionally noted as well, all the positioning options tend to grow out 
of specific research approaches and their specific problems. This does raise the 
question, do they function solely as solutions to their specific problems or could 
they be adaptable for the discipline overall? Of course, as often happens in such 
cases, advocates of all the positioning options are indeed themselves arguing that 
their option indeed can be and should be adopted by the discipline overall. Thus, 
this last point also serves as an evaluation of their claims. The analysis of the 
positioning options will be followed by a comparative evaluation. 
 
 
7.2.1. Methodological naturalism 
Since I have already described methodological naturalism as well as extensively 
discussed issues related to it, I am going to be brief here with regards to every-
thing that I have already touched on. I will mostly rather focus on the aspects and 
questions I have not yet delved into previously. 
At the centre of methodological naturalism lies the idea that religion ought to 
be studied, understood and explained solely in naturalistic terms. Any and all non-
naturalistic explanation, causal connections or interpretive elaborations should be 
steadfastly avoided. Methodological naturalism is supposed to function as a 
practical rule of thumb in epistemological matters. It is not directly atheistic as it 
does not rule out the possibility of something beyond the natural world, but that 
should not be included in scientific research. Once these rules of action are in 
place, no further specifications and basic propositions are necessary (or at least 
not inevitably necessary). With regards to the issue of human limitedness, 
methodological naturalism appears to take the stance that we should focus on 
things we can easily study from an empirical point of view and we should assume 
that everything we have arguable, questionable, limited or problematic access to 
is irrelevant. Or in a less ambitious form it can mean that easily accessible 
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material can be reasonably well studied and explained even when problematically 
accessible phenomena are pretty much ignored or assumed to be irrelevant. 
As far as positioning in relation to the ‘religious insiders’ is concerned, 
methodological naturalism appears to see the researcher as one viewing religious 
people or religiosity in general as something in need of an additional explanation. 
Researchers are not thought of as occupying the same social and cultural sphere 
as the people they study.207 Therefore, it is possible to determine the foundations 
of religiosity and acquire knowledge about religious people through scientific 
practices. Religious insiders are basically just objects of research, just as plants 
are for botanists and animals for zoology. How religious people themselves 
understand matters is only relevant as ‘data’ for the subsequent research analysis 
and the possibility that those insiders might themselves actually be right about 
the way the world works is ruled out beforehand. Furthermore, as noted previously, 
justifications of methodological naturalism are closely accompanied by justi-
fications of a specific concept of scientificity, derived from an idealized depiction 
of experimental natural sciences. One could speculate that methodological 
naturalism is not really inevitably attached to such a concept of scientificity and 
to an extent would also leave room for combinations with other concepts of 
scientificity,208 but this would remain strictly speculative, since in the context of 
the study of religion methodological naturalism has (with very few exceptions) 
come in concert with this kind of ideals. 
Discussions concerning the justifiability of methodological naturalism were 
thoroughly analysed in the third chapter, but with regards to the ideas of scienti-
ficity also elsewhere. There I noted how one cannot derive any notable epistemo-
logical inferences from the cognitive science of religion, but more importantly, 
how arguments in favour of methodological naturalism as the method for all study 
of religion are not nearly as convincing as they are claimed to be. The universal 
acceptance argument suggests that naturalism is the basis of all proper scientific 
research, yet this does not offer any epistemological justification and more 
problematically – a comparative look at actual research quickly shows that 
scientific practice is far more diverse than advocates of this one position claim. 
The successfulness argument suggests that we ought to adopt methodological 
naturalism, since it is the basis of all successful and progressive disciplines, yet 
this relies on an unjustifiably narrow understanding of success and thus ignores 
the successfulness of all interpretatively oriented research approaches.  
The argument of no ontology claims that this position does not enforce any 
specific ontological-metaphysical positions, these are merely preliminary rules of 
                                                                          
207  This is explicitly visible in one article by Jeppe Sinding Jensen where he discusses the 
rationale of the study of religion and then explicitly claims: “In terms of normative epistemo-
logy, scientific knowledge simply must be considered cognitively superior to religious thought 
if the study of religion is to make any sense” (Jensen 1997: 11). 
208  The fact that ’methodological atheism’ has been applied quite extensively in sociology – 
a discipline many advocates of the new scientific approaches find problematic – serves as 
proof here that such positions are not inevitably related to one specific concept, though this 
does not mean that it could be fit with any of the scientificity-ideals in existence. 
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action. Yet, at a closer look there is no real difference between methodological 
naturalism and metaphysical naturalism, as far as practical research situations are 
concerned. Lastly, the argument of inevitably necessity suggests that evolutio-
nary research and methodological naturalism are fundamentally linked. But this 
argument as well comes with its problems, since ‘natural entities’ appears to be 
an ever-changing concept. Furthermore, even those evolutionary sciences rely on 
many things that definitely are not strictly naturalistic in any sense (mathe-
matics!). But as I also showed in the fourth chapter, any kind of claims about the 
inevitable connection of evolutionary research and naturalism also face the 
problem that it is not possible to justify naturalism as an epistemological or/and 
metaphysical position evolutionarily. One cannot conclusively derive epistemo-
logical arguments in favour of any specific general position from the theory of 
evolution or from any evolutionary discipline. But just as well: one could justify 
any general position just as successfully.209 Overall, epistemological (or in 
general theoretical and philosophical) arguments in favour of methodological 
naturalism have remained rather weak as far as its universal and preferable 
application is concerned. They have not managed to show that it is the inevitable, 
only successful way of doing research, nor have they shown that it is more 
successful than any of its alternatives.  
Similarly, naturalists’ ideas of scientificity face major problems in actual 
research practice. They emphasize adherence to a strict ideal of scientificity and 
exclude significant proportions of notable (sub)disciplines (philology, cultural 
anthropology, history), yet in their own practice rely on those disciplines for the 
‘data’ they focus on. And yet, despite its shortcomings naturalistic research per-
spective without doubt has had quite a bit of success in developing empirical 
research programmes in numerous scientific fields. I would argue that it is very 
much this practical success that makes methodological naturalism an attractive 
candidate, despite its numerous methodological and theoretical problems and 
contradictions – at least it enables focused research with clearly definable results. 
Indeed, this is where advocates of the methodological naturalism are very much 
right – in the end it is the actual applicability and success that determines the 
viability of a position, not its theoretical justifiability. Theoretical virtues need to 
be applicable in research situations. Even if these same research projects and the 
data acquired through them is also open to alternative interpretations and 
adoptions by advocates of other positions, since nothing in the research design 
and results in itself rules out the possibility of also seeing data acquired 
naturalistically to be interpreted otherwise. 
                                                                          
209  That said, this does not rule out the possibility of epistemic consequences for specific 
religioos beliefs about some specific objects, historical events, developmental processes – 
think of some of the more specific historical claims of the creationists – and other such specific 
and concrete matters. In such cases deriving epistemological arguments from the evolutionary 
theory may be possible. But when it comes to more matters of positioning and generalizing 
stances such as ’methodological naturalism’, ’methodological agnosticism’, etc., then we are 
not dealing with any specific beliefs. 
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Yet, this easy applicability into concrete research projects is certainly one of 
the reasons why ‘methodological supernaturalism’210 has never really been 
convincing. Not because it is not theoretically justifiable – it is definitely 
justifiable theoretically.211 After all, I spent a decent proportion of the fourth 
chapter just to show how a view radically different from naturalism could be 
derived from the theory of evolution just as successfully as that of naturalism or 
scientific realism.212 It is true that my theoretical argument had to do with a view 
slightly different from that of ‘methodological supernaturalism’, but still, it does 
serve as a significant enough of an example to highlight the impossibility of 
justifying naturalism theoretically any more convincingly than supernaturalism. 
But the problem still remains – both my theoretical alternative or ‘methodological 
supernaturalism’ at best serve as alternative interpretations of existing empirical 
data, but they do not offer good ways how to put their basic premises into research 
practice.213 This is what methodological naturalism does offer – applicability. 
Alternatively, if in actual research practice there is no notable difference between 
that theoretical alternative, supernaturalism and naturalism, one can again ask 
“why include such additional presumptions?”. Thus, it would appear that the 
metaphysical and epistemological premises methodological naturalism applies 
are strict enough that they do help with developing research programmes. 
Yet, this applicability is at the same time still relatively unsatisfactory. First, 
there are strong reasons to believe that this applicability really only extends to 
those fields which are primarily experimental. Anthropologists doing research 
need to be open to the chance that the people they are going to be studying and 
spending a lot of time with are likely to see the world in a (very) different way. 
Simply put: to make notes reliably and accurately about such different lives, 
beliefs and practices – to do one’s best to understand those people – one cannot 
                                                                          
210  I have in mind all approaches which wish to include talk about God or gods (or anything 
supernatural otherwise) into the scientific practice and want to allow “this happened, because 
God did this and that” kind of arguments. 
211  In fact, even Wiebe, who is otherwise well-known for his support of naturalism, notes in 
one of his earlier writings that “religious explanation” can never be dismissed a priori and 
therefore Christian theology or Buddhist teachings are justifiable approaches which “must be 
considered on its own merits” (Wiebe 1981: 80) and thus have to be taken seriously (Wiebe 
1981: 72–81). Although he does not specify how this “considering” should actually take place 
and he does earlier in the same book (Wiebe 1981: 33–39) suggest that if “religious know-
ledge” is knowledge about the world at all and thus comparable to scientific knowledge, then 
it should be possible to evaluate its justifiability the same way as we evaluate it other sciences, 
thus from a scientific perspective after all. Because of this one could of course argue that either 
he is not being entirely consistent (evaluate “as on other scientific disciplines” or “on its own 
merits”?) or he is not taking theology as seriously as he claims after all. Still, I find it 
significant that this proponent of naturalism is willing to admit even this much justifiability to 
any kind of religious-theological perspective. 
212  See in particular sections 4.2.2. and 4.2.3. 
213  Forrest (2000: 9–13) also argues in the similar direction, pointing out applicability as the 
major different between methodological naturalism and methodological supernaturalism, even 
if the latter is logically just as possible and as justifiable as the former.  
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just start with the presumption that “actually they are wrong anyway”. Similarly 
with historical and philological work – assuming that religious people are wrong 
is likely to become an obstacle in understanding their writings.214 Additionally, 
reducing people one studies to objects of research, maintaining a distance with 
them and evaluating them from a scientific perspective is not really possible in a 
fieldwork environment where the researcher inevitably becomes part of the 
cultural and social situation and therefore becomes one person among many and 
no longer clearly detached from one’s supposed research object. Such concerns 
indicate that even though it is practically possible to follow methodological 
naturalism in hermeneutically inclined research approaches, there is little reason 
to believe that it would have significant success and there certainly does not seem 
to be any reason to believe that it could be more successful than agnostic or 
dialogical positions in such situations (but more on those two shortly). Therefore, 
as applicable and as practical methodological naturalism may be in experimental 
research approaches, it appears to face serious problems and difficulties else-
where and its applicability in all the subdisciplines of the study of religions 
remains at best questionable, at worst gravely misleading.  
Secondly, this applicability – even if we stick to experimental sciences – is 
still rather unsatisfactory because of its limitations as far as major generalizations 
are concerned. As one easily notices, new evolutionary sciences of religion are 
very much interested in working out big theories of religion that aim to explain 
its origins, historical development, role in contemporary world as well as basic 
functionality. Thus in addition to a specific ideal of scientificity, methodological 
naturalism is also closely accompanied by big theoretical ambitions, i. e. by a 
wish to return to the ideals of the early scholars of religion. Yet, by basing one’s 
research and theoretical argumentation on a strictly naturalistic basis and 
excluding alternative possibilities, these explanatory theories of religion ‘inherit’ 
the presumptions that lie at the foundations of the theories they rely on.215 In this 
sense all theories of religion that build on the naturalistic foundations are theories 
of religion with “if unprovable assumptions X, Y and Z are true” kind of clauses. 
If one were to abandon any or all of their basic premises, one could come up with 
significantly different theories. This would not be a problem for the naturalistic 
theories, of course, if they were able to convincingly show that their theories are 
more reliable or at least that alternatives are not as reliable, but due to reasons 
extensively discussed in chapters four and five, this as well is not the case and 
alternatives remain very much possible for all naturalistic theories. 
                                                                          
214  One could here even go so far as comparing such an approach to the Christian theological 
projects from earlier centuries that also focused on other religions, but undoubtedly also 
presumed that they are wrong anyway and thus their existence and nature needs to be 
explained in light of Christian theology and their inherent erroneousness. In fact, as I already 
once noted in passing, at least on one occasion advocates of the ‘new scientificity’ have been 
explicitly compared to religious cult due this kind of concerns. See Stuckrad (2012: 55). 
215  For example, in sections 3.2.1. to 3.2.4. I thoroughly analysed the problems as well as the 
logical conclusions that grow out of the presumption of (epistemological) costliness as it is 
currently utilized in the evolutionary study of religion. 
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Consequently, methodological naturalism finds itself in a rather complicated 
situation. On the one hand its justifiability is limited and its ideals of scientificity 
are in conflict with actual research practices; on the other hand it is definitely 
applicable in practical research settings a lot more easily than any deliberately 
non-naturalistic position. And yet, it is unclear how much or what we learned 
about religion or religiosity as our supposed object of study from this kind of 
research practices and theories. After all, they depend on the acceptance of rather 
specific clauses which one needs to accept as correct or at least as coherent with 
their empirical basis. However, the proper evaluation of this position cannot take 
place on its own, it has to be based on comparisons with other notable positions 
as those have been described and practiced in the study of religion. Thus, I will 
now ask the same questions about a couple of potential alternatives. 
 
 
7.2.2. Methodological agnosticism 
Since I discussed methodological agnosticism at some length already in the 
second chapter, I will keep it short here. Therefore, to summarize it succinctly 
here, one can say that the central idea behind methodological agnosticism is that 
scholars have to avoid making claims about things they have no access to. In 
other words, scholars should not be presuming anything about the “meta-
empirical reality”216 that religious insiders talk about in their work. Typically, this 
is talked about as the act of ‘bracketing’ one’s own presumptions, preferences 
and beliefs. Ideally, someone following the agnostic position should manage to 
avoid positioning oneself as a representative of any specific group or standpoint, 
either theological or atheistic. This position is comparatively similar to methodo-
logical naturalism in the sense that here as well the primary focus is on laying out 
a set of epistemological rules that tell you what you should or should not do. 
Though, since the avoidance of unnecessary judgment is central, mostly these 
rules are about what one should not do, whereas methodological naturalism also 
lays out guidelines about what one should do (seek natural(istic) explanations!). 
With regards to the issue of human limitedness it can be said that methodo-
logical agnosticism takes this seriously and tries to take it into account by 
avoiding presumptions, claims or judgments about matters we likely cannot and 
will not ever have clear knowledge about. In this sense methodological agnosticism 
is definitely more self-limiting than methodological naturalism, since it does not 
try to overcome the problem of our limitations by simply choosing one epistemo-
logical option (the best one, they would argue, obviously) as the basis of research. 
Instead methodological agnosticism appears to suggest that we can indeed go 
only as far as our intersubjectively available empirical material takes us and no 
further and we should not try to develop theories or claims that would necessitate 
some kind of epistemological presumptions to make their causal or interpretive 
                                                                          




(or other) arguments work. Concerning the relationship of the researcher and the 
‘religious insider’ methodological agnosticism is still – similarly to methodo-
logical naturalism – trying to keep the researcher at a distance from the religious 
people themselves. After all, one is supposed to study religiosity without relying 
on any specific doctrine, ideology or tradition. At the same time the researcher 
and his/her scientific perspective and knowledge is definitely not considered 
superior to the religious insiders in any way. The researcher is very much a human 
being with a cultural, historical, social (and potentially religious) background as 
well, but during research activities the researcher is supposed to strictly follow 
methodological agnosticism and thus avoid pitfalls of simply reading one’s own 
presumptions into the research material. Any kind of descriptions should grow 
out of the position of the insiders and then elaborate how things appear to the 
insiders. In other words, methodological agnosticism is seen as a hermeneutically 
useful tool that enables a positive environment for the proper understanding of 
the religious tradition or group or text or practice in focus. Typically methodo-
logical agnosticism is also accompanied by one specific conception of scienti-
ficity. This considers empiricity the most important aspect of any properly 
scientific research. One should not go beyond empirically available materials and 
one should always try to ‘grow’ generalizations directly out of the empirical 
material itself. Any kind of more extensive theoretical discussion is frowned 
upon.217 Also, similarly to methodological naturalism here as well one can justi-
fiably speculate that this combination of positioning and scientificity is probably 
not inevitable and one could understand the ideals and goals of scientific research 
in a rather different way, while still maintaining a methodologically agnostic 
position. 
Criticisms of methodological agnosticism can be described as falling into two 
main lines of argumentation – first there are methodological-epistemological 
criticisms and then there are also concerns with limits to its practical application. 
On the epistemological side the central problem with methodological agnosticism 
can be basically described as one of “is this even possible?”. Numerous scholars 
(Cantrell 2016; Northcote 2004; Cox 2003; Wiebe 1981: 153–163) have noted 
how methodological agnosticism could appear in theory indeed as a very 
desirable option and one that we should definitely value. However, the critics 
note that it also appears to be humanly impossible – we are always part of the 
world and we always have to pursue research from some specific perspective and 
therefore we cannot claim to be agnostic about every philosophical issue. We 
have to rely on some basic preliminary starting points for research to be possible 
and in such a case it would be inaccurate to describe this as agnostic. For these 
critics methodological agnosticism is merely a convenient label to hide or 
downplay the presumptions one relies on. And even if we were able to avoid the 
kind of presumptions that would make a difference in the study of one religious 
                                                                          
217  I will not delve into this any further right now, since I have already thoroughly described 




phenomenon or another, we could not do this consistently. We simply would not 
get very far with our research without running into the need to make actual choices 
with regards to specific methodological, theoretical and philosophical preferences.  
This is why Morton Smith (1968: 12–16) already fifty years ago noted that 
historical research as commonly practiced academically, is inherently atheistic – 
even if religious insiders themselves understand one or another event as “god’s 
or gods’ intervention/action in the world”, such an explanatory option is a priori 
excluded in historical research. Of course there is always a chance that perhaps 
supernatural beings at one point or another intervened and caused historical 
events to go one way and not the other, but since historians cannot confirm this, 
they simply have to pursue the kind of descriptions and explanations which do 
not include any such possibility. This is indeed a major problem for those who 
wish to practice methodological agnosticism. After all, historical, philological 
and anthropological fields of research are the main research approaches in which 
methodological agnosticism is being justified as the preferably position. But if 
methodological agnosticism is (because of our epistemological limitations) not 
really consistently applicable in historical research, then this would appear to be 
a major weakness for the position overall. This also directly relates to the second 
problem methodological agnosticism faces – that of practical limitations. Even if 
we leave such epistemological criticisms aside and presume that principally – at 
least as far as understanding, describing (and to an extent, interpreting) is con-
cerned – methodologically agnostic research is possible, then we are still faced 
with the problem that this does not take us very far. Scientific research is not just 
about understanding and describing, those practices are supposed to lead to 
discovering comparative similarities (or differences) and eventually to some kind 
of generalization. Yet, because generalizing always requires that one relies on 
some kind of assumptions, it is definitely no longer a purely agnostic practice. 
This becomes especially apparent in all matters concerning evolutionary theories 
of religion – I would say that none of the ones I described in the first chapter are 
possible without numerous (empirically unverifiable) assumptions about the 
world and everything in it. Thus, the problem of actual practical applicability by 
researchers in actual research situations serves as the major concern and criticism 
(either empirically or practically) regarding methodological agnosticism. 
In defence of methodological agnosticism one could here argue that 
methodological agnosticism never claimed to lack all preliminary presumptions, 
it is merely focused on avoiding epistemological presumptions regarding matters 
of truth. Although such a defence would still not solve the problem that any kind 
of generalizing explanatory theories of religion do appear to take some kind of a 
position in the matters of truth as well. Conjointly one can defend methodological 
agnosticism by suggesting that even if complete and thorough agnosticism in all 
matters is not possible, we should at least try to remain as agnostic as possible. 
Or in a more generalized form: presumption-free research might be impossible, 
but at least we should employ as few presumptions as possible. Thus, methodo-
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logical agnosticism would behave more like an ideal than as something con-
sistently attainable in all aspects of research.218 If one were to adopt such a 
defence, then from this perspective advocates of methodological naturalism have 
simply waved the white flag and have chosen to pursue research comparable to 
the various theological schools of thought. The simple difference being that their 
research builds upon a naturalistic ideology; those still pursuing methodological 
agnosticism, however, are at least trying to overcome the general social tendency 
to fragment into competing, apologetic schools of thought.  
Nevertheless, returning to the issue of applicability in general, we can say that 
we are dealing with a somewhat unclear situation. Even if we agree that research 
is possible with some minimal basic presumptions, but deliberate presumptions 
concerning the existence or non-existence of the ‘meta-empirical reality’ should 
be avoided, then it is still somewhat unclear how far this actually takes us. On the 
one hand methodological agnosticism does not appear to face any serious 
problems with any specific research approach, not like methodological naturalism 
faces with all hermeneutically-inclined fields of research anyway. One can pursue 
philological, anthropological as well as neurological or cognitive research while 
maintaining an agnostic outlook regarding all epistemological matters of ‘religious 
truth’. At the same time it is uncertain how well it actually fits any specific field – 
how well it can claim to be preferable to all other alternatives for specific 
subdisciplines. I will come back to this comparative problem in the subsequent 
analysis, but for now it should be noted that at least methodological agnosticism 
does not seem to cause major methodological problems in matters of applic-
ability. Yet, this conclusion does rely on the assumption that it is at least in some 




Although not discussed and debated as much as methodological naturalism and 
methodological agnosticism, ideas of about the neutrality of the scholar have 
steadily been in the background in many debates. As I noted in the very 
beginning, even the most casual conference reports can exemplify this very well 
as apparently everybody can be in agreement that “the study of religion must be 
neutral, unbiased, non-confessional, and peaceful” (Geertz 1992: 226), yet quite 
typically not much is said about how to actually get this done. Similarly Don 
Wiebe – a critic of methodological agnosticism and an advocate of naturalism – 
can still be found arguing that “the student of religion must, ideally speaking, 
bracket all questions of commitment and advocacy on entering the profession and 
therefore is, as an academic student of religion, neither a believer (devotee) nor a 
nonbeliever (sceptic)” (Wiebe 1994: 119). Wiebe’s way of phrasing the ideal, 
                                                                          
218  This kind of arguments are also the reason why Cantrell (2016) in the comparative 
perspective still considers methodological agnosticism the preferable and most justifiable 
position, despite its many shortcomings. 
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however, gives us a hint at what it would mean to think of neutrality as a form of 
scholarly self-positioning. His central concern, after all, has to do with avoiding 
certain ‘poles’ of self-positioning which he finds unacceptable for the student of 
religion.  
Actual conceptualizations of neutrality as a position have indeed approached 
it in such a way – neutrality means a deliberate choice to position oneself in 
relation to the relevant parties, but not as a representative of any specific party. 
Perhaps the most significant treatment of this position comes from Peter Donovan 
(1990). Here I will concentrate on him perspective as an example of con-
ceptualizing neutrality. He defines it in the following way: “To be neutral is to 
stand in relation to two or more parties which are themselves in tension, in such 
a way that the respective interests of those parties are not thereby materially 
affected” (1990: 103). Thus, for Donovan neutrality is a relational matter that 
always necessitates some kind of a specific context, but there are different ways 
one can think of neutrality. He distinguishes ‘observer-neutrality’, ‘participant-
neutrality’ and ‘role-neutrality’ (Donovan 1990: 104–111). The first, observer-
neutrality, means the position of a detached, non-involved on-looker. Yet, as 
Donovan is also quick to note, due to the inherent limitations of humans such a 
position is unattainable, since all of us inevitably approach things from our own 
specific point of view. The second, participant-neutrality accepts the inevitable 
situatedness of all humans, researchers included, but tries to limit one’s partici-
pation to such an extent that one is not affecting the outcome of the situation in 
any significant way and does not favour one side over the other. Yet, here as well 
Donovan finds the actual applicability of this position rather problematic or at 
least extremely hard to achieve. As he notes, oftentimes there is simply no such 
option, no available course of action out there that would allow one to maintain 
participant-neutrality.  
This is why Donovan himself finds the third option, role-neutrality the most 
defendable out of them all (Donovan 1990: 106–111). What he has in mind here 
is the kind of neutrality judges, arbitrators, referees, mediators and ombudsmen 
impersonate – it is still participation, but participation with specific rules and 
procedures to follow. In this sense neutrality indeed becomes a very context-
specific matter. One always needs to first determine all the relevant parties and 
participants and then one can decide what kind of a neutral position is possible in 
one or another situation. He considers this achievable for scholars of religion and 
argues that the use of non-prejudiced language (e. g. avoiding problematic 
concepts), the suspension of belief and disbelief and the avoidance of personal 
bias in professional situations should accomplish this. Thus, in short, neutrality 
as a position is always very context-dependent, relying on the specific situation 
one faces. It can never be presented as a universal, generalized position with 
universalized rules that all neutral scholars should follow. But if applied in 
specified contexts and situations it does enable the scholar to avoid taking sides, 
avoid undesired (epistemological) presumptions and judgments and study 




It could be said that positional neutrality tries to solve the issue of human 
limitedness by giving up the attempt to draw up some kind of a generic position 
that would fit the ideals of the study of religion in general (and these, in turn, 
would of course depend on one’s conception of scientificity). Instead, Donovan 
appears to argue that the best we can do is at least choose the more preferable 
kind of position in the wider social sphere. Judges, arbitrators and mediators are 
all clearly positioned members of the society in general, but in matters of 
‘competing claims’ they adopt certain kind of positions with detailed rules of 
action. This also very clearly indicates what kind of a relationship scholars of 
religion ought to have with ‘religious insiders’. None of the many religious 
groups (or individuals with different understandings and backgrounds) should be 
favoured over others, each should receive a fair treatment – whereas fairness 
comes from following specific rules of the position.  
Anything about the matter of scientificity and role-neutrality would have to 
be somewhat of a speculation, since Donovan does not explicitly elaborate on 
how he understands the criteria of scientificity in religious studies. However, 
looking at his final discussion concerning the importance of being neutral 
(Donovan 1990: 114–115), it would appear that his primary concern is indeed 
social and anthropological and specifically even hermeneutical. For example, he 
is worried about avoiding “factional concerns and pressures” (Donovan 1990: 
114), he emphasizes the need to include “widest possible range of relevant data” 
(Donovan 1990: 114) and thus he sees the ideal scholar of religion “as an ‘honest 
broker’”, who “can play a valuable role in fostering scholarly collaboration and 
research” (Donovan 1990: 114). In this sense one could say that his idea of a 
scholar is definitely closer to that of the Religionswissenschaft-centred per-
spective than that of the ‘new scientificity’, but at the same time also he sees 
academic practice far more as a ‘hands on’ applied activity than most of the 
people typically in that tradition.219 Still, it puts such significant emphasis on 
understanding and producing reliable descriptions and interpretations that it is 
definitely accepting philological, anthropological and historical disciplines in 
humanities as scientific on their own virtues rather than through some kind of 
‘additional justifications’.  
However, this kind of a positioning comes with some obvious shortcomings. 
By focusing on the social dimension and the interrelationship of specific groups 
and situations, it does not tell us how to deal with more complex or generalized 
cases. To be more specific, what I have in mind is that this kind of positioning 
works very well as long as we are thinking of situations where we have an 
                                                                          
219  This is quite well exemplified by reaction Mircea Eliade received when he criticised 
history of religions for its lack of cultural relevance for the Western world in general and 
emphasized the need for a hermeneutically more relevant approach to the typical research 
topics of the historians of religion (Eliade 1965). Of course, Eliade went further than Donovan 
and also argued for a restructuring of the discipline overall to better fit the ‘desired 
applications’ of the study, but the critics – for example, see Rudolph (1989) – still found the 
whole ‘cultural application’ and ‘influencing culture’ talk entirely unacceptable or at least 
unsuitable for a proper history of religions. 
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anthropologist focusing on a religious community/individual. Similarly, it helps 
to deal with comparative situations as one focuses on historical sources and 
competing worldviews. But, academic study as such and religious studies more 
specifically is not limited to such cases. In many cases the problem cannot be 
reduced to competing groups, but rather to competing and mutually incompatible 
methodological and theoretical presumptions. Of course, as with everything 
human, one could technically also trace the historical background of these 
presumptions and determine the ‘communities or individuals’ that these descend 
from, but this would not in any way solve actual problems. As with religious 
beliefs, so with academic theories and concepts – their reliability and usefulness 
cannot be determined simply by studying their historical development. Cognitive 
science of religion, neurological study of religion or even any kind more 
ambitious comparative projects do not really work in such a way that one could 
reduce them to socially competing groups, then position oneself as a mediator, 
arbitrator or as a referee somehow in between them and thus maintain role-
neutrality. The core of the problems scholars face in these matters are primarily 
theoretical and methodological. This is where role-neutrality falls short – it can 
be helpful in the study of contemporary religiosity from sociological, anthropo-
logical and other such perspectives, but as soon as one looks for more 
generalizing approaches, which are oftentimes not focused on the specificities of 
concrete groups or/and individuals (psychology of religion in general and 
certainly all evolutionary approaches), role-neutrality does not really help us in 
any notable way.  
 
 
7.2.4. Dialogical position 
The fourth noteworthy positioning option I would tentatively name the ‘dialogical 
position’, but one could just as well describe this as the ‘dialogical perspective’. 
I will also describe this in a bit more detail, since I have not previously dealt with 
it. This has been most extensively discussed by Gavin Flood (1999), but as I will 
show, several other scholars have also advocated rather similar ideas. This 
position can be called ‘dialogical’, because it places central attention to the com-
municative and conversational aspect of all knowledge-acquiring processes 
concerning human life. As Flood notes, any researcher is always in a dialogical 
relationship with his/her research ‘object’ (whether that is texts, behaviours, or 
other) and thus always part of the larger system of life as such (Flood 1999: 33–
41, 50–57, 137–150). Because of that all attempts to establish a ‘view from now-
here’ type of a position for the scholar of religion are doomed to fail. The 
dialogical position instead promotes a ‘view from somewhere’ approach to the 
study of religion (Flood 1999: 40). The subject of research thus must be always 
defined in relation to other subjects, it cannot be thought of as a “detached, 
epistemic subject penetrating the alien world of the other” (Flood 1999: 143). 
Consequently, this means moving away from the “idea of a detached objectivity; 
a neutral place from which to examine the ‘world religions’ towards the idea that 
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all knowledge is generated from a perspective and that the study of world 
religions is the intersubjective engagement of one mode of socially sanctioned 
discourse with another” (Flood 1999: 57). Because of that the dialogical position, 
contrarily to perspectives that try to position the researcher outside the life world 
of the people under focus, leaves room for the ‘object’ of inquiry to respond and 
establish a dialogue (Flood 1999: 77). However, in such a case all knowledge is 
inevitably situated, coming from ‘a specific place’ (Flood 1999: 144–145) and 
thus emic accounts cannot be treated merely as ‘data’, but instead have an equal, 
competitive claim on validity (Flood 1999: 148). Still, this does not mean that 
‘anything goes’ in research, merely that we inevitably find ourselves in a situation 
of competing narrative accounts which might be totally incompatible and built on 
drastically different presuppositions (Flood 1999: 148). At the same time, dia-
logical position very much comes with a deliberate pursuit of self-reflexivity and 
criticism, since it is vitally important to be aware of one’s own situatedness and 
one’s own presumptions as well as it is important to avoid a naïve adoption of the 
position of one’s dialogue (Flood 1999: 33–41, 147–150). In this sense the 
student of religion should still maintain a clear distinction between oneself as a 
researcher and one’s ‘research objects’ (Flood 1999: 215–219). 
It is worth noting that although much of Flood’s book is centred on criticising 
earlier phenomenological approaches and presenting the dialogical position as the 
alternative (that very much relies on the philosophy of Bakhtin), it is possible to 
find remarkably similar lines of discussion in some phenomenologically inclined 
discussions as well.220 In one of his articles Charles H. Long (1978) has argued 
that emphasizing objectivity, distancing and the superiority of rational, scientific 
research has brought about major hermeneutical failures when studying distant, 
foreign peoples. Therefore, to overcome such misleading conceptions of 
superiority, “centered rational notions of epistemology must be seen as heuristic 
devices and not as somehow ontologically given. Or to put it in another way, all 
dimensions of human consciousness are ontological and all human groups and 
persons are ontologically real. There are no privileged positions” (Long 1978: 
410). For Long it is the absence of a privileged centre that makes it possible for 
“religious expressions and manifestations … to reveal their own specific 
modalities” (Long 1978: 411). And in this sense, at least hermeneutically, some 
representatives or aspects of the phenomenological perspective can also appear 
noticeably dialogical.221 
Elsewhere Northcote (2004) has argued in favour of a remarkably similar 
position, also emphasizing the inevitably dialogical practice of gathering ‘data’ 
(through informants, discussions, etc.), the necessity of presenting emic and etic 
views and the need to allow different positions to ‘speak’ in the final account 
                                                                          
220  At least based on the arguments Charles H. Long has presented in an earlier article (Long 
1967) I would definitely see him as part of the phenomenological approach. 
221  However, the position of ’bracketing’ and ’methodological agnosticism’ is of course the 
position most directly related to the phenomenological tradition rather than any kind of 
attempts to position the scholar dialogically. 
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(Northcote 2004: 93–94). As noted earlier, Northcote’s views largely grow out of 
his criticism of methodological agnosticism, which he finds impossible to 
maintain and practice consistently in research situations. This is not an uncommon 
path towards more dialogical positioning options, as Knibbe and Droogers (2011) 
also begin by criticising methodological atheism as well as methodological 
agnosticism and propose their own ‘ludist’ approach as a preferable alternative 
(Knibbe, Droogers 2011: 290–297).222  
However, in this they also want to take the dialogical element of the research 
further. Whereas Flood advocated for a position-conscious approach that relies 
on the dialogue of the research and the insider, but maintains the distinction 
between the two, the ludic position (as proposed by Knibbe and Droogers) agrees 
with Flood in most other aspects, but argues that for a genuine understanding of 
the religious person, action, practice or belief one needs to participate in the 
studied practices as thoroughly as all insiders do, to the effect of “not only 
learning how to think like the people [one] was doing research with, but also 
learning how to react in the same ways to the healing services and the various 
ways in which ‘proof’ was offered” (Knibbe, Droogers 2011: 291). This is neces-
sary for a genuine understanding of the religious situation under study and with 
the help of such a participation the researcher is “able to intersubjectively partici-
pate in the world that Jomanda223 and her visitors constructed” and thus is “able 
to create a field of intersubjectivity that [is] centred on the experience and 
priorities of the participants of Jomanda’s healings rather than on a pre-set 
academic agenda” (Knibbe, Droogers 2011: 292). Discussions about the extent 
to which one really needs to participate in something to understand it and acquire 
knowledge about it are of course enduring and ever-present in all of humanities 
(if not also in many social sciences),224 but in the context of the dialogical position 
the difference between Flood and Knibbe and Droogers indeed comes down to 
how far one needs to take the dialogue or what the dialogical situation actually 
entails in practice. However, when it comes to basic foundations and starting 
points in matters of positioning I would say Flood and Knibbe and Droogers are 
largely in agreement. 
Concerning the issue of human limitations, the dialogical perspective – 
similarly to the idea of role-neutrality – also concedes that any kind of properly 
detached positioning is simply not possible and the researcher is always and 
                                                                          
222  It should be noted, though, that contrarily to these scholars Flood does not view methodo-
logical agnosticism that critically. For Flood methodological agnosticism is a perfectly 
legitimate position, but “it becomes another competing narrative alongside other outsider 
discourses, and alongside the equally legitimate insider discourse” (Flood 1999: 103).  
223  Jomanda is the religious leader under focus in the study of Knibbe and Droogers. 
224  For example, very similarly to Knibbe and Droogers, Gothoni (2000: 122–130) also notes 
how his study of pilgrimage and the monks of Mount Athos brought about a situation where 
for a limited period of time he himself felt as a pilgrim in search of God (Gothoni 2000: 124–
127) and thus all anthropological fieldwork requires a close balancing of intimate participation 
and deliberate distancing (Gothoni 2000: 127–130).  
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inevitably a member of a community and thus his/her perspectives and pre-
sumptions depend on his/her community. At best, one can become conscious of 
one’s limitations, but one cannot overcome them by choosing one or another way 
to position oneself. Contrarily to the role-specific option advocated by Donovan, 
the dialogical position is not so much interested in finding some kind of a 
‘suitable social location’ for the student of religion as it is interested in viewing 
scholars of religion and the discipline in general in relation to other movements 
that also rely on traditions, narratives, community and so on. In this sense, from 
the perspective of this position, study of religion is simply one narrative among 
many and we cannot overcome this. As Flood argues, “from a narrativist per-
spective, because of the differential nature of the sign, there are truly no ‘outsider’ 
views but only competing ‘insider’ ones” (1999: 104) and thus he concludes later 
in the book that “the only epistemological superiority [dialogism] can claim is 
outsideness or transgredience – a view from elsewhere rather than the view from 
nowhere” (1999: 223). 
As one surely notices, this also answers how the dialogical perspective envi-
sions the relationship of the researcher and the religious insider – these are 
competing narrative accounts constantly in dialogue. Contrarily to any kind of 
attempts to establish a universally applicable position, this perspective views the 
world as one of many narrative traditions that cannot be made congruent or 
unified into a more general or higher perspective. Flood is similarly pessimistic 
about the possibility of any kind of general scientificity. He does object to the 
idea that ‘anything goes’, emphasizing the necessity of standards concerning 
evidence, rigor and coherence, but at the same time he still argues that all 
explanations are inevitably situated, limited and competing accounts that might 
turn out to be completely incompatible (due to reliance on different presup-
positions) (Flood 1999: 149).  
Looking at such arguments, I would say that the dialogical position is clearly 
the most pessimistic out of the four. From this perspective our human limitations 
are a rather hopeless burden for anyone who tries to acquire knowledge any more 
reliable than simply ‘just another proposal out there’. Furthermore, although still 
emphasizing the need for strict standards of assessment in the context of the study 
of religion, it remains unclear why one would really want to follow such a path if 
there does not appear to be anything of significance to be gained from it and one 
might just as well ‘go native’ and it does not make much of a difference (other 
than simply choosing a different perspective on things). Flood’s analysis of the 
study of religion – which is easily generalizable to all academic research – 
definitely does make one ask ‘why bother?’ as far as the justifiability of such 
academic approaches is concerned. This is not to say that Jensen’s aforemen-
tioned argument – scientific knowledge must be superior to religious knowledge 
for the study of religion to be worth our time – is justifiable. I certainly do not 
think it is, but Flood appears to go very far in the other direction where study of 
religion cannot even claim to be successful in some aspects whereas theological 
approaches are more successful in other aspects. Thus, one of the clear problems 
with the dialogical position is that it comes with such bleak views about the 
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justifiability and reliability of scientific knowledge that it remains unclear why 
one should pursue such research (other than for simply wanting to pursue things 
from the perspective of this one narrative account and not any other).225 As 
depicted by Flood, study of religion would appear to be simply another competing 
narrative among theological and other ideas about religiosity and the world as 
such. Overall, the problem with justifying Flood’s position is not even that much 
about the strength of the presented arguments, as it raises the general concern – 
what is there left to defend or dispute in such a case, why should one pursue a 
study of religions perspective at all?226 
But even if we leave this rather bleak picture aside and suppose that study of 
religion can still justify itself as a perspective that at least in some respects is 
capable of acquiring knowledge that is more reliable than its alternatives even 
while pursuing deliberately dialogical research practices, this positioning option 
faces problems rather similar those I highlighted with regards to the idea of role-
neutrality. Namely, even though pursuing deliberately dialogical research can 
certainly work as long as one is focusing on fieldwork or hermeneutically 
oriented research in general, one is again left with the problem that as soon as we 
are not asking questions that are related specifically to one or another religious 
community, text or practice and are instead dealing with issues more ‘abstract’ or 
‘unconscious’ or ‘generalized’, it is not at all clear how the dialogical position can 
help us. In fact, by arguing that all explanations are inevitably situated and 
dependent on their specific (cultural, social or other) background, it would appear 
that the dialogical perspective is also dismissing the very possibility of any proper 
research in such more ‘abstract’ issues that cannot be thought of as a matter of 
competing communities and traditions.227 Furthermore, it is vital to notice that his 
arguments clearly go against the scholarly ideal of one, unified study of religion. 
Since Flood puts so much emphasis on the situatedness of the scholar and the 
                                                                          
225  Furthermore, if we accept Flood’s arguments about study of religion simply being one 
narrative tradition among others with nothing noteworthy or particularly preferable about it, 
then it becomes unclear why he is at the same time so persistently arguing that the study of 
religion “must position itself outside its object” (Flood 1999: 215) even as he is emphasizing 
the dialogical character of the discipline. Why not just try to overcome this separation and 
pursue some kind of a transformation of both or either tradition?  
226  For an analogous criticism of Flood, see Hedges (2000) who also in his conclusion notes 
the same problem: „Here I think we see the failure of Flood's not dealing adequately with the 
grounds of knowledge between his dialogical approach and postmodernism as he does not 
guard against an all-theories-are-as-good-as-any-other approach“ (Hedges 2000: 297). 
227  Flood does at least once indirectly address this problem as he argues that regardless of 
which approach one is pursuing, “the primary data of investigation are either written and oral 
texts or behavioural text-analogues” (Flood 1999: 78), subsequently arguing that “only that 
which is represented can be explained. If something is not represented as knowledge within 
human sign-systems, it is beyond explanation at that time; quarks are only given meaning 
within scientific models. That which cannot be represented is unknowable” (Flood 1999: 78). 
And this could certainly work as a way how to think of academic study in general, if it were 
not for the claims Flood is also making about the inevitable situatedness (in practice: sub-
jectivity) of all explanatory arguments.  
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narrative contextuality of specific scholars research perspectives, it becomes very 
unclear how one could still establish a shared common ground for all of this or 
what purpose this would serve. However, why then should we look for that shared 
metatheory, which Flood considers vital for the future development of the 
discipline (as emphasized in Flood 1999: 4–8)? Taking his arguments to their 
logical end would mean that Indians could just as justifiably develop ‘an Indian 
study of religions’, Japanese could have ‘a Japanese study of religions’, Peruvians 
could have their own and so on, all of these in the end amounting to competing 
and incongruent narrative accounts which cannot be unified to any shared 
foundation.  
While one cannot of course conclusively dismiss such a harsh criticism of the 
possibility of acquiring reliable knowledge – it is certainly possible to justify 
Flood’s arguments – one can also just as well point out the impossibility of 
conclusively proving Flood’s pessimistic views as well. In such a situation I think 
one could at least try to look for ways how to overcome at least some of our 
limitations or some aspects of our limitations. Perhaps even the very fact that 
Flood himself has continued to pursue concrete, specific research projects228 even 
after publishing this critical book indicates that he himself does not give into the 
most pessimistic conclusions of his analysis either and still believes that there are 




7.3. Comparative evaluation 
Having gone through this point-by-point, one-by-one analysis of the four notable 
options, it is time to move to a more comparative analysis. Here I intend to high-
light their most notable similarities (and differences) as well as address the 
question whether there is, should be or even can be a clearly preferable position. 
On the one hand this is undoubtedly an epistemological issue, but due to the inter-
relationship of epistemology and methodology, this is inevitably also a 
method(olog)ical matter and since the acceptability, justifiability or preferability 
of one or another method(ology) is very much related to one’s understanding of 
scientificity, one cannot completely ignore this aspect either. Still, the focus here 
continues to be on the matter of positioning. However, aside this epistemological-
methodological aspect, there is also the matter of social positioning. Academic 
research and self-positioning does not take place in an ‘epistemological vacuum’, 
it is a matter human beings as biological, cognitive, cultural and social beings 
face in their lives and research. Because of that positions I have dealt with also 
deserve to be comparatively evaluated from the social perspective – how do they 
understand one or another position as something researchers as humans have to 
                                                                          




take in a society? Finally, I will look for a way to comparatively justify one 
specific position over others.  
 
 
7.3.1. Objectivity and its (distant) relatives? 
As I have repeatedly noted, much of this discussion about scientificity and 
positioning has to do with the desire to acquire as reliable knowledge as possible. 
Yet, there are many good reasons why it is not possible to acquire objective 
knowledge as such. Objectivity as an ideal is simply unattainable for humans in 
matters of intersubjectively attainable empirical knowledge. However, at the 
same time here lies the most interesting similarity of all these positioning options 
as well – they are all trying to come to grips with the impossibility of objectivity 
and the inevitable human limitations. All of them are searching for the most 
reliable methods and for the most reliable methodological perspectives. All of 
them would like to be fully aware of the presumptions, biases and foundations 
we rely on in our research practices. All of them would ideally structure their 
research so that it is scientifically sound (however that is understood), inter-
disciplinarily translatable and congruent. In other words, all of them would still 
prefer to do research ‘objectively’ if that were possible, since the ideal of solid 
knowledge all research approaches and perspectives are aiming for is still very 
much that of the objectively reliable knowledge or at least something as close to 
that as possible. 
For the methodological naturalist true objectivity is unattainable, yet we can 
supposedly overcome this problem by relying on a specific set of presumptions 
when dealing with phenomena we are unable to acquire intersubjectively testable 
knowledge about (but which ought to be knowable in an ideal, objective 
situation). The methodological agnostic resorts to simply avoiding judgment 
about matters we cannot make any properly reliable judgments about and focuses 
on matters in which case we (hopefully) can acquire reliable knowledge. Role-
neutrality, instead, argues that there can be no universalized solution to the matter 
and we can at best acquire knowledge that is advocating the views of any specific 
party. The dialogical approach in a sense takes this even further and portrays the 
scholar as inevitably a member of one party.  
Still, concerns they all express and try to overcome are very similar – how can 
we acquire knowledge that is as reliable as humanly possible? Of course, at the 
same time, what is humanly possible and what is not, is very much disputed 
between them. What is not argued about is the goal – we should do reliable and 
solid research and determine the state of the matters as convincingly as possible. 
The kind of knowledge we would like to acquire is still that of as-objective-as-
possible kind of knowledge, we are simply very much aware of how difficult or 
impossible that may be. Depending on one’s approach, this is a problem general 
to all knowledge or a problem more acute in some aspects than others and 
something we can perhaps overcome in specific settings. However, regardless of 
how one sees this or which position one prefers to justify, this debate would not 
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exist without the unattainable goal of objectivity. The debate of human limitations 
of course is also never-ending, since definitive answers to the questions of how 
reliability – how reliable knowledge can we really acquire or whether we are more 
able in some aspects than others? – could only be given from a truly objective 
position. In this sense, one could possibly say that there can never be a definitive 
solution to this issue and we are inevitably dealing with options we cannot be 
entirely sure about. Still, that does not stop one from conceptualizing ideals one 
would like to attain. 
In any case, overall it can be said that all the positioning options I have dealt 
with are in one way or another attempts to establish a relationship between that 
ideal and the practical situation we find ourselves in and thus the title of this 
section. Metaphorically speaking we are conceptualizing ourselves and our 
research practices as ‘relatives’ of objectivity.  
 
 
7.3.2. Distance and nearness – the researcher and the society 
But there is obviously more to this positioning debate than simply the attempt to 
situate one as adequately and justifiably as possible from an epistemological 
perspective and as close to the ideal as possible. One rather significant factor here 
is the social dimension in general. By this I mean how scientific research in 
general and researchers as people more specifically are viewed as part of the 
wider social and cultural context where their research takes place and what they 
themselves focus on.  
From this perspective, the first two positioning options basically view the 
researcher as one who ought to keep a detached, distanced position as long as one 
is doing research (and regardless of one’s personal views as a person). Therefore, 
it could be said that the researcher is a viewed as someone who acquires know-
ledge that is academically and scientifically as reliable as possible and sub-
sequently communicates that to the society in general. Socially the position of the 
scholar is here very clearly distanced from the communities themselves. Research 
as such is not seen in any way as ‘applied research’ and ideally it is not done to 
answer any ‘hot topics’ in current politics or society. Of course, the end result is 
still seen as one of great value, but primarily in the sense of ‘knowledge is 
valuable in itself’. This does not rule out applicability entirely of course, since 
determining the naturalistic causes of, say, religiously motivated terrorism and 
thus enabling more successful action strategies against that can have very signi-
ficant applications in politics and society as well. However, this has to do with 
the matter of subsequent applications of research, during the research period itself 
the researcher should maintain clear distance from the social matters and should 
ideally not be a participating agent in any way. 
Even though not challenging the ideal of scientifically sound knowledge and 
the need to do research that avoids favouring any specific worldview or com-
munity, the idea of role-neutrality does envision the scholar as someone far more 
socially active than the first two positions do. By visualized the researcher as 
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someone whose position in relation to the religious communities can be compared 
to that of the arbitrators, mediators and other similar occupations, one is clearly 
conceptualizing the scholar as someone who is not so much trying to keep a 
distance. Instead, the scholar is understood to be very much part of the social 
dimension of life and while one is still supposed to maintain distance, this is only 
selective and even in its selectivity is not ruling out dialogical communication 
with these communities that one is supposed to maintain a distance from. After 
all, how else, but through dialogue and communication could one even occupy a 
position comparable to that of mediators, arbitrators, referees and so on?  
Lastly, there is the dialogical perspective on positioning. Even though the idea 
of role-neutrality also looks at the scholar as an inevitable part of the society, the 
dialogical perspective takes this even further. Here the discipline as a whole is 
seen as one community-based narrative tradition among others, in many ways 
comparable to the religious communities it studies as well. Therefore, researcher 
and his/her research practices are just as much part of the society as a whole as 
are all other communities and traditions. But this does not mean that the researcher 
should just blend in with everything else. No, the dialogical position as portrayed 
by its advocators still finds it essential to keep the researcher and the researched 
clearly differentiated. In this sense one can say that even the dialogical position 
with all its criticisms of the earlier ideas of objectivity, phenomenology of religion 
and pure scientificity and its admittance that researchers and the discipline are 
inevitably contextualized and situated, it still emphasizes the importance to 
maintaining a clear line of differentiation between the researcher and the people 
(s)he researches.229 Overall, one can say that for all of these positions the researcher 
is on the one hand always supposed to be part of the society and yet remain apart 
from the society. All of them have visualized and conceptualized this concurrent 
practice of separation and nearness in different ways and have portrayed the 
difficulties of our situation differently. Yet, they do all agree that in one way or 
another that researchers specifically and the discipline in general needs to 
maintain an approach that does clearly clarify how the researcher is distinctively 
different from the one being researched.  
 
 
7.3.3. Positioning, generalizing and underdetermination 
In addition to these two major comparative aspects of the positioning debate, a 
few further details also deserve some attention. First, there is the issue of 
generalizing – to what extent do each of these positioning options actually allow 
us to seek generalizing understandings or explanations or conceptualizations of 
descriptions of religion as a phenomenon or as an ‘object’ of research? Secondly, 
                                                                          
229  As Flood argues: „The study of religion must position itself outside of its object, yet remain 
in dialogical relationship with it; the religionist or anthropologist must position herself outside 
of the religious stranger yet remain in dialogue, reflexively recognizing the context of the 
encounter and embarking on ’power sensitive conversation’“ (Flood 1999: 218–219). 
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this also directly relates to the potential alternatives – something I already discus-
sed in relation to naturalism in general and methodological naturalism specifi-
cally. But this also deserves some attention in relation to the positioning 
discussion in general. 
When looking at the potential for generalization, the situation appears to be 
quite complex. First of all it is of course obvious that methodological naturalism 
offers wide-reaching and ambitious possibilities for anyone interested in devel-
oping all-including, general theories of religion. This is something I discussed in 
the first chapter and subsequently analysed and criticized in the three chapters of 
the second part, particularly concentrating on the issue of underdetermination and 
naturalistic theories in the fifth chapter.230 In short, it became apparent that as 
capable as methodological naturalism may be in enabling ambitious generali-
zations, it is equally incapable of convincingly ruling out alternatives.  
In comparison, one can say that methodological agnosticism is far more limiting 
when it comes to the issue of generalization. By placing the avoidance of judgment 
about certain issues at its centre it is also making it nearly impossible to develop 
more far-reaching (explanatory, descriptive, interpretive or other) theories of 
religion, since those can rarely if ever do without relying on some kind of pre-
sumptions about the very things methodological agnosticism deliberately avoids. 
Morton Smith’s aforementioned criticism of the implicit atheism of historical 
research serves as an excellent example here – in developing extensive explan-
ations of historical developments (why this and not that?, and so on), researchers 
have to first decide which factors to include and which to avoid. Of course, this 
does not mean that generalization as such is fundamentally impossible for the 
methodological agnostic, but this would indicate that at best one can develop only 
more focused theories of specific (comparable) cases and phenomena and far-
reaching interpretations and explanations are not available for the methodological 
agnostic. Consequently, issues of underdetermination also seem to not play that 
big of a role when it comes to methodological agnosticism. Still, I do not think it 
is quite that simple. Methodological agnosticism is regularly practiced among 
historians and anthropologists, both of whom are very much dealing with scat-
tered, limited or randomly accessible data as well as with the inevitability of 
epistemological choices. However, contrarily to the problems of underdetermi-
nation methodological naturalism faces, here we are mainly dealing with specific 
cases and situations and rarely with theories of religion in general. After all, the 
very premises of methodological agnosticism do not enable pursuing grand 
theories like that. 
The idea of role-neutrality comes with a rather ambiguous perspective on 
generalizing. On the one hand it is possible to highlight its insistence of the 
context-specific nature of any positioning and conclude that role-neutrality does 
not allow for major generalizations, since those would no longer enable the scholar 
to specify one’s position contextually. On the other hand, role-neutrality 
emphasizes the deliberate need to ‘avoid taking sides’ with the implication that 
                                                                          
230  See especially sections 5.2.2. and 5.3.  
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this enables research to be more reliable in general. Yet, rules scholars are 
supposed to follow in their “role” are still very much those of the contemporary 
Western academy – they are simply supposed to apply them in a way analogous 
to that of the mediators, arbitrators, referees and so on. Because of this it is hard 
to say anything conclusive about the possibility of generalization from the 
perspective of role-neutrality and subsequently also about underdetermination in 
relation to it. Depending on which of the two variants of the role-neutrality one 
chooses to emphasize, one can end up in significantly different situations. By 
emphasizing the context-dependency of positioning one would clearly restrain 
the possibilities of generalization to a rather significant extent and thus make 
issues of underdetermination rather secondary. Alternatively, if one were to 
instead emphasize the role of the academic researcher one could still go as far as 
one’s specific research approaches would allow. Here one could even say that 
role-neutrality, naturalism and agnosticism are not entirely incompatible – after 
all, if one were to focus on the role of the academic research, then what exactly 
are those rules? Here the answer could either one of those two. And thus, issues 
of underdetermination would come up in ways similar to methodological natu-
ralism and methodological agnosticism. This is largely why I find role-neutrality 
rather ambiguous and open to multiple different interpretations and applications. 
It has not been analysed and practiced and detailed to such an extent that one 
could easily point to its likely consequences with regards to any and all aspects 
of research. 
Lastly, there is the dialogical perspective. What I find rather remarkable about 
this and clearly different from the previous two is its deliberate emphasis on the 
existence of alternatives and on the inability to rule out alternatives. Of course, 
none of the previously discussed positions are really claiming that we can 
conclusively rule out all theological, spiritual and other alternatives, but they are 
at least hoping to be able to rule out other academically-scientifically based 
alternatives.231 Although this does not apply to all the advocates of the dialogical 
perspective (or at least not explicitly), Flood emphasizes repeatedly that study of 
religion can at best be a different view on these matters, but it cannot hope to 
achieve superiority. In this sense underdetermination and the possibility of 
alternatives is practically written into the very foundation of the dialogical 
approach. Turning to the issue of generalization, it remains relatively unclear how 
much of it does the dialogical approach actually allow. Does the deliberate and 
persistent process of dialogue between the researcher and the ‘insider’ limit 
possibilities of generalization or not? Or do issues related to its questionable 
applicability outside hermeneutically oriented research limit the possibilities of 
generalization from the dialogical perspective? In a way similar to role-neutrality, 
I would argue that here as well it comes down to the exact interpretation of the 
dialogical position and it is hard to pinpoint any specific inevitabilities.  
                                                                          
231  With the exception of role-neutrality, perhaps, due to its ambiguity and openness to 
different kinds of interpretations. 
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Overall, one can say that although underdetermination as such is clearly most 
problematic for all naturalistically directed approaches, other positions are not 
entirely free from such problems either. Furthermore, while the possibilities for 
generalization are rather clear and straightforward from the perspective of 
methodological naturalism, it remains relatively debatable how much 
generalization is indeed possible in case of the other three positional options. This 
in turn leads me directly into the issue of application, since any conceptualization 
of a position always has to be applicable by researchers in actual research 
situations for it to be a valuable option for scholars. 
 
 
7.3.4. Possibilities and limitations of applicability 
Although I have here mostly concentrated on the interrelated issues of methodo-
logy and epistemology, applicability is definitely one of the issues one cannot 
avoid. It is possible to conceptualize many epistemological positions that cannot 
be put to practice, even though they are more convincing than others. But 
academic disciplines are always practical endeavours of knowledge and not just 
philosophical or spiritual pursuits of self-reflection.  
Because of that, I paid some attention to issues of applicability in the previous 
sections as well, pointing out likely problems and possibilities of each position. 
In short, it became apparent that methodological naturalism is practically very 
applicable, yet only as long as one is dealing with research approaches that are 
not centrally hermeneutical. Methodological agnosticism on the other hand sets 
stricter limitations on research and thus it becomes questionable how far one can 
actually take such a position. It certainly does enable research focused on under-
standing and description very well, but problems arise as soon as more extensive 
explanatory schemes come into play, since those cannot completely do without 
presumptions that methodological agnosticism would ideally avoid. Yet, it 
appears that methodological agnosticism does not face any fundamental problems 
of applicability. On the one hand, it does not come with the kind of presumptions 
that would complicated matters of mutual understanding and communication in 
anthropological, historical and philological research. On the other hand, it does 
try to establish a foundation that is generalizable and not heavily context-
specific.232 This is something that role-neutrality and the dialogical perspective 
struggle with. Of course, it is not possible to disprove issues of human limitedness 
the way they depict them, but their solutions are way too heavily focused on 
context-specific research that is done primarily from the perspective of history, 
anthropology, philology (and sometimes also sociology). Arguments in favour of 
                                                                          
232  It is of course still somewhat context-specific, since the presumptions one should avoid 
depend on the research topic as such and cannot be formulated independently from it. But in 
this sense methodological naturalism is of course just as context-specific, as its basic principles 
(those ‘procedural rules’) are also formulated in response to the issues one encounters in the 
context of research situations. 
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role-neutrality or dialogism do not offer satisfactory explanations how a neuro-
logist of religion or an ecologist of religion should really deal with matters of 
self-positioning. Yet, it is certainly true that when we are solely focused on 
hermeneutically inclined research, these two offer a far more accurate and 
productive description (and prescription) of the position scholar inevitably has to 
take, but also ought to take.  
As a result it would appear that out of the four options dealt with here there is 
no obviously superior solution in matters of applicability. Each has grown out of 
problems encountered in one or another research approach with the subsequent 
attempt to generalize the solution to the discipline overall. All of these attempts 
have then faced problems of justification and actual applicability, but none of 
them can be entirely dismissed either. It is this relatively inconclusive outcome 
that lead us to the issue whether there is or even should be a generally preferable 
position for all scholars of religion? 
 
 
7.3.5. Is there a preferable position? 
Indeed, for much of the previous discussion I have looked for the possibility of 
finding a generally applicable position for all scholars of religion, regardless of 
their specific research approaches. This has been a good way for approaching this 
issue because advocates of the many positioning options also clearly think that 
we should establish a shared positional foundation for the discipline as a whole 
and indeed also because ideally this would seem be the preferred solution for the 
study of religion as a discipline. Of course, as noted in my earlier discussion of 
the possibility of a unified foundation and also highlighted in the analysis in this 
chapter, it is up for debate whether it is at all possible for all the subdisciplines 
and research approaches in the study of religion to have a unified foundation in 
an actual, practical form and not just as a theoretical ideal. And thus we should 
not just take it for granted, we should critically ask, whether this is indeed neces-
sary or what this is necessary for.  
When turning to the issue of necessity a couple of things should be noted. First 
off, if one were to insist on establishing a universally shared way of positioning 
oneself, then this would need to come with benefits more significant than the 
mere fact of understanding the position of the scholar in a similar way and 
practicing it in the similar way and thus envisioning the discipline in general as a 
more unified whole. Disciplinary unity in itself is not valuable enough. However, 
there is also no such thing as “disciplinary unity in itself”. A shared foundation 
enables far better communication between different approaches, subdisciplines 
and methods. It is thus a preliminary necessity for the possibility of maintaining 
a situation of mutual translatability of the empirical results and conceptuali-
zations. Furthermore, it is necessary to establish that ‘complete picture’ scholars 
of religion ideally would like to attain. Otherwise we would be stuck with, ‘a 
psychological theory of religion’, ‘an anthropological theory of religion’, ‘a 
sociological theory of religion’ and so on. All these aspects are interrelated – for 
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communication to be possible, one needs to be able to translate between different 
approaches and subdisciplines. In addition, to establish a general theory about 
religion both of these are necessary. All the same the other way around too – 
translatability (or the search for it) already necessitates the existence of some kind 
of a potential general perspective and it certainly looks for successful paths of 
communication. Of course, if all those different approaches were to diverge so 
completely as to make it appear that they are indeed dealing with different (even 
if loosely connected) phenomena,233 this would in such a case no longer appear 
like a problem, but as things stand right now it looks very unlikely for that to 
happen. For one, this would require abandoning much of the current academic 
vocabulary – something different approaches largely share these days, even if 
their conceptualizations and utilizations of the specific terms vary in many ways.  
Therefore, one can certainly argue that finding a generally shared way of 
positioning would definitely benefit the discipline as a whole, but it is likely not 
something we absolutely have to have. This in turn means that it is entirely possible 
to argue in favour of accepting a ‘limited diversity’ of positions, each of which is 
mainly used in the context of the specific approach where it is found most useful. 
Hermeneutically inclined fields could then continue to pursue their more dialogical 
and context-sensitive approaches whereas fields which looks for more general or 
more fundamental aspects (for example: the neurology of religion), can stick to 
the methodological options they find more useful. Still, there are good reasons to 
believe that the issue of translatability will become a problem in such a case.234 
However, this also brings about an even more intriguing question – to what 
extent might it be possible to apply these positions in combination? Are they 
mutually exclusive? It is certainly obvious from their very ‘formulations’ that 
methodological naturalism and methodological agnosticism are mutually 
exclusive. Also, the dialogical approach is probably not compatible with methodo-
logical naturalism – after all, how is one supposed to find compatibility between 
an idea centred on deliberate distancing and observation from a predefined 
position with the idea of building and maintaining a steady dialogue with the 
‘religious insider’? But beyond that things get more complicated. For one, role-
neutrality could be compatible with all the other positions, depending on how one 
is supposed to understand context-specific application of roles. If one is to think 
of the rules of a role as those of academic practice, then many could argue that 
these are indeed the ‘procedural requirements’ of methodological naturalism or 
methodological agnosticism. But if one is going to emphasize the context-
                                                                          
233  By ’different phenomena’ I have in mind the situation where the ‘objects of study’ are 
conceptualized and operationalized in ways so drastically different that they do not appear to 
be even studying the same thing, thus their explanations, theories, perspectives, etc. would no 
longer appear to be competing with each other. For example, one can here think of all the 
disciplines focused on ‘culture’ and attempting to develop ‘theories of culture’. Oftentimes 
these are seen as interesting discussion partners for scholars of religion and theories of 
religion, but rarely if ever have they been seen as competitors to the theories specifically about 
‘religion’. 
234  For discussion and examples, see section 6.2. 
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dependency of the role of the scholar, then it is hard to see anything but the 
dialogical perspective having any real compatibility with role-neutrality.  
But similarly one can turn to the issue of the dialogical perspective in relation 
to naturalism and agnosticism. On the one hand it is here possible to look at 
Flood’s own arguments, since he has addressed both of these positions, but also 
one can address this from a wider perspective, since the dialogical perspective is 
not limited to Flood. Therefore, from Flood’s perspective it becomes apparent 
that he is far more critical of methodological naturalism than of methodological 
agnosticism. This becomes apparent in his treatment of naturalism, which he 
finds problematic, because it does not allow the ‘object’ of inquiry to have a voice 
and is thus still looking to find a kind of a modified ‘way from nowhere’ (Flood 
1999: 66–80). He is slightly critical of methodological agnosticism as well, 
finding it still slightly on the side of the sceptic, but at the same time he accepts 
methodological agnosticism as a legitimate position – that is, as long as it is 
understood as one competing narrative alongside other outsider discourses (Flood 
1999: 99–104). Yet, when we look beyond Flood, the compatibility of dialogism 
and agnosticism becomes more complicated. For one, many other advocates of a 
dialogically directed perspective find methodological agnosticism problematic or 
practically impossible (Northcote 2004; Knibbe, Droogers 2011) As I noted 
earlier in section 7.2.4., some portrayals of dialogism emphasize the need to 
temporarily forgo one’s outsider-position and look at the studied phenomenon 
from the perspective of the insider (Knibbe, Droogers 2011). This is kind of a 
(for the lack of a better word) ‘dialectical’ approach is problematic from the 
perspective of the agnostic, since it specifically gives up one’s detached 
agnosticism in favour of a specific religious worldview, even if only temporarily. 
But this is also specific to the position advocated by Knibbe and Droogers. As 
noted previously, Flood does try to keep the researcher and the ones being 
researched distinct from each other. In general one can say that all in all the 
compatibility of these two comes down to the specific interpretation and 
application one prefers. 
Moving on from this discussion of simple compatibility to the matter of actual 
usefulness, much of this is inevitably speculative and hypothetical, since the 
actual answers to these questions lie in research practices and possibilities. No 
matter how nuanced and thorough a theoretical discussion on these matters is, 
there is always the possibility that actual practice will prove it wrong. That said, 
there are a few combinations one can think of as potentially useful, given the 
inherent problems and limitations every one of them faces. The first one I have 
in mind is the combination of methodological agnosticism and the dialogical 
position. As I noted in my critical assessment, dialogism does not really elaborate 
how it is supposed to be practiced in any kind of research that is not primarily 
hermeneutical. Here adopting a kind of a combination of methodological 
agnosticism and dialogism could be helpful. Depending on one’s specific 
research approach, it is possible to make use of one or another and ideally a 
deliberate and continuous dialogue between such different approaches helps to 
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maintain a situation where their results and conceptualizations remain mutually 
translatable.  
Secondly, one could also clearly point to the compatibility of methodological 
agnosticism and role-neutrality in quite the same way as the combination of 
methodological agnosticism and dialogism would work, but I do not find this 
combination as significant. This would require the kind of interpretation of role-
neutrality that understands the rules of academic practice as the ones that define 
the ‘role’ of the ‘neutral’ scholar and thus it becomes kind of meaningless to 
portray this as a combination of two positions, since in actual practice it would 
just be methodological agnosticism anyway, simply in a slightly more context-
sensitive way. On the other hand, if one were to think of the rules of the role-
neutrality more directly comparable to arbitrators, mediators, judges and so on 
and thus really emphasize the context-specificity of any kind of positioning, then 
role-neutrality and methodological agnosticism simply become incompatible, 
since methodological agnosticism does try to establish the kind of a position 
which at least in some sense is not dependant on the specificities of the contexts.  
Of course, one could also next point to the compatibility of role-neutrality and 
the dialogical perspective, since they certainly are compatible, but I do not find 
this particularly significant. Both of them struggle with explaining the position of 
the scholar in the context of research programmes that are not focused on specific 
communities and groups and thus their combination would not really solve 
certain problems both of them face. And lastly, at least from a theoretical 
perspective it does indeed seem that methodological naturalism is not really 
compatible with any of the other three options, unless of course one were to 
portray it as the ‘rules of the role’ the scholar in role-neutrality is supposed to 
take, but this again assumes the kind of interpretation of role-neutrality that very 
much downplays its inherent emphasis on context and the impossibility of 
justifying context-independent positions.  
All in all it should be fairly apparent that we cannot declare any of these 
positions as superior to the others. None of them are obviously preferable to all 
others. Each one of them comes with its problems, unresolved issues or conflicts. 
But none of them are wholly unreliable and unjustifiable either. In light of this it 
is now time to take a new look at the ecological and cognitive sciences of religion 
that I depicted in the first chapter and ask if and how one could pursue such 




7.4. Cognitive and ecological sciences of religion  
from alternative perspectives? 
Since I have spent quite a bit of space in several previous chapters on criticising 
many of the ecological and cognitive approaches to religion due to the epistemo-
logical premises of their research programmes, this is a topic that definitely needs 
to be addressed. After all, if it turned out that they are not really trying to 
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deliberately ‘undermine’ religious worldviews as much as they are simply relying 
on the only available set of premises that makes that kind of research possible at 
all, it would rather be practical concerns and not really an epistemological agenda 
that caused their approach to religion have the kind of premises that they have. 
Now I have shown in the third and fourth chapter that there is no epistemological 
or evolutionary necessity to apply such specific premises in the evolutionary 
study of religion, but the question still remains – what kind of alternatives could 
one then turn to in actual research practice? I will not present detailed examples 
of alternatively conducted empirical studies – due the (meta)theoretical and 
(meta)methodological focus such empirical studies remain outside the focus of 
this study. Rather, I will be focusing on existing research programmes, to discuss 
whether these could be perhaps developed based on other kinds of premises as 
well.  
But to begin with I should note that I do not find such problems urgently 
burdening all kinds of evolutionary treatments of religion. In some cases 
problems of positioning and epistemology are more immediately present than in 
others. This obviously does not mean that there could be evolutionary approaches 
that somehow avoid issues of methodology, positioning and epistemology. Rather, 
the key difference is that some treatments of religion do not rely on premises so 
specific as to rely specifically on one positional perspective. Geertz’s (2014a) 
analysis of the evolution of religion, cognition and culture is one noteworthy 
example which attempts to present a general overview of the aforementioned 
aspects in human evolution. But similarly the general treatments of the cultural 
and cognitive evolution of humanity by Donald (2011) as well as by Tomasello 
(1999a; 1999b) are also equally good examples of such generality that positional 
and epistemological divisions do not become urgent concerns. However, these 
are the exception rather than the rule – the Geertzian overview remains too general 
and attempts to present a generalized theory of religion want to uncover far more 
detailed developments and causes in the evolution of religiosity than what one 
can find in Geertz (2014a). And in such a case issues of epistemology and 
positioning become far more immediately relevant. 
Turning to the specific examples and the possibility of alternative perspectives, 
I am primarily going to concentrate on two main research programmes – that of 
the costly signalling theory of religion as developed from an ecological perspective 
and that of the cognitive science of religion. But I will also briefly comment on a 
few others as well. I covered the epistemological arguments and premises of both 
of these research programmes already in the third chapter, noting how explicit 
declarations of falseness of religious positions are a common, basic premise of 
the cognitive approach and similarly, how assumptions about the sub-optimality 
and uselessness (thus: costliness) of religiosity are a common characteristic of the 
costly signalling approach. Much of this is subsequently justified by appealing to 
methodological naturalism – but as I have also highlighted, not really as 
convincingly and unproblematically as claimed.  
Starting with the cognitive science of religion, I find it particularly interesting 
that much of the research actually done from this perspective does not really 
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require the presumptions cognitive researchers emphatically rely on. For example, 
one could here think of all the research done on TOM and HADD and its relevance 
for the study of religion. Earlier in section 3.1.3. I noted how the epistemological 
argument of unreliability as typically derived from these remains very uncon-
vincing, but even the relationship of TOM and HADD to the explicitly atheistic 
or methodologically naturalistic premises is actually rather indirect. Empirical 
studies of the human mind and its treatment of various things as ‘acts of a mind’ 
do not really require a preliminary assessment about the actual existence of those 
things. Similarly with HADD, one can study the hyperactive actions of the human 
mind and its eagerness to find minds in the world without the need to constantly 
decide which of the ‘agents it finds’ actually exist or not. The same applies to such 
questions as theological correctness as well – it is a useful way for exemplifying 
the capabilities and limitations of our mind, but we do not need to base this study 
on an explicit categorization of ‘existing’ and ‘not-existing’ phenomena. And in 
this sense, indeed, much of the epistemological problem-setting235 is not really 
inevitably necessary for the comprehension or justification of the specific empirical 
studies that follow such ambitious epistemological claims. Still, it would be 
misleading to conclude from this that perhaps one can simply drop all the 
naturalistic premises and continue doing cognitive research all the same. As far 
as narrowly defined research questions are concerned, this could be quite 
possible, but things become more complicated as soon as one attempts to develop 
a general explanatory exposition of religion based on such detailed studies. 
Looking for large-scale causal links that explain the appearance and functionality 
of one or another phenomenon do appear to inevitably necessitate the imposition 
of some kind of presumptions about what can exert causal influence and what 
cannot. At the same time, studies focusing on narrowly defined ‘objects’, 
‘functions’ or such can avoid definitive claims or presumptions concerning funda-
mental (or ‘ultimate’) causation more easily.  
Therefore one can say that cognitive science of religion in its specific 
empirical studies and the theoretical elaboration of these studies emphasizes its 
naturalistic basis unnecessarily too much. Then again, given the theoretical 
ambitions of this research programme, this is hardly surprising as they have 
always looked for ways how to derive ambitious theoretical conclusions out of 
narrowly focused experimental results. This is the situation where the question 
for the possibility of alternative perspectives arises. Yet, there does not seem to 
be many promising options here, as discussed previously. Many of the options 
put forth are mostly focusing on the immediate interaction of the researcher and 
the ‘religious insiders’ and thus they are either not applicable at all or not really 
successful in fields of research which have a different kind of focus. Dialogism 
and role-neutrality with their focus on the cultural-social context and the positional 
relationship of the different interacting parties are the obvious examples here.  
                                                                          
235  Most of the examples I rely on in the third chapter (especially see section 3.1.) are typically 




This leaves us with methodological agnosticism as the only potential option 
to evaluate. From an agnostic point of view one would obviously have to abandon 
the atheistically inclined questions and research premises that typically appear in 
the works of cognitivists as explanations why religion is an evolutionarily 
interesting and puzzling phenomenon. As noted, one should be able to do 
narrowly defined empirical research just fine. The problematic part of metho-
dological agnosticism emerges when one tries to derive generalizations from 
these specific studies. As noted earlier in this chapter, methodological agnosticism 
comes with two major problems: first, is it really possible to maintain it con-
sistently, and secondly, whether we can actually develop generalizations while 
positioning ourselves in such a way. The first one is quite debatable and in the 
discussion here I have relied on a more ‘generous’ approach to this issue, 
assuming that it is possible to at least come close to maintaining a consistently 
agnostic position. However, it is the second one that becomes an issue here, if 
one really emphasizes the pursuit of generalized theories. In short it would appear 
that cognitive science of religion pursued from the position of methodological 
agnosticism can be done and would not require any kind of major overhaul of the 
regular empirical research practices, but it would require researchers to rethink 
the reasons for their studies236 and furthermore, it would necessitate the kind of 
research approach which does not attempt to present all-encompassing explanatory 
theories of religiosity, but rather indeed focuses on the ‘piecemeal fashion’ 
research that many often emphasize. As such, cognitivist research on religion 
done from an agnostic position would come with a more explicit acknowledge-
ment that any kind of generalized theories we propose come with inevitable and 
influential premises about epistemological issues we cannot (as things stand right 
now) test, evaluate or solve empirically. Obviously, this is not really an entirely 
satisfying option for the cognitivist researcher, but this would appear to be the 
best one out of all the options which do try to avoid the (epistemological and 
other) problems of methodological naturalism. 
In comparison, things appear quite a bit more complicated for the costly 
signalling approach. As I showed earlier in the third chapter,237 epistemological 
costliness lies at the centre of this theory and it is not possible to argue in favour 
of any specific interpretation of the available data from the perspective of costly 
signalling without assumptions what the ‘currency’ of foraging is and thus what 
is ‘optimal behaviour’. The costly signalling approach follows classical eco-
logical paradigm and measures that currency strictly materialistically, thus ending 
up with the kind of analysis that by design assumes religious beliefs to be 
‘suboptimal’ (at least as far as their adequacy as descriptions and interpretations 
of the world is concerned). I do not think that this problem can be generalized to 
the ecological approach as a whole, but this is certainly an unavoidable issue in 
the context of the costly signalling. Potentially one could even argue that this 
                                                                          
236  Descriptions like „we study why people believe misleading things?“ obviously are un-
acceptable from an agnostic point of view. 
237  To be more specific: see sections 3.2.2. and 3.2.3. 
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might go so far as to become an issue even in the context of specific research 
projects – in contrast to the dominantly experiment-based research of the cognitive 
science of religion, the costly signalling approach relies a lot on anthropological 
fieldwork – but this would require a case by case analysis of all the specific 
instances. Still, epistemological presumptions are here far more central to the 
approach as a whole than they are to the cognitive science of religion and since it 
is misleading to conceive of empirical data/results and theoretical premises and 
conclusions as separate,238 one cannot claim to have empirical data about the 
costliness and signalling aspects of religiosity without already relying on some 
central theoretical tenets.  
As one might expect, this also complicated the possibility of pursuing this kind 
of research from perspectives other than that of methodological naturalism. 
Predictably, role-neutrality and the dialogical position remain inadequate due to the 
same reasons as they are inadequate as alternatives for pursuing a cognitivist 
approach. But it is also doubtful whether methodological agnosticism could be 
properly applied or not. After all, epistemological presumptions that the costly 
signalling approach relies on are specifically the kind of things methodological 
agnosticism deliberately wants to avoid. This something a few commentators have 
also pointed out in their criticism of the costly signalling approach (Murray, Moore 
2009). They also note the issue of epistemological and practical costs and they have 
argued that the advocates of the costly signalling approach have not shown the 
existence of the minimal requirements necessary for the emergence of costly 
signalling (Murray, Moore 2009: 231–239). Therefore, they argue in favour of 
seeing religion as a case of honest, index signalling (Murray, Moore 2009: 239–
242) and thus one does not need to delve into the whole issue of costliness 
(including epistemological costliness). But this does not so much solve the problem 
costly signalling theory faces as it tries to develop an alternative, even if closely 
related, theory of religion. Religion as index signalling is likely more compatible 
with methodological agnosticism, but that still leaves us with the problem that 
costly signalling as a theory is likely only compatible with methodological 
naturalism (at least from the options available to us right now). Perhaps the 
behavioural-ecological approach as a whole can avoid this kind of problems,239 but 
this is certainly concerning about the costly signalling approach as such. 
Looking further one could certainly also find many more interesting cases to 
analyse. For example, the ‘big gods’ approach of Norenzayan (2013, 2015) would 
offer an intriguing and complicated problem, since it is trying to develop a unified 
theory that grows out of all the notable approaches and theories in existence. And 
even though most of those are very much relying on methodological naturalism, 
this is not necessarily universally so. After all, Norenzayan is not just relying on 
evolutionary research, he is also looking into archaeology and other relevant 
                                                                          
238  This is something I discussed earlier in section 2.2. 
239  And yes, I would call it a problem, if a theory of religion requires specific epistemological 




fields to tie his approach to the study of prehistorical times in general and I would 
hypothesize that these are not nearly as explicitly reliant on methodological 
naturalism as evolutionary research programmes are. Elsewhere one could also 
analyse Harvey Whitehouse’s theory of the modes of religiosity (Whitehouse 
2002, 2004a, 2004b). In this case there are good reasons to think that White-
house’s approach might be more compatible with methodological agnosticism 
than any of the approaches I have evaluated here thus far. After all, it is different 
from others because it is not trying to determine the ‘ultimate causes of the 
appearance or/and existence of religion’ as it is interesting in finding out the 
cognitive functionalities that enable the kind of cognitive processing which we 
would describe as ‘religious’. As such it is a more specifically focused theory and 
thus I find it more compatible with methodological agnosticism than any of the 
ones I have discussed thus far. Compatibility with role-neutrality and the 
dialogical perspective is just as unlikely and problematic as with all the other 
ecological and cognitive approaches though. 
But on top of the examples I have discussed here one should also not forget 
the important conclusion I pointed out in my discussion of underdetermination 
and its relevance for this topic. Even if some research programmes need to 
definitely rely on methodological naturalism just to ‘get off the ground’ by 
specifying one’s research question, research object and research method(ologie)s, 
then most of the research started naturalistically is empirically too underdetermined 
to rule out alternative interpretations post factum. And thus even if one or another 
research approach in the cognitive or ecological study of religion needs 
naturalistic premises to specify its research, its eventual results can be most of the 
time interpreted in many different ways, thus enabling many different theoretical 
conclusions. 
In any case, what I hope to have shown here is the complexity of the situation. 
This indicates very clearly that we cannot simply insist on one or another position 
in general without detailed analysis of the specifics of research programmes. 
Furthermore, as good and as applicable possible alternative positioning options 
might be elsewhere, none of them are universally and easily applicable in the 
context of the ecological and cognitive sciences of religion. Here of course one 
could argue that if studying religion is not possible from the epistemologically 
favourable position, then that kind of an approach or a research programme 
cannot be justified at all or at least it is inherently problematic and thus perhaps 
it should not be taken as seriously as those which are more compatible with the 
position found epistemologically favourable (whichever that might be). This is 
an approach I do not support – some kind of research, even if problematic and 
arguable, is still better than no research at all or even a general dismissal of all 
existing research. Yet, if possible, a more justifiable position should be preferred 
and this is why I also think that cognitivist as well as ecological scholars should 
look for ways how to rely on atheistic presumptions as little as possible. As noted, 
it is likely that some evolutionary research is not really possible without the 
problematic and epistemologically weak premises of methodological naturalism, 
but even so, it is possible to manage without such premises in many situations. 
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Knowledge acquired by relying on methodological naturalism or methodological 
agnosticism is likely reciprocally translatable without major losses or difficulties 
and thus one ought to prefer the position which is better in sync with the greater 
goals and ideals of the study of religion as a whole. 
 
 
7.5. Preferable positioning as the compromise or  
balance of goals as possibilities? 
By now it has hopefully become glaringly obvious that I do not consider any of 
the suggested options generally satisfying for the study of religion. They all 
wrestle with the unobtainable goal of objectivity and since that is not feasible, 
scholars look how to build their research on a foundation as reliable as possible. 
As I have shown, this can be approached in different ways. It is specifically the 
full extent and diversity of all the research approaches that complicates matters 
for anyone who tries to look for a unifying, shared position for the study of 
religion in general. As emphasized, epistemological virtues are not worth much 
without actual applicability. Some kind of research – even if in some aspects 
problematic – is still better than no research at all and because of this one needs 
to look for the best compromise available. Overall it could be said that the 
position everybody seem to be looking for would be as objective as possible, yet 
as conscious of our inevitable limitations as possible, while still maximizing our 
abilities to learn things about the world around us. Unfortunately, as things stand 
right now it would appear that there is no clear favourite, no clearly ‘preferable 
candidate’ we could apply in all the research approaches.  
This brings me back to the issue I raised in the sixth chapter – is it possible to 
determine or establish a shared foundation for the study of religion as a discipline? 
There I analysed some of the attempts to conceptualize ideals of scientificity as 
the foundations of the discipline, yet also pointed out numerous reasons why this 
has not been as successful as some have hoped. All in all, it became apparent that 
there is no easy way to conceptualize foundations of scientificity for the study of 
religion and thus depict that as the shared basis of all research. As exemplified 
through the case of ‘religion’, not much attention has been paid to working out 
proper translations of the scholarly conceptual tools. Instead, most of the time 
they are simply adopted in the way most convenient for the goals and methods of 
the approach at hand. A similar situation also surfaces in the analysis of positioning 
and the options available for scholars of religion. There as well adopting any of the 
advocated options as normatively mandatory would cause serious problems for 
some of the subdisciplines. Hence, it would seem that the study of religion is facing 
inevitable fragmentation into divergent research perspectives that rely on different 
understandings of scientificity, the position of the scholar, the acceptability and 
unacceptability of presumptions, goals, perspectives, methods and so on.  
However, if that were indeed the case, then why has it not happened already? 
How come do these diverging perspectives still see themselves as working 
towards a similar goal – and thus oftentimes consider each other as competitors? 
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After all, if they did not see themselves as working towards the same goal and 
contributing to the study of the same supposed object of study, then there would 
be no essential need to take others’ research into account (at least no more than 
people take existing research in other ‘neighbouring fields’ into account anyway) 
or show why others should take their research into account. But the fact that all 
sides of this ‘debate’ are indeed paying very much attention to this, does show 
that this idea of the shared goal does continue to have relevance. Also, the 
existence of diverse research approaches is not a new thing. Most of the research 
approaches in existence today have histories going back more than half a century 
and one could easily point to earlier research approaches which have faded 
away240 to counter the argument of new approaches making the field more diverse 
than it was during earlier times. Of course, it could be that earlier developments 
have just been so slow that the fragmentation is only now really beginning to take 
visible shape, but I find such an argument too speculative to be particularly 
convincing.241 Furthermore, as noted, even if proposed perspectives are at times 
very different, none of them are really dismissing whole research approaches in 
general. Whether we look at conceptualizations of scientificity or positioning, 
they are all still trying to account for everything, from hermeneutics to neuro-
logical experimentation. And perhaps even more significantly – they are sticking 
to the same conceptual toolbox. There is no inherently inevitably reason why all 
these diverging research approaches should keep using the same basic conceptual 
tools, but for the most part they indeed have done just that. This is very well 
exemplified through the continuous insistence that it is indeed ‘religion’ that 
everybody is after, even though they might be conceptualizing and operationalizing 
that term in noticeably different ways. 
This is why I find it unlikely that a complete divergence and fragmentation 
would really take place. As long as all the involved parties continue to understand 
each other as essentially studying the same phenomenon and as long as everybody 
continues to accept the existence and legitimacy of other research approaches 
(even if they would like to reform them in one way or another if given the 
opportunity), there will always remain some kind of a shared foundation for the 
discipline overall. However, this is clearly not the kind of foundation advocates 
of one or another kind of scientificity have in mind when they try to establish a 
clear foundation for the discipline, nor is it the kind of foundation Gavin Flood 
(1999: 4–8) had in mind when he insisted on the need for a solid metatheoretical 
foundation. It is a far more loosely envisioned foundation, one more reliant on a 
shared understanding of the end goal of all research and the ideal way of getting 
there than on anything more concrete than that. Furthermore, such goals of 
completion are oftentimes the very reasons that lead many scholars to look for 
answers in other disciplines, thus sometimes eventually bringing about the 
development of a separate subdiscipline (or simply the attempt to incorporate 
                                                                          
240  For example, phenomenology of religion in its classical (all-encompassing) form is no 
longer practiced any more. 
241  One would need to come up with very strong empirically founded arguments to claim that. 
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methods and ideas of another discipline into one’s own). Underdetermination of 
all and any more ambitious theories will also continue to trouble the discipline as 
there does not seem to be a position that we could generally utilize in such a way 
that would not leave proposed theories inevitably open to theoretically possible 
alternatives. Because of that different research approaches will also continue to 
behave as competitors, even when they are clearly and explicitly reliant on each 
other.  
Now, if so, does it even make sense to look for a way of self-positioning that 
is epistemologically justifiable and consistent with the ideals of the disciplinary 
activity? I think it does make sense. If the only shared foundation we can agree 
on – and which does not require abandoning significant parts of current research 
activities – has to do with conceptual tools, disciplinary ideals and visions of the 
final goal, then conceptualizations of the position of the scholar could also begin 
to function as one of those shared ideals that we try to achieve, even if they might 
be almost unobtainable. Of course, as noted, ideally scholars of religion would 
prefer to be objective. But in our actual situation scholars try to look for a position 
that comes closest to the epistemological ideals and practical applicability, all the 
while taking the inherent human limitations into account in the best possible way. 
It will still remain just an ideal, but not such an ideal which one cannot even get 
close to. 
Here I think if one tries to make an argument in favour of any of the 
possibilities at all, then it should be methodological agnosticism. It does not come 
with the severe problems of application the dialogical position and neutrality face 
in research approaches, which do not focus on a specific group of people and their 
self-conceptions. At the same time, it also does not come with the problematic 
premises of methodological naturalism. Its major weakness is its epistemological 
applicability – whether we can really consistently maintain an agnostic stance. 
Discussions of this and theories developed thus far certainly indicate that it is not 
possible to develop theories and explanations of religion while remaining a 
methodological agnostic. However, as noted earlier, this could be possible as far 
as description and interpretation is concerned. Furthermore, as also noted in 
section 7.4., in many parts of the evolutionary and cognitive research, there is no 
inevitable need for naturalistic premises and some of that research could be 
developed from the perspective of methodological agnosticism just as well. Of 
course, presented in such a way this argument in favour of methodological 
agnosticism is certainly not particularly strong. But it does come closest to the 
prevalent, implicit goals of the study of religion all the while maintaining basic 
epistemological credibility and practical applicability. Yet, even in this form, it 
is at best a rather modest argument. In all likelihood practitioners of different 
research approaches will continue to pursue their projects from the position they 
find useful within the more specific context of their own research approach and 
there is certainly no good argument to justify any kind of top-down enforcement 




In this thesis I have dealt with the issue of self-positioning in the context of the 
study of religion and as it relates to the contemporary behavioural and cognitive 
evolutionary sciences of religion. I have concentrated on its place in the larger 
issue of methodology and highlighted its relationship to the debate over the nature 
of scientificity. In addition, I have extensively discussed various arguments 
presented to justify methodological naturalism. I have also focused on a couple 
of ways how one can present equally credible alternatives to the naturalistic per-
spective. I concluded all of this with a critical and comparative evaluation of the 
positioning options available for a scholar of religion and assessed the applic-
ability and justifiability of methodological naturalism as well as that of three 
alternative possibilities. To close this complex topic, I will here sum up my six 
main conclusions. 
First, in my critical assessment of the discussions over method(ology) as one 
can find these in the study of religion, I have shown how it would make more 
sense to talk of three distinctly different dimensions in matters of methodology. 
This way it is possible to distinguish between procedural practices, research 
approaches and self-positioning, instead of trying to establish a clear difference 
between method and methodology and thus ignoring the whole methodological 
debate about positioning in the process (or trying to portray it as methodology 
analogously to, say, participant observation or experimentation).  
Secondly, I have shown why arguments in defence of methodological 
naturalism are in fact much weaker than claimed. Furthermore, these arguments 
are also incapable of excluding possible alternatives. Instead of any epistemo-
logical strengths, the strengths of methodological naturalism appear to be in its 
applicability – it is easy to specify research problems, study those problems and 
offer general explanations for them from the perspective of methodological 
naturalism. At the same time, possible alternatives are not capable of all that 
within the limitations they have set themselves (however, see also the fourth 
conclusion below concerning this). 
Thirdly, I have shown the immediate relevance of evolutionary epistemology 
for the debate over methodological naturalism, especially in relation to the 
possibility of alternatives. As exemplified, discussions in evolutionary epistemo-
logy have shown how one cannot conclusively link the theory of evolution to any 
specific philosophical position and thus naturalism is no more privileged or 
preferable as an epistemological position in evolutionary research than any other 
position. Furthermore, I showed how evolutionary theory enables justifying a 
position diametrically opposed to methodological naturalism, which is just as 
defendable as methodological naturalism (but also just as weak in some aspects). 
Fourthly, I have shown the relevance of underdetermination for the positioning 
debate as it takes place in the study of religion as it is discussed in the philosophy 
of science. Here the perspective of empirical equivalence can show how metho-
dological naturalism can be more applicable in formulating research questions 
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and research projects, but due to the underdetermination of its empirical research, 
it is perfectly possible for competitors to rely on most of the results developed 
naturalistically to defend alternative positions. This also means that theoretically 
possible alternatives are not as completely inapplicable as it might at first seem. 
Fifthly, even though study of religion would appear to be fragmenting more 
and more into distinctly separate research approaches and thus it would seem to 
be rather questionable whether there is even any possibility or need for discussing 
the position of the scholar in general, a closer look does reveal its continuing 
relevance. The reason for this grows out of the continuing dialogue and desire to 
establish a general, unified understanding of religion as it is visible in the dis-
ciplinary discussions concerning religion. Therefore, for the purposes of striving 
towards that idealized goal, it is necessary to maintain positional compatibility 
between different approaches and thus look for the favourable position. 
Sixthly, in my comparative evaluations of methodological naturalism and its 
more noteworthy alternatives I have shown why none of the positions can really 
claim to be generally more preferable than all other positions. All of them have 
their strengths and weaknesses, depending on the specific research approach one 
intends to follow. Still, it could be said that one of them is perhaps somewhat better 
off when comparing justifiability and applicability – particularly in the context of 
evolutionary studies on religion. As I have shown, methodological naturalism is 
not the only evolutionarily consistent position here and as highlighted, most of the 
specific research questions as they are pursued in behavioural and cognitive 
research, can be pursued from the perspective of methodological agnosticism as 
well. Quite significantly, methodological agnosticism makes it possible to avoid 
the more problematic premises of methodological naturalism. Therefore, even if 
methodological agnosticism in its ideal form is not feasible in all aspects of 
research for humans due to our inherent limitations, even the possibility of 
applying it in a form coming relatively close to the ideal still enables epistemologi-
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Uurijat positsioneerides: epistemoloogilised ja metodoloogilised 
küsimuseasetused evolutsioonilises religiooniuurimises 
Käesoleva doktoritöö põhiküsimuseks on religiooniuurija positsioon kui selline. 
Tegu on komplitseeritud probleemiga, kus saavad kokku metodoloogilised ja 
epistemoloogilised küsimused. Lihtsustatult võiks öelda, et positsioneerimise 
teema on küsimus sellest, kes uurija on või saab olla seoses uuritavaga? Kuivõrd 
on uurijal võimalik jääda neutraalseks, teaduslikuks kõrvalseisjaks? Kuivõrd on 
ta paratamatult osa uurimisväljast või peab uurimisvälja osaks eduka uurimis-
tegevuse nimel saama? Aimatavalt pole sellisele küsimusele sugugi lihtne vastata, 
nõnda kombineerib ka siinne uurimistöö vägagi erinevate teadusalade ja 
lähenemisviiside käsitlusi ja järeldusi. Siinse doktoritöö raames olen sellele küsi-
muse keskendunud spetsiifilisemalt kognitiivsete ja käitumisökoloogiliste 
religiooniteaduste raames. Neis uurimisvaldkondades on viimastel kümnendil 
väga jõuliselt argumenteeritud metodoloogilise naturalismi kasuks, mida nähakse 
kõige õigema viisina, kuidas uurija peaks ennast positsioneerima uuritava suhtes. 
Siinses doktoritöös ongi põhirõhk metodoloogilise naturalismi õigustatavuse 
hindamisel ning võimalike alternatiivide võrdleval analüüsil. Selline küsimuse-
püstitus tingib ka vajaduse integreerida uurimistöösse arutlusi mitmesugustest 
erinevatest teadusaladest, sh ka näiteks evolutsioonilisest bioloogiast, teadus-
filosoofiast ja evolutsioonilisest epistemoloogiast. 
Ülesehituslikult on töö jaotatud kolme osa ning seitsme sisupeatüki vahel. 
Esimeses sisupeatükis annan ma ülevaate peamistest uurimissuundadest ja 
lähenemisviisidest evolutsioonilistes religiooniteadustes. Neid uurimisvaldkondi 
iseloomustab soov vaadelda religiooni kui nähtust üldistatuna ja seejuures lähtudes 
evolutsiooniteoreetilisest paradigmast. Kognitiivne religiooniteadus pöörab see-
tõttu eriti tähelepanu inimreligioossuse kognitiivsetele alusmehhanismidele ja 
seega sellele, kuidas üks või teine mehhanism tingib inimese kalduvuse mõelda 
ühest või teisest asjast just mingil konkreetsel viisil, mitte kuidas iganes. Käitumis-
ökoloogiline religiooniteadus samal ajal vaatleb religioossust pigem käitumise 
pinnalt, kuivõrd just meie valikud toimimises on need asjad, mis hakkavad mõju-
tama evolutsioonilist valikut. Sellest tulenevalt on põhirõhk palju olulisemalt ka 
rituaalsetel praktikatel ja nende rollil evolutsioonilises valikuprotsessis. Sellele 
lisaks tõstan esile nn biokultuurilise perspektiivi, kus pööratakse eelnevatest palju 
enam tähelepanu kultuurilisuse rollile evolutsioonilises arengus ja seejuures eriti 
viisidele, kuidas kultuurilisus võib mõjutada inimese bioloogilis-kognitiivset 
evolutsioonilist arengut. Viimaks osutan mõningatele katsetele arendada välja 
lähenemisi, mis kombineeriksid kõik eelmainitud üheks tervikuks. 
Ühtlasi pööran esimeses peatükis oluliselt tähelepanu sellele, kuidas evolut-
sioonilistes religiooniteadustes on mõistetud teadustöö teaduslikkuse küsimust 
ehk teisisõnu, mis kriteeriumid peavad olema täidetud selleks, et üht või teist 
uurimistööd pidada igas mõttes teaduslikuks? Mis on teaduslikkuse kõige 
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olulisemad tunnused? Toon välja viisi, kuidas evolutsioonilistes lähenemistes 
seostatakse teaduslikkust eelkõige eksperimentaalsete loodusteaduste kui teadus-
likkuse ideaalidega ning mõistetakse igasugust muud tegevust vähemteaduslikuna. 
Eriti kriitilised ollakse seetõttu mõistagi igasugusele hermeneutikale ja tõlgenda-
misele tugineva humanitaarteaduse suhtes, leides, et niisugused valdkonnad 
saavad olla teaduslikud ainult niivõrd, kui nad suudavad sisuliselt suhestuda 
loodusteaduslike meetoditega ja neid ka enda tegevusse integreerida. Võrdlevalt 
osutan selles punktis asjaolule, et varasemalt leidub religiooniuuringutes ka teisi 
viise, kuidas religioonialase uurimistöö teaduslikkust on mõistetud, osutades 
varasemate arusaamade ja selle uuema suuna sarnasustele ja erinevustele. 
Teises peatükis esitan süstemaatilise ülevaate meetodi/metodoloogia teemast 
religiooniuuringute kontekstis. Põhjaliku ülevaate toel näitan, kuidas mõisted 
meetod ja metodoloogia on religiooniuuringute kontekstis tähendanud vägagi eri-
nevaid asju ning ühes kontekstis ’meetodiks’ peetav võib tihtipeale teises kon-
tekstis olla ’metodoloogia’ ja vastupidi. Nõnda on meetodiks ja/või metodo-
loogiaks religiooniuuringute kontekstis peetud kõike spetsiifilistest protseduuri-
listest tehnikatest üldiste uurimisvaldkondadeni (nt võidakse rääkida ’religiooni-
sotsioloogia meetodist’). Kõigele eelnevale lisaks räägitakse ka enesepositsio-
neerimise temaatikast tüüpiliselt metodoloogia kontseptuaalse sõnavara raames, 
olgu siis jutt metodoloogiliselt naturalismist, metodoloogilisest agnostitsismist 
või muust. Niisuguse mitmekesisusega toime tulemiseks pakkusin välja kolme-
dimensionaalse mudeli, mis võimaldab eristada rangetele reeglitele tuginevaid 
praktikaid (nt eksperiment, faktoranalüüs vms), teaduslikke lähenemisviise 
üldisemas mõttes (nt hermeneutika, diskursuseanalüüs, strukturalism või ajalugu) 
ning enesepositsioneerimisi (nt metodoloogiline naturalism). Igas konkreetses 
uurimisprojektis esinevad alati kõik kolm dimensiooni korraga, moodustades 
erineva kombinatsioone. Näiteks võivad üheskoos toimida kognitiivne religiooni-
teadus lähenemisviisina, metodoloogiline naturalism positsioonilise valikuna 
ning eksperiment protseduurilise tegevusena. Teisal aga võivad kombineeruda 
dialoogiline enesepositsioneerimine, osalusvaatlusepõhine välitöö ning dis-
kursuseanalüüs selle mõiste kitsamas, protseduurilisemas tähenduses. Suures 
plaanis ei ole aga see kolmikjaotus mõeldud kirjeldusena sellest „kuidas asjad 
päriselt on“, vaid üksnes praktiliselt kasuliku viisina, kuidas struktureeritumalt 
mõelda sellest metodoloogilisest kirevusest, mida religiooniuuringutes leida 
võib. Väga oluline on tähele panna, et niiviisi on võimalik välja tuua asjaolud, 
miks positsioneerimise küsimuse puhul on tegu selgelt eristuva aspektiga iga-
suguses religiooniuuringulises teadustöös ning just see eristus on keskselt oluline 
ka järgneva arutelu raames. 
Doktoritöö teise osa kolmes peatükis (st doktoritöö kolmandas, neljandas ja 
viiendas peatükis) keskendungi metodoloogilise naturalismi põhjalikumale ana-
lüüsile, vaatlemaks selle kasuks esitatud argumentide tugevust, kui ka võimalust 
esitada alternatiivseid positsioone, mis lähtuksid samadest alustest. Selleks 
vaatlen kolmandas peatükis kõigepealt kõiki argumente, mida on religioossete 
uskumuste tõesuse võimalikkuse vastu esitatud evolutsioonilise religiooniteaduse 
perspektiivist. Osutan tervele reale asjaoludele, mispärast ei saa ühtegi neist 
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pidada kuidagi märkimisväärselt õnnestunuks ning miks seetõttu ei ole praeguse 
uurimisseisu puhul põhjust arvata, et evolutsioonilise uurimistöö pinnalt oleks 
võimalik midagi väita uskumuste endi tõesuse kohta. Ühtlasi vaatlen kolmandas 
peatükis lähemalt religioossete uskumuste kulukuse argumentatsiooni, nii nagu 
see evolutsioonilistes religiooniteadustes on tuginedes evolutsioonilisele bio-
loogiale välja arendatud. Lähemalt analüüsin seejuures tervet rida argumente, mis 
on esitatud õigustamaks metodoloogilist naturalismi kui väidetavalt ainukest 
võimalikku enesepositsioneerimise varianti, mis teaduslikus ja evolutsioonilises 
kontekstis õigustatav on. Analüüsi käigus näitan, kuidas need argumendid pole 
sugugi nii veenvad, kui väidetakse ning kuidas igaühega neist kaasnevad 
märkimisväärsed probleemid, või siis toimib mõni argument ainult tuginedes 
täiendavatele eeldustele. Üldiselt osutab esitatud analüüs tervikuna sellele, kuidas 
metodoloogiline naturalism ei ole sugugi nii selgelt õigustatav positsioon, kui 
eriti näiteks kognitiivse religiooniteaduse esindajad on väitnud. 
Töö neljandas peatükis käsitlen lähemalt evolutsioonilise epistemoloogia 
uurimisvaldkonda ning näitan, kuidas see on väga oluline siinse diskusiooni 
raames. Nimelt on üheks metodoloogilise naturalismi õigustajate keskseks argu-
mendiks väide, et ainult metodoloogiline naturalism on kooskõlas nende filo-
soofilis-epistemoloogiliste eeldustega, mis evolutsiooniteooriast paratamatult tule-
nevad. Evolutsioonilise epistemoloogia valdkonnas on aga just selliste küsi-
mustega suure põhjalikkusega tegelenud. Põhjaliku analüüsi abil näitan, kuidas 
evolutsioonilise epistemoloogia alaste uurimiste tulemusena on siiski ilmnenud, 
et evolutsiooniteooriast ei saa kuidagi tuletada argumente ühegi konkreetse 
filosoofilise positsiooni kaitseks. Või siis vastupidi – samavõrd edukaid argumente 
on võimalik tuletada kõigi positsioonide kaitseks. Selle tõdemuse näitlikusta-
miseks esitan detailse skeemi sellest, kuidas oleks võimalik kaitsta ka metodo-
loogilise supernaturalismi positsiooni viisil, mis on samuti evolutsiooniteooriaga 
igati kooskõlas.  
Ometi tekib sellises punktis küsimus, kas niisugusest positsioonist lähtudes on 
empiiriline uurimistöö üldse võimalik on ning selle küsimuse ilmestamiseks 
pöördungi ma töö järgmises, viiendas, peatükis lähemalt teadustegevuse empiirilise 
alamääratuse küsimuse juurde, nii nagu seda on ulatuslikult analüüsitud teadus-
filosoofias. Selle käsitluse raames osutan asjaoludele, miks on erinevatest posit-
sioonidest lähtuvaid religioonialaseid käsitlusi võimalik vaadelda empiiriliselt 
ekvivalentsete uurimisperspektiividena, mistõttu on suurt osa naturalistlikult 
perspektiivist läbi viidud uurimismaterjalist võimalik ühtlasi käsitleda ka tugi-
nedes oluliselt teistsugustele positsioonidele. Asjaolu, et uurimistöö on läbi viidud 
lähtudes ühest positsioonist, ei välista omandatud empiirilise materjali tõlgen-
damist lähtuvalt mõnest muust positsioonist just alamääratuse ja empiirilise 
ekvivalentsuse tõttu. 
Töö kolmandas osas (ehk kuuendas ja seitsmendas peatükis) võtan eelnevad 
asjaolud kokku ning vaatlen võrdlevalt positsioneerimise küsimust kui sellist. 
Määratlemaks selgemalt, millisest erialasest alusest lähtuvalt peaks võrdluse läbi 
viima, käsitlen kuuendas peatükis küsimust sellest, kas religiooniuuringuid üldsegi 
on vaadeldud või saab vaadelda piisavalt ühtse ja koherentse uurimisala/ 
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distsipliinina, rääkimaks religiooniuurija positsioonist kui milleski üldisest. Välja 
toodud küsimuse lähema analüüsi abil osutan põhjustele, miks see on endiselt 
õigustatav, tulenedes peamiselt asjaolust, et kui ka kõiges muus võidakse oluliselt 
erineda, mõistetakse erineva lähenemisega uurijaid tegelemas sama uurimis-
objektiga ja selliselt tajutakse üksteist ka konkureerivate lähenemisviisidena, siis 
järelikult on õigustatav arutleda ka religiooniuurija positsiooni üle üleüldiselt. 
Töö seitsmes peatükk ongi pühendatud sellekohasele võrdlusele, vaatlemaks 
metodoloogilist naturalismi ühe võimaliku variandina uurija enesepositsioneeri-
misel. Võimalike alternatiividena tõstan esile metodoloogilist agnostitsismi, neut-
raalsust ning dialoogilist perspektiivi. Toon välja igaühe tugevused ja nõrkused 
ning näitan, kuidas ükski neist neljast ei saa apelleerida üleüldisele eelistatavusele 
kõigis religiooniuurimise valdkondades. Igaüks neist sobitub kokku mingi(te) 
lähenemisviisi(de)ga kõige paremini, ent mitte millistega iganes üleüldiselt. Küll 
aga osutan ühtlasi asjaolule, et suur osa evolutsioonilisest uurimistööst ei pea üldse 
tingimata tuginema neile probleemsetele epistemoloogilistele eeldustele, mis on 
metodoloogilise naturalismi aluseks ja seega oleks mõttekam niisugust uurimis-
tööd läbi viia pigem lähtudes metodoloogilisest agnostitsismist, millel on küll 
omad probleemid, ent need pole päris nii põhimõttelised, kui metodoloogilise 
naturalismi ateistlikud eeldused. 
Üldistatult toon kokkuvõttes välja kuus peamist järeldust, mida kõige eelneva 
pealt saab teha. Esiteks, kogu metodoloogilist kirevust oleks mõttekam vaadelda 
kolme eristuva ent üksteisega läbi põimunud dimensiooni raames. Teiseks, epi-
stemoloogilised argumendid metodoloogilise naturalismi kasuks on tegelikult 
palju nõrgemad, kui on väidetud ning praktikas on ainukene tugev argument 
metodoloogilise naturalismi kasuks tema kerge rakendatavus praktiliste uurimis-
projektide läbi viimiseks ja konkreetsete uurimisküsimuste käsitlemiseks. Ent ka 
see on asjaolu, millega kaasnevad mõningad „agad“ (vt neljas järeldus allpool).  
Kolmandaks saab selgeks evolutsioonilise epistemoloogia olulisus niisuguse 
debati tarvis, kuivõrd evolutsioonilise epistemoloogia abiga on võimalik näidata, 
miks ei ole evolutsiooniline uurimistöö kuidagi paratamatult seotud ühegi konk-
reetse filosoofilise positsiooniga. Neljandaks ilmestab alamääratuse teesi rakenda-
mine eredalt seda, kuidas metodoloogilise naturalismi vaatenurgast läbi viidud 
uurimistöö võib küll kergesti võimaldada uurimisprojektide määratlemist ja läbi 
viimist, ent ühtlasi ei kohusta see omandatud empiirilisi andmeid tingimata tõlgen-
dama naturalistlikult, jäädes avatuks alternatiivsetele võimalustele. Viiendaks 
olen osutanud sellele, kuidas hoolimata näiliselt süvenevast killustumisest seob 
ühtne arusaam religioonist kui kõigi uurimislähenemiste ühisest objektist endiselt 
kõiksugu erinevad religiooniuurimuslikud uurimisvaldkonnad kokku. Kuuendaks 
ja viimaseks olen näidanud, miks ei saa ühtegi positsioneerimisvarianti pidada 
teistest selgelt eelistatumaks kõigis uurimisviisides. Pigem võib rääkida igaühe 
tugevustest ja nõrkustest, olenevalt spetsiifilisest olukorrast, küll aga on ilmneb 
metodoloogiline agnostitsism positsioonina, mille raames on ka võimalik läbi 
viia suurt osa evolutsioonilisest religiooniuurimisest, ent ühtlasi siis ka viisil, mis 
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